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My patient got arrested! What do I do?
Nonforensic psychiatrists in private practice rarely expect to be dealing with patients involved in the correctional system, but unexpected things happen even with the most carefully chosen patients. I’m writing this column to offer guidance to clinicians facing this situation for the first time, based upon the most common questions I get asked.
The most common situation I hear about is that a patient has missed an appointment, and the clinician hears from a family member that the patient has been arrested. The conscientious doctor wants to make sure that his seriously mentally ill client doesn’t experience an interruption in treatment, and that an appointment will be ready after release. The first challenge is to locate the patient.
In small communities, or when a family member was present at the time of arrest, it’s relatively easy to figure out which detention center or jail the patient was taken to. If the patient was arrested in a large urban area, or even out of state, this can be more of a challenge. Fortunately, many states and even now some local county or city jurisdictions have inmate locator web pages. The website will provide search capabilities to identify anyone currently in custody, and will generally provide a unique booking or inmate number that should be used in any facility communication, along with a date of birth and the address of the facility. Be aware that a large jail with high turnover may not have real-time data capability, meaning that new arrests may not show up on the website for 24 hours.
For psychiatrists who spend a lot of time tracking down their patients in custody, there is even an iPhone- and Android-compatible app called MobilePatrol, which provides a convenient interface to many inmate locator databases nationwide. MobilePatrol does not provide information about charges or date of birth, so it’s mainly useful if the patient can be identified by age and has a unique name.
The next step is to ensure that the patient has been identified as needing psychiatric care within the facility. Almost all jails and prisons now have routine multilevel screens to identify arrestees with chronic medical or mental health needs, and to assess suicide risk at intake. This is required by any jail or prison accredited by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care. Nevertheless, some patients are reluctant to self-identify out of fear they might be inappropriately or precipitously thrown into a suicide observation cell.
When it comes to transmitting information to a correctional facility, don’t rely on custody staff. They aren’t clinicians, they change with every shift, and they won’t know what questions to ask about the patient. This includes the warden’s office. The best thing to do is call the psychology department to transmit the patient’s name, date of birth, jail or prison number, and any pertinent clinical information. Don’t rely on an administrative assistant or nonmedical therapist to do this for you – I can’t tell you the number of times I’ve gotten a message that "...John Doe is in your jail and he needs to be seen..." with absolutely no information about medication names, dosage, and frequency, or even a diagnosis! An initial phone call will ensure that the patient is found within the facility and scheduled to see the institutional psychiatrist.
Follow the phone call up with a letter. This will ensure that the clinical information is still available on the day the psychiatrist comes in, and for the next institutional physician if the patient is transferred to another facility. The letter should summarize pertinent symptoms, violence or suicide risk factors, and previous medication trials. The past med trial information is particularly important for correctional psychiatrists, given that many jails and prisons require "fail-first" prescribing policies. Outside documentation that supports a current nonformulary medication regimen can be crucial to ensuring a smooth transition of care. But please, resist the temptation to reprimand the correctional psychiatrist in advance for making a medication change – there are many valid clinical reasons for a correctional psychiatrist to alter a treatment regimen upon arrest that have nothing to do with formulary issues.
Finally, encourage the patient’s family members to maintain contact with their incarcerated loved one if that relationship is healthy and supportive. No one knows a patient better than those in his own household, and a family member can be particularly sensitive to early signs of relapse sometimes through nothing more than a patient’s tone of voice during a phone call. Give the primary caregivers contact information for the institutional psychology department and encourage them to call if they observe anything concerning during a visit or court appearance. Court dates are particularly stressful times and may serve as a crisis point for a suicidal inmate. Having an extra pair of eyes on the scene could be lifesaving.
Once the patient has been identified and referred, and treatment started, your job is done until release. For misdemeanor offenders in local detention, this could take place within days or a few weeks, or even the day of arrest if the patient is able to make bail. Following the steps I’ve recommended to ensure continuity of care will help your patient return to you in at least as good a condition as when he came in.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work" (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
Nonforensic psychiatrists in private practice rarely expect to be dealing with patients involved in the correctional system, but unexpected things happen even with the most carefully chosen patients. I’m writing this column to offer guidance to clinicians facing this situation for the first time, based upon the most common questions I get asked.
The most common situation I hear about is that a patient has missed an appointment, and the clinician hears from a family member that the patient has been arrested. The conscientious doctor wants to make sure that his seriously mentally ill client doesn’t experience an interruption in treatment, and that an appointment will be ready after release. The first challenge is to locate the patient.
In small communities, or when a family member was present at the time of arrest, it’s relatively easy to figure out which detention center or jail the patient was taken to. If the patient was arrested in a large urban area, or even out of state, this can be more of a challenge. Fortunately, many states and even now some local county or city jurisdictions have inmate locator web pages. The website will provide search capabilities to identify anyone currently in custody, and will generally provide a unique booking or inmate number that should be used in any facility communication, along with a date of birth and the address of the facility. Be aware that a large jail with high turnover may not have real-time data capability, meaning that new arrests may not show up on the website for 24 hours.
For psychiatrists who spend a lot of time tracking down their patients in custody, there is even an iPhone- and Android-compatible app called MobilePatrol, which provides a convenient interface to many inmate locator databases nationwide. MobilePatrol does not provide information about charges or date of birth, so it’s mainly useful if the patient can be identified by age and has a unique name.
The next step is to ensure that the patient has been identified as needing psychiatric care within the facility. Almost all jails and prisons now have routine multilevel screens to identify arrestees with chronic medical or mental health needs, and to assess suicide risk at intake. This is required by any jail or prison accredited by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care. Nevertheless, some patients are reluctant to self-identify out of fear they might be inappropriately or precipitously thrown into a suicide observation cell.
When it comes to transmitting information to a correctional facility, don’t rely on custody staff. They aren’t clinicians, they change with every shift, and they won’t know what questions to ask about the patient. This includes the warden’s office. The best thing to do is call the psychology department to transmit the patient’s name, date of birth, jail or prison number, and any pertinent clinical information. Don’t rely on an administrative assistant or nonmedical therapist to do this for you – I can’t tell you the number of times I’ve gotten a message that "...John Doe is in your jail and he needs to be seen..." with absolutely no information about medication names, dosage, and frequency, or even a diagnosis! An initial phone call will ensure that the patient is found within the facility and scheduled to see the institutional psychiatrist.
Follow the phone call up with a letter. This will ensure that the clinical information is still available on the day the psychiatrist comes in, and for the next institutional physician if the patient is transferred to another facility. The letter should summarize pertinent symptoms, violence or suicide risk factors, and previous medication trials. The past med trial information is particularly important for correctional psychiatrists, given that many jails and prisons require "fail-first" prescribing policies. Outside documentation that supports a current nonformulary medication regimen can be crucial to ensuring a smooth transition of care. But please, resist the temptation to reprimand the correctional psychiatrist in advance for making a medication change – there are many valid clinical reasons for a correctional psychiatrist to alter a treatment regimen upon arrest that have nothing to do with formulary issues.
Finally, encourage the patient’s family members to maintain contact with their incarcerated loved one if that relationship is healthy and supportive. No one knows a patient better than those in his own household, and a family member can be particularly sensitive to early signs of relapse sometimes through nothing more than a patient’s tone of voice during a phone call. Give the primary caregivers contact information for the institutional psychology department and encourage them to call if they observe anything concerning during a visit or court appearance. Court dates are particularly stressful times and may serve as a crisis point for a suicidal inmate. Having an extra pair of eyes on the scene could be lifesaving.
Once the patient has been identified and referred, and treatment started, your job is done until release. For misdemeanor offenders in local detention, this could take place within days or a few weeks, or even the day of arrest if the patient is able to make bail. Following the steps I’ve recommended to ensure continuity of care will help your patient return to you in at least as good a condition as when he came in.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work" (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
Nonforensic psychiatrists in private practice rarely expect to be dealing with patients involved in the correctional system, but unexpected things happen even with the most carefully chosen patients. I’m writing this column to offer guidance to clinicians facing this situation for the first time, based upon the most common questions I get asked.
The most common situation I hear about is that a patient has missed an appointment, and the clinician hears from a family member that the patient has been arrested. The conscientious doctor wants to make sure that his seriously mentally ill client doesn’t experience an interruption in treatment, and that an appointment will be ready after release. The first challenge is to locate the patient.
In small communities, or when a family member was present at the time of arrest, it’s relatively easy to figure out which detention center or jail the patient was taken to. If the patient was arrested in a large urban area, or even out of state, this can be more of a challenge. Fortunately, many states and even now some local county or city jurisdictions have inmate locator web pages. The website will provide search capabilities to identify anyone currently in custody, and will generally provide a unique booking or inmate number that should be used in any facility communication, along with a date of birth and the address of the facility. Be aware that a large jail with high turnover may not have real-time data capability, meaning that new arrests may not show up on the website for 24 hours.
For psychiatrists who spend a lot of time tracking down their patients in custody, there is even an iPhone- and Android-compatible app called MobilePatrol, which provides a convenient interface to many inmate locator databases nationwide. MobilePatrol does not provide information about charges or date of birth, so it’s mainly useful if the patient can be identified by age and has a unique name.
The next step is to ensure that the patient has been identified as needing psychiatric care within the facility. Almost all jails and prisons now have routine multilevel screens to identify arrestees with chronic medical or mental health needs, and to assess suicide risk at intake. This is required by any jail or prison accredited by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care. Nevertheless, some patients are reluctant to self-identify out of fear they might be inappropriately or precipitously thrown into a suicide observation cell.
When it comes to transmitting information to a correctional facility, don’t rely on custody staff. They aren’t clinicians, they change with every shift, and they won’t know what questions to ask about the patient. This includes the warden’s office. The best thing to do is call the psychology department to transmit the patient’s name, date of birth, jail or prison number, and any pertinent clinical information. Don’t rely on an administrative assistant or nonmedical therapist to do this for you – I can’t tell you the number of times I’ve gotten a message that "...John Doe is in your jail and he needs to be seen..." with absolutely no information about medication names, dosage, and frequency, or even a diagnosis! An initial phone call will ensure that the patient is found within the facility and scheduled to see the institutional psychiatrist.
Follow the phone call up with a letter. This will ensure that the clinical information is still available on the day the psychiatrist comes in, and for the next institutional physician if the patient is transferred to another facility. The letter should summarize pertinent symptoms, violence or suicide risk factors, and previous medication trials. The past med trial information is particularly important for correctional psychiatrists, given that many jails and prisons require "fail-first" prescribing policies. Outside documentation that supports a current nonformulary medication regimen can be crucial to ensuring a smooth transition of care. But please, resist the temptation to reprimand the correctional psychiatrist in advance for making a medication change – there are many valid clinical reasons for a correctional psychiatrist to alter a treatment regimen upon arrest that have nothing to do with formulary issues.
Finally, encourage the patient’s family members to maintain contact with their incarcerated loved one if that relationship is healthy and supportive. No one knows a patient better than those in his own household, and a family member can be particularly sensitive to early signs of relapse sometimes through nothing more than a patient’s tone of voice during a phone call. Give the primary caregivers contact information for the institutional psychology department and encourage them to call if they observe anything concerning during a visit or court appearance. Court dates are particularly stressful times and may serve as a crisis point for a suicidal inmate. Having an extra pair of eyes on the scene could be lifesaving.
Once the patient has been identified and referred, and treatment started, your job is done until release. For misdemeanor offenders in local detention, this could take place within days or a few weeks, or even the day of arrest if the patient is able to make bail. Following the steps I’ve recommended to ensure continuity of care will help your patient return to you in at least as good a condition as when he came in.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work" (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
Can medication reduce crime?
Lately, I've been busy wading through a heavily publicized study that was published this month in the Lancet. In their paper, "Antipsychotics, mood stabilisers and risk of violent crime," Dr. Seena Fazel and his associates linked Swedish national registers to compare rates of violent crime among 82,647 male and female psychiatric patients to assess the effect of medication on this outcome.
The study made quite a splash in the news, because the outcome was almost too good to be true. There was a 64% reduction in violent crime among patients who had been prescribed any antipsychotic or mood stabilizer, compared with those taking other psychotropics. The reduction in violence for those taking neuroleptics and mood stabilizers was 45% and 24%, respectively. Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) had no apparent effect on crime (Lancet 2014 [doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(14)60379-2]).
Given our American anxiety over spree shooters and other high-profile crimes allegedly committed by untreated psychiatric patients, this study clearly deserves some scrutiny to thoroughly understand the findings, limitations, and other factors that could limit generalizability to the United States.
The authors compared mental health treatment registries with the national criminal history database. They looked at the rate and types of crimes committed by psychiatric patients when they were in and out of treatment. The "in-treatment" time interval was defined as the time between two or more prescriptions, as long as the prescriptions were no more than 4 months apart. Individuals who had only been given one script [prescription] were excluded. The outcome measure was any criminal conviction. The conviction outcome was based upon the date the offense took place, not the date of conviction. Individuals were excluded if the offense date was unknown.
A within-individual analysis showed significant reduction in all crimes, including violent crime, drug-related crime, and less severe crimes, during times when patients were prescribed medication, compared with medication-free intervals. When medicated, the rate of violent crime did not differ between patients with and without a history of violent offenses when diagnosis was not considered. When the analysis was limited to people with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or other psychotic disorders, the prescription of neuroleptics significantly reduced violent crime for both men and women.
For bipolar disorder, mood stabilizing medication reduced violent crime for men but not for women. The SSRI-medicated group was used as a control, to account for the general effect of contact with the mental health system and non-medication interventions related to this, and there was no effect on violent crime with this class of medication.
Now on to the limitations. Medication adherence was not assessed and could not be verified apart from patients given depot neuroleptics. The overall rate of violent crime was low, as would be expected. Only 6% of men and 1% of the women committed a violent crime. The numbers were so low that the study could not statistically assess the impact of violent crime history among patients diagnosed with psychosis. This is a small but crucial finding that did not make the traditional media coverage of this study.
Also, only 40% of those patients taking antipsychotics and mood stabilizers had a diagnosis of schizophrenia, other psychosis, or bipolar disorder, suggesting that, in Sweden, these medications might be prescribed for other indications such as characterologic low frustration tolerance or irritability. The analysis did not look at impact on violent crime by personality disorder diagnosis.
The authors acknowledged that their research could not prove a causal link between psychiatric illness and violence, another important conclusion that was not mentioned in traditional media coverage. In Sweden, mental illness cannot be used to prevent or mitigate a criminal conviction, so any connection between psychiatric symptoms and crime in this population can't be determined. The study also did not consider which subjects, if any, were taking medication or in treatment under court-mandated conditions.
As legislators and advocacy groups push to strengthen involuntary treatment laws, there is a risk that "bottom line" media coverage of research like this may inappropriately sway public opinion. Psychiatrists should be prepared to respond to proposed policies based on inaccurate interpretation of research.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work" (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson's employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
Lately, I've been busy wading through a heavily publicized study that was published this month in the Lancet. In their paper, "Antipsychotics, mood stabilisers and risk of violent crime," Dr. Seena Fazel and his associates linked Swedish national registers to compare rates of violent crime among 82,647 male and female psychiatric patients to assess the effect of medication on this outcome.
The study made quite a splash in the news, because the outcome was almost too good to be true. There was a 64% reduction in violent crime among patients who had been prescribed any antipsychotic or mood stabilizer, compared with those taking other psychotropics. The reduction in violence for those taking neuroleptics and mood stabilizers was 45% and 24%, respectively. Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) had no apparent effect on crime (Lancet 2014 [doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(14)60379-2]).
Given our American anxiety over spree shooters and other high-profile crimes allegedly committed by untreated psychiatric patients, this study clearly deserves some scrutiny to thoroughly understand the findings, limitations, and other factors that could limit generalizability to the United States.
The authors compared mental health treatment registries with the national criminal history database. They looked at the rate and types of crimes committed by psychiatric patients when they were in and out of treatment. The "in-treatment" time interval was defined as the time between two or more prescriptions, as long as the prescriptions were no more than 4 months apart. Individuals who had only been given one script [prescription] were excluded. The outcome measure was any criminal conviction. The conviction outcome was based upon the date the offense took place, not the date of conviction. Individuals were excluded if the offense date was unknown.
A within-individual analysis showed significant reduction in all crimes, including violent crime, drug-related crime, and less severe crimes, during times when patients were prescribed medication, compared with medication-free intervals. When medicated, the rate of violent crime did not differ between patients with and without a history of violent offenses when diagnosis was not considered. When the analysis was limited to people with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or other psychotic disorders, the prescription of neuroleptics significantly reduced violent crime for both men and women.
For bipolar disorder, mood stabilizing medication reduced violent crime for men but not for women. The SSRI-medicated group was used as a control, to account for the general effect of contact with the mental health system and non-medication interventions related to this, and there was no effect on violent crime with this class of medication.
Now on to the limitations. Medication adherence was not assessed and could not be verified apart from patients given depot neuroleptics. The overall rate of violent crime was low, as would be expected. Only 6% of men and 1% of the women committed a violent crime. The numbers were so low that the study could not statistically assess the impact of violent crime history among patients diagnosed with psychosis. This is a small but crucial finding that did not make the traditional media coverage of this study.
Also, only 40% of those patients taking antipsychotics and mood stabilizers had a diagnosis of schizophrenia, other psychosis, or bipolar disorder, suggesting that, in Sweden, these medications might be prescribed for other indications such as characterologic low frustration tolerance or irritability. The analysis did not look at impact on violent crime by personality disorder diagnosis.
The authors acknowledged that their research could not prove a causal link between psychiatric illness and violence, another important conclusion that was not mentioned in traditional media coverage. In Sweden, mental illness cannot be used to prevent or mitigate a criminal conviction, so any connection between psychiatric symptoms and crime in this population can't be determined. The study also did not consider which subjects, if any, were taking medication or in treatment under court-mandated conditions.
As legislators and advocacy groups push to strengthen involuntary treatment laws, there is a risk that "bottom line" media coverage of research like this may inappropriately sway public opinion. Psychiatrists should be prepared to respond to proposed policies based on inaccurate interpretation of research.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work" (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson's employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
Lately, I've been busy wading through a heavily publicized study that was published this month in the Lancet. In their paper, "Antipsychotics, mood stabilisers and risk of violent crime," Dr. Seena Fazel and his associates linked Swedish national registers to compare rates of violent crime among 82,647 male and female psychiatric patients to assess the effect of medication on this outcome.
The study made quite a splash in the news, because the outcome was almost too good to be true. There was a 64% reduction in violent crime among patients who had been prescribed any antipsychotic or mood stabilizer, compared with those taking other psychotropics. The reduction in violence for those taking neuroleptics and mood stabilizers was 45% and 24%, respectively. Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) had no apparent effect on crime (Lancet 2014 [doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(14)60379-2]).
Given our American anxiety over spree shooters and other high-profile crimes allegedly committed by untreated psychiatric patients, this study clearly deserves some scrutiny to thoroughly understand the findings, limitations, and other factors that could limit generalizability to the United States.
The authors compared mental health treatment registries with the national criminal history database. They looked at the rate and types of crimes committed by psychiatric patients when they were in and out of treatment. The "in-treatment" time interval was defined as the time between two or more prescriptions, as long as the prescriptions were no more than 4 months apart. Individuals who had only been given one script [prescription] were excluded. The outcome measure was any criminal conviction. The conviction outcome was based upon the date the offense took place, not the date of conviction. Individuals were excluded if the offense date was unknown.
A within-individual analysis showed significant reduction in all crimes, including violent crime, drug-related crime, and less severe crimes, during times when patients were prescribed medication, compared with medication-free intervals. When medicated, the rate of violent crime did not differ between patients with and without a history of violent offenses when diagnosis was not considered. When the analysis was limited to people with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or other psychotic disorders, the prescription of neuroleptics significantly reduced violent crime for both men and women.
For bipolar disorder, mood stabilizing medication reduced violent crime for men but not for women. The SSRI-medicated group was used as a control, to account for the general effect of contact with the mental health system and non-medication interventions related to this, and there was no effect on violent crime with this class of medication.
Now on to the limitations. Medication adherence was not assessed and could not be verified apart from patients given depot neuroleptics. The overall rate of violent crime was low, as would be expected. Only 6% of men and 1% of the women committed a violent crime. The numbers were so low that the study could not statistically assess the impact of violent crime history among patients diagnosed with psychosis. This is a small but crucial finding that did not make the traditional media coverage of this study.
Also, only 40% of those patients taking antipsychotics and mood stabilizers had a diagnosis of schizophrenia, other psychosis, or bipolar disorder, suggesting that, in Sweden, these medications might be prescribed for other indications such as characterologic low frustration tolerance or irritability. The analysis did not look at impact on violent crime by personality disorder diagnosis.
The authors acknowledged that their research could not prove a causal link between psychiatric illness and violence, another important conclusion that was not mentioned in traditional media coverage. In Sweden, mental illness cannot be used to prevent or mitigate a criminal conviction, so any connection between psychiatric symptoms and crime in this population can't be determined. The study also did not consider which subjects, if any, were taking medication or in treatment under court-mandated conditions.
As legislators and advocacy groups push to strengthen involuntary treatment laws, there is a risk that "bottom line" media coverage of research like this may inappropriately sway public opinion. Psychiatrists should be prepared to respond to proposed policies based on inaccurate interpretation of research.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work" (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson's employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
Report suggests reforms for mentally ill in prison
The Treatment Advocacy Center has released an update of a national survey of prison and jail involuntary treatment policies in its 116-page report, "The Treatment of Persons with Mental Illness in Prisons and Jails: A State Survey."
The survey was a replication of a previous study done in 2008. The purpose of the study was to compare treatment bed capacity and the numbers of seriously mentally ill patients housed within a state’s correctional system versus its public mental health system, and to promote the use of involuntary treatment procedures within correctional facilities.
To prepare the report, the center gathered data from each state prison system, as well as from non–randomly selected jails, regarding total bed capacity and the percentage of seriously mentally ill prisoners housed in the correctional system. Information about nonemergency involuntary medication procedures was gathered from prison websites or through Freedom of Information requests. For jails, some policies were obtained or clarified from administrative personnel or mental health professionals within the facility. Information about available psychiatric state hospital beds was gathered from a previous TAC report on state per-capita treatment capacity.
The new report found that the ratio of seriously mentally ill patients housed in correctional facilities versus state hospitals has increased substantially since 2008. Then, the ratio was 3:1. Currently, the ratio is 10 patients held in jail or prison for every single patient in a state hospital. This is clearly a significant change, which TAC attributes to closure of state hospital beds and failure to implement outpatient commitment laws.
As I’ve said in previous columns, I’m reluctant to attribute the incarceration of mentally ill people solely to mental illness. I’m uncomfortable with a reductionist hypothesis that overlooks the whole person. All of my prison patients have challenges common to many non–mentally ill prisoners: substance abuse, lack of social supports, illiteracy, poor vocational skills, and poverty. Psychiatric patients also suffer the baser instincts common to all humanity: fear, greed, and jealous rage. Changes in laws governing sentencing also will affect all offenders, regardless of psychiatric status. Psychiatric medication, voluntary or involuntary, is not the sole answer to the problem of criminality and will do nothing to address these other issues.
Nevertheless, I agree with the majority of the TAC report recommendations, and I applaud the emphasis placed upon expanded use of mental health courts and crisis intervention teams (CIT) to avert incarceration. The recommendation to screen prisoners for mental illness is already mandated by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC) for any accredited facility. According to a 1994 national survey by Dr. Jeffrey L. Metzner and associates, all prisons systems provided either reception or prompt intake mental health screening to all newly admitted intakes (Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 1994;22:451-7). Twenty-six percent of the prison systems exceeded screening standards recommended by the American Psychiatric Association. This is good news.
The TAC report also recommended mandatory release planning. Systematic release planning is a challenge to implement for most correctional systems for several reasons. In jail, release may be contingent upon the outcome of a trial and is therefore unpredictable. If the trial is postponed, a valuable community treatment slot is tied up for a patient who will never arrive. Conversely, failure to plan prior to a court date might leave a prisoner on the street directly from court with no aftercare. Nevertheless, states are beginning to realize the cost and public safety benefit of release plans that integrate medical, mental health, and substance abuse services.
One recent outcome study showed that more than half of released prisoners stayed in treatment in the community when an in-reach program provided integrated release planning services, and that annual criminal charges dropped by more than 50% in the year following engagement. More good news.
Finally, a minor quibble. My own state, Maryland, was cited in the report as one of the few states in which the involuntary treatment of inmates is most difficult because of the requirement to transfer the inmate to a hospital first. What the TAC failed to mention was that, in Maryland, the involuntary medication process was substantially undermined by case law. In 2006, the Maryland Court of Appeals decided in Department of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Anthony Kelly that involuntary medication only can be administered if the patient demonstrates dangerousness within the institution. Given this restriction, involuntary medication could not be administered on a nonemergency basis even in a correctional facility.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work" (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
The Treatment Advocacy Center has released an update of a national survey of prison and jail involuntary treatment policies in its 116-page report, "The Treatment of Persons with Mental Illness in Prisons and Jails: A State Survey."
The survey was a replication of a previous study done in 2008. The purpose of the study was to compare treatment bed capacity and the numbers of seriously mentally ill patients housed within a state’s correctional system versus its public mental health system, and to promote the use of involuntary treatment procedures within correctional facilities.
To prepare the report, the center gathered data from each state prison system, as well as from non–randomly selected jails, regarding total bed capacity and the percentage of seriously mentally ill prisoners housed in the correctional system. Information about nonemergency involuntary medication procedures was gathered from prison websites or through Freedom of Information requests. For jails, some policies were obtained or clarified from administrative personnel or mental health professionals within the facility. Information about available psychiatric state hospital beds was gathered from a previous TAC report on state per-capita treatment capacity.
The new report found that the ratio of seriously mentally ill patients housed in correctional facilities versus state hospitals has increased substantially since 2008. Then, the ratio was 3:1. Currently, the ratio is 10 patients held in jail or prison for every single patient in a state hospital. This is clearly a significant change, which TAC attributes to closure of state hospital beds and failure to implement outpatient commitment laws.
As I’ve said in previous columns, I’m reluctant to attribute the incarceration of mentally ill people solely to mental illness. I’m uncomfortable with a reductionist hypothesis that overlooks the whole person. All of my prison patients have challenges common to many non–mentally ill prisoners: substance abuse, lack of social supports, illiteracy, poor vocational skills, and poverty. Psychiatric patients also suffer the baser instincts common to all humanity: fear, greed, and jealous rage. Changes in laws governing sentencing also will affect all offenders, regardless of psychiatric status. Psychiatric medication, voluntary or involuntary, is not the sole answer to the problem of criminality and will do nothing to address these other issues.
Nevertheless, I agree with the majority of the TAC report recommendations, and I applaud the emphasis placed upon expanded use of mental health courts and crisis intervention teams (CIT) to avert incarceration. The recommendation to screen prisoners for mental illness is already mandated by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC) for any accredited facility. According to a 1994 national survey by Dr. Jeffrey L. Metzner and associates, all prisons systems provided either reception or prompt intake mental health screening to all newly admitted intakes (Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 1994;22:451-7). Twenty-six percent of the prison systems exceeded screening standards recommended by the American Psychiatric Association. This is good news.
The TAC report also recommended mandatory release planning. Systematic release planning is a challenge to implement for most correctional systems for several reasons. In jail, release may be contingent upon the outcome of a trial and is therefore unpredictable. If the trial is postponed, a valuable community treatment slot is tied up for a patient who will never arrive. Conversely, failure to plan prior to a court date might leave a prisoner on the street directly from court with no aftercare. Nevertheless, states are beginning to realize the cost and public safety benefit of release plans that integrate medical, mental health, and substance abuse services.
One recent outcome study showed that more than half of released prisoners stayed in treatment in the community when an in-reach program provided integrated release planning services, and that annual criminal charges dropped by more than 50% in the year following engagement. More good news.
Finally, a minor quibble. My own state, Maryland, was cited in the report as one of the few states in which the involuntary treatment of inmates is most difficult because of the requirement to transfer the inmate to a hospital first. What the TAC failed to mention was that, in Maryland, the involuntary medication process was substantially undermined by case law. In 2006, the Maryland Court of Appeals decided in Department of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Anthony Kelly that involuntary medication only can be administered if the patient demonstrates dangerousness within the institution. Given this restriction, involuntary medication could not be administered on a nonemergency basis even in a correctional facility.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work" (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
The Treatment Advocacy Center has released an update of a national survey of prison and jail involuntary treatment policies in its 116-page report, "The Treatment of Persons with Mental Illness in Prisons and Jails: A State Survey."
The survey was a replication of a previous study done in 2008. The purpose of the study was to compare treatment bed capacity and the numbers of seriously mentally ill patients housed within a state’s correctional system versus its public mental health system, and to promote the use of involuntary treatment procedures within correctional facilities.
To prepare the report, the center gathered data from each state prison system, as well as from non–randomly selected jails, regarding total bed capacity and the percentage of seriously mentally ill prisoners housed in the correctional system. Information about nonemergency involuntary medication procedures was gathered from prison websites or through Freedom of Information requests. For jails, some policies were obtained or clarified from administrative personnel or mental health professionals within the facility. Information about available psychiatric state hospital beds was gathered from a previous TAC report on state per-capita treatment capacity.
The new report found that the ratio of seriously mentally ill patients housed in correctional facilities versus state hospitals has increased substantially since 2008. Then, the ratio was 3:1. Currently, the ratio is 10 patients held in jail or prison for every single patient in a state hospital. This is clearly a significant change, which TAC attributes to closure of state hospital beds and failure to implement outpatient commitment laws.
As I’ve said in previous columns, I’m reluctant to attribute the incarceration of mentally ill people solely to mental illness. I’m uncomfortable with a reductionist hypothesis that overlooks the whole person. All of my prison patients have challenges common to many non–mentally ill prisoners: substance abuse, lack of social supports, illiteracy, poor vocational skills, and poverty. Psychiatric patients also suffer the baser instincts common to all humanity: fear, greed, and jealous rage. Changes in laws governing sentencing also will affect all offenders, regardless of psychiatric status. Psychiatric medication, voluntary or involuntary, is not the sole answer to the problem of criminality and will do nothing to address these other issues.
Nevertheless, I agree with the majority of the TAC report recommendations, and I applaud the emphasis placed upon expanded use of mental health courts and crisis intervention teams (CIT) to avert incarceration. The recommendation to screen prisoners for mental illness is already mandated by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC) for any accredited facility. According to a 1994 national survey by Dr. Jeffrey L. Metzner and associates, all prisons systems provided either reception or prompt intake mental health screening to all newly admitted intakes (Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 1994;22:451-7). Twenty-six percent of the prison systems exceeded screening standards recommended by the American Psychiatric Association. This is good news.
The TAC report also recommended mandatory release planning. Systematic release planning is a challenge to implement for most correctional systems for several reasons. In jail, release may be contingent upon the outcome of a trial and is therefore unpredictable. If the trial is postponed, a valuable community treatment slot is tied up for a patient who will never arrive. Conversely, failure to plan prior to a court date might leave a prisoner on the street directly from court with no aftercare. Nevertheless, states are beginning to realize the cost and public safety benefit of release plans that integrate medical, mental health, and substance abuse services.
One recent outcome study showed that more than half of released prisoners stayed in treatment in the community when an in-reach program provided integrated release planning services, and that annual criminal charges dropped by more than 50% in the year following engagement. More good news.
Finally, a minor quibble. My own state, Maryland, was cited in the report as one of the few states in which the involuntary treatment of inmates is most difficult because of the requirement to transfer the inmate to a hospital first. What the TAC failed to mention was that, in Maryland, the involuntary medication process was substantially undermined by case law. In 2006, the Maryland Court of Appeals decided in Department of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Anthony Kelly that involuntary medication only can be administered if the patient demonstrates dangerousness within the institution. Given this restriction, involuntary medication could not be administered on a nonemergency basis even in a correctional facility.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work" (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
A new jail could prove transformative
In the jail cell I had appropriated as an office, the toilet was broken. The metal toilet bowl was wrapped carelessly in heavy plastic and the plastic was anchored in place by gray duct tape. The window opened hopefully to about 4 inches, just enough to let in the August humidity. Outside, the temperature reached 90 F. Inside the cell, the temperature was easily over 100° F. I was wilting, my patients were wilting, and I left the building at the end of the morning soaked in sweat carrying stacks of damp paper. For the first time since I was an intern, I donned a pair of surgical scrubs because the building was too intolerable for wearing street clothes. This was the legacy of my jail. The facility was opened in 1859, well before the invention of modern heating and air conditioning.
Thanks to the intervention of the Department of Justice, some improvements were made. Certain tiers were given air-conditioning units and designated for the housing of inmates vulnerable to heat exhaustion. Intake procedures were modified to identify and stratify new detainees according to their medical needs and heat tolerance. Inmates were given education on the symptoms of heat exhaustion and how to prevent it. Eventually summer passed, and I was able to lose the surgical scrubs and slip back into street clothes.
Yet the remaining need for a new jail was obvious to anyone working in the facility or incarcerated there. A recent legislative inquiry pointed out the security risks posed by the antiquated tier structures and other hazards. In the report published later, the cost of a new jail was estimated to be $553 million.
The protest started almost immediately. People wrote to the local newspaper to object to the idea of spending money on incarceration rather than crime prevention. Advocacy groups carved out territorial niches to promote diversion of juveniles, pregnant women, and the mentally ill, apparently leaving any prisoner who didn’t fit into one of those categories to fend for himself. In the end, the jail – which opened at a time when there were only 33 states in the union, the year that "A Tale of Two Cities" and "On the Origin of Species" were published, and when the works of Johannes Brahms were being heard for the first time – remained untouched.
These memories returned quickly after reading a recent New York Times story about a homeless veteran with mental illness who died in his jail cell, presumably because of excessive heat. The man had been incarcerated for a misdemeanor and held only because he couldn’t make bail. The fact that this happened in winter tells me a lot about the nature of the facility’s heating and ventilation system.
The first thing that struck me about this story was the need to invoke certain adjectives, as though readers would not care about the story if the prisoner who died was not mentally ill or was not a veteran. There may be some truth to that concern. When it comes to prison reform, I’ve seen the tendency within psychiatry to limit discussions only to conditions as they affect the mentally ill. This was not always the case. Dr. Benjamin Rush, founder of Pennsylvania Hospital, also founded one of the first prison reformation societies. He advocated humane care for everyone in the facility, not just a certain faction.
Unless someone figures out how to "cure" crime, we will always need jails and prisons. Building a new facility is neither a failure nor a waste of resources. It may be the beginning of a long-term commitment to rehabilitation.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work." The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
In the jail cell I had appropriated as an office, the toilet was broken. The metal toilet bowl was wrapped carelessly in heavy plastic and the plastic was anchored in place by gray duct tape. The window opened hopefully to about 4 inches, just enough to let in the August humidity. Outside, the temperature reached 90 F. Inside the cell, the temperature was easily over 100° F. I was wilting, my patients were wilting, and I left the building at the end of the morning soaked in sweat carrying stacks of damp paper. For the first time since I was an intern, I donned a pair of surgical scrubs because the building was too intolerable for wearing street clothes. This was the legacy of my jail. The facility was opened in 1859, well before the invention of modern heating and air conditioning.
Thanks to the intervention of the Department of Justice, some improvements were made. Certain tiers were given air-conditioning units and designated for the housing of inmates vulnerable to heat exhaustion. Intake procedures were modified to identify and stratify new detainees according to their medical needs and heat tolerance. Inmates were given education on the symptoms of heat exhaustion and how to prevent it. Eventually summer passed, and I was able to lose the surgical scrubs and slip back into street clothes.
Yet the remaining need for a new jail was obvious to anyone working in the facility or incarcerated there. A recent legislative inquiry pointed out the security risks posed by the antiquated tier structures and other hazards. In the report published later, the cost of a new jail was estimated to be $553 million.
The protest started almost immediately. People wrote to the local newspaper to object to the idea of spending money on incarceration rather than crime prevention. Advocacy groups carved out territorial niches to promote diversion of juveniles, pregnant women, and the mentally ill, apparently leaving any prisoner who didn’t fit into one of those categories to fend for himself. In the end, the jail – which opened at a time when there were only 33 states in the union, the year that "A Tale of Two Cities" and "On the Origin of Species" were published, and when the works of Johannes Brahms were being heard for the first time – remained untouched.
These memories returned quickly after reading a recent New York Times story about a homeless veteran with mental illness who died in his jail cell, presumably because of excessive heat. The man had been incarcerated for a misdemeanor and held only because he couldn’t make bail. The fact that this happened in winter tells me a lot about the nature of the facility’s heating and ventilation system.
The first thing that struck me about this story was the need to invoke certain adjectives, as though readers would not care about the story if the prisoner who died was not mentally ill or was not a veteran. There may be some truth to that concern. When it comes to prison reform, I’ve seen the tendency within psychiatry to limit discussions only to conditions as they affect the mentally ill. This was not always the case. Dr. Benjamin Rush, founder of Pennsylvania Hospital, also founded one of the first prison reformation societies. He advocated humane care for everyone in the facility, not just a certain faction.
Unless someone figures out how to "cure" crime, we will always need jails and prisons. Building a new facility is neither a failure nor a waste of resources. It may be the beginning of a long-term commitment to rehabilitation.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work." The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
In the jail cell I had appropriated as an office, the toilet was broken. The metal toilet bowl was wrapped carelessly in heavy plastic and the plastic was anchored in place by gray duct tape. The window opened hopefully to about 4 inches, just enough to let in the August humidity. Outside, the temperature reached 90 F. Inside the cell, the temperature was easily over 100° F. I was wilting, my patients were wilting, and I left the building at the end of the morning soaked in sweat carrying stacks of damp paper. For the first time since I was an intern, I donned a pair of surgical scrubs because the building was too intolerable for wearing street clothes. This was the legacy of my jail. The facility was opened in 1859, well before the invention of modern heating and air conditioning.
Thanks to the intervention of the Department of Justice, some improvements were made. Certain tiers were given air-conditioning units and designated for the housing of inmates vulnerable to heat exhaustion. Intake procedures were modified to identify and stratify new detainees according to their medical needs and heat tolerance. Inmates were given education on the symptoms of heat exhaustion and how to prevent it. Eventually summer passed, and I was able to lose the surgical scrubs and slip back into street clothes.
Yet the remaining need for a new jail was obvious to anyone working in the facility or incarcerated there. A recent legislative inquiry pointed out the security risks posed by the antiquated tier structures and other hazards. In the report published later, the cost of a new jail was estimated to be $553 million.
The protest started almost immediately. People wrote to the local newspaper to object to the idea of spending money on incarceration rather than crime prevention. Advocacy groups carved out territorial niches to promote diversion of juveniles, pregnant women, and the mentally ill, apparently leaving any prisoner who didn’t fit into one of those categories to fend for himself. In the end, the jail – which opened at a time when there were only 33 states in the union, the year that "A Tale of Two Cities" and "On the Origin of Species" were published, and when the works of Johannes Brahms were being heard for the first time – remained untouched.
These memories returned quickly after reading a recent New York Times story about a homeless veteran with mental illness who died in his jail cell, presumably because of excessive heat. The man had been incarcerated for a misdemeanor and held only because he couldn’t make bail. The fact that this happened in winter tells me a lot about the nature of the facility’s heating and ventilation system.
The first thing that struck me about this story was the need to invoke certain adjectives, as though readers would not care about the story if the prisoner who died was not mentally ill or was not a veteran. There may be some truth to that concern. When it comes to prison reform, I’ve seen the tendency within psychiatry to limit discussions only to conditions as they affect the mentally ill. This was not always the case. Dr. Benjamin Rush, founder of Pennsylvania Hospital, also founded one of the first prison reformation societies. He advocated humane care for everyone in the facility, not just a certain faction.
Unless someone figures out how to "cure" crime, we will always need jails and prisons. Building a new facility is neither a failure nor a waste of resources. It may be the beginning of a long-term commitment to rehabilitation.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work." The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
Voice of experience missing at Senate hearing on solitary confinement
Recently, the Senate Judiciary Committee heard testimony regarding the use of solitary confinement in the Federal Bureau of Prisons. This was the second hearing on this issue, which featured testimony from the director of the federal system, from several human rights organizations, from state prison officials, and from former inmates themselves. Although one of the main concerns of the hearing was the psychological effects of solitary confinement, only one of the 11 speakers was a mental health professional. Psychology professor Craig Haney, Ph.D., has spent 30 years studying the effects of solitary confinement; however, by his own testimony, he did this primarily as an expert witness retained in the context of correctional litigation. None of those offering testimony was a mental health professional actively involved in the treatment of segregated prisoners. In fact, according to the curriculum vitae that Dr. Haney filed in his capacity as an expert in the California prison overcrowding case, Dr. Haney has never worked in a jail or a prison.
During the hearing, Sen. Al Franken (D-Minn.) made a reference to the risks some inmates posed to prison "guards." For those readers who have never worked in corrections, this is a tremendous faux pas. A "guard" is a generic term for a civilian hired by a private company or business who is given minimal training, slapped into a uniform, and told to stand watch over something. A correctional officer is a law enforcement professional who is trained, regulated, and monitored by the state. A correctional officer is a professional with a code of ethics and who is granted police powers, including the right to use deadly force. Confusing a correctional officer with a "guard" is like mistaking a Navy Seal for a Boy Scout.
So we have a hearing about the psychological effects of confinement in which a psychologist with no correctional experience is testifying before a senator who is not familiar with even basic correctional training standards. What could possibly go wrong?
This topic is close to my heart lately, because there is a bill currently before the Maryland General Assembly to study the use of solitary confinement in our prison system. I’ve read the bill, I’ve listened to the testimony, and I have a few opinions on the issue myself.
First, a few stipulations and clarifications. People involved in this issue tend to confuse terminology related to restricted housing within a correctional facility. The term "solitary confinement" traditionally means a housing situation in which the inmate is placed alone in a cell. The term "administrative segregation" or "ad seg" is sometimes used interchangeably with "disciplinary segregation," although this is not accurate. Disciplinary segregation means that the inmate is removed from the general population because of a rule violation. Inmates on disciplinary segregation are often barred from owning certain property like a television or radio. Visiting privileges and phone calls may also be restricted as a punishment.
In contrast, an inmate could be placed on administrative segregation for nondisciplinary reasons if the prisoner requires medical isolation temporarily, if the inmate voluntarily requests special housing, or if there is a need for protective custody. In this case, the inmate is still allowed to own property, and he retains basic visiting and telephone privileges. In all cases, there is time allowed out of the cell for exercise and recreation. There is also still access to medical and mental health services.
Regarding the stipulations, I don’t question that the prevalence of mental illness among prisoners will be high in a facility that is designated as maximum security or in a control unit prison. I also agree that solitary confinement, or housing without a cellmate, is a bad idea for a prisoner who is deemed a high suicide risk. I agree that boredom and lack of activity are generally a very bad thing for anyone, prisoner or not, and that we shouldn’t keep prisoners on segregation status longer than is necessary to accomplish the intended purpose of the housing.
Here’s where the agreement ends: I don’t think restricted housing is automatically and consistently bad for everyone, and I certainly don’t agree that the segregated housing itself causes whatever mental disturbance may be present. Association does not prove cause and effect, and the number of well-designed, controlled studies of this issue are too few and far between to allow a causal link to be drawn. I realize that this goes against the grain of most court findings on this issue, but that’s the state of the science. I was not surprised to see that the proponents of the solitary confinement bill didn’t mention contradictory evidence. Few journalists in the traditional media have, either.
I think when it comes to dictating prison policy, our legislators need to realize how dangerous our prison systems have become. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, between 2001 and 2011, the number of murders in American prisons increased by 79%. During that time my own state ranked second in the country in per capita prison murders. According to the testimony by the federal prison director, 47% of the inmates confined in the Florence SuperMax facility – the institution at the heart of the latest class action suit over solitary confinement – are there for killing another prisoner or staff member while incarcerated. Some of them have killed more than once. If one of my patients tells me that he feels safer in segregated housing and wants to be there, I’m not going to question that, and I hope no outside politician or advocacy group is going to criticize that intervention.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work" (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
Recently, the Senate Judiciary Committee heard testimony regarding the use of solitary confinement in the Federal Bureau of Prisons. This was the second hearing on this issue, which featured testimony from the director of the federal system, from several human rights organizations, from state prison officials, and from former inmates themselves. Although one of the main concerns of the hearing was the psychological effects of solitary confinement, only one of the 11 speakers was a mental health professional. Psychology professor Craig Haney, Ph.D., has spent 30 years studying the effects of solitary confinement; however, by his own testimony, he did this primarily as an expert witness retained in the context of correctional litigation. None of those offering testimony was a mental health professional actively involved in the treatment of segregated prisoners. In fact, according to the curriculum vitae that Dr. Haney filed in his capacity as an expert in the California prison overcrowding case, Dr. Haney has never worked in a jail or a prison.
During the hearing, Sen. Al Franken (D-Minn.) made a reference to the risks some inmates posed to prison "guards." For those readers who have never worked in corrections, this is a tremendous faux pas. A "guard" is a generic term for a civilian hired by a private company or business who is given minimal training, slapped into a uniform, and told to stand watch over something. A correctional officer is a law enforcement professional who is trained, regulated, and monitored by the state. A correctional officer is a professional with a code of ethics and who is granted police powers, including the right to use deadly force. Confusing a correctional officer with a "guard" is like mistaking a Navy Seal for a Boy Scout.
So we have a hearing about the psychological effects of confinement in which a psychologist with no correctional experience is testifying before a senator who is not familiar with even basic correctional training standards. What could possibly go wrong?
This topic is close to my heart lately, because there is a bill currently before the Maryland General Assembly to study the use of solitary confinement in our prison system. I’ve read the bill, I’ve listened to the testimony, and I have a few opinions on the issue myself.
First, a few stipulations and clarifications. People involved in this issue tend to confuse terminology related to restricted housing within a correctional facility. The term "solitary confinement" traditionally means a housing situation in which the inmate is placed alone in a cell. The term "administrative segregation" or "ad seg" is sometimes used interchangeably with "disciplinary segregation," although this is not accurate. Disciplinary segregation means that the inmate is removed from the general population because of a rule violation. Inmates on disciplinary segregation are often barred from owning certain property like a television or radio. Visiting privileges and phone calls may also be restricted as a punishment.
In contrast, an inmate could be placed on administrative segregation for nondisciplinary reasons if the prisoner requires medical isolation temporarily, if the inmate voluntarily requests special housing, or if there is a need for protective custody. In this case, the inmate is still allowed to own property, and he retains basic visiting and telephone privileges. In all cases, there is time allowed out of the cell for exercise and recreation. There is also still access to medical and mental health services.
Regarding the stipulations, I don’t question that the prevalence of mental illness among prisoners will be high in a facility that is designated as maximum security or in a control unit prison. I also agree that solitary confinement, or housing without a cellmate, is a bad idea for a prisoner who is deemed a high suicide risk. I agree that boredom and lack of activity are generally a very bad thing for anyone, prisoner or not, and that we shouldn’t keep prisoners on segregation status longer than is necessary to accomplish the intended purpose of the housing.
Here’s where the agreement ends: I don’t think restricted housing is automatically and consistently bad for everyone, and I certainly don’t agree that the segregated housing itself causes whatever mental disturbance may be present. Association does not prove cause and effect, and the number of well-designed, controlled studies of this issue are too few and far between to allow a causal link to be drawn. I realize that this goes against the grain of most court findings on this issue, but that’s the state of the science. I was not surprised to see that the proponents of the solitary confinement bill didn’t mention contradictory evidence. Few journalists in the traditional media have, either.
I think when it comes to dictating prison policy, our legislators need to realize how dangerous our prison systems have become. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, between 2001 and 2011, the number of murders in American prisons increased by 79%. During that time my own state ranked second in the country in per capita prison murders. According to the testimony by the federal prison director, 47% of the inmates confined in the Florence SuperMax facility – the institution at the heart of the latest class action suit over solitary confinement – are there for killing another prisoner or staff member while incarcerated. Some of them have killed more than once. If one of my patients tells me that he feels safer in segregated housing and wants to be there, I’m not going to question that, and I hope no outside politician or advocacy group is going to criticize that intervention.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work" (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
Recently, the Senate Judiciary Committee heard testimony regarding the use of solitary confinement in the Federal Bureau of Prisons. This was the second hearing on this issue, which featured testimony from the director of the federal system, from several human rights organizations, from state prison officials, and from former inmates themselves. Although one of the main concerns of the hearing was the psychological effects of solitary confinement, only one of the 11 speakers was a mental health professional. Psychology professor Craig Haney, Ph.D., has spent 30 years studying the effects of solitary confinement; however, by his own testimony, he did this primarily as an expert witness retained in the context of correctional litigation. None of those offering testimony was a mental health professional actively involved in the treatment of segregated prisoners. In fact, according to the curriculum vitae that Dr. Haney filed in his capacity as an expert in the California prison overcrowding case, Dr. Haney has never worked in a jail or a prison.
During the hearing, Sen. Al Franken (D-Minn.) made a reference to the risks some inmates posed to prison "guards." For those readers who have never worked in corrections, this is a tremendous faux pas. A "guard" is a generic term for a civilian hired by a private company or business who is given minimal training, slapped into a uniform, and told to stand watch over something. A correctional officer is a law enforcement professional who is trained, regulated, and monitored by the state. A correctional officer is a professional with a code of ethics and who is granted police powers, including the right to use deadly force. Confusing a correctional officer with a "guard" is like mistaking a Navy Seal for a Boy Scout.
So we have a hearing about the psychological effects of confinement in which a psychologist with no correctional experience is testifying before a senator who is not familiar with even basic correctional training standards. What could possibly go wrong?
This topic is close to my heart lately, because there is a bill currently before the Maryland General Assembly to study the use of solitary confinement in our prison system. I’ve read the bill, I’ve listened to the testimony, and I have a few opinions on the issue myself.
First, a few stipulations and clarifications. People involved in this issue tend to confuse terminology related to restricted housing within a correctional facility. The term "solitary confinement" traditionally means a housing situation in which the inmate is placed alone in a cell. The term "administrative segregation" or "ad seg" is sometimes used interchangeably with "disciplinary segregation," although this is not accurate. Disciplinary segregation means that the inmate is removed from the general population because of a rule violation. Inmates on disciplinary segregation are often barred from owning certain property like a television or radio. Visiting privileges and phone calls may also be restricted as a punishment.
In contrast, an inmate could be placed on administrative segregation for nondisciplinary reasons if the prisoner requires medical isolation temporarily, if the inmate voluntarily requests special housing, or if there is a need for protective custody. In this case, the inmate is still allowed to own property, and he retains basic visiting and telephone privileges. In all cases, there is time allowed out of the cell for exercise and recreation. There is also still access to medical and mental health services.
Regarding the stipulations, I don’t question that the prevalence of mental illness among prisoners will be high in a facility that is designated as maximum security or in a control unit prison. I also agree that solitary confinement, or housing without a cellmate, is a bad idea for a prisoner who is deemed a high suicide risk. I agree that boredom and lack of activity are generally a very bad thing for anyone, prisoner or not, and that we shouldn’t keep prisoners on segregation status longer than is necessary to accomplish the intended purpose of the housing.
Here’s where the agreement ends: I don’t think restricted housing is automatically and consistently bad for everyone, and I certainly don’t agree that the segregated housing itself causes whatever mental disturbance may be present. Association does not prove cause and effect, and the number of well-designed, controlled studies of this issue are too few and far between to allow a causal link to be drawn. I realize that this goes against the grain of most court findings on this issue, but that’s the state of the science. I was not surprised to see that the proponents of the solitary confinement bill didn’t mention contradictory evidence. Few journalists in the traditional media have, either.
I think when it comes to dictating prison policy, our legislators need to realize how dangerous our prison systems have become. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, between 2001 and 2011, the number of murders in American prisons increased by 79%. During that time my own state ranked second in the country in per capita prison murders. According to the testimony by the federal prison director, 47% of the inmates confined in the Florence SuperMax facility – the institution at the heart of the latest class action suit over solitary confinement – are there for killing another prisoner or staff member while incarcerated. Some of them have killed more than once. If one of my patients tells me that he feels safer in segregated housing and wants to be there, I’m not going to question that, and I hope no outside politician or advocacy group is going to criticize that intervention.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work" (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
A different take on sensory deprivation
Recently, my local newspaper featured a story by Julie Scharper entitled "What I found in the sensory-deprivation chamber" (Baltimore Sun, Jan. 11, 2014) about a new local business known as a flotation spa, a trend currently spreading across the East Coast. For $50 an hour (or $70 for 90 minutes), the customer is escorted to a dark and quiet room, where she floats nude in a body-temperature pool of Epsom salts.
In this environment, the client reportedly enters a "drug-free altered state" intended to soothe aches and tension, as well as ease sleep problems. The author described her experience in the pool, during which she had a vivid daydream of a woman playing a red piano. Soon, a new idea for a children’s book sprang into her mind, and she left the session relaxed and filled with creative energy.
A while ago I reviewed some of the old research about sensory deprivation. Psychologists and psychiatrists began studying this topic following the Korean War, when the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense wanted to learn more about conditions that would make people more susceptible to brainwashing. They placed people in baths of water while covering their eyes and ears, and encased their limbs in protective coverings to minimize tactile input. The subjects were then interviewed about their experiences and were monitored through EEGs. They reported many disturbances, such as alterations in concentration and attention, illusions, anxiety and panic, and perceptual disturbances inaccurately described as hallucinations.
All of these symptoms resolved spontaneously after the subjects were removed from the deprivation chamber. This amorphous constellation of sensations was later given the label "special housing unit" (SHU) syndrome when it occurred in prisoners held in long-term segregation. One longstanding opponent of long-term segregation, who also frequently appeared as an expert in suits against control unit prisons, referred to sensory deprivation as "toxic" to brain functioning and a cause of stupor and delirium in segregated prisoners.
Critics of this theory, and I count myself among them, point out that current control unit conditions are hardly anything like a sensory deprivation chamber. Although segregation is less noisy and stimulating than a general population tier, it is hardly without distractions. Segregated inmates still have access to mail and recreation if they are not segregated for disciplinary reasons. They have contact with other people, although not always other inmates. Most facilities do regular rounds to check on prisoners in segregated tiers, and confined inmates can still have access to psychiatric services. In contrast to the SHU syndrome proponents, I rarely see psychological deterioration in segregated prisoners. There are even inmates who request segregated confinement specifically because it is less stimulating than general population.
So what makes sensory deprivation "cruel and unusual" to some but a source of energy and relaxation to others?
Expectation counts for a lot. Inmates placed in disciplinary segregation are not happy to be there – they are cut off from visits and ready access to the telephone, as well as certain personal property like a radio or television if they had one. A disciplinary segregation inmate enters the cell with the expectation that the experience will be punishment. In contrast, a flotation spa client is prepared for the experience by being told what positive experiences to expect and that these positive effects will carry over after the spa session ends.
Similarly, when I interview prisoners, I find that the most successful ones are those who are able to shift their own individual mindsets from an expectation of punishment to one of anticipated opportunity. The punishment mindset ("I’m here for no reason, so I’m going to spend my time complaining") is a hefty barrier to rehabilitation. An inmate who is able to accept the reality of his confinement and his responsibility for it ("I put myself here, so I better make my time work for me") will find ways to adapt psychologically, regardless of sentence length.
Reading about flotation spas brought on a weird sense of deja vu for me, but it also was a useful reminder of the effects of expectation and outlook for managing many life experiences.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work" (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
Recently, my local newspaper featured a story by Julie Scharper entitled "What I found in the sensory-deprivation chamber" (Baltimore Sun, Jan. 11, 2014) about a new local business known as a flotation spa, a trend currently spreading across the East Coast. For $50 an hour (or $70 for 90 minutes), the customer is escorted to a dark and quiet room, where she floats nude in a body-temperature pool of Epsom salts.
In this environment, the client reportedly enters a "drug-free altered state" intended to soothe aches and tension, as well as ease sleep problems. The author described her experience in the pool, during which she had a vivid daydream of a woman playing a red piano. Soon, a new idea for a children’s book sprang into her mind, and she left the session relaxed and filled with creative energy.
A while ago I reviewed some of the old research about sensory deprivation. Psychologists and psychiatrists began studying this topic following the Korean War, when the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense wanted to learn more about conditions that would make people more susceptible to brainwashing. They placed people in baths of water while covering their eyes and ears, and encased their limbs in protective coverings to minimize tactile input. The subjects were then interviewed about their experiences and were monitored through EEGs. They reported many disturbances, such as alterations in concentration and attention, illusions, anxiety and panic, and perceptual disturbances inaccurately described as hallucinations.
All of these symptoms resolved spontaneously after the subjects were removed from the deprivation chamber. This amorphous constellation of sensations was later given the label "special housing unit" (SHU) syndrome when it occurred in prisoners held in long-term segregation. One longstanding opponent of long-term segregation, who also frequently appeared as an expert in suits against control unit prisons, referred to sensory deprivation as "toxic" to brain functioning and a cause of stupor and delirium in segregated prisoners.
Critics of this theory, and I count myself among them, point out that current control unit conditions are hardly anything like a sensory deprivation chamber. Although segregation is less noisy and stimulating than a general population tier, it is hardly without distractions. Segregated inmates still have access to mail and recreation if they are not segregated for disciplinary reasons. They have contact with other people, although not always other inmates. Most facilities do regular rounds to check on prisoners in segregated tiers, and confined inmates can still have access to psychiatric services. In contrast to the SHU syndrome proponents, I rarely see psychological deterioration in segregated prisoners. There are even inmates who request segregated confinement specifically because it is less stimulating than general population.
So what makes sensory deprivation "cruel and unusual" to some but a source of energy and relaxation to others?
Expectation counts for a lot. Inmates placed in disciplinary segregation are not happy to be there – they are cut off from visits and ready access to the telephone, as well as certain personal property like a radio or television if they had one. A disciplinary segregation inmate enters the cell with the expectation that the experience will be punishment. In contrast, a flotation spa client is prepared for the experience by being told what positive experiences to expect and that these positive effects will carry over after the spa session ends.
Similarly, when I interview prisoners, I find that the most successful ones are those who are able to shift their own individual mindsets from an expectation of punishment to one of anticipated opportunity. The punishment mindset ("I’m here for no reason, so I’m going to spend my time complaining") is a hefty barrier to rehabilitation. An inmate who is able to accept the reality of his confinement and his responsibility for it ("I put myself here, so I better make my time work for me") will find ways to adapt psychologically, regardless of sentence length.
Reading about flotation spas brought on a weird sense of deja vu for me, but it also was a useful reminder of the effects of expectation and outlook for managing many life experiences.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work" (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
Recently, my local newspaper featured a story by Julie Scharper entitled "What I found in the sensory-deprivation chamber" (Baltimore Sun, Jan. 11, 2014) about a new local business known as a flotation spa, a trend currently spreading across the East Coast. For $50 an hour (or $70 for 90 minutes), the customer is escorted to a dark and quiet room, where she floats nude in a body-temperature pool of Epsom salts.
In this environment, the client reportedly enters a "drug-free altered state" intended to soothe aches and tension, as well as ease sleep problems. The author described her experience in the pool, during which she had a vivid daydream of a woman playing a red piano. Soon, a new idea for a children’s book sprang into her mind, and she left the session relaxed and filled with creative energy.
A while ago I reviewed some of the old research about sensory deprivation. Psychologists and psychiatrists began studying this topic following the Korean War, when the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense wanted to learn more about conditions that would make people more susceptible to brainwashing. They placed people in baths of water while covering their eyes and ears, and encased their limbs in protective coverings to minimize tactile input. The subjects were then interviewed about their experiences and were monitored through EEGs. They reported many disturbances, such as alterations in concentration and attention, illusions, anxiety and panic, and perceptual disturbances inaccurately described as hallucinations.
All of these symptoms resolved spontaneously after the subjects were removed from the deprivation chamber. This amorphous constellation of sensations was later given the label "special housing unit" (SHU) syndrome when it occurred in prisoners held in long-term segregation. One longstanding opponent of long-term segregation, who also frequently appeared as an expert in suits against control unit prisons, referred to sensory deprivation as "toxic" to brain functioning and a cause of stupor and delirium in segregated prisoners.
Critics of this theory, and I count myself among them, point out that current control unit conditions are hardly anything like a sensory deprivation chamber. Although segregation is less noisy and stimulating than a general population tier, it is hardly without distractions. Segregated inmates still have access to mail and recreation if they are not segregated for disciplinary reasons. They have contact with other people, although not always other inmates. Most facilities do regular rounds to check on prisoners in segregated tiers, and confined inmates can still have access to psychiatric services. In contrast to the SHU syndrome proponents, I rarely see psychological deterioration in segregated prisoners. There are even inmates who request segregated confinement specifically because it is less stimulating than general population.
So what makes sensory deprivation "cruel and unusual" to some but a source of energy and relaxation to others?
Expectation counts for a lot. Inmates placed in disciplinary segregation are not happy to be there – they are cut off from visits and ready access to the telephone, as well as certain personal property like a radio or television if they had one. A disciplinary segregation inmate enters the cell with the expectation that the experience will be punishment. In contrast, a flotation spa client is prepared for the experience by being told what positive experiences to expect and that these positive effects will carry over after the spa session ends.
Similarly, when I interview prisoners, I find that the most successful ones are those who are able to shift their own individual mindsets from an expectation of punishment to one of anticipated opportunity. The punishment mindset ("I’m here for no reason, so I’m going to spend my time complaining") is a hefty barrier to rehabilitation. An inmate who is able to accept the reality of his confinement and his responsibility for it ("I put myself here, so I better make my time work for me") will find ways to adapt psychologically, regardless of sentence length.
Reading about flotation spas brought on a weird sense of deja vu for me, but it also was a useful reminder of the effects of expectation and outlook for managing many life experiences.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work" (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
Patient assault – An insider’s view
I saw the patient standing near the door of the unit, watching me and shifting from foot to foot. This in itself wasn’t unusual. At our forensic hospital some of the most seriously ill patients have behaviors that are stranger than this if not overtly bizarre. As I was leaving the unit, he approached me, which also wasn’t unusual. Although I wasn’t the ward psychiatrist, a patient might approach a stranger to find out what that person is doing on the unit or just to say hello if the patient knows you from a previous court-ordered evaluation.
I wasn’t expecting him to hit me in the face, twice. My glasses flew off; my head flew to the side, but I was still able to immediately shout for help to the nurses within the station. As soon as the attack began, it stopped. He calmly dropped his hands and walked quietly away. The nurses quickly moved between the two of us, a calming human shield. My initial reaction was anger. I didn’t know this patient, wasn’t his doctor, and had had no previous negative interactions with him. It just wasn’t fair!
"We’ve all been there," my friends and colleagues said later. And this was true; off the top of my head, I counted at least five psychiatrists I knew over the years who had been assaulted by patients. That’s probably an underestimate, given how long it’s been since my residency and my time working in an emergency department.
Still, I consider myself fortunate. I was bruised but not significantly injured, and it could have been worse: a dislocated jaw, a broken nose, a skull fracture, or even homicide. A casual Google search limited to the last 2 months turned up news stories about injuries like this inflicted on staff in state psychiatric facilities in at least five other states, and most of these stories commented on the increasing frequency of patient-on-staff assaults. Some states have even proposed legislation to make patient-on-staff assaults a felony offense regardless of the level of injury.
After the incident I spent about an hour filling out the OSHA-mandated paperwork. One form included a checkbox to answer the question, "Do you want to file criminal charges?" Without a second thought, I checked off "no." In retrospect it was a curious reaction, given my initial anger over the incident. I think instinctively I knew several things: I knew that the patient was likely a person with a treatment-resistant illness, a long-term institutional patient, who was repetitively assaultive in spite of all clinical interventions; I knew that a state’s attorney would likely be unwilling or uninterested in prosecuting someone like that; and finally I knew a prosecution would take many weeks and take up more time than I was willing to invest. My gut instinct was that prosecution would be not only unjust, but also a colossal waste of time.
This is not to say that prosecution of assaultive patients is unjust or useless in all cases; I’m aware of at least one case where the stern admonition of a judge, combined with a substantial suspended sentence, led to an almost miraculous change in behavior.
Apart from forcing me to directly confront the decision about prosecution, the incident gave me the opportunity to question my choice of specialty and working environment. I have to say that safety has never been a primary concern, given that every place I’ve ever worked has made safety a priority. My hospital was even recently given an award for a reduction in assaults. And I’ve always been careful to take personal responsibility for my safety and to speak up if I have a concern about an unsafe patient or situation. This event won’t change the enjoyment I have in my specialty, or my dedication to the work.
I do have a new appreciation for the potential psychological fallout, which I think may be somewhat different for forensic psychiatrists compared with general practitioners. Forensic psychiatrists take pride in being willing and able to work with dangerous patients. Given this, there may be more pressure to respond with bravado and trivialize injury, or deny emotional distress over the incident. There may be embarrassment for failing to predict or assess a potentially dangerous clinical situation. For consultant evaluators, there may be a risk of displaced anger toward evaluees and potential bias toward assaultive criminal defendants. But as with general psychiatrists, awareness is the first step toward minimizing those risks.
Finally, some colleagues view the goals of security and therapy as incompatible, particularly in correctional settings. This incident highlights the fact that the best treatment can be given when both the patient and the clinician feel safe.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work." The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
I saw the patient standing near the door of the unit, watching me and shifting from foot to foot. This in itself wasn’t unusual. At our forensic hospital some of the most seriously ill patients have behaviors that are stranger than this if not overtly bizarre. As I was leaving the unit, he approached me, which also wasn’t unusual. Although I wasn’t the ward psychiatrist, a patient might approach a stranger to find out what that person is doing on the unit or just to say hello if the patient knows you from a previous court-ordered evaluation.
I wasn’t expecting him to hit me in the face, twice. My glasses flew off; my head flew to the side, but I was still able to immediately shout for help to the nurses within the station. As soon as the attack began, it stopped. He calmly dropped his hands and walked quietly away. The nurses quickly moved between the two of us, a calming human shield. My initial reaction was anger. I didn’t know this patient, wasn’t his doctor, and had had no previous negative interactions with him. It just wasn’t fair!
"We’ve all been there," my friends and colleagues said later. And this was true; off the top of my head, I counted at least five psychiatrists I knew over the years who had been assaulted by patients. That’s probably an underestimate, given how long it’s been since my residency and my time working in an emergency department.
Still, I consider myself fortunate. I was bruised but not significantly injured, and it could have been worse: a dislocated jaw, a broken nose, a skull fracture, or even homicide. A casual Google search limited to the last 2 months turned up news stories about injuries like this inflicted on staff in state psychiatric facilities in at least five other states, and most of these stories commented on the increasing frequency of patient-on-staff assaults. Some states have even proposed legislation to make patient-on-staff assaults a felony offense regardless of the level of injury.
After the incident I spent about an hour filling out the OSHA-mandated paperwork. One form included a checkbox to answer the question, "Do you want to file criminal charges?" Without a second thought, I checked off "no." In retrospect it was a curious reaction, given my initial anger over the incident. I think instinctively I knew several things: I knew that the patient was likely a person with a treatment-resistant illness, a long-term institutional patient, who was repetitively assaultive in spite of all clinical interventions; I knew that a state’s attorney would likely be unwilling or uninterested in prosecuting someone like that; and finally I knew a prosecution would take many weeks and take up more time than I was willing to invest. My gut instinct was that prosecution would be not only unjust, but also a colossal waste of time.
This is not to say that prosecution of assaultive patients is unjust or useless in all cases; I’m aware of at least one case where the stern admonition of a judge, combined with a substantial suspended sentence, led to an almost miraculous change in behavior.
Apart from forcing me to directly confront the decision about prosecution, the incident gave me the opportunity to question my choice of specialty and working environment. I have to say that safety has never been a primary concern, given that every place I’ve ever worked has made safety a priority. My hospital was even recently given an award for a reduction in assaults. And I’ve always been careful to take personal responsibility for my safety and to speak up if I have a concern about an unsafe patient or situation. This event won’t change the enjoyment I have in my specialty, or my dedication to the work.
I do have a new appreciation for the potential psychological fallout, which I think may be somewhat different for forensic psychiatrists compared with general practitioners. Forensic psychiatrists take pride in being willing and able to work with dangerous patients. Given this, there may be more pressure to respond with bravado and trivialize injury, or deny emotional distress over the incident. There may be embarrassment for failing to predict or assess a potentially dangerous clinical situation. For consultant evaluators, there may be a risk of displaced anger toward evaluees and potential bias toward assaultive criminal defendants. But as with general psychiatrists, awareness is the first step toward minimizing those risks.
Finally, some colleagues view the goals of security and therapy as incompatible, particularly in correctional settings. This incident highlights the fact that the best treatment can be given when both the patient and the clinician feel safe.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work." The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
I saw the patient standing near the door of the unit, watching me and shifting from foot to foot. This in itself wasn’t unusual. At our forensic hospital some of the most seriously ill patients have behaviors that are stranger than this if not overtly bizarre. As I was leaving the unit, he approached me, which also wasn’t unusual. Although I wasn’t the ward psychiatrist, a patient might approach a stranger to find out what that person is doing on the unit or just to say hello if the patient knows you from a previous court-ordered evaluation.
I wasn’t expecting him to hit me in the face, twice. My glasses flew off; my head flew to the side, but I was still able to immediately shout for help to the nurses within the station. As soon as the attack began, it stopped. He calmly dropped his hands and walked quietly away. The nurses quickly moved between the two of us, a calming human shield. My initial reaction was anger. I didn’t know this patient, wasn’t his doctor, and had had no previous negative interactions with him. It just wasn’t fair!
"We’ve all been there," my friends and colleagues said later. And this was true; off the top of my head, I counted at least five psychiatrists I knew over the years who had been assaulted by patients. That’s probably an underestimate, given how long it’s been since my residency and my time working in an emergency department.
Still, I consider myself fortunate. I was bruised but not significantly injured, and it could have been worse: a dislocated jaw, a broken nose, a skull fracture, or even homicide. A casual Google search limited to the last 2 months turned up news stories about injuries like this inflicted on staff in state psychiatric facilities in at least five other states, and most of these stories commented on the increasing frequency of patient-on-staff assaults. Some states have even proposed legislation to make patient-on-staff assaults a felony offense regardless of the level of injury.
After the incident I spent about an hour filling out the OSHA-mandated paperwork. One form included a checkbox to answer the question, "Do you want to file criminal charges?" Without a second thought, I checked off "no." In retrospect it was a curious reaction, given my initial anger over the incident. I think instinctively I knew several things: I knew that the patient was likely a person with a treatment-resistant illness, a long-term institutional patient, who was repetitively assaultive in spite of all clinical interventions; I knew that a state’s attorney would likely be unwilling or uninterested in prosecuting someone like that; and finally I knew a prosecution would take many weeks and take up more time than I was willing to invest. My gut instinct was that prosecution would be not only unjust, but also a colossal waste of time.
This is not to say that prosecution of assaultive patients is unjust or useless in all cases; I’m aware of at least one case where the stern admonition of a judge, combined with a substantial suspended sentence, led to an almost miraculous change in behavior.
Apart from forcing me to directly confront the decision about prosecution, the incident gave me the opportunity to question my choice of specialty and working environment. I have to say that safety has never been a primary concern, given that every place I’ve ever worked has made safety a priority. My hospital was even recently given an award for a reduction in assaults. And I’ve always been careful to take personal responsibility for my safety and to speak up if I have a concern about an unsafe patient or situation. This event won’t change the enjoyment I have in my specialty, or my dedication to the work.
I do have a new appreciation for the potential psychological fallout, which I think may be somewhat different for forensic psychiatrists compared with general practitioners. Forensic psychiatrists take pride in being willing and able to work with dangerous patients. Given this, there may be more pressure to respond with bravado and trivialize injury, or deny emotional distress over the incident. There may be embarrassment for failing to predict or assess a potentially dangerous clinical situation. For consultant evaluators, there may be a risk of displaced anger toward evaluees and potential bias toward assaultive criminal defendants. But as with general psychiatrists, awareness is the first step toward minimizing those risks.
Finally, some colleagues view the goals of security and therapy as incompatible, particularly in correctional settings. This incident highlights the fact that the best treatment can be given when both the patient and the clinician feel safe.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work." The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
Popular cartoonist illustrates pain of end-of-life care
In a recent blog post, Scott Adams, cartoonist and creator of the popular Dilbert comic strip, talked about his dying father. At the age of 86, his father’s mind was mostly gone and his physical lifespan tenuous. His estate was paying $8,000 a month to provide essentially custodial health care. While the details of his father’s condition were never revealed, Mr. Adams’ grief was undisguised. His anger at his father’s prolonged suffering was raw and unfiltered.
Entitled "I Hope My Father Dies Soon," his blog post excoriated anyone opposed to the idea of physician-assisted suicide:
"If you’re a politician who has ever voted against doctor-assisted suicide, or you would vote against it in the future, I hate your [expletive deleted] guts and I would like you to die a long, horrible death. I would be happy to kill you personally and watch you bleed out. I won’t do that, because I fear the consequences. But I’d enjoy it, because you [expletive deleted] are responsible for torturing my father."
He blamed the government for making his father suffer by taking away the option of physician-assisted suicide.
Hours after the post was published, his father died. Hundreds of readers wrote in to offer condolences and support, and there were more than 5,000 votes on the comments that followed, most in favor of physician-assisted suicide. Many castigated the medical profession and hospitals in general for prolonging suffering at great financial expense, and boiled the issue down to one of mere greed. While I didn’t get through all of the comments, none of comments I read were from people who identified themselves as physicians.
There were a lot of unanswered questions behind this post: Why there was no living will or advance directive, no specifics about who had decision-making authority in the family, and what role (if any) palliative care had in the case or if pain control was an issue. In situations like this, sometimes legal decision-making authority is only part of the picture and end-of-life care gets complicated by family dynamics, financial, or religious concerns.
During the training year, my forensic program addresses state statutes and cases related to advance directives, the right to refuse medical care, and assisted suicide. We talk about the right to privacy and personal autonomy, as well as the potential abuse of assisted suicide. We talk about cases like Karen Ann Quinlan, Nancy Cruzan, and Terry Schiavo. We cover the Supreme Court cases that address constitutional issues related to euthanasia, and the legal reasoning behind historical prohibitions against suicide.
Presently only two states, Oregon and Washington, allow physicians to administer lethal medications to patients. Two state appellate courts have found that a law banning discussion of suicide methods was an unconstitutional restriction of free speech. In my state, it is a misdemeanor criminal offense to knowingly provide the means to commit suicide, and as recently as last spring, one local circuit court criminally prosecuted someone for this.
Recently the New England Journal of Medicine sponsored an online opinion survey about the issue. Readers from 74 countries weighed in, and two-thirds were opposed to the practice. Among American states, only 18 voted in favor of permitting it.
Surveys and case law do little to capture how painfully personal end-of-life decisions are. As Mr. Adams’ post illustrates, all of these intellectual discussions feel sterile when confronted with the real, acute misery of a suffering family. The next time this topic comes up in our training year, I’m going to include his post as suggested reading.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work" (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
In a recent blog post, Scott Adams, cartoonist and creator of the popular Dilbert comic strip, talked about his dying father. At the age of 86, his father’s mind was mostly gone and his physical lifespan tenuous. His estate was paying $8,000 a month to provide essentially custodial health care. While the details of his father’s condition were never revealed, Mr. Adams’ grief was undisguised. His anger at his father’s prolonged suffering was raw and unfiltered.
Entitled "I Hope My Father Dies Soon," his blog post excoriated anyone opposed to the idea of physician-assisted suicide:
"If you’re a politician who has ever voted against doctor-assisted suicide, or you would vote against it in the future, I hate your [expletive deleted] guts and I would like you to die a long, horrible death. I would be happy to kill you personally and watch you bleed out. I won’t do that, because I fear the consequences. But I’d enjoy it, because you [expletive deleted] are responsible for torturing my father."
He blamed the government for making his father suffer by taking away the option of physician-assisted suicide.
Hours after the post was published, his father died. Hundreds of readers wrote in to offer condolences and support, and there were more than 5,000 votes on the comments that followed, most in favor of physician-assisted suicide. Many castigated the medical profession and hospitals in general for prolonging suffering at great financial expense, and boiled the issue down to one of mere greed. While I didn’t get through all of the comments, none of comments I read were from people who identified themselves as physicians.
There were a lot of unanswered questions behind this post: Why there was no living will or advance directive, no specifics about who had decision-making authority in the family, and what role (if any) palliative care had in the case or if pain control was an issue. In situations like this, sometimes legal decision-making authority is only part of the picture and end-of-life care gets complicated by family dynamics, financial, or religious concerns.
During the training year, my forensic program addresses state statutes and cases related to advance directives, the right to refuse medical care, and assisted suicide. We talk about the right to privacy and personal autonomy, as well as the potential abuse of assisted suicide. We talk about cases like Karen Ann Quinlan, Nancy Cruzan, and Terry Schiavo. We cover the Supreme Court cases that address constitutional issues related to euthanasia, and the legal reasoning behind historical prohibitions against suicide.
Presently only two states, Oregon and Washington, allow physicians to administer lethal medications to patients. Two state appellate courts have found that a law banning discussion of suicide methods was an unconstitutional restriction of free speech. In my state, it is a misdemeanor criminal offense to knowingly provide the means to commit suicide, and as recently as last spring, one local circuit court criminally prosecuted someone for this.
Recently the New England Journal of Medicine sponsored an online opinion survey about the issue. Readers from 74 countries weighed in, and two-thirds were opposed to the practice. Among American states, only 18 voted in favor of permitting it.
Surveys and case law do little to capture how painfully personal end-of-life decisions are. As Mr. Adams’ post illustrates, all of these intellectual discussions feel sterile when confronted with the real, acute misery of a suffering family. The next time this topic comes up in our training year, I’m going to include his post as suggested reading.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work" (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
In a recent blog post, Scott Adams, cartoonist and creator of the popular Dilbert comic strip, talked about his dying father. At the age of 86, his father’s mind was mostly gone and his physical lifespan tenuous. His estate was paying $8,000 a month to provide essentially custodial health care. While the details of his father’s condition were never revealed, Mr. Adams’ grief was undisguised. His anger at his father’s prolonged suffering was raw and unfiltered.
Entitled "I Hope My Father Dies Soon," his blog post excoriated anyone opposed to the idea of physician-assisted suicide:
"If you’re a politician who has ever voted against doctor-assisted suicide, or you would vote against it in the future, I hate your [expletive deleted] guts and I would like you to die a long, horrible death. I would be happy to kill you personally and watch you bleed out. I won’t do that, because I fear the consequences. But I’d enjoy it, because you [expletive deleted] are responsible for torturing my father."
He blamed the government for making his father suffer by taking away the option of physician-assisted suicide.
Hours after the post was published, his father died. Hundreds of readers wrote in to offer condolences and support, and there were more than 5,000 votes on the comments that followed, most in favor of physician-assisted suicide. Many castigated the medical profession and hospitals in general for prolonging suffering at great financial expense, and boiled the issue down to one of mere greed. While I didn’t get through all of the comments, none of comments I read were from people who identified themselves as physicians.
There were a lot of unanswered questions behind this post: Why there was no living will or advance directive, no specifics about who had decision-making authority in the family, and what role (if any) palliative care had in the case or if pain control was an issue. In situations like this, sometimes legal decision-making authority is only part of the picture and end-of-life care gets complicated by family dynamics, financial, or religious concerns.
During the training year, my forensic program addresses state statutes and cases related to advance directives, the right to refuse medical care, and assisted suicide. We talk about the right to privacy and personal autonomy, as well as the potential abuse of assisted suicide. We talk about cases like Karen Ann Quinlan, Nancy Cruzan, and Terry Schiavo. We cover the Supreme Court cases that address constitutional issues related to euthanasia, and the legal reasoning behind historical prohibitions against suicide.
Presently only two states, Oregon and Washington, allow physicians to administer lethal medications to patients. Two state appellate courts have found that a law banning discussion of suicide methods was an unconstitutional restriction of free speech. In my state, it is a misdemeanor criminal offense to knowingly provide the means to commit suicide, and as recently as last spring, one local circuit court criminally prosecuted someone for this.
Recently the New England Journal of Medicine sponsored an online opinion survey about the issue. Readers from 74 countries weighed in, and two-thirds were opposed to the practice. Among American states, only 18 voted in favor of permitting it.
Surveys and case law do little to capture how painfully personal end-of-life decisions are. As Mr. Adams’ post illustrates, all of these intellectual discussions feel sterile when confronted with the real, acute misery of a suffering family. The next time this topic comes up in our training year, I’m going to include his post as suggested reading.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work" (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
ICE and the inpatient psychiatrist
Lately, I’ve been immersing myself in the complex and convoluted world of immigration law. I’ve spoken to law professors and immigration lawyers about this because there were many aspects that didn’t seem to make sense to me, and I figured I just didn’t understand it. After talking with the professionals, I realized I understood it just fine. The laws just didn’t make sense. The adjective that I frequently heard in reference to immigration law was "the Wild West" – an area so new and unsettled that nobody really knew how the process was supposed to work, particularly as applied to mentally ill immigrants facing deportation.
The fun aspect to learning a new area of law is that you get to see fundamental issues challenged and established for the first time, kind of like watching a man land on the moon or the launch of the first space shuttle. The disturbing aspect of it is that real people and real human lives are being disrupted and abused in the process.
Which leads me to the story of José Franco-Gonzales.
José Franco-Gonzales was petitioned for deportation (also known as "removal") after spending a year in the California correctional system. Upon release, he was taken into custody by Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and transferred to an immigration detention center, a civil facility housing people facing deportation who haven’t yet had a deportation hearing. (See a video about José here.)
Franco-Gonzales was moderately cognitively impaired and did not have sufficient English skills to defend himself in court. When a psychiatrist opined that he was incompetent to participate in a deportation hearing, the immigration judge administratively closed the case, leaving the man in a legal limbo. He was forgotten – legally and literally – and held in an ICE facility for 4 years, in spite of the fact that he had already served time for his crime and had no new criminal charges pending. Eventually, an American Civil Liberties Union lawyer happened to stumble over his case and filed a habeas corpus petition on his behalf.
He was released in 2010, and his case was combined with others to form a class action suit against the Department of Homeland Security on behalf of all mentally ill, unrepresented detainees in Washington, California, and Oregon. The suit was brought by the ACLU and several other legal advocacy organizations. The suit sought to require qualified legal representation for the incompetent detainees and to allow them to have a bond hearing after 6 months of detention. This past April, the California district court agreed that this was necessary and ordered the government to put these protections in place.
This order hasn’t been challenged or appealed by the government, which is now scrambling to allocate funds and resources to provide low-cost or pro bono counsel and to locate psychiatrists willing to do competency assessments. While this order applies only to the states involved in the case, it is likely that this will soon become the law of the land once other cases are brought elsewhere. In 2011, there were 429,000 immigration detainees in 250 ICE facilities across the country and 15% of them had a mental disability. More than half of those had no legal representation.
I know that few psychiatrists reading this article will have any interest in the law generally or immigration law in particular. I think it is important for psychiatrists to know about this situation, because it’s pretty likely that at any point in time any doctor reading this article could have an undocumented immigrant on his inpatient unit. In that case, an inpatient service could be served with something called an immigration detainer, in other words, a notice from ICE that the patient is being petitioned for removal. The detainer is a request to hold the patient until he or she can be taken into custody by ICE.
Inpatient psychiatrists should be aware that this detainer is not binding. It is a merely an unenforceable request, not a court order, and it doesn’t bar a patient discharge. If the patient is seriously mentally ill, discharging the patient into the custody of ICE could mean that you are sending the patient out of state to an immigration detention center far away from his family, without a lawyer or right to a hearing, indefinitely. You don’t need to care about immigration law to know that would be a bad thing.
If a mentally ill inpatient is taken into custody, the patient’s family can be advised that the Executive Office for Immigration Review maintains a state-by-state list of pro bono legal service providers.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work." The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
Lately, I’ve been immersing myself in the complex and convoluted world of immigration law. I’ve spoken to law professors and immigration lawyers about this because there were many aspects that didn’t seem to make sense to me, and I figured I just didn’t understand it. After talking with the professionals, I realized I understood it just fine. The laws just didn’t make sense. The adjective that I frequently heard in reference to immigration law was "the Wild West" – an area so new and unsettled that nobody really knew how the process was supposed to work, particularly as applied to mentally ill immigrants facing deportation.
The fun aspect to learning a new area of law is that you get to see fundamental issues challenged and established for the first time, kind of like watching a man land on the moon or the launch of the first space shuttle. The disturbing aspect of it is that real people and real human lives are being disrupted and abused in the process.
Which leads me to the story of José Franco-Gonzales.
José Franco-Gonzales was petitioned for deportation (also known as "removal") after spending a year in the California correctional system. Upon release, he was taken into custody by Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and transferred to an immigration detention center, a civil facility housing people facing deportation who haven’t yet had a deportation hearing. (See a video about José here.)
Franco-Gonzales was moderately cognitively impaired and did not have sufficient English skills to defend himself in court. When a psychiatrist opined that he was incompetent to participate in a deportation hearing, the immigration judge administratively closed the case, leaving the man in a legal limbo. He was forgotten – legally and literally – and held in an ICE facility for 4 years, in spite of the fact that he had already served time for his crime and had no new criminal charges pending. Eventually, an American Civil Liberties Union lawyer happened to stumble over his case and filed a habeas corpus petition on his behalf.
He was released in 2010, and his case was combined with others to form a class action suit against the Department of Homeland Security on behalf of all mentally ill, unrepresented detainees in Washington, California, and Oregon. The suit was brought by the ACLU and several other legal advocacy organizations. The suit sought to require qualified legal representation for the incompetent detainees and to allow them to have a bond hearing after 6 months of detention. This past April, the California district court agreed that this was necessary and ordered the government to put these protections in place.
This order hasn’t been challenged or appealed by the government, which is now scrambling to allocate funds and resources to provide low-cost or pro bono counsel and to locate psychiatrists willing to do competency assessments. While this order applies only to the states involved in the case, it is likely that this will soon become the law of the land once other cases are brought elsewhere. In 2011, there were 429,000 immigration detainees in 250 ICE facilities across the country and 15% of them had a mental disability. More than half of those had no legal representation.
I know that few psychiatrists reading this article will have any interest in the law generally or immigration law in particular. I think it is important for psychiatrists to know about this situation, because it’s pretty likely that at any point in time any doctor reading this article could have an undocumented immigrant on his inpatient unit. In that case, an inpatient service could be served with something called an immigration detainer, in other words, a notice from ICE that the patient is being petitioned for removal. The detainer is a request to hold the patient until he or she can be taken into custody by ICE.
Inpatient psychiatrists should be aware that this detainer is not binding. It is a merely an unenforceable request, not a court order, and it doesn’t bar a patient discharge. If the patient is seriously mentally ill, discharging the patient into the custody of ICE could mean that you are sending the patient out of state to an immigration detention center far away from his family, without a lawyer or right to a hearing, indefinitely. You don’t need to care about immigration law to know that would be a bad thing.
If a mentally ill inpatient is taken into custody, the patient’s family can be advised that the Executive Office for Immigration Review maintains a state-by-state list of pro bono legal service providers.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work." The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
Lately, I’ve been immersing myself in the complex and convoluted world of immigration law. I’ve spoken to law professors and immigration lawyers about this because there were many aspects that didn’t seem to make sense to me, and I figured I just didn’t understand it. After talking with the professionals, I realized I understood it just fine. The laws just didn’t make sense. The adjective that I frequently heard in reference to immigration law was "the Wild West" – an area so new and unsettled that nobody really knew how the process was supposed to work, particularly as applied to mentally ill immigrants facing deportation.
The fun aspect to learning a new area of law is that you get to see fundamental issues challenged and established for the first time, kind of like watching a man land on the moon or the launch of the first space shuttle. The disturbing aspect of it is that real people and real human lives are being disrupted and abused in the process.
Which leads me to the story of José Franco-Gonzales.
José Franco-Gonzales was petitioned for deportation (also known as "removal") after spending a year in the California correctional system. Upon release, he was taken into custody by Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and transferred to an immigration detention center, a civil facility housing people facing deportation who haven’t yet had a deportation hearing. (See a video about José here.)
Franco-Gonzales was moderately cognitively impaired and did not have sufficient English skills to defend himself in court. When a psychiatrist opined that he was incompetent to participate in a deportation hearing, the immigration judge administratively closed the case, leaving the man in a legal limbo. He was forgotten – legally and literally – and held in an ICE facility for 4 years, in spite of the fact that he had already served time for his crime and had no new criminal charges pending. Eventually, an American Civil Liberties Union lawyer happened to stumble over his case and filed a habeas corpus petition on his behalf.
He was released in 2010, and his case was combined with others to form a class action suit against the Department of Homeland Security on behalf of all mentally ill, unrepresented detainees in Washington, California, and Oregon. The suit was brought by the ACLU and several other legal advocacy organizations. The suit sought to require qualified legal representation for the incompetent detainees and to allow them to have a bond hearing after 6 months of detention. This past April, the California district court agreed that this was necessary and ordered the government to put these protections in place.
This order hasn’t been challenged or appealed by the government, which is now scrambling to allocate funds and resources to provide low-cost or pro bono counsel and to locate psychiatrists willing to do competency assessments. While this order applies only to the states involved in the case, it is likely that this will soon become the law of the land once other cases are brought elsewhere. In 2011, there were 429,000 immigration detainees in 250 ICE facilities across the country and 15% of them had a mental disability. More than half of those had no legal representation.
I know that few psychiatrists reading this article will have any interest in the law generally or immigration law in particular. I think it is important for psychiatrists to know about this situation, because it’s pretty likely that at any point in time any doctor reading this article could have an undocumented immigrant on his inpatient unit. In that case, an inpatient service could be served with something called an immigration detainer, in other words, a notice from ICE that the patient is being petitioned for removal. The detainer is a request to hold the patient until he or she can be taken into custody by ICE.
Inpatient psychiatrists should be aware that this detainer is not binding. It is a merely an unenforceable request, not a court order, and it doesn’t bar a patient discharge. If the patient is seriously mentally ill, discharging the patient into the custody of ICE could mean that you are sending the patient out of state to an immigration detention center far away from his family, without a lawyer or right to a hearing, indefinitely. You don’t need to care about immigration law to know that would be a bad thing.
If a mentally ill inpatient is taken into custody, the patient’s family can be advised that the Executive Office for Immigration Review maintains a state-by-state list of pro bono legal service providers.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work." The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson’s employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
Consultation to law enforcement: A case study for the early career psychiatrist
Recently, I received a phone call from a local homicide detective. He was investigating the death of a child, and the suspect in the case was a 19-year-old woman who was also a caretaker. She had a history of psychiatric problems, and family members implicated her in the death of another child. The detective expressed concern about a potential future risk to other children in the home, and he wanted help with his investigation.
While speaking to a detective can be a routine part of forensic work, this is usually done in the context of a larger pretrial evaluation after someone is charged with a crime. Psychiatry residents looking for a career in forensic psychiatry, as well as some members of the general public, sometimes think of forensic work as being a CSI-type investigator who helps the police catch the "bad guy." In fact, consultation to law enforcement is a tricky business fraught with ethical implications.
Let’s consider what this detective wanted. The first issue he wanted help with involved the design of interrogation questions. He wanted to know what he should ask this young woman to trigger a "tell," or in other words, a reaction indicative of guilt. His second question was to ask for help eliciting information that could be grounds for an involuntary psychiatric admission – an opportunity for "further study" or information-gathering, potentially for incriminating purposes.
There are several ethical imperatives for both general and forensic psychiatrists that apply to this situation. Honesty, nonmalfeasance, and respect for persons would always require a psychiatrist to disclose the purpose and limits of questioning, and to refrain from aiding or participating in deceptive practices. Deception is a standard practice in an interrogation and is legally allowed for police investigators. Identifying points of psychological weakness to elicit a confession, true or otherwise, would violate the principle of nonmalfeasance. The forensic psychiatrist’s duty to strive for objectivity would be violated by accepting the investigator’s implication of guilt. Finally, general medical ethics dictates that a physician should practice competently within the limits of one’s training and experience. Neither general nor forensic training prepares a practitioner to be a qualified lie detector.
Once the investigator failed to get the response he had hoped for to either question, he fell back to the last resort of a risk to public safety. "Think of the children," he told me, thus giving me a firsthand taste of another interrogation tactic – an emotional appeal for empathy and justice. This guy was good.
Psychiatry as a profession bears a duty to exercise police powers in order to protect public safety under certain well-circumscribed conditions. Professionals who consult with law enforcement take the position that this duty must supersede the imperatives I’ve just outlined. My personal view is that this line of justification has been extended far enough; psychiatry is now at risk of being coopted and corrupted in the name of safety and national security. A psychiatrist’s skills should not be usurped and turned against those they were designed to protect and treat.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work" (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson's employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
Recently, I received a phone call from a local homicide detective. He was investigating the death of a child, and the suspect in the case was a 19-year-old woman who was also a caretaker. She had a history of psychiatric problems, and family members implicated her in the death of another child. The detective expressed concern about a potential future risk to other children in the home, and he wanted help with his investigation.
While speaking to a detective can be a routine part of forensic work, this is usually done in the context of a larger pretrial evaluation after someone is charged with a crime. Psychiatry residents looking for a career in forensic psychiatry, as well as some members of the general public, sometimes think of forensic work as being a CSI-type investigator who helps the police catch the "bad guy." In fact, consultation to law enforcement is a tricky business fraught with ethical implications.
Let’s consider what this detective wanted. The first issue he wanted help with involved the design of interrogation questions. He wanted to know what he should ask this young woman to trigger a "tell," or in other words, a reaction indicative of guilt. His second question was to ask for help eliciting information that could be grounds for an involuntary psychiatric admission – an opportunity for "further study" or information-gathering, potentially for incriminating purposes.
There are several ethical imperatives for both general and forensic psychiatrists that apply to this situation. Honesty, nonmalfeasance, and respect for persons would always require a psychiatrist to disclose the purpose and limits of questioning, and to refrain from aiding or participating in deceptive practices. Deception is a standard practice in an interrogation and is legally allowed for police investigators. Identifying points of psychological weakness to elicit a confession, true or otherwise, would violate the principle of nonmalfeasance. The forensic psychiatrist’s duty to strive for objectivity would be violated by accepting the investigator’s implication of guilt. Finally, general medical ethics dictates that a physician should practice competently within the limits of one’s training and experience. Neither general nor forensic training prepares a practitioner to be a qualified lie detector.
Once the investigator failed to get the response he had hoped for to either question, he fell back to the last resort of a risk to public safety. "Think of the children," he told me, thus giving me a firsthand taste of another interrogation tactic – an emotional appeal for empathy and justice. This guy was good.
Psychiatry as a profession bears a duty to exercise police powers in order to protect public safety under certain well-circumscribed conditions. Professionals who consult with law enforcement take the position that this duty must supersede the imperatives I’ve just outlined. My personal view is that this line of justification has been extended far enough; psychiatry is now at risk of being coopted and corrupted in the name of safety and national security. A psychiatrist’s skills should not be usurped and turned against those they were designed to protect and treat.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work" (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson's employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.
Recently, I received a phone call from a local homicide detective. He was investigating the death of a child, and the suspect in the case was a 19-year-old woman who was also a caretaker. She had a history of psychiatric problems, and family members implicated her in the death of another child. The detective expressed concern about a potential future risk to other children in the home, and he wanted help with his investigation.
While speaking to a detective can be a routine part of forensic work, this is usually done in the context of a larger pretrial evaluation after someone is charged with a crime. Psychiatry residents looking for a career in forensic psychiatry, as well as some members of the general public, sometimes think of forensic work as being a CSI-type investigator who helps the police catch the "bad guy." In fact, consultation to law enforcement is a tricky business fraught with ethical implications.
Let’s consider what this detective wanted. The first issue he wanted help with involved the design of interrogation questions. He wanted to know what he should ask this young woman to trigger a "tell," or in other words, a reaction indicative of guilt. His second question was to ask for help eliciting information that could be grounds for an involuntary psychiatric admission – an opportunity for "further study" or information-gathering, potentially for incriminating purposes.
There are several ethical imperatives for both general and forensic psychiatrists that apply to this situation. Honesty, nonmalfeasance, and respect for persons would always require a psychiatrist to disclose the purpose and limits of questioning, and to refrain from aiding or participating in deceptive practices. Deception is a standard practice in an interrogation and is legally allowed for police investigators. Identifying points of psychological weakness to elicit a confession, true or otherwise, would violate the principle of nonmalfeasance. The forensic psychiatrist’s duty to strive for objectivity would be violated by accepting the investigator’s implication of guilt. Finally, general medical ethics dictates that a physician should practice competently within the limits of one’s training and experience. Neither general nor forensic training prepares a practitioner to be a qualified lie detector.
Once the investigator failed to get the response he had hoped for to either question, he fell back to the last resort of a risk to public safety. "Think of the children," he told me, thus giving me a firsthand taste of another interrogation tactic – an emotional appeal for empathy and justice. This guy was good.
Psychiatry as a profession bears a duty to exercise police powers in order to protect public safety under certain well-circumscribed conditions. Professionals who consult with law enforcement take the position that this duty must supersede the imperatives I’ve just outlined. My personal view is that this line of justification has been extended far enough; psychiatry is now at risk of being coopted and corrupted in the name of safety and national security. A psychiatrist’s skills should not be usurped and turned against those they were designed to protect and treat.
Dr. Hanson is a forensic psychiatrist and coauthor of "Shrink Rap: Three Psychiatrists Explain Their Work" (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). The opinions expressed are those of the author only, and do not represent those of any of Dr. Hanson's employers or consultees, including the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or the Maryland Division of Correction.