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The US Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) oversight of the oral anticoagulant dabigatran (Pradaxa) raises questions about the agency’s reliability, according to a report by the Project On Government Oversight (POGO).
POGO’s report describes a series of “questionable” calls the FDA has made in its oversight of dabigatran.
The report calls attention to issues with the clinical trial used to support dabigatran’s approval.
It also details concerns regarding FDA advisory committee members, the distribution of potentially misleading information about dabigatran, the possibility that patients receiving dabigatran may actually need to be monitored, and other issues.
“The deeply disturbing part is that the public has to trust the FDA to keep it safe, and the way the agency handled Pradaxa doesn’t inspire confidence,” said Daniel Brian, POGO’s executive director.
This is not the first time the safety of dabigatran and results of dabigatran trials have been called into question.
Following post-marketing reports of adverse events and deaths related to dabigatran, the FDA conducted its own studies investigating the drug’s safety. The agency ultimately concluded that dabigatran’s benefits outweigh any detriments.
Still, a paper published in JAMA in 2012 suggested the FDA may have approved dabigatran too soon.
And several papers published in The BMJ last year indicated that Boehringer Ingelheim, the company developing dabigatran, underreported events associated with the drug and withheld data showing that monitoring and dose adjustment could improve the safety of dabigatran without compromising its efficacy.
The company has denied these allegations, but POGO’s report appears to support these claims, in addition to raising other concerns.
Trial issues
Dabigatran was initially approved by the FDA in 2010 on the basis of the RE-LY trial, in which researchers compared dabigatran and warfarin.
POGO’s report notes that this was an unblinded trial and suggests that investigators treated patients in the dabigatran arm differently than those in the warfarin arm. An FDA review showed that, when study subjects showed “signs of trouble,” those in the dabigatran arm were more likely to stop receiving treatment. This may have prevented adverse events such as hemorrhagic strokes.
FDA inspections also revealed that RE-LY investigators mismanaged parts of the trial. For example, they enrolled patients who were supposed to be excluded and failed to promptly inform Boehringer Ingelheim about possible adverse effects of dabigatran, among other infractions.
POGO’s report also cites FDA documents showing that the agency allowed Boehringer Ingelheim to finalize the scoring system for the RE-LY trial after it was over and the data had been gathered. A subsequent FDA review suggested that this allowance worked in dabigatran’s favor.
Advisory committee concerns
POGO’s report points out that members of the committee that advised the FDA on dabigatran’s approval have financial ties to the drug’s maker.
According to public databases, 2 of the advisory committee members who voted to approve dabigatran went on to receive tens of thousands of dollars from Boehringer Ingelheim.
POGO also found that when Boehringer Ingelheim held a practice session to prepare for questioning by the FDA advisory committee, a former member and a former chairman of that committee were paid to play roles in the rehearsal.
‘Misleading’ information
Another of POGO’s concerns is that the FDA redacted information from a public memo announcing and explaining its decision to approve dabigatran. The deleted section said that patients who were well-treated using warfarin had no reason to switch to dabigatran.
POGO’s report also points out that the FDA initially refused to allow Boehringer Ingelheim to claim that dabigatran was superior to warfarin but later changed its mind without providing much explanation.
In addition, the FDA allowed Boehringer Ingelheim to advertise that, in a clinical trial, dabigatran “reduced stroke risk 35% more than warfarin.” But after dabigatran had been on the market for more than 2.5 years, the FDA decided this claim was misleading.
The agency told Boehringer Ingelheim to add the following clarification: “That means that, in a large clinical study, 3.4% of patients taking warfarin had a stroke, compared to 2.2% of patients taking Pradaxa.” So, in absolute terms, the difference between the drugs was 1.2%.
Potential need for monitoring
According to POGO, Boehringer Ingelheim has been the target of thousands of lawsuits regarding adverse events and deaths thought to be related to dabigatran. In 2013, Boehringer Ingelheim was fined by a federal judge for withholding or failing to preserve records.
Some of these documents suggested that patients taking dabigatran may require monitoring to ensure they remain within a therapeutic range. A scientist at Boehringer Ingelheim, Thorsten Lehr, drafted a paper concluding that there is a therapeutic range for dabigatran.
But company emails indicated that other employees were against publishing this paper. An email from Boehringer Ingelheim’s Jutta Heinrich-Nols said publishing the paper would “make any defense of no monitoring . . . extremely difficult . . . and undermine our efforts to compete” with other new anticoagulants.
For more details, see POGO’s full report. POGO is a nonpartisan, independent watchdog that champions government reform. 
The US Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) oversight of the oral anticoagulant dabigatran (Pradaxa) raises questions about the agency’s reliability, according to a report by the Project On Government Oversight (POGO).
POGO’s report describes a series of “questionable” calls the FDA has made in its oversight of dabigatran.
The report calls attention to issues with the clinical trial used to support dabigatran’s approval.
It also details concerns regarding FDA advisory committee members, the distribution of potentially misleading information about dabigatran, the possibility that patients receiving dabigatran may actually need to be monitored, and other issues.
“The deeply disturbing part is that the public has to trust the FDA to keep it safe, and the way the agency handled Pradaxa doesn’t inspire confidence,” said Daniel Brian, POGO’s executive director.
This is not the first time the safety of dabigatran and results of dabigatran trials have been called into question.
Following post-marketing reports of adverse events and deaths related to dabigatran, the FDA conducted its own studies investigating the drug’s safety. The agency ultimately concluded that dabigatran’s benefits outweigh any detriments.
Still, a paper published in JAMA in 2012 suggested the FDA may have approved dabigatran too soon.
And several papers published in The BMJ last year indicated that Boehringer Ingelheim, the company developing dabigatran, underreported events associated with the drug and withheld data showing that monitoring and dose adjustment could improve the safety of dabigatran without compromising its efficacy.
The company has denied these allegations, but POGO’s report appears to support these claims, in addition to raising other concerns.
Trial issues
Dabigatran was initially approved by the FDA in 2010 on the basis of the RE-LY trial, in which researchers compared dabigatran and warfarin.
POGO’s report notes that this was an unblinded trial and suggests that investigators treated patients in the dabigatran arm differently than those in the warfarin arm. An FDA review showed that, when study subjects showed “signs of trouble,” those in the dabigatran arm were more likely to stop receiving treatment. This may have prevented adverse events such as hemorrhagic strokes.
FDA inspections also revealed that RE-LY investigators mismanaged parts of the trial. For example, they enrolled patients who were supposed to be excluded and failed to promptly inform Boehringer Ingelheim about possible adverse effects of dabigatran, among other infractions.
POGO’s report also cites FDA documents showing that the agency allowed Boehringer Ingelheim to finalize the scoring system for the RE-LY trial after it was over and the data had been gathered. A subsequent FDA review suggested that this allowance worked in dabigatran’s favor.
Advisory committee concerns
POGO’s report points out that members of the committee that advised the FDA on dabigatran’s approval have financial ties to the drug’s maker.
According to public databases, 2 of the advisory committee members who voted to approve dabigatran went on to receive tens of thousands of dollars from Boehringer Ingelheim.
POGO also found that when Boehringer Ingelheim held a practice session to prepare for questioning by the FDA advisory committee, a former member and a former chairman of that committee were paid to play roles in the rehearsal.
‘Misleading’ information
Another of POGO’s concerns is that the FDA redacted information from a public memo announcing and explaining its decision to approve dabigatran. The deleted section said that patients who were well-treated using warfarin had no reason to switch to dabigatran.
POGO’s report also points out that the FDA initially refused to allow Boehringer Ingelheim to claim that dabigatran was superior to warfarin but later changed its mind without providing much explanation.
In addition, the FDA allowed Boehringer Ingelheim to advertise that, in a clinical trial, dabigatran “reduced stroke risk 35% more than warfarin.” But after dabigatran had been on the market for more than 2.5 years, the FDA decided this claim was misleading.
The agency told Boehringer Ingelheim to add the following clarification: “That means that, in a large clinical study, 3.4% of patients taking warfarin had a stroke, compared to 2.2% of patients taking Pradaxa.” So, in absolute terms, the difference between the drugs was 1.2%.
Potential need for monitoring
According to POGO, Boehringer Ingelheim has been the target of thousands of lawsuits regarding adverse events and deaths thought to be related to dabigatran. In 2013, Boehringer Ingelheim was fined by a federal judge for withholding or failing to preserve records.
Some of these documents suggested that patients taking dabigatran may require monitoring to ensure they remain within a therapeutic range. A scientist at Boehringer Ingelheim, Thorsten Lehr, drafted a paper concluding that there is a therapeutic range for dabigatran.
But company emails indicated that other employees were against publishing this paper. An email from Boehringer Ingelheim’s Jutta Heinrich-Nols said publishing the paper would “make any defense of no monitoring . . . extremely difficult . . . and undermine our efforts to compete” with other new anticoagulants.
For more details, see POGO’s full report. POGO is a nonpartisan, independent watchdog that champions government reform.
The US Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) oversight of the oral anticoagulant dabigatran (Pradaxa) raises questions about the agency’s reliability, according to a report by the Project On Government Oversight (POGO).
POGO’s report describes a series of “questionable” calls the FDA has made in its oversight of dabigatran.
The report calls attention to issues with the clinical trial used to support dabigatran’s approval.
It also details concerns regarding FDA advisory committee members, the distribution of potentially misleading information about dabigatran, the possibility that patients receiving dabigatran may actually need to be monitored, and other issues.
“The deeply disturbing part is that the public has to trust the FDA to keep it safe, and the way the agency handled Pradaxa doesn’t inspire confidence,” said Daniel Brian, POGO’s executive director.
This is not the first time the safety of dabigatran and results of dabigatran trials have been called into question.
Following post-marketing reports of adverse events and deaths related to dabigatran, the FDA conducted its own studies investigating the drug’s safety. The agency ultimately concluded that dabigatran’s benefits outweigh any detriments.
Still, a paper published in JAMA in 2012 suggested the FDA may have approved dabigatran too soon.
And several papers published in The BMJ last year indicated that Boehringer Ingelheim, the company developing dabigatran, underreported events associated with the drug and withheld data showing that monitoring and dose adjustment could improve the safety of dabigatran without compromising its efficacy.
The company has denied these allegations, but POGO’s report appears to support these claims, in addition to raising other concerns.
Trial issues
Dabigatran was initially approved by the FDA in 2010 on the basis of the RE-LY trial, in which researchers compared dabigatran and warfarin.
POGO’s report notes that this was an unblinded trial and suggests that investigators treated patients in the dabigatran arm differently than those in the warfarin arm. An FDA review showed that, when study subjects showed “signs of trouble,” those in the dabigatran arm were more likely to stop receiving treatment. This may have prevented adverse events such as hemorrhagic strokes.
FDA inspections also revealed that RE-LY investigators mismanaged parts of the trial. For example, they enrolled patients who were supposed to be excluded and failed to promptly inform Boehringer Ingelheim about possible adverse effects of dabigatran, among other infractions.
POGO’s report also cites FDA documents showing that the agency allowed Boehringer Ingelheim to finalize the scoring system for the RE-LY trial after it was over and the data had been gathered. A subsequent FDA review suggested that this allowance worked in dabigatran’s favor.
Advisory committee concerns
POGO’s report points out that members of the committee that advised the FDA on dabigatran’s approval have financial ties to the drug’s maker.
According to public databases, 2 of the advisory committee members who voted to approve dabigatran went on to receive tens of thousands of dollars from Boehringer Ingelheim.
POGO also found that when Boehringer Ingelheim held a practice session to prepare for questioning by the FDA advisory committee, a former member and a former chairman of that committee were paid to play roles in the rehearsal.
‘Misleading’ information
Another of POGO’s concerns is that the FDA redacted information from a public memo announcing and explaining its decision to approve dabigatran. The deleted section said that patients who were well-treated using warfarin had no reason to switch to dabigatran.
POGO’s report also points out that the FDA initially refused to allow Boehringer Ingelheim to claim that dabigatran was superior to warfarin but later changed its mind without providing much explanation.
In addition, the FDA allowed Boehringer Ingelheim to advertise that, in a clinical trial, dabigatran “reduced stroke risk 35% more than warfarin.” But after dabigatran had been on the market for more than 2.5 years, the FDA decided this claim was misleading.
The agency told Boehringer Ingelheim to add the following clarification: “That means that, in a large clinical study, 3.4% of patients taking warfarin had a stroke, compared to 2.2% of patients taking Pradaxa.” So, in absolute terms, the difference between the drugs was 1.2%.
Potential need for monitoring
According to POGO, Boehringer Ingelheim has been the target of thousands of lawsuits regarding adverse events and deaths thought to be related to dabigatran. In 2013, Boehringer Ingelheim was fined by a federal judge for withholding or failing to preserve records.
Some of these documents suggested that patients taking dabigatran may require monitoring to ensure they remain within a therapeutic range. A scientist at Boehringer Ingelheim, Thorsten Lehr, drafted a paper concluding that there is a therapeutic range for dabigatran.
But company emails indicated that other employees were against publishing this paper. An email from Boehringer Ingelheim’s Jutta Heinrich-Nols said publishing the paper would “make any defense of no monitoring . . . extremely difficult . . . and undermine our efforts to compete” with other new anticoagulants.
For more details, see POGO’s full report. POGO is a nonpartisan, independent watchdog that champions government reform.