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fagges
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faiged
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faiges
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felched
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felchered
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felchingly
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fellateing
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fellatioing
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feltched
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feltches
feltching
feltchly
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feomed
feomer
feomes
feoming
feomly
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fisteder
fistedes
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fisting
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fistyer
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fistying
fistyly
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floozyed
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floozyes
floozying
floozyly
floozys
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foaded
foader
foades
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foadly
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fondleer
fondlees
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foobarly
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freexed
freexer
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freexly
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frigga
friggaed
friggaer
friggaes
friggaing
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frigger
frigges
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friggly
friggs
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fubared
fubarer
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fubarly
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fuckedly
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fuckered
fuckerer
fuckeres
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A medical center is not a hospital: Reflections of a department chair still in the game

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A medical center is not a hospital: Reflections of a department chair still in the game

Dr. Thomas Lansdale’s commentary in the September issue (Cleve Clin J Med 2008; 75:618–622) resonated with many physicians because he so eloquently captured the increasing frustration many physicians feel:

  • Frustration at the loss of a hospital culture that many of us loved;
  • Frustration at the increasing challenges of providing effective medical care;
  • Frustration with the increasing difficulty of providing outstanding education to future generations of physicians;
  • Frustration at the escalating pressure to increase productivity and efficiency, shorten length of stay, reduce cost, improve quality, and enhance patient safety and satisfaction, all at the same time;
  • Frustration at the nursing shortage and the need for more and more paperwork that takes physicians and nurses away from the bedside;
  • Frustration with the ascendancy of third-party payers who dictate reimbursement and deny payment for care that is often necessary; and
  • Frustration with hospital administrators who themselves are struggling to maintain the viability of our institutions at a time of escalating financial stress in health care.

Not all change has been for the worse

I trained in the same era as Dr. Lansdale and Dr. Brian Mandell (editor of CCJM), though at a different institution. Dr. Lansdale perfectly captured the ethos of the hospitals where I worked. Those were the days when house officers and nurses were in it together and bonded, when “everybody knew everybody,” when house staff and nurses ran patient care, and when we kept patients in the hospital for as long as we deemed necessary and got reimbursed for it. Those were also the days (before Libby Zion) when attending oversight was sometimes marginal (attending rounds happened on the wards three times a week for 45–60 minutes), when 36-hour shifts without sleep were common, when hospital-acquired infections were felt to be the cost of doing business and were not tracked (let alone prevented), when quality and patient safety were not articulated as drivers, when medication errors weren’t on the radar screen, when professionalism was not a core competency and we jokingly referred to some patients as “gomers,” when patient satisfaction didn’t matter, and when answering a question that came up on rounds required a trip to the library to sort through textbooks and journals in the stacks, rather than a few minutes on the computer. A lot has changed in hospitals and health care over the last 30 years, and not all of it for the worse.

I have been in medical leadership positions for the past 16 years, as a division chief for 10 and as a chair of medicine for the past 6. Maybe I’ve been lucky, but I have worked at institutions where there has been a commitment to medical education and to quality and patient safety. My current institution has quality as the dominant strategic goal, and we have tried to put our money where our mouth is. Hospital administrators and physician leaders are remarkably aligned in support of this goal, and we have won numerous national awards for the quality of our care. Educational innovation is another institutional strategic goal, which we have supported with hard money to fund teaching time for our faculty. Despite these commitments, physicians in our community share many of the frustrations articulated by Dr. Lansdale. Even at institutions with physician and hospital leadership aligned around goals of importance to doctors, these are tough times.

 

 

Some ideas for the future

In the editorial that accompanied Dr. Lansdale’s commentary, Dr. Mandell asked not just for complaints, but for ideas and potential solutions. Here are a few, none of them an easy or quick fix.

  • Never in the history of medicine has physician leadership been so important. We need more physicians in senior leadership positions at health care institutions and hospitals. Physician leaders need to better collaborate with and influence hospital leaders to accomplish the goals we care about. We also need to recognize the very real stresses that hospital administrators face and to work with them as partners rather than adversaries. Similarly, hospital administrators need to partner with and not marginalize physicians.
  • Physicians and physician leaders need to accept and manage change. Doctors don’t like change, but we need to better influence it to the advantage of our patients, our profession, and the next generation of physicians we train. As an example, Dr. Lansdale correctly laments poor hand hygiene practices. We as physicians are often the worst offenders. If physicians don’t drive adoption of this simple but vitally important practice, who should?
  • We need to re-engineer care in hospitals to drive it back to the bedside. This means developing multidisciplinary-team care that is patient- and family-centered. Technology needs to be used to support rather than impede that care. For example, as Dr. Lansdale noted, physician order entry and computerized software that provides medication alerts will not prevent all errors, but will prevent some. Physician leaders must partner with others in their organizations to develop systems that prevent the administration of the wrong medications to the wrong patients, such as positive patient identification.
  • For those of us at teaching hospitals, we as physician leaders must protect the educational and academic missions and convince our colleagues in hospital administration of the vital importance of doing so. For teaching, this means finding money to fund faculty time.
  • We also need to develop innovative educational strategies that enhance the education of medical students, residents, fellows, and nurses in this era of declining hospital length of stay, where providers see only a very short segment of a patient’s entire illness. This will require redesigning residency and medical student curricula to include shorter alternating block schedules of inpatient and outpatient time that enable residents and students to follow their patients after hospitalization through the continuum of care. We need to employ simulation technology to teach students and residents technical and critical thinking skills.
  • We also need to embed quality measurement and improvement, patient safety, and the development of teamwork skills into our medical school and residency curricula. These are vital skills for the future.
  • For better and worse, hospital medicine is likely here to stay. The system has many advantages but some disadvantages, mainly related to the lack of nuanced knowledge about new patients and the issue of handoffs. We need to devise seamless and standardized systems that optimize communication and patient safety at admission, during hospitalization, and through the continuum of care.
  • We need to be far more aggressive at challenging denials from third-party payers for care that is appropriate. That said, we as physicians and physician leaders also need to look for ways to provide more efficient and effective care. This means constantly re-examining our practices. Our patients and insurers have every right to expect quality, and we have an obligation to provide it. In turn, third-party payers have an obligation to pay for it, and not just with paltry quality incentives whose true goal sometimes appears to be to deny payment and reduce overall reimbursement.

Medicine is still a great profession

My oldest daughter, Sarah, is a third-year medical student at another institution and is now completing her last core clerkship. She chose to apply to medical school after working for several years after college. My wife and I, both physicians, were silent about a career in medicine until she ultimately asked our opinion. Despite the many challenges outlined by Dr. Lansdale, we encouraged her. Medicine is still a great profession where, despite our challenges, one can wake up every day and make a contribution to peoples’ lives. I talk with Sarah each evening. For her, the excitement of the hospital is no different than what Dr. Lansdale and I experienced 30 years ago.

For me, the most discouraging thing about Dr. Lansdale’s commentary is its conclusion. I do not know Dr. Lansdale personally, but I know of him. He has the reputation of being a superb clinician and teacher. It’s disappointing that he has hung up the cleats. We desperately need people like Dr. Lansdale in the game because it is far more than a game. If we as physicians and physician leaders don’t solve the problems we face, who will?

Times are tough, but I’m still a hospital guy.

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Professor of Medicine and Deputy Chairman, Department of Medicine, Tufts University School of Medicine; Chairman, Department of Medicine, Baystate Health System, Springfield, MA

Address: David L. Longworth, MD, Baystate Medical Center, Department of Medicine, 759 Chestnut Street, Springfield, MA 01199; e-mail [email protected]

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Dr. Thomas Lansdale’s commentary in the September issue (Cleve Clin J Med 2008; 75:618–622) resonated with many physicians because he so eloquently captured the increasing frustration many physicians feel:

  • Frustration at the loss of a hospital culture that many of us loved;
  • Frustration at the increasing challenges of providing effective medical care;
  • Frustration with the increasing difficulty of providing outstanding education to future generations of physicians;
  • Frustration at the escalating pressure to increase productivity and efficiency, shorten length of stay, reduce cost, improve quality, and enhance patient safety and satisfaction, all at the same time;
  • Frustration at the nursing shortage and the need for more and more paperwork that takes physicians and nurses away from the bedside;
  • Frustration with the ascendancy of third-party payers who dictate reimbursement and deny payment for care that is often necessary; and
  • Frustration with hospital administrators who themselves are struggling to maintain the viability of our institutions at a time of escalating financial stress in health care.

Not all change has been for the worse

I trained in the same era as Dr. Lansdale and Dr. Brian Mandell (editor of CCJM), though at a different institution. Dr. Lansdale perfectly captured the ethos of the hospitals where I worked. Those were the days when house officers and nurses were in it together and bonded, when “everybody knew everybody,” when house staff and nurses ran patient care, and when we kept patients in the hospital for as long as we deemed necessary and got reimbursed for it. Those were also the days (before Libby Zion) when attending oversight was sometimes marginal (attending rounds happened on the wards three times a week for 45–60 minutes), when 36-hour shifts without sleep were common, when hospital-acquired infections were felt to be the cost of doing business and were not tracked (let alone prevented), when quality and patient safety were not articulated as drivers, when medication errors weren’t on the radar screen, when professionalism was not a core competency and we jokingly referred to some patients as “gomers,” when patient satisfaction didn’t matter, and when answering a question that came up on rounds required a trip to the library to sort through textbooks and journals in the stacks, rather than a few minutes on the computer. A lot has changed in hospitals and health care over the last 30 years, and not all of it for the worse.

I have been in medical leadership positions for the past 16 years, as a division chief for 10 and as a chair of medicine for the past 6. Maybe I’ve been lucky, but I have worked at institutions where there has been a commitment to medical education and to quality and patient safety. My current institution has quality as the dominant strategic goal, and we have tried to put our money where our mouth is. Hospital administrators and physician leaders are remarkably aligned in support of this goal, and we have won numerous national awards for the quality of our care. Educational innovation is another institutional strategic goal, which we have supported with hard money to fund teaching time for our faculty. Despite these commitments, physicians in our community share many of the frustrations articulated by Dr. Lansdale. Even at institutions with physician and hospital leadership aligned around goals of importance to doctors, these are tough times.

 

 

Some ideas for the future

In the editorial that accompanied Dr. Lansdale’s commentary, Dr. Mandell asked not just for complaints, but for ideas and potential solutions. Here are a few, none of them an easy or quick fix.

  • Never in the history of medicine has physician leadership been so important. We need more physicians in senior leadership positions at health care institutions and hospitals. Physician leaders need to better collaborate with and influence hospital leaders to accomplish the goals we care about. We also need to recognize the very real stresses that hospital administrators face and to work with them as partners rather than adversaries. Similarly, hospital administrators need to partner with and not marginalize physicians.
  • Physicians and physician leaders need to accept and manage change. Doctors don’t like change, but we need to better influence it to the advantage of our patients, our profession, and the next generation of physicians we train. As an example, Dr. Lansdale correctly laments poor hand hygiene practices. We as physicians are often the worst offenders. If physicians don’t drive adoption of this simple but vitally important practice, who should?
  • We need to re-engineer care in hospitals to drive it back to the bedside. This means developing multidisciplinary-team care that is patient- and family-centered. Technology needs to be used to support rather than impede that care. For example, as Dr. Lansdale noted, physician order entry and computerized software that provides medication alerts will not prevent all errors, but will prevent some. Physician leaders must partner with others in their organizations to develop systems that prevent the administration of the wrong medications to the wrong patients, such as positive patient identification.
  • For those of us at teaching hospitals, we as physician leaders must protect the educational and academic missions and convince our colleagues in hospital administration of the vital importance of doing so. For teaching, this means finding money to fund faculty time.
  • We also need to develop innovative educational strategies that enhance the education of medical students, residents, fellows, and nurses in this era of declining hospital length of stay, where providers see only a very short segment of a patient’s entire illness. This will require redesigning residency and medical student curricula to include shorter alternating block schedules of inpatient and outpatient time that enable residents and students to follow their patients after hospitalization through the continuum of care. We need to employ simulation technology to teach students and residents technical and critical thinking skills.
  • We also need to embed quality measurement and improvement, patient safety, and the development of teamwork skills into our medical school and residency curricula. These are vital skills for the future.
  • For better and worse, hospital medicine is likely here to stay. The system has many advantages but some disadvantages, mainly related to the lack of nuanced knowledge about new patients and the issue of handoffs. We need to devise seamless and standardized systems that optimize communication and patient safety at admission, during hospitalization, and through the continuum of care.
  • We need to be far more aggressive at challenging denials from third-party payers for care that is appropriate. That said, we as physicians and physician leaders also need to look for ways to provide more efficient and effective care. This means constantly re-examining our practices. Our patients and insurers have every right to expect quality, and we have an obligation to provide it. In turn, third-party payers have an obligation to pay for it, and not just with paltry quality incentives whose true goal sometimes appears to be to deny payment and reduce overall reimbursement.

Medicine is still a great profession

My oldest daughter, Sarah, is a third-year medical student at another institution and is now completing her last core clerkship. She chose to apply to medical school after working for several years after college. My wife and I, both physicians, were silent about a career in medicine until she ultimately asked our opinion. Despite the many challenges outlined by Dr. Lansdale, we encouraged her. Medicine is still a great profession where, despite our challenges, one can wake up every day and make a contribution to peoples’ lives. I talk with Sarah each evening. For her, the excitement of the hospital is no different than what Dr. Lansdale and I experienced 30 years ago.

For me, the most discouraging thing about Dr. Lansdale’s commentary is its conclusion. I do not know Dr. Lansdale personally, but I know of him. He has the reputation of being a superb clinician and teacher. It’s disappointing that he has hung up the cleats. We desperately need people like Dr. Lansdale in the game because it is far more than a game. If we as physicians and physician leaders don’t solve the problems we face, who will?

Times are tough, but I’m still a hospital guy.

Dr. Thomas Lansdale’s commentary in the September issue (Cleve Clin J Med 2008; 75:618–622) resonated with many physicians because he so eloquently captured the increasing frustration many physicians feel:

  • Frustration at the loss of a hospital culture that many of us loved;
  • Frustration at the increasing challenges of providing effective medical care;
  • Frustration with the increasing difficulty of providing outstanding education to future generations of physicians;
  • Frustration at the escalating pressure to increase productivity and efficiency, shorten length of stay, reduce cost, improve quality, and enhance patient safety and satisfaction, all at the same time;
  • Frustration at the nursing shortage and the need for more and more paperwork that takes physicians and nurses away from the bedside;
  • Frustration with the ascendancy of third-party payers who dictate reimbursement and deny payment for care that is often necessary; and
  • Frustration with hospital administrators who themselves are struggling to maintain the viability of our institutions at a time of escalating financial stress in health care.

Not all change has been for the worse

I trained in the same era as Dr. Lansdale and Dr. Brian Mandell (editor of CCJM), though at a different institution. Dr. Lansdale perfectly captured the ethos of the hospitals where I worked. Those were the days when house officers and nurses were in it together and bonded, when “everybody knew everybody,” when house staff and nurses ran patient care, and when we kept patients in the hospital for as long as we deemed necessary and got reimbursed for it. Those were also the days (before Libby Zion) when attending oversight was sometimes marginal (attending rounds happened on the wards three times a week for 45–60 minutes), when 36-hour shifts without sleep were common, when hospital-acquired infections were felt to be the cost of doing business and were not tracked (let alone prevented), when quality and patient safety were not articulated as drivers, when medication errors weren’t on the radar screen, when professionalism was not a core competency and we jokingly referred to some patients as “gomers,” when patient satisfaction didn’t matter, and when answering a question that came up on rounds required a trip to the library to sort through textbooks and journals in the stacks, rather than a few minutes on the computer. A lot has changed in hospitals and health care over the last 30 years, and not all of it for the worse.

I have been in medical leadership positions for the past 16 years, as a division chief for 10 and as a chair of medicine for the past 6. Maybe I’ve been lucky, but I have worked at institutions where there has been a commitment to medical education and to quality and patient safety. My current institution has quality as the dominant strategic goal, and we have tried to put our money where our mouth is. Hospital administrators and physician leaders are remarkably aligned in support of this goal, and we have won numerous national awards for the quality of our care. Educational innovation is another institutional strategic goal, which we have supported with hard money to fund teaching time for our faculty. Despite these commitments, physicians in our community share many of the frustrations articulated by Dr. Lansdale. Even at institutions with physician and hospital leadership aligned around goals of importance to doctors, these are tough times.

 

 

Some ideas for the future

In the editorial that accompanied Dr. Lansdale’s commentary, Dr. Mandell asked not just for complaints, but for ideas and potential solutions. Here are a few, none of them an easy or quick fix.

  • Never in the history of medicine has physician leadership been so important. We need more physicians in senior leadership positions at health care institutions and hospitals. Physician leaders need to better collaborate with and influence hospital leaders to accomplish the goals we care about. We also need to recognize the very real stresses that hospital administrators face and to work with them as partners rather than adversaries. Similarly, hospital administrators need to partner with and not marginalize physicians.
  • Physicians and physician leaders need to accept and manage change. Doctors don’t like change, but we need to better influence it to the advantage of our patients, our profession, and the next generation of physicians we train. As an example, Dr. Lansdale correctly laments poor hand hygiene practices. We as physicians are often the worst offenders. If physicians don’t drive adoption of this simple but vitally important practice, who should?
  • We need to re-engineer care in hospitals to drive it back to the bedside. This means developing multidisciplinary-team care that is patient- and family-centered. Technology needs to be used to support rather than impede that care. For example, as Dr. Lansdale noted, physician order entry and computerized software that provides medication alerts will not prevent all errors, but will prevent some. Physician leaders must partner with others in their organizations to develop systems that prevent the administration of the wrong medications to the wrong patients, such as positive patient identification.
  • For those of us at teaching hospitals, we as physician leaders must protect the educational and academic missions and convince our colleagues in hospital administration of the vital importance of doing so. For teaching, this means finding money to fund faculty time.
  • We also need to develop innovative educational strategies that enhance the education of medical students, residents, fellows, and nurses in this era of declining hospital length of stay, where providers see only a very short segment of a patient’s entire illness. This will require redesigning residency and medical student curricula to include shorter alternating block schedules of inpatient and outpatient time that enable residents and students to follow their patients after hospitalization through the continuum of care. We need to employ simulation technology to teach students and residents technical and critical thinking skills.
  • We also need to embed quality measurement and improvement, patient safety, and the development of teamwork skills into our medical school and residency curricula. These are vital skills for the future.
  • For better and worse, hospital medicine is likely here to stay. The system has many advantages but some disadvantages, mainly related to the lack of nuanced knowledge about new patients and the issue of handoffs. We need to devise seamless and standardized systems that optimize communication and patient safety at admission, during hospitalization, and through the continuum of care.
  • We need to be far more aggressive at challenging denials from third-party payers for care that is appropriate. That said, we as physicians and physician leaders also need to look for ways to provide more efficient and effective care. This means constantly re-examining our practices. Our patients and insurers have every right to expect quality, and we have an obligation to provide it. In turn, third-party payers have an obligation to pay for it, and not just with paltry quality incentives whose true goal sometimes appears to be to deny payment and reduce overall reimbursement.

Medicine is still a great profession

My oldest daughter, Sarah, is a third-year medical student at another institution and is now completing her last core clerkship. She chose to apply to medical school after working for several years after college. My wife and I, both physicians, were silent about a career in medicine until she ultimately asked our opinion. Despite the many challenges outlined by Dr. Lansdale, we encouraged her. Medicine is still a great profession where, despite our challenges, one can wake up every day and make a contribution to peoples’ lives. I talk with Sarah each evening. For her, the excitement of the hospital is no different than what Dr. Lansdale and I experienced 30 years ago.

For me, the most discouraging thing about Dr. Lansdale’s commentary is its conclusion. I do not know Dr. Lansdale personally, but I know of him. He has the reputation of being a superb clinician and teacher. It’s disappointing that he has hung up the cleats. We desperately need people like Dr. Lansdale in the game because it is far more than a game. If we as physicians and physician leaders don’t solve the problems we face, who will?

Times are tough, but I’m still a hospital guy.

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Influenza: It’s right to bare arms

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Snow season is nearly upon us, which means, first, that I must emotionally prepare to put up the top on my convertible, and second, that it is time for the Journal’s influenza update by Dr. Sherif Mossad.

We were relatively spared in the last flu season, considering what might have been. The 2007–2008 vaccine, specifically formulated to stave off the strains predicted to predominate in North America last year, had lower-than-usual efficacy. Resistance to the oral antiviral oseltamivir (Tamiflu) became widespread, and the prevalence of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) increased. MRSA is relevant to any discussion of influenza, since staphylococcal pneumonia was a lethal complication of influenza even before virulent MRSA emerged in the community. Nonetheless, the vaccination rate increased last year, fears of widespread bird-to-human spread of avian flu were not realized, and influenza-related death rates did not increase. And there are additional reasons for optimism in the upcoming years.

Vaccine for the coming flu season is readily available, and the targeted strains seem to be appropriate. Strategies to assure greater compliance with vaccination guidelines in the workplace, particularly in health care settings, continue to be implemented. If we should need it, there is a vaccine that is active against the H5N1 avian flu. Several studies have documented the safety and immunologic efficacy of the vaccine in therapeutically immunocompromised patients. Akin to using adjunctive corticosteroids when treating severe Pneumocystis jiroveci (formerly P carinii) pneumonia or bacterial meningitis, provocative preclinical studies found that down-modulating the inflammatory response to experimental influenza infection with cyclooxygenase-2-selective nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs lessened lung injury and improved survival (Zheng BJ et al, Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2008; 105:8091–8096).

But the immediate realities are that the roof of my convertible will be up for the next 6 months, and that some of my patients will decline the flu shot, saying “I never get the flu,” or the “flu shot made me sick,” or “the flu shot gave my mother the flu.” As busy as we are in the office and hospital, it is worth spending extra time continuing to aggressively promote appropriate immunization to our patients, our staff, and ourselves.

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Snow season is nearly upon us, which means, first, that I must emotionally prepare to put up the top on my convertible, and second, that it is time for the Journal’s influenza update by Dr. Sherif Mossad.

We were relatively spared in the last flu season, considering what might have been. The 2007–2008 vaccine, specifically formulated to stave off the strains predicted to predominate in North America last year, had lower-than-usual efficacy. Resistance to the oral antiviral oseltamivir (Tamiflu) became widespread, and the prevalence of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) increased. MRSA is relevant to any discussion of influenza, since staphylococcal pneumonia was a lethal complication of influenza even before virulent MRSA emerged in the community. Nonetheless, the vaccination rate increased last year, fears of widespread bird-to-human spread of avian flu were not realized, and influenza-related death rates did not increase. And there are additional reasons for optimism in the upcoming years.

Vaccine for the coming flu season is readily available, and the targeted strains seem to be appropriate. Strategies to assure greater compliance with vaccination guidelines in the workplace, particularly in health care settings, continue to be implemented. If we should need it, there is a vaccine that is active against the H5N1 avian flu. Several studies have documented the safety and immunologic efficacy of the vaccine in therapeutically immunocompromised patients. Akin to using adjunctive corticosteroids when treating severe Pneumocystis jiroveci (formerly P carinii) pneumonia or bacterial meningitis, provocative preclinical studies found that down-modulating the inflammatory response to experimental influenza infection with cyclooxygenase-2-selective nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs lessened lung injury and improved survival (Zheng BJ et al, Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2008; 105:8091–8096).

But the immediate realities are that the roof of my convertible will be up for the next 6 months, and that some of my patients will decline the flu shot, saying “I never get the flu,” or the “flu shot made me sick,” or “the flu shot gave my mother the flu.” As busy as we are in the office and hospital, it is worth spending extra time continuing to aggressively promote appropriate immunization to our patients, our staff, and ourselves.

Snow season is nearly upon us, which means, first, that I must emotionally prepare to put up the top on my convertible, and second, that it is time for the Journal’s influenza update by Dr. Sherif Mossad.

We were relatively spared in the last flu season, considering what might have been. The 2007–2008 vaccine, specifically formulated to stave off the strains predicted to predominate in North America last year, had lower-than-usual efficacy. Resistance to the oral antiviral oseltamivir (Tamiflu) became widespread, and the prevalence of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) increased. MRSA is relevant to any discussion of influenza, since staphylococcal pneumonia was a lethal complication of influenza even before virulent MRSA emerged in the community. Nonetheless, the vaccination rate increased last year, fears of widespread bird-to-human spread of avian flu were not realized, and influenza-related death rates did not increase. And there are additional reasons for optimism in the upcoming years.

Vaccine for the coming flu season is readily available, and the targeted strains seem to be appropriate. Strategies to assure greater compliance with vaccination guidelines in the workplace, particularly in health care settings, continue to be implemented. If we should need it, there is a vaccine that is active against the H5N1 avian flu. Several studies have documented the safety and immunologic efficacy of the vaccine in therapeutically immunocompromised patients. Akin to using adjunctive corticosteroids when treating severe Pneumocystis jiroveci (formerly P carinii) pneumonia or bacterial meningitis, provocative preclinical studies found that down-modulating the inflammatory response to experimental influenza infection with cyclooxygenase-2-selective nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs lessened lung injury and improved survival (Zheng BJ et al, Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2008; 105:8091–8096).

But the immediate realities are that the roof of my convertible will be up for the next 6 months, and that some of my patients will decline the flu shot, saying “I never get the flu,” or the “flu shot made me sick,” or “the flu shot gave my mother the flu.” As busy as we are in the office and hospital, it is worth spending extra time continuing to aggressively promote appropriate immunization to our patients, our staff, and ourselves.

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2008–2009 Influenza update: A better vaccine match

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2008–2009 Influenza update: A better vaccine match

Last year, some people may have lost their faith in flu shots. The three antigens chosen for the vaccine in advance by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) did not match very well the influenza strains that ultimately circulated in North America, and the overall protective efficacy of the vaccine was estimated at only 40%.

Nevertheless, vaccination remains the primary preventive measure for both epidemic and pandemic influenza, especially in view of a rising rate of resistance to the oral antiviral agent oseltamivir (Tamiflu).

In the 2008–2009 influenza season, we hope to do better. All three antigens contained in the 2008–2009 vaccine are new. Surveillance data from the Southern Hemisphere during the summer of 2008 show that this vaccine is expected to be a good match for the strains circulating in the Northern Hemisphere. And with 146 million doses expected to be manufactured this season by six companies—the largest number of doses ever manufactured in the United States—enough should be available for all.

GREAT STRIDES HAVE BEEN MADE, BUT FLU IS STILL A PROBLEM

We are making great strides against influenza. Over the last 50 years, the rate of influenzarelated deaths in the United States declined by 95%, from an average seasonal rate of 10.2 deaths per 100,000 population in the 1940s to 0.56 per 100,000 by the 1990s.1

However, influenza still accounts for about 10% of patients admitted to intensive care units for acute respiratory failure during epidemics.2

Children and the elderly are still hit the hardest: infants age 0 through 23 months and adults age 65 years and older have the highest peak rates of pneumonia and influenza hospitalization and death.3 School-age children (5–18 years) have an indirect role in anticipating the risk to others and can learn to help avoid spreading the virus by washing their hands more, wearing masks, and adopting other hygienic measures.

In the 1918–1919 pandemic, most deaths were from secondary bacterial pneumonia, a fact that has implications for pandemic preparedness. 4 Currently, Staphylococcus aureus, particularly methicillin-resistant strains (MRSA), is an important cause of secondary bacterial pneumonia, with a high mortality rate.5

UPDATE ON DIAGNOSIS: PCR IS THE BEST TEST

In the hospital, it is important to identify patients who have influenza so that we can give them appropriate antiviral therapy and also protect other patients from getting the flu. Unfortunately, the sensitivity and positive predictive value of fever, cough, and other symptoms for the diagnosis of influenza in hospitalized patients are 40% or less.6

Real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (PCR), compared with direct fluorescent antigen detection or cell culture, has the highest sensitivity (98.7%) and specificity (100%) in both children7 and the elderly.8 Furthermore, cell culture is slow and therefore is not useful in clinical practice. Nasopharyngeal wash sampling appears impractical in nursing home residents, owing to their underlying disabilities, and nasopharyngeal swabs tested by PCR are equally sensitive. 8

However, improvements are needed in molecular detection and subtyping of influenza viruses.9 If a pandemic breaks out, we will need to identify the virus quickly to have enough time for preventive interventions. The US Food and Drug Administration has recently cleared a new test called the Human Virus Real-Time RT-PCR Detection and Characterization Panel to detect and differentiate between seasonal and novel influenza strains.10

UPDATE ON INFLUENZA VACCINE

New recommendations in 2008 by the CDC Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices11 include annual vaccination for all children age 5 through 18 years, and either the trivalent inactivated vaccine (ie, the shot) or the live-attenuated vaccine (ie, the Flu-Mist intranasal spray) for healthy people age 2 through 49 years. The CDC recommendations are summarized at www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/acip/index.htm.

Has the benefit of vaccination in adults been overestimated?

Jackson et al,12 in an article published in August 2008, suggested that the effect of influenza vaccination on the risk of community-acquired pneumonia in immunocompetent elderly people during influenza season is less than previously estimated. However, some patients in this study who were classified as not having been vaccinated may have actually been vaccinated by other health care providers without notifying their primary care providers. Moreover, influenza infection may cause only a small proportion of cases of pneumonia in this population.

In another study, Eurich et al13 suggested that previous observational studies overestimated the benefit of influenza vaccination on reducing deaths in patients with pneumonia outside the flu season. Although they found the incidence of death to be 51% lower in vaccinated than in unvaccinated adults with community-acquired pneumonia (N = 1,813) admitted to six hospitals, they ascribed it to confounding factors, specifically socioeconomic and functional status. This phenomenon was previously called the “frailty bias” or the “healthy user effect.” However, this study included only patients hospitalized with pneumonia and did not include data on vaccine-induced immunity or the cause of pneumonia, and measures of the healthy user effect were rudimentary. In addition, only outcomes during hospitalization were included.

Most experts still believe that vaccination prevents 50% of influenza-related deaths (with a smaller effect on rates of all-cause mortality14), including deaths in very old people. 15 A recent review found no basis for the historic concern that the antibody response to the influenza vaccine in people age 60 and older declines more rapidly than in younger people and below seroprotective levels within 4 months of immunization.16

Nevertheless, discordance between antibody and T-cell responses to influenza vaccine does exist17 (ie, the vaccine can induce antibodies while not boosting the T-cell-specific response), and we should continue to seek new vaccines that are more effective.

 

 

More people are being vaccinated, but we’re still below our goals

Although influenza vaccination rates among adults continue to improve,18 they remain well below the Healthy People 2010 initiative’s target of 90% in adults age 65 and older (the current rate is 72%) and below the target of 60% in people age 18 through 64 who have one or more high-risk conditions, health care workers, and pregnant women19 (currently 35% in people age 18 through 49 and 42% in people age 50 through 64). Thus, we still need to improve vaccination coverage rates.

Health care providers should offer vaccination at every opportunity between October and May.20 Offering vaccination in nontraditional settings such as work sites and pharmacies is likely to be cost-saving for healthy adults due to averted morbidity.21 At many hospitals, health care workers can opt out of being vaccinated, but they must formally state that they are doing so. The use of these declination statements among health care workers is associated with a mean increase of 11.6% in vaccination rates.22

Since influenza is the second most frequent vaccine-preventable infection in travelers, the vaccine should be offered to those crossing to the opposite hemisphere during its peak influenza season (eg, to South America in May through September), as well as to those visiting the tropics at any time of year.23

Vaccination is safe and effective in high-risk groups

Data on vaccination are reassuring in several at-risk groups.

In pregnancy, there is no indication that infants are harmed if their mothers are vaccinated in the first trimester.24 The evidence of excess morbidity during influenza epidemics supports vaccinating healthy pregnant women in the second or third trimester and those with comorbidities any time during pregnancy. Influenza vaccination during pregnancy reduces laboratory-confirmed influenza in infants up to 6 months of age by 63% and prevents 29% of all febrile respiratory illnesses in infants and 36% of those in mothers.25

In patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, vaccination cuts the rate of outpatient visits and hospitalizations due to acute respiratory illness by 67%.26 The antibody response to influenza vaccine in patients with rheumatoid arthritis treated with rituximab (Rituxan), a monoclonal antibody directed against CD20 surface antigen-positive B lymphocytes, was lower than in healthy controls, but was not negligible.27

Dispelling myths about vaccination in children

One recently published study in children younger than 5 years did not find vaccination to be effective in preventing influenza-related hospitalizations and outpatient visits.28 However, in both seasons in which this study was conducted, there was a suboptimal antigenic match between vaccines and circulating strains. Moreover, about 60% of participants were unvaccinated and another 20% were only partially vaccinated, making it difficult to assess vaccine effectiveness. Several other studies have shown that, when there is a good match, vaccine effectiveness in children is 85% to 90%.

Even though the live-attenuated (inhaled) vaccine is more expensive than the inactivated (injected) vaccine, it reduces the number of influenza illness cases and lowers subsequent health care use in children and productivity loss in their parents, with a net total savings of $45.80 relative to the inactivated vaccine.29 The live-attenuated vaccine provides sustained protection against influenza illness for 12 months following vaccination, as well as meaningful efficacy through a second season without revaccination, although at a lower level.30

Several myths about the live-attenuated vaccine should be dispelled.31 It is well tolerated and causes only mild, transient symptoms of upper respiratory infection, even in people with asthma or the early stages of human immunodeficiency virus infection. Genetic reversion of the vaccine strain to a wild-type virus requires independent mutation in four gene segments, an event that has not been observed. Finally, although viral shedding is common for several days after vaccination, transmission to another person has been shown in only one person, who remained asymptomatic.

Unfortunately, rates of influenza vaccination are even worse for children than for adults.32 In children 6 through 23 months old, only 22% are fully vaccinated; in those 24 through 59 months old, only 16.5% are.

One group of immunocompromised children, liver transplant recipients, achieved antibody seroprotection and seroconversion rates similar to those achieved by their healthy siblings, with no vaccine-related serious side effects.33 As in adults, the cell-mediated immune response to the vaccine was diminished, suggesting that other strategies are needed to provide optimal protection.

 

 

IF BIRD FLU BREAKS OUT, WE HAVE A VACCINE

In the event of an outbreak of avian influenza in humans, the US government now has a vaccine against H5N1, the causative virus. A two-dose regimen of a whole-virus H5N1 vaccine, which is derived from cell culture, induced neutralizing antibodies against diverse H5N1 virus strains in most subjects in one study.34 Another vaccine, which is egg-independent and adenoviral vector-based and contains conserved nucleoproteins, is broadly protective against globally dispersed H5N1 virus clades.35 The addition of the MF59 adjuvant to a subvirion H5N1 vaccine increased antibody response, but the addition of aluminum hydroxide did not.36

EXERCISE AND HYGIENE PREVENT FLU

Exercise has benefits beyond the usual ones: one study showed that exercising at low to moderate frequency (between once a month and three times a week) is associated with lower rates of influenza-related death.37

A recent meta-analysis38 confirmed that hygienic measures can prevent the spread of respiratory viruses in the community. The investigators calculated that hand-washing at least 10 times daily can prevent a large number of these infections (number needed to treat [NNT] = 4), and wearing surgical masks (NNT = 6), N95 masks (NNT = 3), gloves (NNT = 6), and gowns (NNT = 5) had incremental effects. On the other hand, the value of adding virucidal or antiseptic solutions to normal hand-washing was uncertain. Strict adherence to hand hygiene and masks (including by children) is needed to prevent influenza transmission in the home.39

AMANTADINE, RIMANTADINE ARE OUT; OSELTAMIVIR RESISTANCE IS GROWING

The CDC continues to recommend against using amantadine (Symmetrel) or rimantadine (Flumadine) to treat flu, owing to a high rate (> 90%) of resistance to these drugs.

A nonrandomized study suggests that zanamivir (Relenza) is more effective than oseltamivir (Tamiflu) for treating influenza B.40 A retrospective study in nine lung transplant recipients showed that oseltamivir is well tolerated and may reduce the risk of complications in these patients.41 Large, randomized, multicenter studies are under way to better assess oseltamivir’s preventive and therapeutic efficacy in transplant recipients.

In children, as in adults, oseltamivir is less effective against influenza B than influenza A,42 and both neuraminidase inhibitors, ie, oseltamivir and zanamivir, are equally effective in reducing the febrile period of influenza.43

During the 2007–2008 season, the rate of resistance to oseltamivir increased alarmingly.44 Resistance was restricted to A (H1N1) viruses carrying the H274Y mutation. In March 2008, the frequency of resistance among A (H1N1) viruses in the United States was 8.6%, 10 times higher than during the preceding influenza season. Resistance rates were much higher in several European countries, including Norway and France. During the Southern Hemisphere’s influenza season (May 2008 though September 2008), 46.5% of influenza A (H1N1) viruses received from 14 countries were resistant to oseltamivir. 45 It is worrisome that many of these resistant viruses were isolated from untreated patients. Fortunately, to date, 99% of these isolates remain susceptible to zanamivir.

Microbiologic tests to detect resistance are not currently available for clinical use. During an influenza pandemic, widespread use of neuraminidase inhibitors will likely promote further development of drug resistance. A mathematical model concluded that combined treatment and prophylaxis with antiviral agents will be necessary to control transmission during a pandemic, and that allocating different drugs to cases and contacts would be most effective in curtailing emergence of resistance.46

For now, either oseltamivir or zanamivir is acceptable for patients with flu symptoms and can be started pending results of PCR testing of nasopharyngeal swabs to make sure that the patient really has influenza. The drugs should be taken for 5 days.

References
  1. Doshi P. Trends in recorded influenza mortality: United States, 1900–2004. Am J Public Health 2008; 98:939945.
  2. Brocas E, Cormier P, Barouk D, Van de Louw A, Tenaillon A. Influenza incidence estimated with a rapid diagnostic test in critically ill patients with acute respiratory failure during the 2005 and 2006 winter flu epidemics. Presse Med 2008; 37:943947.
  3. Sebastian R, Skowronski DM, Chong M, Dhaliwal J, Brownstein JS. Age-related trends in the timeliness and prediction of medical visits, hospitalizations and deaths due to pneumonia and influenza, British Columbia, Canada, 1998–2004. Vaccine 2008; 26:13971403.
  4. Morens DM, Taubenberger JK, Fauci AS. Predominant role of bacterial pneumonia as a cause of death in pandemic influenza: implications for pandemic influenza preparedness. J Infect Dis 2008; 198:962970.
  5. Rothberg MB, Haessler SD, Brown RB. Complications of viral influenza. Am J Med 2008; 121:258264.
  6. van den Dool C, Hak E, Wallinga J, van Loon AM, Lammers JW, Bonten MJ. Symptoms of influenza virus infection in hospitalized patients. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2008; 29:314319.
  7. Gharabaghi F, Tellier R, Cheung R, et al. Comparison of a commercial qualitative real-time RT-PCR kit with direct immunofluorescence assay (DFA) and cell culture for detection of influenza A and B in children. J Clin Virol 2008; 42:190193.
  8. Gooskens J, Swaan CM, Claas EC, Kroes AC. Rapid molecular detection of influenza outbreaks in nursing homes. J Clin Virol 2008; 41:712.
  9. Mackay WG, van Loon AM, Niedrig M, Meijer A, Lina B, Niesters HG. Molecular detection and typing of influenza viruses: are we ready for an influenza pandemic? J Clin Virol 2008; 42:194197.
  10. US Department of Health and Human Services. FDA clears new CDC test to detect human influenza. www.pandemicflu.gov. Accessed 11/3/08.
  11. Fiore AE, Shay DK, Broder K, et al; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). Prevention and control of influenza: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2008. MMWR Recomm Rep 2008; 57(RR-7):160.
  12. Jackson ML, Nelson JC, Weiss NS, Neuzil KM, Barlow W, Jackson LA. Influenza vaccination and risk of community-acquired pneumonia in immunocompetent elderly people: a population-based, nested case-control study. Lancet 2008; 372:398405.
  13. Eurich DT, Marrie TJ, Johnstone J, Majumdar SR. Mortality reduction with influenza vaccine in patients with pneumonia outside “flu” season: pleiotropic benefits or residual confounding? Am J Respir Crit Care Med 2008; 178:527533.
  14. Kelly H, Newall AT. Mortality benefits of influenza vaccination in elderly people. Lancet Infect Dis 2008; 8:462463.
  15. Voordouw BC, Sturkenboom MC, Dieleman JP, Stricker BH. Mortality benefits of influenza vaccination in elderly people. Lancet Infect Dis 2008; 8:461462.
  16. Skowronski DM, Tweed SA, De Serres G. Rapid decline of influenza vaccine-induced antibody in the elderly: is it real, or is it relevant? J Infect Dis 2008; 197:490502.
  17. Co MD, Orphin L, Cruz J, et al. Discordance between antibody and T cell responses in recipients of trivalent inactivated influenza vaccine. Vaccine 2008; 26:19901998.
  18. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Statespecific influenza vaccination coverage among adults— United States, 2006–07 influenza season. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2008; 57:10331039.
  19. Lu P, Bridges CB, Euler GL, Singleton JA. Influenza vaccination of recommended adult populations, U.S., 1989–2005. Vaccine 2008; 26:17861793.
  20. Poland GA, Johnson DR. Increasing influenza vaccination rates: the need to vaccinate throughout the entire influenza season. Am J Med 2008; 121(suppl 2):S3S10.
  21. Prosser LA, O’Brien MA, Molinari NA, et al. Nontraditional settings for influenza vaccination of adults: costs and cost effectiveness. Pharmacoeconomics 2008; 26:163178.
  22. Polgreen PM, Septimus EJ, Parry MF, et al. Relationship of influenza vaccination declination statements and influenza vaccination rates for healthcare workers in 22 US hospitals. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2008; 29:675677l.
  23. Marti F, Steffen R, Mutsch M. Influenza vaccine: a travelers’ vaccine? Expert Rev Vaccines 2008; 7:679687.
  24. Mak TK, Mangtani P, Leese J, Watson JM, Pfeifer D. Influenza vaccination in pregnancy: current evidence and selected national policies. Lancet Infect Dis 2008; 8:4452.
  25. Zaman K, Roy E, Arifeen SE, et al. Effectiveness of maternal influenza immunization in mothers and infants. N Engl J Med 2008; 359:15551564.
  26. Menon B, Gurnani M, Aggarwal B. Comparison of outpatient visits and hospitalisations, in patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, before and after influenza vaccination. Int J Clin Pract 2008; 62:593598.
  27. Oren S, Mandelboim M, Braun-Moscovici Y, et al. Vaccination against influenza in patients with rheumatoid arthritis: the effect of rituximab on the humoral response. Ann Rheum Dis 2008; 67:937941.
  28. Szilagyi PG, Fairbrother G, Griffin MR, et al; New Vaccine Surveillance Network. Inluenza vaccine effectiveness among children 6 to 59 months of age during 2 influenza seasons: a case-cohort study. Arch Pediatr Adolesc Med 2008; 162:943951.
  29. Luce BR, Nichol KL, Belshe RB, et al. Cost-effectiveness of live attenuated influenza vaccine versus inactivated influenza vaccine among children aged 24–59 months in the United States. Vaccine 2008; 26:28412848.
  30. Ambrose CS, Yi T, Walker RE, Connor EM. Duration of protection provided by live attenuated influenza vaccine in children. Pediatr Infect Dis J 2008; 27:744748.
  31. Tosh PK, Boyce TG, Poland GA. Flu myths: dispelling the myths associated with live attenuated influenza vaccine. Mayo Clin Proc 2008; 83:7784.
  32. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Influenza vaccination coverage among children aged 6–59 months—eight immunization information system sentinel sites, United States, 2007–08 influenza season. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2008; 57:10431046.
  33. Madan RP, Tan M, Fernandez-Sesma A, et al. A prospective, comparative study of the immune response to inactivated influenza vaccine in pediatric liver transplant recipients and their healthy siblings. Clin Infect Dis 2008; 46:712718.
  34. Ehrlich HJ, Muller M, Oh HM, et al; Baxter H5N1 Pandemic Influenza Vaccine Clinical Study Team. A clinical trial of a whole-virus H5N1 vaccine derived from cell culture. N Engl J Med 2008; 358:25732584.
  35. Hoelscher MA, Singh N, Garg S, et al. A broadly protective vaccine against globally dispersed clade 1 and clade 2 H5N1 influenza viruses. J Infect Dis 2008; 197:11851188.
  36. Bernstein DI, Edwards KM, Dekker CL, et al. Effects of adjuvants on the safety and immunogenicity of an avian influenza H5N1 vaccine in adults. J Infect Dis 2008; 197:667675.
  37. Wong CM, Lai HK, Ou CQ, et al. Is exercise protective against influenza-associated mortality? PLoS ONE 2008; 3:e2108.
  38. Jefferson T, Foxlee R, Del Mar C, et al. Physical interventions to interrupt or reduce the spread of respiratory viruses: systematic review. BMJ 2008; 336:7780.
  39. Cowling BJ, Fung RO, Cheng CK, et al. Preliminary findings of a randomized trial of non-pharmaceutical interventions to prevent influenza transmission in households. PLoS ONE 2008; 3:e2101.
  40. Kawai N, Ikematsu H, Iwaki N, et al. A comparison of the effectiveness of zanamivir and oseltamivir for the treatment of influenza A and B. J Infect 2008; 56:5157.
  41. Ison MG, Sharma A, Shepard JA, Wain JC, Ginns LC. Outcome of influenza infection managed with oseltamivir in lung transplant recipients. J Heart Lung Transplant 2008; 27:282288.
  42. Suzuki E, Ichihara K. The course of fever following influenza virus infection in children treated with oseltamivir. J Med Virol 2008; 80:10651071.
  43. Sugaya N, Tamura D, Yamazaki M, et al. Comparison of the clinical effectiveness of oseltamivir and zanamivir against influenza virus infection in children. Clin Infect Dis 2008; 47:339345.
  44. Sheu TG, Deyde VM, Okomo-Adhiambo M, et al. Surveillance for neuraminidase inhibitor resistance among human influenza A and B viruses circulating worldwide from 2004 to 2008. Antimicrob Agents Chemother 2008; 52:32843292.
  45. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Influenza activity—United States and worldwide, May 18–September 19, 2008. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2008; 57:10461049.
  46. McCaw JM, Wood JG, McCaw CT, McVernon J. Impact of emerging antiviral drug resistance on influenza containment and spread: influence of subclinical infection and strategic use of a stockpile containing one or two drugs. PLoS ONE 2008; 3:e2362.
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Address: Sherif B. Mossad, MD, Department of Infectious Diseases, S32, Cleveland Clinic, 9500 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland OH 44195; e-mail mossads@ ccf.org

Dr. Mossad is the site principal investigator for two studies sponsored by Hoffman-La Roche, the manufacturer of oseltamivir (Tamiflu).

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Sherif B. Mossad, MD
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Address: Sherif B. Mossad, MD, Department of Infectious Diseases, S32, Cleveland Clinic, 9500 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland OH 44195; e-mail mossads@ ccf.org

Dr. Mossad is the site principal investigator for two studies sponsored by Hoffman-La Roche, the manufacturer of oseltamivir (Tamiflu).

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Sherif B. Mossad, MD
Department of Infectious Diseases, Section of Transplant Infectious Diseases, Medicine Institute, Cleveland Clinic; Associate Professor of Medicine, Cleveland Clinic Lerner College of Medicine of Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH

Address: Sherif B. Mossad, MD, Department of Infectious Diseases, S32, Cleveland Clinic, 9500 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland OH 44195; e-mail mossads@ ccf.org

Dr. Mossad is the site principal investigator for two studies sponsored by Hoffman-La Roche, the manufacturer of oseltamivir (Tamiflu).

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Last year, some people may have lost their faith in flu shots. The three antigens chosen for the vaccine in advance by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) did not match very well the influenza strains that ultimately circulated in North America, and the overall protective efficacy of the vaccine was estimated at only 40%.

Nevertheless, vaccination remains the primary preventive measure for both epidemic and pandemic influenza, especially in view of a rising rate of resistance to the oral antiviral agent oseltamivir (Tamiflu).

In the 2008–2009 influenza season, we hope to do better. All three antigens contained in the 2008–2009 vaccine are new. Surveillance data from the Southern Hemisphere during the summer of 2008 show that this vaccine is expected to be a good match for the strains circulating in the Northern Hemisphere. And with 146 million doses expected to be manufactured this season by six companies—the largest number of doses ever manufactured in the United States—enough should be available for all.

GREAT STRIDES HAVE BEEN MADE, BUT FLU IS STILL A PROBLEM

We are making great strides against influenza. Over the last 50 years, the rate of influenzarelated deaths in the United States declined by 95%, from an average seasonal rate of 10.2 deaths per 100,000 population in the 1940s to 0.56 per 100,000 by the 1990s.1

However, influenza still accounts for about 10% of patients admitted to intensive care units for acute respiratory failure during epidemics.2

Children and the elderly are still hit the hardest: infants age 0 through 23 months and adults age 65 years and older have the highest peak rates of pneumonia and influenza hospitalization and death.3 School-age children (5–18 years) have an indirect role in anticipating the risk to others and can learn to help avoid spreading the virus by washing their hands more, wearing masks, and adopting other hygienic measures.

In the 1918–1919 pandemic, most deaths were from secondary bacterial pneumonia, a fact that has implications for pandemic preparedness. 4 Currently, Staphylococcus aureus, particularly methicillin-resistant strains (MRSA), is an important cause of secondary bacterial pneumonia, with a high mortality rate.5

UPDATE ON DIAGNOSIS: PCR IS THE BEST TEST

In the hospital, it is important to identify patients who have influenza so that we can give them appropriate antiviral therapy and also protect other patients from getting the flu. Unfortunately, the sensitivity and positive predictive value of fever, cough, and other symptoms for the diagnosis of influenza in hospitalized patients are 40% or less.6

Real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (PCR), compared with direct fluorescent antigen detection or cell culture, has the highest sensitivity (98.7%) and specificity (100%) in both children7 and the elderly.8 Furthermore, cell culture is slow and therefore is not useful in clinical practice. Nasopharyngeal wash sampling appears impractical in nursing home residents, owing to their underlying disabilities, and nasopharyngeal swabs tested by PCR are equally sensitive. 8

However, improvements are needed in molecular detection and subtyping of influenza viruses.9 If a pandemic breaks out, we will need to identify the virus quickly to have enough time for preventive interventions. The US Food and Drug Administration has recently cleared a new test called the Human Virus Real-Time RT-PCR Detection and Characterization Panel to detect and differentiate between seasonal and novel influenza strains.10

UPDATE ON INFLUENZA VACCINE

New recommendations in 2008 by the CDC Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices11 include annual vaccination for all children age 5 through 18 years, and either the trivalent inactivated vaccine (ie, the shot) or the live-attenuated vaccine (ie, the Flu-Mist intranasal spray) for healthy people age 2 through 49 years. The CDC recommendations are summarized at www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/acip/index.htm.

Has the benefit of vaccination in adults been overestimated?

Jackson et al,12 in an article published in August 2008, suggested that the effect of influenza vaccination on the risk of community-acquired pneumonia in immunocompetent elderly people during influenza season is less than previously estimated. However, some patients in this study who were classified as not having been vaccinated may have actually been vaccinated by other health care providers without notifying their primary care providers. Moreover, influenza infection may cause only a small proportion of cases of pneumonia in this population.

In another study, Eurich et al13 suggested that previous observational studies overestimated the benefit of influenza vaccination on reducing deaths in patients with pneumonia outside the flu season. Although they found the incidence of death to be 51% lower in vaccinated than in unvaccinated adults with community-acquired pneumonia (N = 1,813) admitted to six hospitals, they ascribed it to confounding factors, specifically socioeconomic and functional status. This phenomenon was previously called the “frailty bias” or the “healthy user effect.” However, this study included only patients hospitalized with pneumonia and did not include data on vaccine-induced immunity or the cause of pneumonia, and measures of the healthy user effect were rudimentary. In addition, only outcomes during hospitalization were included.

Most experts still believe that vaccination prevents 50% of influenza-related deaths (with a smaller effect on rates of all-cause mortality14), including deaths in very old people. 15 A recent review found no basis for the historic concern that the antibody response to the influenza vaccine in people age 60 and older declines more rapidly than in younger people and below seroprotective levels within 4 months of immunization.16

Nevertheless, discordance between antibody and T-cell responses to influenza vaccine does exist17 (ie, the vaccine can induce antibodies while not boosting the T-cell-specific response), and we should continue to seek new vaccines that are more effective.

 

 

More people are being vaccinated, but we’re still below our goals

Although influenza vaccination rates among adults continue to improve,18 they remain well below the Healthy People 2010 initiative’s target of 90% in adults age 65 and older (the current rate is 72%) and below the target of 60% in people age 18 through 64 who have one or more high-risk conditions, health care workers, and pregnant women19 (currently 35% in people age 18 through 49 and 42% in people age 50 through 64). Thus, we still need to improve vaccination coverage rates.

Health care providers should offer vaccination at every opportunity between October and May.20 Offering vaccination in nontraditional settings such as work sites and pharmacies is likely to be cost-saving for healthy adults due to averted morbidity.21 At many hospitals, health care workers can opt out of being vaccinated, but they must formally state that they are doing so. The use of these declination statements among health care workers is associated with a mean increase of 11.6% in vaccination rates.22

Since influenza is the second most frequent vaccine-preventable infection in travelers, the vaccine should be offered to those crossing to the opposite hemisphere during its peak influenza season (eg, to South America in May through September), as well as to those visiting the tropics at any time of year.23

Vaccination is safe and effective in high-risk groups

Data on vaccination are reassuring in several at-risk groups.

In pregnancy, there is no indication that infants are harmed if their mothers are vaccinated in the first trimester.24 The evidence of excess morbidity during influenza epidemics supports vaccinating healthy pregnant women in the second or third trimester and those with comorbidities any time during pregnancy. Influenza vaccination during pregnancy reduces laboratory-confirmed influenza in infants up to 6 months of age by 63% and prevents 29% of all febrile respiratory illnesses in infants and 36% of those in mothers.25

In patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, vaccination cuts the rate of outpatient visits and hospitalizations due to acute respiratory illness by 67%.26 The antibody response to influenza vaccine in patients with rheumatoid arthritis treated with rituximab (Rituxan), a monoclonal antibody directed against CD20 surface antigen-positive B lymphocytes, was lower than in healthy controls, but was not negligible.27

Dispelling myths about vaccination in children

One recently published study in children younger than 5 years did not find vaccination to be effective in preventing influenza-related hospitalizations and outpatient visits.28 However, in both seasons in which this study was conducted, there was a suboptimal antigenic match between vaccines and circulating strains. Moreover, about 60% of participants were unvaccinated and another 20% were only partially vaccinated, making it difficult to assess vaccine effectiveness. Several other studies have shown that, when there is a good match, vaccine effectiveness in children is 85% to 90%.

Even though the live-attenuated (inhaled) vaccine is more expensive than the inactivated (injected) vaccine, it reduces the number of influenza illness cases and lowers subsequent health care use in children and productivity loss in their parents, with a net total savings of $45.80 relative to the inactivated vaccine.29 The live-attenuated vaccine provides sustained protection against influenza illness for 12 months following vaccination, as well as meaningful efficacy through a second season without revaccination, although at a lower level.30

Several myths about the live-attenuated vaccine should be dispelled.31 It is well tolerated and causes only mild, transient symptoms of upper respiratory infection, even in people with asthma or the early stages of human immunodeficiency virus infection. Genetic reversion of the vaccine strain to a wild-type virus requires independent mutation in four gene segments, an event that has not been observed. Finally, although viral shedding is common for several days after vaccination, transmission to another person has been shown in only one person, who remained asymptomatic.

Unfortunately, rates of influenza vaccination are even worse for children than for adults.32 In children 6 through 23 months old, only 22% are fully vaccinated; in those 24 through 59 months old, only 16.5% are.

One group of immunocompromised children, liver transplant recipients, achieved antibody seroprotection and seroconversion rates similar to those achieved by their healthy siblings, with no vaccine-related serious side effects.33 As in adults, the cell-mediated immune response to the vaccine was diminished, suggesting that other strategies are needed to provide optimal protection.

 

 

IF BIRD FLU BREAKS OUT, WE HAVE A VACCINE

In the event of an outbreak of avian influenza in humans, the US government now has a vaccine against H5N1, the causative virus. A two-dose regimen of a whole-virus H5N1 vaccine, which is derived from cell culture, induced neutralizing antibodies against diverse H5N1 virus strains in most subjects in one study.34 Another vaccine, which is egg-independent and adenoviral vector-based and contains conserved nucleoproteins, is broadly protective against globally dispersed H5N1 virus clades.35 The addition of the MF59 adjuvant to a subvirion H5N1 vaccine increased antibody response, but the addition of aluminum hydroxide did not.36

EXERCISE AND HYGIENE PREVENT FLU

Exercise has benefits beyond the usual ones: one study showed that exercising at low to moderate frequency (between once a month and three times a week) is associated with lower rates of influenza-related death.37

A recent meta-analysis38 confirmed that hygienic measures can prevent the spread of respiratory viruses in the community. The investigators calculated that hand-washing at least 10 times daily can prevent a large number of these infections (number needed to treat [NNT] = 4), and wearing surgical masks (NNT = 6), N95 masks (NNT = 3), gloves (NNT = 6), and gowns (NNT = 5) had incremental effects. On the other hand, the value of adding virucidal or antiseptic solutions to normal hand-washing was uncertain. Strict adherence to hand hygiene and masks (including by children) is needed to prevent influenza transmission in the home.39

AMANTADINE, RIMANTADINE ARE OUT; OSELTAMIVIR RESISTANCE IS GROWING

The CDC continues to recommend against using amantadine (Symmetrel) or rimantadine (Flumadine) to treat flu, owing to a high rate (> 90%) of resistance to these drugs.

A nonrandomized study suggests that zanamivir (Relenza) is more effective than oseltamivir (Tamiflu) for treating influenza B.40 A retrospective study in nine lung transplant recipients showed that oseltamivir is well tolerated and may reduce the risk of complications in these patients.41 Large, randomized, multicenter studies are under way to better assess oseltamivir’s preventive and therapeutic efficacy in transplant recipients.

In children, as in adults, oseltamivir is less effective against influenza B than influenza A,42 and both neuraminidase inhibitors, ie, oseltamivir and zanamivir, are equally effective in reducing the febrile period of influenza.43

During the 2007–2008 season, the rate of resistance to oseltamivir increased alarmingly.44 Resistance was restricted to A (H1N1) viruses carrying the H274Y mutation. In March 2008, the frequency of resistance among A (H1N1) viruses in the United States was 8.6%, 10 times higher than during the preceding influenza season. Resistance rates were much higher in several European countries, including Norway and France. During the Southern Hemisphere’s influenza season (May 2008 though September 2008), 46.5% of influenza A (H1N1) viruses received from 14 countries were resistant to oseltamivir. 45 It is worrisome that many of these resistant viruses were isolated from untreated patients. Fortunately, to date, 99% of these isolates remain susceptible to zanamivir.

Microbiologic tests to detect resistance are not currently available for clinical use. During an influenza pandemic, widespread use of neuraminidase inhibitors will likely promote further development of drug resistance. A mathematical model concluded that combined treatment and prophylaxis with antiviral agents will be necessary to control transmission during a pandemic, and that allocating different drugs to cases and contacts would be most effective in curtailing emergence of resistance.46

For now, either oseltamivir or zanamivir is acceptable for patients with flu symptoms and can be started pending results of PCR testing of nasopharyngeal swabs to make sure that the patient really has influenza. The drugs should be taken for 5 days.

Last year, some people may have lost their faith in flu shots. The three antigens chosen for the vaccine in advance by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) did not match very well the influenza strains that ultimately circulated in North America, and the overall protective efficacy of the vaccine was estimated at only 40%.

Nevertheless, vaccination remains the primary preventive measure for both epidemic and pandemic influenza, especially in view of a rising rate of resistance to the oral antiviral agent oseltamivir (Tamiflu).

In the 2008–2009 influenza season, we hope to do better. All three antigens contained in the 2008–2009 vaccine are new. Surveillance data from the Southern Hemisphere during the summer of 2008 show that this vaccine is expected to be a good match for the strains circulating in the Northern Hemisphere. And with 146 million doses expected to be manufactured this season by six companies—the largest number of doses ever manufactured in the United States—enough should be available for all.

GREAT STRIDES HAVE BEEN MADE, BUT FLU IS STILL A PROBLEM

We are making great strides against influenza. Over the last 50 years, the rate of influenzarelated deaths in the United States declined by 95%, from an average seasonal rate of 10.2 deaths per 100,000 population in the 1940s to 0.56 per 100,000 by the 1990s.1

However, influenza still accounts for about 10% of patients admitted to intensive care units for acute respiratory failure during epidemics.2

Children and the elderly are still hit the hardest: infants age 0 through 23 months and adults age 65 years and older have the highest peak rates of pneumonia and influenza hospitalization and death.3 School-age children (5–18 years) have an indirect role in anticipating the risk to others and can learn to help avoid spreading the virus by washing their hands more, wearing masks, and adopting other hygienic measures.

In the 1918–1919 pandemic, most deaths were from secondary bacterial pneumonia, a fact that has implications for pandemic preparedness. 4 Currently, Staphylococcus aureus, particularly methicillin-resistant strains (MRSA), is an important cause of secondary bacterial pneumonia, with a high mortality rate.5

UPDATE ON DIAGNOSIS: PCR IS THE BEST TEST

In the hospital, it is important to identify patients who have influenza so that we can give them appropriate antiviral therapy and also protect other patients from getting the flu. Unfortunately, the sensitivity and positive predictive value of fever, cough, and other symptoms for the diagnosis of influenza in hospitalized patients are 40% or less.6

Real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (PCR), compared with direct fluorescent antigen detection or cell culture, has the highest sensitivity (98.7%) and specificity (100%) in both children7 and the elderly.8 Furthermore, cell culture is slow and therefore is not useful in clinical practice. Nasopharyngeal wash sampling appears impractical in nursing home residents, owing to their underlying disabilities, and nasopharyngeal swabs tested by PCR are equally sensitive. 8

However, improvements are needed in molecular detection and subtyping of influenza viruses.9 If a pandemic breaks out, we will need to identify the virus quickly to have enough time for preventive interventions. The US Food and Drug Administration has recently cleared a new test called the Human Virus Real-Time RT-PCR Detection and Characterization Panel to detect and differentiate between seasonal and novel influenza strains.10

UPDATE ON INFLUENZA VACCINE

New recommendations in 2008 by the CDC Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices11 include annual vaccination for all children age 5 through 18 years, and either the trivalent inactivated vaccine (ie, the shot) or the live-attenuated vaccine (ie, the Flu-Mist intranasal spray) for healthy people age 2 through 49 years. The CDC recommendations are summarized at www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/acip/index.htm.

Has the benefit of vaccination in adults been overestimated?

Jackson et al,12 in an article published in August 2008, suggested that the effect of influenza vaccination on the risk of community-acquired pneumonia in immunocompetent elderly people during influenza season is less than previously estimated. However, some patients in this study who were classified as not having been vaccinated may have actually been vaccinated by other health care providers without notifying their primary care providers. Moreover, influenza infection may cause only a small proportion of cases of pneumonia in this population.

In another study, Eurich et al13 suggested that previous observational studies overestimated the benefit of influenza vaccination on reducing deaths in patients with pneumonia outside the flu season. Although they found the incidence of death to be 51% lower in vaccinated than in unvaccinated adults with community-acquired pneumonia (N = 1,813) admitted to six hospitals, they ascribed it to confounding factors, specifically socioeconomic and functional status. This phenomenon was previously called the “frailty bias” or the “healthy user effect.” However, this study included only patients hospitalized with pneumonia and did not include data on vaccine-induced immunity or the cause of pneumonia, and measures of the healthy user effect were rudimentary. In addition, only outcomes during hospitalization were included.

Most experts still believe that vaccination prevents 50% of influenza-related deaths (with a smaller effect on rates of all-cause mortality14), including deaths in very old people. 15 A recent review found no basis for the historic concern that the antibody response to the influenza vaccine in people age 60 and older declines more rapidly than in younger people and below seroprotective levels within 4 months of immunization.16

Nevertheless, discordance between antibody and T-cell responses to influenza vaccine does exist17 (ie, the vaccine can induce antibodies while not boosting the T-cell-specific response), and we should continue to seek new vaccines that are more effective.

 

 

More people are being vaccinated, but we’re still below our goals

Although influenza vaccination rates among adults continue to improve,18 they remain well below the Healthy People 2010 initiative’s target of 90% in adults age 65 and older (the current rate is 72%) and below the target of 60% in people age 18 through 64 who have one or more high-risk conditions, health care workers, and pregnant women19 (currently 35% in people age 18 through 49 and 42% in people age 50 through 64). Thus, we still need to improve vaccination coverage rates.

Health care providers should offer vaccination at every opportunity between October and May.20 Offering vaccination in nontraditional settings such as work sites and pharmacies is likely to be cost-saving for healthy adults due to averted morbidity.21 At many hospitals, health care workers can opt out of being vaccinated, but they must formally state that they are doing so. The use of these declination statements among health care workers is associated with a mean increase of 11.6% in vaccination rates.22

Since influenza is the second most frequent vaccine-preventable infection in travelers, the vaccine should be offered to those crossing to the opposite hemisphere during its peak influenza season (eg, to South America in May through September), as well as to those visiting the tropics at any time of year.23

Vaccination is safe and effective in high-risk groups

Data on vaccination are reassuring in several at-risk groups.

In pregnancy, there is no indication that infants are harmed if their mothers are vaccinated in the first trimester.24 The evidence of excess morbidity during influenza epidemics supports vaccinating healthy pregnant women in the second or third trimester and those with comorbidities any time during pregnancy. Influenza vaccination during pregnancy reduces laboratory-confirmed influenza in infants up to 6 months of age by 63% and prevents 29% of all febrile respiratory illnesses in infants and 36% of those in mothers.25

In patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, vaccination cuts the rate of outpatient visits and hospitalizations due to acute respiratory illness by 67%.26 The antibody response to influenza vaccine in patients with rheumatoid arthritis treated with rituximab (Rituxan), a monoclonal antibody directed against CD20 surface antigen-positive B lymphocytes, was lower than in healthy controls, but was not negligible.27

Dispelling myths about vaccination in children

One recently published study in children younger than 5 years did not find vaccination to be effective in preventing influenza-related hospitalizations and outpatient visits.28 However, in both seasons in which this study was conducted, there was a suboptimal antigenic match between vaccines and circulating strains. Moreover, about 60% of participants were unvaccinated and another 20% were only partially vaccinated, making it difficult to assess vaccine effectiveness. Several other studies have shown that, when there is a good match, vaccine effectiveness in children is 85% to 90%.

Even though the live-attenuated (inhaled) vaccine is more expensive than the inactivated (injected) vaccine, it reduces the number of influenza illness cases and lowers subsequent health care use in children and productivity loss in their parents, with a net total savings of $45.80 relative to the inactivated vaccine.29 The live-attenuated vaccine provides sustained protection against influenza illness for 12 months following vaccination, as well as meaningful efficacy through a second season without revaccination, although at a lower level.30

Several myths about the live-attenuated vaccine should be dispelled.31 It is well tolerated and causes only mild, transient symptoms of upper respiratory infection, even in people with asthma or the early stages of human immunodeficiency virus infection. Genetic reversion of the vaccine strain to a wild-type virus requires independent mutation in four gene segments, an event that has not been observed. Finally, although viral shedding is common for several days after vaccination, transmission to another person has been shown in only one person, who remained asymptomatic.

Unfortunately, rates of influenza vaccination are even worse for children than for adults.32 In children 6 through 23 months old, only 22% are fully vaccinated; in those 24 through 59 months old, only 16.5% are.

One group of immunocompromised children, liver transplant recipients, achieved antibody seroprotection and seroconversion rates similar to those achieved by their healthy siblings, with no vaccine-related serious side effects.33 As in adults, the cell-mediated immune response to the vaccine was diminished, suggesting that other strategies are needed to provide optimal protection.

 

 

IF BIRD FLU BREAKS OUT, WE HAVE A VACCINE

In the event of an outbreak of avian influenza in humans, the US government now has a vaccine against H5N1, the causative virus. A two-dose regimen of a whole-virus H5N1 vaccine, which is derived from cell culture, induced neutralizing antibodies against diverse H5N1 virus strains in most subjects in one study.34 Another vaccine, which is egg-independent and adenoviral vector-based and contains conserved nucleoproteins, is broadly protective against globally dispersed H5N1 virus clades.35 The addition of the MF59 adjuvant to a subvirion H5N1 vaccine increased antibody response, but the addition of aluminum hydroxide did not.36

EXERCISE AND HYGIENE PREVENT FLU

Exercise has benefits beyond the usual ones: one study showed that exercising at low to moderate frequency (between once a month and three times a week) is associated with lower rates of influenza-related death.37

A recent meta-analysis38 confirmed that hygienic measures can prevent the spread of respiratory viruses in the community. The investigators calculated that hand-washing at least 10 times daily can prevent a large number of these infections (number needed to treat [NNT] = 4), and wearing surgical masks (NNT = 6), N95 masks (NNT = 3), gloves (NNT = 6), and gowns (NNT = 5) had incremental effects. On the other hand, the value of adding virucidal or antiseptic solutions to normal hand-washing was uncertain. Strict adherence to hand hygiene and masks (including by children) is needed to prevent influenza transmission in the home.39

AMANTADINE, RIMANTADINE ARE OUT; OSELTAMIVIR RESISTANCE IS GROWING

The CDC continues to recommend against using amantadine (Symmetrel) or rimantadine (Flumadine) to treat flu, owing to a high rate (> 90%) of resistance to these drugs.

A nonrandomized study suggests that zanamivir (Relenza) is more effective than oseltamivir (Tamiflu) for treating influenza B.40 A retrospective study in nine lung transplant recipients showed that oseltamivir is well tolerated and may reduce the risk of complications in these patients.41 Large, randomized, multicenter studies are under way to better assess oseltamivir’s preventive and therapeutic efficacy in transplant recipients.

In children, as in adults, oseltamivir is less effective against influenza B than influenza A,42 and both neuraminidase inhibitors, ie, oseltamivir and zanamivir, are equally effective in reducing the febrile period of influenza.43

During the 2007–2008 season, the rate of resistance to oseltamivir increased alarmingly.44 Resistance was restricted to A (H1N1) viruses carrying the H274Y mutation. In March 2008, the frequency of resistance among A (H1N1) viruses in the United States was 8.6%, 10 times higher than during the preceding influenza season. Resistance rates were much higher in several European countries, including Norway and France. During the Southern Hemisphere’s influenza season (May 2008 though September 2008), 46.5% of influenza A (H1N1) viruses received from 14 countries were resistant to oseltamivir. 45 It is worrisome that many of these resistant viruses were isolated from untreated patients. Fortunately, to date, 99% of these isolates remain susceptible to zanamivir.

Microbiologic tests to detect resistance are not currently available for clinical use. During an influenza pandemic, widespread use of neuraminidase inhibitors will likely promote further development of drug resistance. A mathematical model concluded that combined treatment and prophylaxis with antiviral agents will be necessary to control transmission during a pandemic, and that allocating different drugs to cases and contacts would be most effective in curtailing emergence of resistance.46

For now, either oseltamivir or zanamivir is acceptable for patients with flu symptoms and can be started pending results of PCR testing of nasopharyngeal swabs to make sure that the patient really has influenza. The drugs should be taken for 5 days.

References
  1. Doshi P. Trends in recorded influenza mortality: United States, 1900–2004. Am J Public Health 2008; 98:939945.
  2. Brocas E, Cormier P, Barouk D, Van de Louw A, Tenaillon A. Influenza incidence estimated with a rapid diagnostic test in critically ill patients with acute respiratory failure during the 2005 and 2006 winter flu epidemics. Presse Med 2008; 37:943947.
  3. Sebastian R, Skowronski DM, Chong M, Dhaliwal J, Brownstein JS. Age-related trends in the timeliness and prediction of medical visits, hospitalizations and deaths due to pneumonia and influenza, British Columbia, Canada, 1998–2004. Vaccine 2008; 26:13971403.
  4. Morens DM, Taubenberger JK, Fauci AS. Predominant role of bacterial pneumonia as a cause of death in pandemic influenza: implications for pandemic influenza preparedness. J Infect Dis 2008; 198:962970.
  5. Rothberg MB, Haessler SD, Brown RB. Complications of viral influenza. Am J Med 2008; 121:258264.
  6. van den Dool C, Hak E, Wallinga J, van Loon AM, Lammers JW, Bonten MJ. Symptoms of influenza virus infection in hospitalized patients. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2008; 29:314319.
  7. Gharabaghi F, Tellier R, Cheung R, et al. Comparison of a commercial qualitative real-time RT-PCR kit with direct immunofluorescence assay (DFA) and cell culture for detection of influenza A and B in children. J Clin Virol 2008; 42:190193.
  8. Gooskens J, Swaan CM, Claas EC, Kroes AC. Rapid molecular detection of influenza outbreaks in nursing homes. J Clin Virol 2008; 41:712.
  9. Mackay WG, van Loon AM, Niedrig M, Meijer A, Lina B, Niesters HG. Molecular detection and typing of influenza viruses: are we ready for an influenza pandemic? J Clin Virol 2008; 42:194197.
  10. US Department of Health and Human Services. FDA clears new CDC test to detect human influenza. www.pandemicflu.gov. Accessed 11/3/08.
  11. Fiore AE, Shay DK, Broder K, et al; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). Prevention and control of influenza: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2008. MMWR Recomm Rep 2008; 57(RR-7):160.
  12. Jackson ML, Nelson JC, Weiss NS, Neuzil KM, Barlow W, Jackson LA. Influenza vaccination and risk of community-acquired pneumonia in immunocompetent elderly people: a population-based, nested case-control study. Lancet 2008; 372:398405.
  13. Eurich DT, Marrie TJ, Johnstone J, Majumdar SR. Mortality reduction with influenza vaccine in patients with pneumonia outside “flu” season: pleiotropic benefits or residual confounding? Am J Respir Crit Care Med 2008; 178:527533.
  14. Kelly H, Newall AT. Mortality benefits of influenza vaccination in elderly people. Lancet Infect Dis 2008; 8:462463.
  15. Voordouw BC, Sturkenboom MC, Dieleman JP, Stricker BH. Mortality benefits of influenza vaccination in elderly people. Lancet Infect Dis 2008; 8:461462.
  16. Skowronski DM, Tweed SA, De Serres G. Rapid decline of influenza vaccine-induced antibody in the elderly: is it real, or is it relevant? J Infect Dis 2008; 197:490502.
  17. Co MD, Orphin L, Cruz J, et al. Discordance between antibody and T cell responses in recipients of trivalent inactivated influenza vaccine. Vaccine 2008; 26:19901998.
  18. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Statespecific influenza vaccination coverage among adults— United States, 2006–07 influenza season. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2008; 57:10331039.
  19. Lu P, Bridges CB, Euler GL, Singleton JA. Influenza vaccination of recommended adult populations, U.S., 1989–2005. Vaccine 2008; 26:17861793.
  20. Poland GA, Johnson DR. Increasing influenza vaccination rates: the need to vaccinate throughout the entire influenza season. Am J Med 2008; 121(suppl 2):S3S10.
  21. Prosser LA, O’Brien MA, Molinari NA, et al. Nontraditional settings for influenza vaccination of adults: costs and cost effectiveness. Pharmacoeconomics 2008; 26:163178.
  22. Polgreen PM, Septimus EJ, Parry MF, et al. Relationship of influenza vaccination declination statements and influenza vaccination rates for healthcare workers in 22 US hospitals. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2008; 29:675677l.
  23. Marti F, Steffen R, Mutsch M. Influenza vaccine: a travelers’ vaccine? Expert Rev Vaccines 2008; 7:679687.
  24. Mak TK, Mangtani P, Leese J, Watson JM, Pfeifer D. Influenza vaccination in pregnancy: current evidence and selected national policies. Lancet Infect Dis 2008; 8:4452.
  25. Zaman K, Roy E, Arifeen SE, et al. Effectiveness of maternal influenza immunization in mothers and infants. N Engl J Med 2008; 359:15551564.
  26. Menon B, Gurnani M, Aggarwal B. Comparison of outpatient visits and hospitalisations, in patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, before and after influenza vaccination. Int J Clin Pract 2008; 62:593598.
  27. Oren S, Mandelboim M, Braun-Moscovici Y, et al. Vaccination against influenza in patients with rheumatoid arthritis: the effect of rituximab on the humoral response. Ann Rheum Dis 2008; 67:937941.
  28. Szilagyi PG, Fairbrother G, Griffin MR, et al; New Vaccine Surveillance Network. Inluenza vaccine effectiveness among children 6 to 59 months of age during 2 influenza seasons: a case-cohort study. Arch Pediatr Adolesc Med 2008; 162:943951.
  29. Luce BR, Nichol KL, Belshe RB, et al. Cost-effectiveness of live attenuated influenza vaccine versus inactivated influenza vaccine among children aged 24–59 months in the United States. Vaccine 2008; 26:28412848.
  30. Ambrose CS, Yi T, Walker RE, Connor EM. Duration of protection provided by live attenuated influenza vaccine in children. Pediatr Infect Dis J 2008; 27:744748.
  31. Tosh PK, Boyce TG, Poland GA. Flu myths: dispelling the myths associated with live attenuated influenza vaccine. Mayo Clin Proc 2008; 83:7784.
  32. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Influenza vaccination coverage among children aged 6–59 months—eight immunization information system sentinel sites, United States, 2007–08 influenza season. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2008; 57:10431046.
  33. Madan RP, Tan M, Fernandez-Sesma A, et al. A prospective, comparative study of the immune response to inactivated influenza vaccine in pediatric liver transplant recipients and their healthy siblings. Clin Infect Dis 2008; 46:712718.
  34. Ehrlich HJ, Muller M, Oh HM, et al; Baxter H5N1 Pandemic Influenza Vaccine Clinical Study Team. A clinical trial of a whole-virus H5N1 vaccine derived from cell culture. N Engl J Med 2008; 358:25732584.
  35. Hoelscher MA, Singh N, Garg S, et al. A broadly protective vaccine against globally dispersed clade 1 and clade 2 H5N1 influenza viruses. J Infect Dis 2008; 197:11851188.
  36. Bernstein DI, Edwards KM, Dekker CL, et al. Effects of adjuvants on the safety and immunogenicity of an avian influenza H5N1 vaccine in adults. J Infect Dis 2008; 197:667675.
  37. Wong CM, Lai HK, Ou CQ, et al. Is exercise protective against influenza-associated mortality? PLoS ONE 2008; 3:e2108.
  38. Jefferson T, Foxlee R, Del Mar C, et al. Physical interventions to interrupt or reduce the spread of respiratory viruses: systematic review. BMJ 2008; 336:7780.
  39. Cowling BJ, Fung RO, Cheng CK, et al. Preliminary findings of a randomized trial of non-pharmaceutical interventions to prevent influenza transmission in households. PLoS ONE 2008; 3:e2101.
  40. Kawai N, Ikematsu H, Iwaki N, et al. A comparison of the effectiveness of zanamivir and oseltamivir for the treatment of influenza A and B. J Infect 2008; 56:5157.
  41. Ison MG, Sharma A, Shepard JA, Wain JC, Ginns LC. Outcome of influenza infection managed with oseltamivir in lung transplant recipients. J Heart Lung Transplant 2008; 27:282288.
  42. Suzuki E, Ichihara K. The course of fever following influenza virus infection in children treated with oseltamivir. J Med Virol 2008; 80:10651071.
  43. Sugaya N, Tamura D, Yamazaki M, et al. Comparison of the clinical effectiveness of oseltamivir and zanamivir against influenza virus infection in children. Clin Infect Dis 2008; 47:339345.
  44. Sheu TG, Deyde VM, Okomo-Adhiambo M, et al. Surveillance for neuraminidase inhibitor resistance among human influenza A and B viruses circulating worldwide from 2004 to 2008. Antimicrob Agents Chemother 2008; 52:32843292.
  45. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Influenza activity—United States and worldwide, May 18–September 19, 2008. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2008; 57:10461049.
  46. McCaw JM, Wood JG, McCaw CT, McVernon J. Impact of emerging antiviral drug resistance on influenza containment and spread: influence of subclinical infection and strategic use of a stockpile containing one or two drugs. PLoS ONE 2008; 3:e2362.
References
  1. Doshi P. Trends in recorded influenza mortality: United States, 1900–2004. Am J Public Health 2008; 98:939945.
  2. Brocas E, Cormier P, Barouk D, Van de Louw A, Tenaillon A. Influenza incidence estimated with a rapid diagnostic test in critically ill patients with acute respiratory failure during the 2005 and 2006 winter flu epidemics. Presse Med 2008; 37:943947.
  3. Sebastian R, Skowronski DM, Chong M, Dhaliwal J, Brownstein JS. Age-related trends in the timeliness and prediction of medical visits, hospitalizations and deaths due to pneumonia and influenza, British Columbia, Canada, 1998–2004. Vaccine 2008; 26:13971403.
  4. Morens DM, Taubenberger JK, Fauci AS. Predominant role of bacterial pneumonia as a cause of death in pandemic influenza: implications for pandemic influenza preparedness. J Infect Dis 2008; 198:962970.
  5. Rothberg MB, Haessler SD, Brown RB. Complications of viral influenza. Am J Med 2008; 121:258264.
  6. van den Dool C, Hak E, Wallinga J, van Loon AM, Lammers JW, Bonten MJ. Symptoms of influenza virus infection in hospitalized patients. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2008; 29:314319.
  7. Gharabaghi F, Tellier R, Cheung R, et al. Comparison of a commercial qualitative real-time RT-PCR kit with direct immunofluorescence assay (DFA) and cell culture for detection of influenza A and B in children. J Clin Virol 2008; 42:190193.
  8. Gooskens J, Swaan CM, Claas EC, Kroes AC. Rapid molecular detection of influenza outbreaks in nursing homes. J Clin Virol 2008; 41:712.
  9. Mackay WG, van Loon AM, Niedrig M, Meijer A, Lina B, Niesters HG. Molecular detection and typing of influenza viruses: are we ready for an influenza pandemic? J Clin Virol 2008; 42:194197.
  10. US Department of Health and Human Services. FDA clears new CDC test to detect human influenza. www.pandemicflu.gov. Accessed 11/3/08.
  11. Fiore AE, Shay DK, Broder K, et al; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). Prevention and control of influenza: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2008. MMWR Recomm Rep 2008; 57(RR-7):160.
  12. Jackson ML, Nelson JC, Weiss NS, Neuzil KM, Barlow W, Jackson LA. Influenza vaccination and risk of community-acquired pneumonia in immunocompetent elderly people: a population-based, nested case-control study. Lancet 2008; 372:398405.
  13. Eurich DT, Marrie TJ, Johnstone J, Majumdar SR. Mortality reduction with influenza vaccine in patients with pneumonia outside “flu” season: pleiotropic benefits or residual confounding? Am J Respir Crit Care Med 2008; 178:527533.
  14. Kelly H, Newall AT. Mortality benefits of influenza vaccination in elderly people. Lancet Infect Dis 2008; 8:462463.
  15. Voordouw BC, Sturkenboom MC, Dieleman JP, Stricker BH. Mortality benefits of influenza vaccination in elderly people. Lancet Infect Dis 2008; 8:461462.
  16. Skowronski DM, Tweed SA, De Serres G. Rapid decline of influenza vaccine-induced antibody in the elderly: is it real, or is it relevant? J Infect Dis 2008; 197:490502.
  17. Co MD, Orphin L, Cruz J, et al. Discordance between antibody and T cell responses in recipients of trivalent inactivated influenza vaccine. Vaccine 2008; 26:19901998.
  18. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Statespecific influenza vaccination coverage among adults— United States, 2006–07 influenza season. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2008; 57:10331039.
  19. Lu P, Bridges CB, Euler GL, Singleton JA. Influenza vaccination of recommended adult populations, U.S., 1989–2005. Vaccine 2008; 26:17861793.
  20. Poland GA, Johnson DR. Increasing influenza vaccination rates: the need to vaccinate throughout the entire influenza season. Am J Med 2008; 121(suppl 2):S3S10.
  21. Prosser LA, O’Brien MA, Molinari NA, et al. Nontraditional settings for influenza vaccination of adults: costs and cost effectiveness. Pharmacoeconomics 2008; 26:163178.
  22. Polgreen PM, Septimus EJ, Parry MF, et al. Relationship of influenza vaccination declination statements and influenza vaccination rates for healthcare workers in 22 US hospitals. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2008; 29:675677l.
  23. Marti F, Steffen R, Mutsch M. Influenza vaccine: a travelers’ vaccine? Expert Rev Vaccines 2008; 7:679687.
  24. Mak TK, Mangtani P, Leese J, Watson JM, Pfeifer D. Influenza vaccination in pregnancy: current evidence and selected national policies. Lancet Infect Dis 2008; 8:4452.
  25. Zaman K, Roy E, Arifeen SE, et al. Effectiveness of maternal influenza immunization in mothers and infants. N Engl J Med 2008; 359:15551564.
  26. Menon B, Gurnani M, Aggarwal B. Comparison of outpatient visits and hospitalisations, in patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, before and after influenza vaccination. Int J Clin Pract 2008; 62:593598.
  27. Oren S, Mandelboim M, Braun-Moscovici Y, et al. Vaccination against influenza in patients with rheumatoid arthritis: the effect of rituximab on the humoral response. Ann Rheum Dis 2008; 67:937941.
  28. Szilagyi PG, Fairbrother G, Griffin MR, et al; New Vaccine Surveillance Network. Inluenza vaccine effectiveness among children 6 to 59 months of age during 2 influenza seasons: a case-cohort study. Arch Pediatr Adolesc Med 2008; 162:943951.
  29. Luce BR, Nichol KL, Belshe RB, et al. Cost-effectiveness of live attenuated influenza vaccine versus inactivated influenza vaccine among children aged 24–59 months in the United States. Vaccine 2008; 26:28412848.
  30. Ambrose CS, Yi T, Walker RE, Connor EM. Duration of protection provided by live attenuated influenza vaccine in children. Pediatr Infect Dis J 2008; 27:744748.
  31. Tosh PK, Boyce TG, Poland GA. Flu myths: dispelling the myths associated with live attenuated influenza vaccine. Mayo Clin Proc 2008; 83:7784.
  32. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Influenza vaccination coverage among children aged 6–59 months—eight immunization information system sentinel sites, United States, 2007–08 influenza season. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2008; 57:10431046.
  33. Madan RP, Tan M, Fernandez-Sesma A, et al. A prospective, comparative study of the immune response to inactivated influenza vaccine in pediatric liver transplant recipients and their healthy siblings. Clin Infect Dis 2008; 46:712718.
  34. Ehrlich HJ, Muller M, Oh HM, et al; Baxter H5N1 Pandemic Influenza Vaccine Clinical Study Team. A clinical trial of a whole-virus H5N1 vaccine derived from cell culture. N Engl J Med 2008; 358:25732584.
  35. Hoelscher MA, Singh N, Garg S, et al. A broadly protective vaccine against globally dispersed clade 1 and clade 2 H5N1 influenza viruses. J Infect Dis 2008; 197:11851188.
  36. Bernstein DI, Edwards KM, Dekker CL, et al. Effects of adjuvants on the safety and immunogenicity of an avian influenza H5N1 vaccine in adults. J Infect Dis 2008; 197:667675.
  37. Wong CM, Lai HK, Ou CQ, et al. Is exercise protective against influenza-associated mortality? PLoS ONE 2008; 3:e2108.
  38. Jefferson T, Foxlee R, Del Mar C, et al. Physical interventions to interrupt or reduce the spread of respiratory viruses: systematic review. BMJ 2008; 336:7780.
  39. Cowling BJ, Fung RO, Cheng CK, et al. Preliminary findings of a randomized trial of non-pharmaceutical interventions to prevent influenza transmission in households. PLoS ONE 2008; 3:e2101.
  40. Kawai N, Ikematsu H, Iwaki N, et al. A comparison of the effectiveness of zanamivir and oseltamivir for the treatment of influenza A and B. J Infect 2008; 56:5157.
  41. Ison MG, Sharma A, Shepard JA, Wain JC, Ginns LC. Outcome of influenza infection managed with oseltamivir in lung transplant recipients. J Heart Lung Transplant 2008; 27:282288.
  42. Suzuki E, Ichihara K. The course of fever following influenza virus infection in children treated with oseltamivir. J Med Virol 2008; 80:10651071.
  43. Sugaya N, Tamura D, Yamazaki M, et al. Comparison of the clinical effectiveness of oseltamivir and zanamivir against influenza virus infection in children. Clin Infect Dis 2008; 47:339345.
  44. Sheu TG, Deyde VM, Okomo-Adhiambo M, et al. Surveillance for neuraminidase inhibitor resistance among human influenza A and B viruses circulating worldwide from 2004 to 2008. Antimicrob Agents Chemother 2008; 52:32843292.
  45. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Influenza activity—United States and worldwide, May 18–September 19, 2008. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2008; 57:10461049.
  46. McCaw JM, Wood JG, McCaw CT, McVernon J. Impact of emerging antiviral drug resistance on influenza containment and spread: influence of subclinical infection and strategic use of a stockpile containing one or two drugs. PLoS ONE 2008; 3:e2362.
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Cleveland Clinic Journal of Medicine - 75(12)
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2008–2009 Influenza update: A better vaccine match
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2008–2009 Influenza update: A better vaccine match
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KEY POINTS

  • Real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction is the most accurate and clinically useful diagnostic test for influenza.
  • All children age 6 months to 18 years should be vaccinated, and the live-attenuated vaccine is now approved for use in children 2 years old and older.
  • We should continue to pursue traditional and innovative measures to increase influenza vaccination rates.
  • Influenza vaccination during pregnancy reduces laboratory-confirmed influenza in infants up to 6 months of age by 63%.
  • Hygienic measures (particularly hand-washing) aimed at younger children can prevent the spread of respiratory viruses in the community.
  • Primary viral resistance to oseltamivir (Tamiflu) is rising, but almost all isolates remain susceptible to zanamivir (Relenza).
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Proceedings of the Ethical Challenges in Surgical Innovation Summit

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Proceedings of the Ethical Challenges in Surgical Innovation Summit

Supplement Editors:
Allen Bashour, MD, and Eric Kodish, MD

Contents

Most of the articles in this supplement were developed from audio transcripts of the summit’s presentations and panel discussions. The transcripts were edited by the Cleveland Clinic Journal of Medicine staff for clarity and conciseness, and were then review and revised/approved by the respective speaker or panelists. Exceptions are the articles followed by an asterisk (*) below, which were submitted as manuscripts by their authors.

From the summit directors*
Eric Kodish, MD, and Allen Bashour, MD

Editors and contributors

Welcome—Ethics in surgical innovation: Vigorous discussion will foster future progress
Delos M. Cosgrove, MD

Panel 1: Surgical Innovation and Ethical Dilemmas
Surgical innovation and ethical dilemmas: Precautions and proximity*
Joseph J. Fins, MD

Surgical innovation and ethical dilemmas: A panel discussion
Isador Lieberman, MD; James Herndon, MD; Joseph Hahn, MD; Joseph J. Fins, MD; and Ali Rezai, MD

Panel 2: Transplant Innovation and Ethical Challenges
Pushing the envelope in transplantation: Three lives at stake*
Pauline W. Chen, MD

Transplant innovation and ethical challenges: What have we learned? A collection of perspectives and panel discussion
Denton A. Cooley, MD; John J. Fung, MD, PhD; James B. Young, MD; Thomas E. Starzl, MD, PhD; Mark Siegler, MD; and Pauline W. Chen, MD

We have come far, but selecting organ recipients remains an ethical minefield—Denton A. Cooley, MD
Despite the odds, the transplant field has progressed rapidly—John J. Fung, MD, PhD
A continued need for evidence-based guidance—James B. Young, MD
What does—and does not—spur innovation?—Thomas E. Starzl, MD, PhD
Panel discussion—Moderated by Mark Siegler, MD

Keynote Address
Medical professionalism in a commercialized health care market*
Arnold S. Relman, MD

Panel 3: Inside the Operating Room
Inside the operating room—balancing the risks and benefi ts of new surgical procedures: A collection of perspectives and panel discussion
Joel D. Cooper, MD; Ralph V. Clayman, MD; Thomas M. Krummel, MD; Philip R. Schauer, MD; Christopher Thompson, MD, MHES; and Jonathan D. Moreno, PhD

How should we introduce and evaluate new procedures?—Joel D. Cooper, MD
Idea to implementation: A personal perspective on the development of laparoscopic nephrectomy—Ralph V. Clayman, MD
Special perspectives in infants and children—Thomas M. Krummel, MD
Bariatric surgery: What role for ethics as established procedures approach new frontiers?—Philip R. Schauer, MD
Natural orifice transluminal endoscopic surgery: Too much too soon?—Christopher Thompson, MD, MHES
Panel discussion—Moderated by Jonathan D. Moreno, PhD

Keynote Address
Will the United States maintain its position as a world leader in medical technology?
Thomas J. Fogarty, MD

Panel 4: Outside the Operating Room
Outside the operating room—economic, regulatory, and legal challenges: A collection of perspectives and panel discussion
Lawrence K. Altman, MD; Michael A. Mussallem; Rebecca Dresser, JD; Paul A. Lombardo, PhD, JD; Peter A. Ubel, MD; and Christopher L. White, Esq

Preface—Lawrence K. Altman, MD (Moderator)
A device company perspective: Serving patients is the key to sustainable success—Michael A. Mussallem
A regulatory and legal perspective: Issues in off-label device use—Rebecca Dresser, JD
A historical perspective: The more things change, the more they remain the same—Paul A. Lombardo, PhD, JD
An economic value perspective: Setting limits on health care can be ethical—Peter A. Ubel, MD
An industry perspective: Proactive self-regulation through an industry code of ethics—Christopher L. White, Esq
Panel discussion—Moderated by Lawrence K. Altman, MD

Panel 5: New Surgical Devices and Ethical Challenges
New surgical devices and ethical challenges: A collection of perspectives and panel discussion
Daniel Schultz, MD; Mary H. McGrath, MD, MPH; Thomas H. Murray, PhD; Roy K. Greenberg, MD; and Thomas J. Fogarty, MD

An FDA perspective on device regulation—Daniel Schultz, MD
Responsibilities of the media, FDA, and professional societies—Mary H. McGrath, MD, MPH
Promoting swift, safe, and smart innovation—Thomas H. Murray, PhD
Panel discussion—Moderated by Roy K. Greenberg, MD

Article PDF
Issue
Cleveland Clinic Journal of Medicine - 75(11)
Publications
Topics
Page Number
S1-S84
Sections
Article PDF
Article PDF

Supplement Editors:
Allen Bashour, MD, and Eric Kodish, MD

Contents

Most of the articles in this supplement were developed from audio transcripts of the summit’s presentations and panel discussions. The transcripts were edited by the Cleveland Clinic Journal of Medicine staff for clarity and conciseness, and were then review and revised/approved by the respective speaker or panelists. Exceptions are the articles followed by an asterisk (*) below, which were submitted as manuscripts by their authors.

From the summit directors*
Eric Kodish, MD, and Allen Bashour, MD

Editors and contributors

Welcome—Ethics in surgical innovation: Vigorous discussion will foster future progress
Delos M. Cosgrove, MD

Panel 1: Surgical Innovation and Ethical Dilemmas
Surgical innovation and ethical dilemmas: Precautions and proximity*
Joseph J. Fins, MD

Surgical innovation and ethical dilemmas: A panel discussion
Isador Lieberman, MD; James Herndon, MD; Joseph Hahn, MD; Joseph J. Fins, MD; and Ali Rezai, MD

Panel 2: Transplant Innovation and Ethical Challenges
Pushing the envelope in transplantation: Three lives at stake*
Pauline W. Chen, MD

Transplant innovation and ethical challenges: What have we learned? A collection of perspectives and panel discussion
Denton A. Cooley, MD; John J. Fung, MD, PhD; James B. Young, MD; Thomas E. Starzl, MD, PhD; Mark Siegler, MD; and Pauline W. Chen, MD

We have come far, but selecting organ recipients remains an ethical minefield—Denton A. Cooley, MD
Despite the odds, the transplant field has progressed rapidly—John J. Fung, MD, PhD
A continued need for evidence-based guidance—James B. Young, MD
What does—and does not—spur innovation?—Thomas E. Starzl, MD, PhD
Panel discussion—Moderated by Mark Siegler, MD

Keynote Address
Medical professionalism in a commercialized health care market*
Arnold S. Relman, MD

Panel 3: Inside the Operating Room
Inside the operating room—balancing the risks and benefi ts of new surgical procedures: A collection of perspectives and panel discussion
Joel D. Cooper, MD; Ralph V. Clayman, MD; Thomas M. Krummel, MD; Philip R. Schauer, MD; Christopher Thompson, MD, MHES; and Jonathan D. Moreno, PhD

How should we introduce and evaluate new procedures?—Joel D. Cooper, MD
Idea to implementation: A personal perspective on the development of laparoscopic nephrectomy—Ralph V. Clayman, MD
Special perspectives in infants and children—Thomas M. Krummel, MD
Bariatric surgery: What role for ethics as established procedures approach new frontiers?—Philip R. Schauer, MD
Natural orifice transluminal endoscopic surgery: Too much too soon?—Christopher Thompson, MD, MHES
Panel discussion—Moderated by Jonathan D. Moreno, PhD

Keynote Address
Will the United States maintain its position as a world leader in medical technology?
Thomas J. Fogarty, MD

Panel 4: Outside the Operating Room
Outside the operating room—economic, regulatory, and legal challenges: A collection of perspectives and panel discussion
Lawrence K. Altman, MD; Michael A. Mussallem; Rebecca Dresser, JD; Paul A. Lombardo, PhD, JD; Peter A. Ubel, MD; and Christopher L. White, Esq

Preface—Lawrence K. Altman, MD (Moderator)
A device company perspective: Serving patients is the key to sustainable success—Michael A. Mussallem
A regulatory and legal perspective: Issues in off-label device use—Rebecca Dresser, JD
A historical perspective: The more things change, the more they remain the same—Paul A. Lombardo, PhD, JD
An economic value perspective: Setting limits on health care can be ethical—Peter A. Ubel, MD
An industry perspective: Proactive self-regulation through an industry code of ethics—Christopher L. White, Esq
Panel discussion—Moderated by Lawrence K. Altman, MD

Panel 5: New Surgical Devices and Ethical Challenges
New surgical devices and ethical challenges: A collection of perspectives and panel discussion
Daniel Schultz, MD; Mary H. McGrath, MD, MPH; Thomas H. Murray, PhD; Roy K. Greenberg, MD; and Thomas J. Fogarty, MD

An FDA perspective on device regulation—Daniel Schultz, MD
Responsibilities of the media, FDA, and professional societies—Mary H. McGrath, MD, MPH
Promoting swift, safe, and smart innovation—Thomas H. Murray, PhD
Panel discussion—Moderated by Roy K. Greenberg, MD

Supplement Editors:
Allen Bashour, MD, and Eric Kodish, MD

Contents

Most of the articles in this supplement were developed from audio transcripts of the summit’s presentations and panel discussions. The transcripts were edited by the Cleveland Clinic Journal of Medicine staff for clarity and conciseness, and were then review and revised/approved by the respective speaker or panelists. Exceptions are the articles followed by an asterisk (*) below, which were submitted as manuscripts by their authors.

From the summit directors*
Eric Kodish, MD, and Allen Bashour, MD

Editors and contributors

Welcome—Ethics in surgical innovation: Vigorous discussion will foster future progress
Delos M. Cosgrove, MD

Panel 1: Surgical Innovation and Ethical Dilemmas
Surgical innovation and ethical dilemmas: Precautions and proximity*
Joseph J. Fins, MD

Surgical innovation and ethical dilemmas: A panel discussion
Isador Lieberman, MD; James Herndon, MD; Joseph Hahn, MD; Joseph J. Fins, MD; and Ali Rezai, MD

Panel 2: Transplant Innovation and Ethical Challenges
Pushing the envelope in transplantation: Three lives at stake*
Pauline W. Chen, MD

Transplant innovation and ethical challenges: What have we learned? A collection of perspectives and panel discussion
Denton A. Cooley, MD; John J. Fung, MD, PhD; James B. Young, MD; Thomas E. Starzl, MD, PhD; Mark Siegler, MD; and Pauline W. Chen, MD

We have come far, but selecting organ recipients remains an ethical minefield—Denton A. Cooley, MD
Despite the odds, the transplant field has progressed rapidly—John J. Fung, MD, PhD
A continued need for evidence-based guidance—James B. Young, MD
What does—and does not—spur innovation?—Thomas E. Starzl, MD, PhD
Panel discussion—Moderated by Mark Siegler, MD

Keynote Address
Medical professionalism in a commercialized health care market*
Arnold S. Relman, MD

Panel 3: Inside the Operating Room
Inside the operating room—balancing the risks and benefi ts of new surgical procedures: A collection of perspectives and panel discussion
Joel D. Cooper, MD; Ralph V. Clayman, MD; Thomas M. Krummel, MD; Philip R. Schauer, MD; Christopher Thompson, MD, MHES; and Jonathan D. Moreno, PhD

How should we introduce and evaluate new procedures?—Joel D. Cooper, MD
Idea to implementation: A personal perspective on the development of laparoscopic nephrectomy—Ralph V. Clayman, MD
Special perspectives in infants and children—Thomas M. Krummel, MD
Bariatric surgery: What role for ethics as established procedures approach new frontiers?—Philip R. Schauer, MD
Natural orifice transluminal endoscopic surgery: Too much too soon?—Christopher Thompson, MD, MHES
Panel discussion—Moderated by Jonathan D. Moreno, PhD

Keynote Address
Will the United States maintain its position as a world leader in medical technology?
Thomas J. Fogarty, MD

Panel 4: Outside the Operating Room
Outside the operating room—economic, regulatory, and legal challenges: A collection of perspectives and panel discussion
Lawrence K. Altman, MD; Michael A. Mussallem; Rebecca Dresser, JD; Paul A. Lombardo, PhD, JD; Peter A. Ubel, MD; and Christopher L. White, Esq

Preface—Lawrence K. Altman, MD (Moderator)
A device company perspective: Serving patients is the key to sustainable success—Michael A. Mussallem
A regulatory and legal perspective: Issues in off-label device use—Rebecca Dresser, JD
A historical perspective: The more things change, the more they remain the same—Paul A. Lombardo, PhD, JD
An economic value perspective: Setting limits on health care can be ethical—Peter A. Ubel, MD
An industry perspective: Proactive self-regulation through an industry code of ethics—Christopher L. White, Esq
Panel discussion—Moderated by Lawrence K. Altman, MD

Panel 5: New Surgical Devices and Ethical Challenges
New surgical devices and ethical challenges: A collection of perspectives and panel discussion
Daniel Schultz, MD; Mary H. McGrath, MD, MPH; Thomas H. Murray, PhD; Roy K. Greenberg, MD; and Thomas J. Fogarty, MD

An FDA perspective on device regulation—Daniel Schultz, MD
Responsibilities of the media, FDA, and professional societies—Mary H. McGrath, MD, MPH
Promoting swift, safe, and smart innovation—Thomas H. Murray, PhD
Panel discussion—Moderated by Roy K. Greenberg, MD

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Surgical innovation lives on the border between tradition and regulation in a vaguely defined frontier. Over the course of many centuries, a framework for clinical medical ethics has developed with broad consensus regarding fiduciary obligations between patient and doctor, the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence, and, more recently, respect for persons and autonomy. During the past century, a parallel set of ethical and regulatory norms has developed surrounding the ethics of research involving human subjects. While both sets of frameworks—those governing clinical ethics and those governing research ethics—contribute to understanding the ethical challenges that arise in the course of surgical innovation, neither is alone sufficient to provide clear guidance.

We decided that further discourse would help resolve some of the ambiguity that exists between the frameworks of clinical ethics and research ethics, and we set out to convene a summit meeting to provide a forum for this discourse. It was our hope that bringing together some of the nation’s foremost surgical innovators with leading bioethicists would catalyze a series of presentations and discussions to create a meaningful ethical framework for thinking about surgical innovation. The summit took place May 8–9, 2008, at Cleveland Clinic, and we were not disappointed. We now have the pleasure of presenting the proceedings in text form.

The summit’s five panel presentations and discussions and two keynote addresses shared the objective of educating participants about moral dilemmas that often arise in the conduct of device development and other innovations in surgery. Panelists suggested potential solutions to the challenges of protecting patients from risk without hindering creativity and progress.

The ethical challenges faced by surgical innovators will not go away. As we develop and refine technology, including new devices, procedures, and transplants, new problems will arise. Two examples of complicated issues on the horizon are robotic surgery and natural orifice transluminal endoscopic surgery (NOTES). While the specific developments will change, the ethical basis of our actions should remain constant. We need to always ask the same questions:

  • Is this in the best interests of the patient?
  • Have we been thoughtful and effective in the process of informed consent?
  • Will our actions be consistent with our own professional integrity?

Our hope is that these proceedings will prompt the necessary next steps: further development of these ideas, writing of papers and convening of more meetings, and, most importantly, further innovation to continue helping patients.

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Eric Kodish, MD
Chairman, Department of Bioethics, Cleveland Clinic; Professor of Pediatrics, Cleveland Clinic Lerner College of Medicine of Case Western Reserve University Cleveland Clinic

Allen Bashour, MD
Department of Cardiothoracic Anesthesiology and Critical Care Center, and Chairman, Ethics Committee, Cleveland Clinic

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Allen Bashour, MD
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Allen Bashour, MD
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Surgical innovation lives on the border between tradition and regulation in a vaguely defined frontier. Over the course of many centuries, a framework for clinical medical ethics has developed with broad consensus regarding fiduciary obligations between patient and doctor, the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence, and, more recently, respect for persons and autonomy. During the past century, a parallel set of ethical and regulatory norms has developed surrounding the ethics of research involving human subjects. While both sets of frameworks—those governing clinical ethics and those governing research ethics—contribute to understanding the ethical challenges that arise in the course of surgical innovation, neither is alone sufficient to provide clear guidance.

We decided that further discourse would help resolve some of the ambiguity that exists between the frameworks of clinical ethics and research ethics, and we set out to convene a summit meeting to provide a forum for this discourse. It was our hope that bringing together some of the nation’s foremost surgical innovators with leading bioethicists would catalyze a series of presentations and discussions to create a meaningful ethical framework for thinking about surgical innovation. The summit took place May 8–9, 2008, at Cleveland Clinic, and we were not disappointed. We now have the pleasure of presenting the proceedings in text form.

The summit’s five panel presentations and discussions and two keynote addresses shared the objective of educating participants about moral dilemmas that often arise in the conduct of device development and other innovations in surgery. Panelists suggested potential solutions to the challenges of protecting patients from risk without hindering creativity and progress.

The ethical challenges faced by surgical innovators will not go away. As we develop and refine technology, including new devices, procedures, and transplants, new problems will arise. Two examples of complicated issues on the horizon are robotic surgery and natural orifice transluminal endoscopic surgery (NOTES). While the specific developments will change, the ethical basis of our actions should remain constant. We need to always ask the same questions:

  • Is this in the best interests of the patient?
  • Have we been thoughtful and effective in the process of informed consent?
  • Will our actions be consistent with our own professional integrity?

Our hope is that these proceedings will prompt the necessary next steps: further development of these ideas, writing of papers and convening of more meetings, and, most importantly, further innovation to continue helping patients.

Surgical innovation lives on the border between tradition and regulation in a vaguely defined frontier. Over the course of many centuries, a framework for clinical medical ethics has developed with broad consensus regarding fiduciary obligations between patient and doctor, the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence, and, more recently, respect for persons and autonomy. During the past century, a parallel set of ethical and regulatory norms has developed surrounding the ethics of research involving human subjects. While both sets of frameworks—those governing clinical ethics and those governing research ethics—contribute to understanding the ethical challenges that arise in the course of surgical innovation, neither is alone sufficient to provide clear guidance.

We decided that further discourse would help resolve some of the ambiguity that exists between the frameworks of clinical ethics and research ethics, and we set out to convene a summit meeting to provide a forum for this discourse. It was our hope that bringing together some of the nation’s foremost surgical innovators with leading bioethicists would catalyze a series of presentations and discussions to create a meaningful ethical framework for thinking about surgical innovation. The summit took place May 8–9, 2008, at Cleveland Clinic, and we were not disappointed. We now have the pleasure of presenting the proceedings in text form.

The summit’s five panel presentations and discussions and two keynote addresses shared the objective of educating participants about moral dilemmas that often arise in the conduct of device development and other innovations in surgery. Panelists suggested potential solutions to the challenges of protecting patients from risk without hindering creativity and progress.

The ethical challenges faced by surgical innovators will not go away. As we develop and refine technology, including new devices, procedures, and transplants, new problems will arise. Two examples of complicated issues on the horizon are robotic surgery and natural orifice transluminal endoscopic surgery (NOTES). While the specific developments will change, the ethical basis of our actions should remain constant. We need to always ask the same questions:

  • Is this in the best interests of the patient?
  • Have we been thoughtful and effective in the process of informed consent?
  • Will our actions be consistent with our own professional integrity?

Our hope is that these proceedings will prompt the necessary next steps: further development of these ideas, writing of papers and convening of more meetings, and, most importantly, further innovation to continue helping patients.

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Ethics in surgical innovation: Vigorous discussion will foster future progress

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Welcome to Cleveland Clinic. We are delighted to have you here, and I am sure this is going to be a very interesting and provocative meeting.

In 1873 Sir John Eric Erichsen, surgeon to Queen Victoria, wrote that “although methods of practice may be modified and varied, and even improved to some extent,” “the knife cannot always have fresh fields for conquest.” How wrong he was.

Surgical innovation has continued without a break from Erichsen’s day to ours. In 1873 only 2.5% of the population survived to age 65. Over the past 100 years, surgical innovation has helped to extend the average life expectancy to 76 years.

AN UNRULY TRADITION

Surgical innovation has happened largely without rules and by its own unruly tradition. In some ways, it is the last frontier in medicine. Today surgical innovation is arguably defined and barely regulated. Technical variation is the norm, and every patient is different. The boundary between taking an alternative approach and embarking on a novel human experimentation may be finely shaded. No surgical equivalent to the Food and Drug Administration monitors the operating room. Professional ethics and common sense guide routine intraoperative intervention.

Formal research projects are carried out in compliance with the institutional review board (IRB) and the usual ethical and regulatory standards for human subjects research. Between these two posts lies a large, vaguely defined field. That is where this symposium will be spending the majority of its time.

Surgical progress is problem-driven and rarely planned. It has often taken place under stress or in response to contingent need or opportunity.

In our own lifetimes we have seen the development of cardiac surgery in a virtually rule-free environment. Surgery for coronary artery disease did not develop out of a surgical protocol but arose out of new knowledge of the disease mechanism and improvements in imaging, anesthesia, extracorporeal oxygenation, and a combination of gifted surgeons and experienced surgical teams. It was immediately accepted as therapy. There are similar examples in every surgical field.

Over the past 40 years only 10% to 20% of surgical techniques have undergone clinical trials. Transplant is a classic example. Cardiac transplant moved forward without clinical trials, and it is unlikely that clinical trials will ever be done. The laparoscopic revolution came about in the same way.

A REGULATORY BALANCING ACT

Regulation is necessary, but where and how much? In a recent speech here at Cleveland Clinic, Anne Mulcahy, chief executive officer of Xerox, said, “Most great things happen by accident and experimentation. The moment you try to streamline and keep everything captive to very focused and disciplined outcomes, you lose your ability to really invent.”

On the other hand, we cannot let surgery devolve into what a past president of the Canadian Medical Association called “a chaos of techniques devoid of moral purpose.”

Finding the right balance will be difficult. All of this makes this symposium on ethics in surgical innovation relevant, necessary, and likely to be of interest well beyond these rooms. The profession of surgery has everything to gain from a frank discussion of the issues surrounding innovation. A solid grasp of ethics will improve our practice, protect our patients, and foster progress and innovation as we go forward.

You have a wonderful opportunity to discuss with some of the finest innovators in surgery—who are here in this room—the ethical and moral dilemmas of innovation. We cannot, on the one hand, proceed completely without plan; on the other hand, we cannot regulate innovation out of existence. In the end, it is about our patients, and their interest has to be placed first.

Thank you for joining us. I am sure you are going to have an excellent symposium.

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Dr. Cosgrove reported that he has no financial interests or relationships that pose a potential conflict of interest with this article.

This article was developed from an audio transcript of Dr. Cosgrove’s address. The transcript was edited by the Cleveland Clinic Journal of Medicine staff for clarity and conciseness, and was then reviewed, revised, and approved by Dr. Cosgrove.

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Dr. Cosgrove reported that he has no financial interests or relationships that pose a potential conflict of interest with this article.

This article was developed from an audio transcript of Dr. Cosgrove’s address. The transcript was edited by the Cleveland Clinic Journal of Medicine staff for clarity and conciseness, and was then reviewed, revised, and approved by Dr. Cosgrove.

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This article was developed from an audio transcript of Dr. Cosgrove’s address. The transcript was edited by the Cleveland Clinic Journal of Medicine staff for clarity and conciseness, and was then reviewed, revised, and approved by Dr. Cosgrove.

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Welcome to Cleveland Clinic. We are delighted to have you here, and I am sure this is going to be a very interesting and provocative meeting.

In 1873 Sir John Eric Erichsen, surgeon to Queen Victoria, wrote that “although methods of practice may be modified and varied, and even improved to some extent,” “the knife cannot always have fresh fields for conquest.” How wrong he was.

Surgical innovation has continued without a break from Erichsen’s day to ours. In 1873 only 2.5% of the population survived to age 65. Over the past 100 years, surgical innovation has helped to extend the average life expectancy to 76 years.

AN UNRULY TRADITION

Surgical innovation has happened largely without rules and by its own unruly tradition. In some ways, it is the last frontier in medicine. Today surgical innovation is arguably defined and barely regulated. Technical variation is the norm, and every patient is different. The boundary between taking an alternative approach and embarking on a novel human experimentation may be finely shaded. No surgical equivalent to the Food and Drug Administration monitors the operating room. Professional ethics and common sense guide routine intraoperative intervention.

Formal research projects are carried out in compliance with the institutional review board (IRB) and the usual ethical and regulatory standards for human subjects research. Between these two posts lies a large, vaguely defined field. That is where this symposium will be spending the majority of its time.

Surgical progress is problem-driven and rarely planned. It has often taken place under stress or in response to contingent need or opportunity.

In our own lifetimes we have seen the development of cardiac surgery in a virtually rule-free environment. Surgery for coronary artery disease did not develop out of a surgical protocol but arose out of new knowledge of the disease mechanism and improvements in imaging, anesthesia, extracorporeal oxygenation, and a combination of gifted surgeons and experienced surgical teams. It was immediately accepted as therapy. There are similar examples in every surgical field.

Over the past 40 years only 10% to 20% of surgical techniques have undergone clinical trials. Transplant is a classic example. Cardiac transplant moved forward without clinical trials, and it is unlikely that clinical trials will ever be done. The laparoscopic revolution came about in the same way.

A REGULATORY BALANCING ACT

Regulation is necessary, but where and how much? In a recent speech here at Cleveland Clinic, Anne Mulcahy, chief executive officer of Xerox, said, “Most great things happen by accident and experimentation. The moment you try to streamline and keep everything captive to very focused and disciplined outcomes, you lose your ability to really invent.”

On the other hand, we cannot let surgery devolve into what a past president of the Canadian Medical Association called “a chaos of techniques devoid of moral purpose.”

Finding the right balance will be difficult. All of this makes this symposium on ethics in surgical innovation relevant, necessary, and likely to be of interest well beyond these rooms. The profession of surgery has everything to gain from a frank discussion of the issues surrounding innovation. A solid grasp of ethics will improve our practice, protect our patients, and foster progress and innovation as we go forward.

You have a wonderful opportunity to discuss with some of the finest innovators in surgery—who are here in this room—the ethical and moral dilemmas of innovation. We cannot, on the one hand, proceed completely without plan; on the other hand, we cannot regulate innovation out of existence. In the end, it is about our patients, and their interest has to be placed first.

Thank you for joining us. I am sure you are going to have an excellent symposium.

Welcome to Cleveland Clinic. We are delighted to have you here, and I am sure this is going to be a very interesting and provocative meeting.

In 1873 Sir John Eric Erichsen, surgeon to Queen Victoria, wrote that “although methods of practice may be modified and varied, and even improved to some extent,” “the knife cannot always have fresh fields for conquest.” How wrong he was.

Surgical innovation has continued without a break from Erichsen’s day to ours. In 1873 only 2.5% of the population survived to age 65. Over the past 100 years, surgical innovation has helped to extend the average life expectancy to 76 years.

AN UNRULY TRADITION

Surgical innovation has happened largely without rules and by its own unruly tradition. In some ways, it is the last frontier in medicine. Today surgical innovation is arguably defined and barely regulated. Technical variation is the norm, and every patient is different. The boundary between taking an alternative approach and embarking on a novel human experimentation may be finely shaded. No surgical equivalent to the Food and Drug Administration monitors the operating room. Professional ethics and common sense guide routine intraoperative intervention.

Formal research projects are carried out in compliance with the institutional review board (IRB) and the usual ethical and regulatory standards for human subjects research. Between these two posts lies a large, vaguely defined field. That is where this symposium will be spending the majority of its time.

Surgical progress is problem-driven and rarely planned. It has often taken place under stress or in response to contingent need or opportunity.

In our own lifetimes we have seen the development of cardiac surgery in a virtually rule-free environment. Surgery for coronary artery disease did not develop out of a surgical protocol but arose out of new knowledge of the disease mechanism and improvements in imaging, anesthesia, extracorporeal oxygenation, and a combination of gifted surgeons and experienced surgical teams. It was immediately accepted as therapy. There are similar examples in every surgical field.

Over the past 40 years only 10% to 20% of surgical techniques have undergone clinical trials. Transplant is a classic example. Cardiac transplant moved forward without clinical trials, and it is unlikely that clinical trials will ever be done. The laparoscopic revolution came about in the same way.

A REGULATORY BALANCING ACT

Regulation is necessary, but where and how much? In a recent speech here at Cleveland Clinic, Anne Mulcahy, chief executive officer of Xerox, said, “Most great things happen by accident and experimentation. The moment you try to streamline and keep everything captive to very focused and disciplined outcomes, you lose your ability to really invent.”

On the other hand, we cannot let surgery devolve into what a past president of the Canadian Medical Association called “a chaos of techniques devoid of moral purpose.”

Finding the right balance will be difficult. All of this makes this symposium on ethics in surgical innovation relevant, necessary, and likely to be of interest well beyond these rooms. The profession of surgery has everything to gain from a frank discussion of the issues surrounding innovation. A solid grasp of ethics will improve our practice, protect our patients, and foster progress and innovation as we go forward.

You have a wonderful opportunity to discuss with some of the finest innovators in surgery—who are here in this room—the ethical and moral dilemmas of innovation. We cannot, on the one hand, proceed completely without plan; on the other hand, we cannot regulate innovation out of existence. In the end, it is about our patients, and their interest has to be placed first.

Thank you for joining us. I am sure you are going to have an excellent symposium.

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Surgical innovation and ethical dilemmas: Precautions and proximity

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No! I am not Prince Hamlet, nor was meant to be;
Am an attendant lord, one that will do
To swell a progress, start a scene or two…

—T.S. Eliot, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock

Let me start by thanking the organizers for their invitation to be here and to start this off. I am not sure if that invitation was an act of kindness or of throwing a fellow bioethicist to the lions, as we will be addressing a complicated set of issues upon which well-intentioned folks disagree and sometimes disagree with a passion.

What I would like to do is to lay out some of the inherent ethical problems related to surgical innovation. I will argue that some of these problems are unique to surgery and that others relate to how we have chosen to define categories like research and practice. Other problems involve how we view the proportionality of risks and benefits in surgical research. I will argue that we have falsely analogized surgical progress to progress made in other areas of biomedical research and misunderstood the highly personal, or proximate, nature of surgical inquiry. Without appreciating the import of what I will call “surgical proximity,” we will be unable to adequately address ethical issues in surgical innovation.

PROBLEMS OR DILEMMAS?

So let me begin with the title of our session, “Surgical Innovation and Ethical Dilemmas,” and why this juxta position is counterproductive. A colleague long ago taught me to distinguish problems from dilemmas—the former being resolvable, the latter intractable, often involving a choice between two equally unfavorable choices.

Although I may be making too much of the semantics, I do think the title betrays a presumption that surgical innovation invariably forces adversarial choices. It tends to dichotomize ethical reflection, pitting those who favor prudence against those who endorse progress, or it creates too stark a difference between ethical issues in surgical practice and those encountered in the conduct of surgical research.

Even therapeutic, validated surgery in many ways has the potential to become innovative, if not outright experimental. Patients may have anatomical differences that require surgical improvisation, or complications may arise during “routine” surgery, creating the need for an imaginative response.1 At what point do these departures from expected care become novel interventions, innovative or even experimental? A routine case with an unexpected turn can even become a case report opening up a new field of endeavor.

For instance, the field of stereotactic functional neurosurgery was born out of a “routine” case of ablative surgery for Parkinson’s disease in the 1980s, when the French neurosurgeon Alim Benabid was using electrodes to determine which areas of the brain should be destroyed. As he was mapping the thalamus, he noted that the tremor of his patient abated. This led him to wonder if one could treat drug-resistant Parkinson’s with electrical stimulation instead of destructive lesioning.2 Benabid’s translational insight during an ordinary case led to the development of the rather extraordinary field of stereotactic functional neurosurgery and neuromodulation.3,4

Another example from an earlier era comes from the life work of neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield, who did pioneering work in the surgical treatment of epilepsy. Here, the accumulation of experience from “routine care” led to generalizable knowledge, much like hypotheses are validated in experimental work. In Penfield’s case, his clinical use of electrical stimulation to plan resections of scar tissue causing epilepsy led him to map the human homunculus, a magnificent achievement of profound importance.5,6

So let us avoid simplistic and confounding demarcations. Instead of dichotomizing innovation and prudence—or surgical research and surgical practice—let us try to start our deliberations with an eye toward a more synthetic approach. Like most things in nature and in biology, ethics too is on a continuum with gradations that can fit into an Aristotelian taxonomy. Let us emulate what Aristotle called phronesis, or practical wisdom, these next 2 days so that we achieve constructive outcomes, or what the pragmatists would call instrumental goods.7

If we are successful in laying out the ethical issues in this clinically pragmatic fashion, we can turn intractable “dilemmas” into problems amenable to resolution through the particularistic invocation of ethical principles as they relate to the surgical context.8 If we follow this inductive method of moral problem solving, we will avoid sweeping ethical generalizations, or categoricals, that can misrepresent the complexity of innovative research and deprive society of its benefits.9

 

 

INNOVATION VS PRUDENCE: A FALSE DICHOTOMY

So let us start by understanding the presuppositions that led to the expectation that dilemmas will descend upon those who engage in surgical innovation. In my view, this expectation begins with what is called the precautionary principle, a concept with some currency in the realm of environmental ethics.10

The precautionary principle urges caution and prudence when facing unknowns and is an antecedent sort of utilitarianism. One makes judgments about the advisability of actions based on a prior assessment of foreseeable risks and benefits. If the risks are excessive or exceed benefits, the precautionary principle urges care, caution, and even avoidance of a given course of action.

When the precautionary principle is implicitly invoked in making judgments about research, the objective is to pursue a degree of safety that is comparable to that of established therapy. But interventions that have progressed to being deemed “therapeutic” have of course achieved a requisite degree of both safety and efficacy—that is what makes them therapeutic, as opposed to investigational, interventions. One cannot know before one has conducted a clinical trial, and completed statistical analysis, whether a new surgical advance or device meets these expectations. Because of this lack of knowledge, there is an inherent degree of risk in any novel intervention.

The challenge posed by innovation or novelty creates the possibility of untoward events. It leads to invocation of the precautionary principle, which, echoing the admonitions of the philosopher Hans Jonas, urges us to “give greater weight to the prognosis of doom than to that of bliss.”11,12

This is not a bad way to go through life, assuming one wants to emulate T.S. Eliot’s J. Alfred Prufrock, who lamentably “measured out my life with coffee spoons.”13 Unlike the surgeon, who must make decisions in real time, Eliot’s protagonist could not move forward. Despite his desire to avoid the indecision of Prince Hamlet, alluded to in this paper’s epigraph, Prufrock was paralyzed by doubts and fears, with “time yet for a hundred indecisions, and for a hundred visions and revisions.”13

Despite Eliot’s invocation of “a patient etherised upon a table,”13 the poem shares little with the surgical life. It has much more in common with the precautionary principle. Like Prufrock, the precautionary principle favors what is known— the status quo—as what is unknown is invariably more risky than the familiar. Needless to say, this is antithetical to innovation because discovery invariably requires scenarios that involve novelty and unknown risks. When faced with the certain security of stasis or the potential dangers of innovation, the precautionary principle will invariably choose stasis, leading us, as the legal scholar Cass Sunstein notes, “in no direction at all.”14

Seen through the prism of the precautionary principle, then, surgical innovation invariably presents a dilemma. Discovery and innovation are fundamentally at odds with the precautionary principle, because of their potential for risk.15

The challenge posed by the precautionary principle—which, to be fair, is seen in all areas of clinical research—becomes even more pronounced in surgical research because of the size and scope of clinical trials. As is well appreciated here, compared with drug trials, surgical trials are small. Sometimes they can involve a single subject, whereas drug trials may include thousands of participants. Because of drug trials’ large volume of subjects, therapeutic effects can be small to justify ongoing research. In a surgical trial or a device trial, the number of subjects is smaller, so the therapeutic impact has to be larger to warrant further development and ongoing study. This burden of scale increases the probability of reciprocally large adverse effects. This potential for disaster magnifies the impact of the precautionary principle and may lead to a distortion in ethical judgment along the lines of Hans Jonas’ admonition.12

By all of this I am not suggesting that we abandon precautions and prudence. Instead, my point is to explicate the additional challenges faced by surgical research and the sway of the precautionary principle over this area of inquiry and innovation. By being explicit about the impact of this principle, we can be cognizant of its potential to distort judgments about risks and benefits. Only then can we hope to balance the pursuit of progress with that of safety.

SURGICAL RESPONSIBILITY

These distortions also need to be recognized, and made explicit, because surgical research, more so than pharmacologic research, is much more personal and intimate. This point becomes clear if we consider a surgical trial that does not succeed.

In the surgical arena, such failures are taken to heart and personalized. Unlike trials that involve drugs, surgical research is more proximate. It is not just the failure of a drug or of pharmacology; it is also possibly the failure of the operator, the surgeon who did not achieve the desired goal because of poor execution of surgical technique.

This crucial difference in medical versus surgical cultures is captured by Charles Bosk in his magisterial sociological study of surgery, Forgive and Remember: Managing Medical Failure. In a discussion of morbidity and mortality rounds, Bosk writes:

The specific nature of surgical treatment links the action of the physician and the response of the patient more intimately than in other areas of medicine....When the patient of an internist dies, the natural question his colleagues ask is, “What happened?” When the patient of a surgeon dies, his colleagues ask, “What did you do?”16

As in clinical surgical practice, in surgical research, it is the personal and individualized mediation of the surgeon that is central to the intervention. Here the intermediary is neither a drug nor its bioavailability; rather, it is the operator’s technique plus or minus the operative design and the reliability of an instrument or a device. In either case, the contribution is more proximate and personal, stemming from the actions of individual surgeons and the work of their hands.

History is instructive on this theme of surgical causality and personal culpability if we consider the life of Harvey Cushing, a Cleveland native whose ashes are buried nearby in Lake View Cemetery.17 Cushing was a gifted and innovative surgeon whose technique handling tissues changed how the brain was approached operatively. He is acknowledged as the father of neurosurgery, having created a professional nexus to institutionalize and carry on his innovative work.18

Cushing’s greatest innovation was probably in his individual efforts as a working surgeon. Over the course of his lifetime, he made the resection of brain tumors a safe and sometimes effective treatment for an otherwise dread disease. Michael Bliss, Cushing’s most recent biographer, reports mortality data from more than 2,400 surgeries done by Cushing during his operative lifetime.17 Early in his career (from 1896 to 1911), while he was at Johns Hopkins, Cushing’s case mortality rate was 24.7%. During his later years at the Brigham Hospital, it was 16.2%. By 1930–1931 it was down to 8.8%.

These were extraordinary statistics: no one matched Cushing’s numbers, or his ability to do what he did. Bliss cites mortality data from his surgical contemporaries in the late 1920s as ranging from approximately 35% to 45%. By the numbers Bliss compares Cushing’s talent—his truly brilliant outlier performance—to that of his Jazz Age contemporary, Babe Ruth, who also had outsized talent compared with his peers.17

Cushing himself, a collegiate second baseman at Yale, linked sport and statistics in a most telling way. Documenting his ongoing surgical progress was a hedge against failure and lightened the emotional burdens of the surgical suite. Cushing observed: “A neurosurgeon’s responsibilities would be insufferable if he did not feel that his knowledge of an intricate subject was constantly growing—that his game was improving.”17

This quote and Cushing’s operative statistics point to his nascent effort to engage in evidence-based research and speaks to the spectacular difference that a surgical innovator can make. The extraordinary results achieved by Cushing in his day also suggest that surgeons are not fungible at the vanguard of discovery. History tells us, as contemporary assessments of current research cannot, that only Harvey Cushing could achieve Cushingoid results.

A second point that stems from Cushing’s comment about the burdens of operative work and surgical research is how personally taxing that responsibility can be. Without making progress, he said, the “responsibilities would be insufferable17 (my italics).

Even the great Harvey Cushing perceived the weight of these burdens, suggesting that any effort to depersonalize the ethics of surgical innovation would be naïve. The singularity of Cushing’s surgical accomplishments (his operative excellence as compared with his peer group) and the felt weight of these achievements suggest that surgical innovation is highly personal and proximate to the surgical researcher in a way that is distinct for surgical innovation. This relationship of operative causality and personal culpability can be subsumed under what I will call surgical proximity.

 

 

SURGICAL PROXIMITY

Surgical proximity has several implications for the conduct of research. In this section I will address two issues: conflicts of interest and clinical equipoise.

Surgical proximity and conflicts of interest

As the Cushing example illustrates, at least at the outset of a clinical trial the surgeon himself is part of the actual design of the trial. The same surgical method in the hands of one of his contemporaries would have led to a dramatically different result. The surgeon who is at the forefront of innovation becomes an experimental variable until the methods can be generalized.

The importance of the operator as an essential ingredient in early surgical research points to a key difference with pharmaceutical trials, where the purity of the drug-based intervention can be maintained. This difference has implications for the “rebuttable presumption” stance promulgated by the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC), which looks askance at innovators conducting clinical trials if they have a conflict of interest, such as intellectual property rights for their discoveries.19,20

In many cases, the work that surgical innovators do, as in the case of device development, could not be done without collaborations with industry. Taking the surgical talent of the potentially conflicted—but highly talented—innovator out of the equation may be counterproductive.

Time does not allow me to fully address the conflict-of-interest issue in this forum; suffice it to say that the differential knowledge, skill, and talent of early surgical innovators may be the difference between a trial’s early success or failure. The role of such innovators should neither be truncated or precluded nor be viewed a priori in a prejudicial fashion. Instead, their talents and vision should be welcomed as instrumental to the potential success of the work, managed of course with the proper degree of transparency and disclosure.

As I have noted previously,4,21 if the rationale for a conflict of interest is to allow laudable work to continue that otherwise could not occur without the personal intervention, and talents, of a surgical innovator, it seems prejudicial to view the conflict of interest as disqualifying until proven otherwise. This view is consistent with the legal framework of the US Constitution, which explicitly authorizes Congress “to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”22 It is also embedded in the Patent Act of 1790,23 which balances the patent’s period of exclusivity against the inventor’s obligation to share and disseminate expertise. This role for the innovator is also consistent with the intent and incentives within the framework of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980,24 which was passed with the expectation that industrial partnerships would move ideas from the bench to the bedside.

I hope that others at this conference will be able to return to the issue of conflicts of interest and how the question of surgical proximity may, or may not, alter our ethical judgments about the surgeon’s role in research where there may be a conflict of interest.

Surgical proximity and equipoise

Surgical proximity also has an impact on clinical equipoise, the ethical neutrality about outcomes felt necessary for the conduct of clinical trials.25 The surgeon’s sense of causality and proximity to the operative act makes surgical research different because the equipoise, which exists objectively about the research questions at hand, may not exist in the mind of the surgical researcher. Let me explain.

Taking a patient to surgery is highly consequential. As we have seen from Bosk’s work,16 surgeons feel a sense of responsibility for their operative acts and surgical work. This felt responsibility, inculcated in surgical training and surgical culture, obligates the surgeon to make a proportionality judgment about bringing a patient to the operating room, be it for research or for clinical practice. In this way, surgical investigators have determined, at least in their own minds, that net benefits outweigh net risks, thus breaching clinical equipoise.

It is hard for a surgeon to commit to an operative procedure—be it for clinical care or for research— with all its attendant risks if he or she does not believe that the intervention is safe and effective. We can appreciate the importance of the surgeon’s perspective on the utility of any proposed operation if we consider the opposing question of futility in clinical practice.26 Whereas internists or intensivists might be compelled by families to continue aggressive intensive care, surgeons cannot be compelled to take a patient to the operating room when they deem that the risks outweigh the benefits. Because the surgeon is such a proximate moral agent, he or she will be held culpable for the actions that occur in theater. This degree of responsibility is accompanied by a retained degree of discretion—an almost old-world paternalistic discretion27—to counter the demands for disproportionate care.

This same sense of culpability and responsibility informs the surgeon’s willingness to take any patient to the operating room. In the case of research, this willingness becomes an issue of concern because it means that in the surgeon’s mind, favorable operative proportionality has been achieved.

This process of self-regulation28 can have implications for the informed-consent process because surgeons believe in their work and can exert a strong dynamic transference on subjects who may be desperate for cure.29 Because of this potential bias, surgical research may become especially prone to a therapeutic misconception. That is, if the surgeon is willing to take the risks of doing an innovative procedure in the operating room, then it has crossed some sort of internal threshold of proportionality in which the risks, whatever they are, have become acceptable given the putative benefits. Given what Bosk has written about surgical failure,16 a high bar is crossed when a surgeon takes a patient to the operating room for a novel procedure, even though motivations at that bar may occasionally be mixed.* (*Lest I be misconstrued as too idealistic, this burdens-vs-benefits equation may be fueled by a complex mosaic of motivations and may not always be informed fully by patient-centered benefits. If the surgeon is the innovator and the inventor, these benefits may be for the pursuit of a hypothesis and associated with potential fame or fortune. But even in these cases, judgments about proportionality are informed by surgical proximity. [For more on the ethics of conflicts of interest, see references 4 and 21.])

 

 

FROM SURGICAL RESEARCH TO EDUCATION

This leads to my closing observations about transitions in surgical research, when the work of the pioneering surgeon is bequeathed to the broader surgical community to pick up the torch—or scalpel—and expand the work.

This takes me away from research and, fittingly here at a medical school dedicated to research training, brings me to medical education. To transcend the personal dimensions of surgical innovation—and the courage and vision of the founders—and sustain it more broadly, innovators also have to become educators of future surgeons, organizers of talent, and moral exemplars for the next generation. They have to appreciate that the work that they started, if it is important, will not be completed during their tenure but that future generations will carry it forward and expand upon it. They also have to prepare the next generation with the tools and orientation to appreciate their vision and to embrace what Thomas Kuhn might call new scientific paradigms.30

On several occasions Wilder Penfield, who founded the Montreal Neurological Institute, wrote with regret about Victor Horsley, the neurosurgeon at Queens Square in London. Penfield viewed Horsley as the founder of his field, but Horsley left no disciples. In his autobiography, fittingly entitled No Man Alone, Penfield noted that Horsley, “the most distinguished pioneer neurosurgeon, had died in 1916 without having established a school of neurosurgery.”5 This is in contrast to the discipline-building work of Cushing.

It is not an accident that Dr. Cushing founded a field full of trainees and protégés, of which my co-panelists are descendants. It was intentional and part of his ethos of being truly innovative. And it is not an accident that the distinguished surgical innovators at this symposium have also created institutional structures to continue their work for decades to come. Their achievements have transcended the individual innovator and have become systematic. It is said that Dr. Thomas Starzl launched a field.31 Dr. Denton Cooley founded the Texas Heart Institute.32 Dr. Thomas Fogarty started the Fogarty Institute for Innovation, whose mission statement explicitly notes that it is “an educational non-profit that mentors, trains and inspires the next generation of medical innovators.”33 Each of these pioneers, I believe, appreciates the need for continuity and dissemination.

But even here there is something that we nonsurgeons need to understand: although the work transcends the individual surgeon, the ties remain personal and linked to the impact and legacy of founders. Take, for example, highly prized membership in the Denton A. Cooley Cardiovascular Surgical Society.34 This too is about the importance of individuals and surgical proximity, but here it is transgenerational.

CONCLUSION

If we truly want to continue the dialogue begun here today, we need to understand these social and professional networks and the importance of surgical proximity in transmitting both methods and values. The proximate nature of surgical research—and the causality and responsibility that accrues to the surgeon—makes surgical research different than other areas of biomedical inquiry. This difference has implications for risk-benefit analysis, conflicts of interest, and clinical equipoise. I hope that my colleagues return to these themes in the coming days so that the regulation of this important area of research can be informed by a deeper understanding of the ethics of surgical discovery and innovation.35

Acknowledgments

Dr. Fins gratefully acknowledges the invitation to participate in this symposium, the helpful suggestions of Dr. Eric Kodish, and partial grant support of the Weill Cornell Medical College Research Ethics Core, NIH Clinical & Translational Science Center UL1-RR024966.

References
  1. Frader JE, Caniano DA. Research and innovation in surgery. In: McCullough LB, Jones JW, Brody BA, eds. Surgical Ethics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press; 1998:216–241.
  2. Speelman JD, Bosch DA. Resurgence of functional neurosurgery for Parkinson’s disease: a historical perspective. Mov Disord 1998; 13:582–588.
  3. Holstein WJ. Rewiring the brain: how a bright idea became an innovative medical device. US News & World Report. March 1, 1999:52–53.
  4. Fins JJ, Schachter M. Investigators, industry, and the heuristic device: ethics, patent law, and clinical innovation. Account Res 2001; 8:219–233.
  5. Penfield W. No Man Alone: A Neurosurgeon’s Life. Boston, MA: Little Brown; 1977.
  6. Feindel W. The contributions of Wilder Penfield to the functional anatomy of the human brain. Hum Neurobiol 1982; 1:231–234.
  7. Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. Weldon JEC, trans. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books; 1987.
  8. Fins JJ, Bacchetta MD, Miller FG. Clinical pragmatism: a method of moral problem solving. Kennedy Inst Ethics J 1997; 7:129–145.
  9. Miller FG, Fins JJ. Protecting human subjects in brain research: a pragmatic perspective. In: Illes J, ed. Neuroethics: Defining the Issues in Theory, Practice and Policy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press; 2005.
  10. Pollan M. The year in ideas: A to Z.; precautionary principle. New York Times. December 9, 2001.
  11. van den Belt H. Debating the precautionary principle: “guilty until proven innocent” or “innocent until proven guilty”? Plant Physiol 2003; 132:1122–1126.
  12. Jonas H. The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; 1985:34.
  13. Eliot TS. The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock. In: Abrams MH, ed. The Norton Anthology of English Literature. Vol 2. 4th ed. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co; 1979:2259–2264.
  14. Sunstein CR. The paralyzing principle. Regulation. Winter 2002– 2003; 25(4):32–37.
  15. Holm S, Harris J. Precautionary principle stifles discovery. Nature 1999; 400:398.
  16. Bosk C. Forgive and Remember: Managing Medical Failure. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; 1979:29–30.
  17. Bliss M. Harvey Cushing: A Life in Surgery. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; 2005.
  18. Pinkus RL. Mistakes as a social construct: an historical approach. Kennedy Inst Ethics J 2001; 11:117–133.
  19. AAMC Task Force on Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research. Protecting subjects, preserving trust, promoting progress I: policy and guidelines for the oversight of individual financial interests in human subjects research. Acad Med 2003; 78:225–236.
  20. AAMC Task Force on Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research. Protecting subjects, preserving trust, promoting progress II: principles and recommendations for oversight of an institution’s financial interests in human subjects research. Acad Med 2003; 78:237– 245.
  21. Fins JJ. Disclose and justify: intellectual property, conflicts of interest, and neurosurgery. Congress Quarterly (Official Newsmagazine of the Congress of Neurological Surgeons) 2007; 8(3):34–36.
  22. U.S. Constitution, art. I, §8, cl. 8; see also id. at art. I, §8, cl. 18.
  23. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–111 (1790).
  24. Patent and Trademark Act Amendments of 1980 (Bayh-Dole Act); Pub L No. 96-517. Codified as 35 USC §§200–212 (1994).
  25. Freedman B. Equipoise and the ethics of clinical research. N Engl J Med 1987; 317:141–145.
  26. Callahan D. Necessity, futility, and the good society. J Am Geriatr Soc 1994; 42:866–867.
  27. Katz J. The Silent World of Doctor and Patient. New York, NY: Free Press; 1984.
  28. Jones RS, Fletcher JC. Self-regulation of surgical practice and research. In: McCullough LB, Jones JW, Brody BA, eds. Surgical Ethics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press; 1998:255–279.
  29. Kim SY. Assessing and communicating the risks and benefits of gene transfer clinical trials. Curr Opin Mol Ther 2006; 8:384– 389.
  30. Kuhn TS. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd ed. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; 1970.
  31. Starzl TE. The Puzzle People: Memoirs of a Transplant Surgeon. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press; 2003.
  32. Twenty Five Years of Excellence: A History of the Texas Heart Institute. Houston, TX: Texas Heart Institute Foundation; 1989.
  33. Fogarty Institute for Innovation Web site. Available at: http://01659a8. netsolhost.com/aboutus.html. Accessed June 6, 2008.
  34. Denton A. Cooley Cardiovascular Surgical Society Web site. Available at: http://www.cooleysociety.com/about.html. Accessed June 6, 2008.
  35. de Melo-Martín I, Palmer LI, Fins JJ. Viewpoint: developing a research ethics consultation service to foster responsive and responsible clinical research. Acad Med 2007; 82:900–904.
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Joseph J. Fins, MD
Chief, Division of Medical Ethics, Professor of Medicine, Professor of Public Health, and Professor of Medicine in Psychiatry at Weill Cornell Medical College, New York, NY; Director, Medical Ethics and an attending physician at New York-Presbyterian Hospital/Weill Cornell Medical Center, as well as an adjunct faculty member of The Rockefeller University

Correspondence: Joseph J. Fins, MD, FACP, Division of Medical Ethics, Weill Cornell Medical College, 435 East 70th Street, Suite 4-J, New York, NY 0021; [email protected]

Dr. Fins reported that he is an unfunded co-investigator of the use of deep brain stimulation in the minimally conscious state funded by Intelect Medical Inc.

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Correspondence: Joseph J. Fins, MD, FACP, Division of Medical Ethics, Weill Cornell Medical College, 435 East 70th Street, Suite 4-J, New York, NY 0021; [email protected]

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Chief, Division of Medical Ethics, Professor of Medicine, Professor of Public Health, and Professor of Medicine in Psychiatry at Weill Cornell Medical College, New York, NY; Director, Medical Ethics and an attending physician at New York-Presbyterian Hospital/Weill Cornell Medical Center, as well as an adjunct faculty member of The Rockefeller University

Correspondence: Joseph J. Fins, MD, FACP, Division of Medical Ethics, Weill Cornell Medical College, 435 East 70th Street, Suite 4-J, New York, NY 0021; [email protected]

Dr. Fins reported that he is an unfunded co-investigator of the use of deep brain stimulation in the minimally conscious state funded by Intelect Medical Inc.

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No! I am not Prince Hamlet, nor was meant to be;
Am an attendant lord, one that will do
To swell a progress, start a scene or two…

—T.S. Eliot, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock

Let me start by thanking the organizers for their invitation to be here and to start this off. I am not sure if that invitation was an act of kindness or of throwing a fellow bioethicist to the lions, as we will be addressing a complicated set of issues upon which well-intentioned folks disagree and sometimes disagree with a passion.

What I would like to do is to lay out some of the inherent ethical problems related to surgical innovation. I will argue that some of these problems are unique to surgery and that others relate to how we have chosen to define categories like research and practice. Other problems involve how we view the proportionality of risks and benefits in surgical research. I will argue that we have falsely analogized surgical progress to progress made in other areas of biomedical research and misunderstood the highly personal, or proximate, nature of surgical inquiry. Without appreciating the import of what I will call “surgical proximity,” we will be unable to adequately address ethical issues in surgical innovation.

PROBLEMS OR DILEMMAS?

So let me begin with the title of our session, “Surgical Innovation and Ethical Dilemmas,” and why this juxta position is counterproductive. A colleague long ago taught me to distinguish problems from dilemmas—the former being resolvable, the latter intractable, often involving a choice between two equally unfavorable choices.

Although I may be making too much of the semantics, I do think the title betrays a presumption that surgical innovation invariably forces adversarial choices. It tends to dichotomize ethical reflection, pitting those who favor prudence against those who endorse progress, or it creates too stark a difference between ethical issues in surgical practice and those encountered in the conduct of surgical research.

Even therapeutic, validated surgery in many ways has the potential to become innovative, if not outright experimental. Patients may have anatomical differences that require surgical improvisation, or complications may arise during “routine” surgery, creating the need for an imaginative response.1 At what point do these departures from expected care become novel interventions, innovative or even experimental? A routine case with an unexpected turn can even become a case report opening up a new field of endeavor.

For instance, the field of stereotactic functional neurosurgery was born out of a “routine” case of ablative surgery for Parkinson’s disease in the 1980s, when the French neurosurgeon Alim Benabid was using electrodes to determine which areas of the brain should be destroyed. As he was mapping the thalamus, he noted that the tremor of his patient abated. This led him to wonder if one could treat drug-resistant Parkinson’s with electrical stimulation instead of destructive lesioning.2 Benabid’s translational insight during an ordinary case led to the development of the rather extraordinary field of stereotactic functional neurosurgery and neuromodulation.3,4

Another example from an earlier era comes from the life work of neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield, who did pioneering work in the surgical treatment of epilepsy. Here, the accumulation of experience from “routine care” led to generalizable knowledge, much like hypotheses are validated in experimental work. In Penfield’s case, his clinical use of electrical stimulation to plan resections of scar tissue causing epilepsy led him to map the human homunculus, a magnificent achievement of profound importance.5,6

So let us avoid simplistic and confounding demarcations. Instead of dichotomizing innovation and prudence—or surgical research and surgical practice—let us try to start our deliberations with an eye toward a more synthetic approach. Like most things in nature and in biology, ethics too is on a continuum with gradations that can fit into an Aristotelian taxonomy. Let us emulate what Aristotle called phronesis, or practical wisdom, these next 2 days so that we achieve constructive outcomes, or what the pragmatists would call instrumental goods.7

If we are successful in laying out the ethical issues in this clinically pragmatic fashion, we can turn intractable “dilemmas” into problems amenable to resolution through the particularistic invocation of ethical principles as they relate to the surgical context.8 If we follow this inductive method of moral problem solving, we will avoid sweeping ethical generalizations, or categoricals, that can misrepresent the complexity of innovative research and deprive society of its benefits.9

 

 

INNOVATION VS PRUDENCE: A FALSE DICHOTOMY

So let us start by understanding the presuppositions that led to the expectation that dilemmas will descend upon those who engage in surgical innovation. In my view, this expectation begins with what is called the precautionary principle, a concept with some currency in the realm of environmental ethics.10

The precautionary principle urges caution and prudence when facing unknowns and is an antecedent sort of utilitarianism. One makes judgments about the advisability of actions based on a prior assessment of foreseeable risks and benefits. If the risks are excessive or exceed benefits, the precautionary principle urges care, caution, and even avoidance of a given course of action.

When the precautionary principle is implicitly invoked in making judgments about research, the objective is to pursue a degree of safety that is comparable to that of established therapy. But interventions that have progressed to being deemed “therapeutic” have of course achieved a requisite degree of both safety and efficacy—that is what makes them therapeutic, as opposed to investigational, interventions. One cannot know before one has conducted a clinical trial, and completed statistical analysis, whether a new surgical advance or device meets these expectations. Because of this lack of knowledge, there is an inherent degree of risk in any novel intervention.

The challenge posed by innovation or novelty creates the possibility of untoward events. It leads to invocation of the precautionary principle, which, echoing the admonitions of the philosopher Hans Jonas, urges us to “give greater weight to the prognosis of doom than to that of bliss.”11,12

This is not a bad way to go through life, assuming one wants to emulate T.S. Eliot’s J. Alfred Prufrock, who lamentably “measured out my life with coffee spoons.”13 Unlike the surgeon, who must make decisions in real time, Eliot’s protagonist could not move forward. Despite his desire to avoid the indecision of Prince Hamlet, alluded to in this paper’s epigraph, Prufrock was paralyzed by doubts and fears, with “time yet for a hundred indecisions, and for a hundred visions and revisions.”13

Despite Eliot’s invocation of “a patient etherised upon a table,”13 the poem shares little with the surgical life. It has much more in common with the precautionary principle. Like Prufrock, the precautionary principle favors what is known— the status quo—as what is unknown is invariably more risky than the familiar. Needless to say, this is antithetical to innovation because discovery invariably requires scenarios that involve novelty and unknown risks. When faced with the certain security of stasis or the potential dangers of innovation, the precautionary principle will invariably choose stasis, leading us, as the legal scholar Cass Sunstein notes, “in no direction at all.”14

Seen through the prism of the precautionary principle, then, surgical innovation invariably presents a dilemma. Discovery and innovation are fundamentally at odds with the precautionary principle, because of their potential for risk.15

The challenge posed by the precautionary principle—which, to be fair, is seen in all areas of clinical research—becomes even more pronounced in surgical research because of the size and scope of clinical trials. As is well appreciated here, compared with drug trials, surgical trials are small. Sometimes they can involve a single subject, whereas drug trials may include thousands of participants. Because of drug trials’ large volume of subjects, therapeutic effects can be small to justify ongoing research. In a surgical trial or a device trial, the number of subjects is smaller, so the therapeutic impact has to be larger to warrant further development and ongoing study. This burden of scale increases the probability of reciprocally large adverse effects. This potential for disaster magnifies the impact of the precautionary principle and may lead to a distortion in ethical judgment along the lines of Hans Jonas’ admonition.12

By all of this I am not suggesting that we abandon precautions and prudence. Instead, my point is to explicate the additional challenges faced by surgical research and the sway of the precautionary principle over this area of inquiry and innovation. By being explicit about the impact of this principle, we can be cognizant of its potential to distort judgments about risks and benefits. Only then can we hope to balance the pursuit of progress with that of safety.

SURGICAL RESPONSIBILITY

These distortions also need to be recognized, and made explicit, because surgical research, more so than pharmacologic research, is much more personal and intimate. This point becomes clear if we consider a surgical trial that does not succeed.

In the surgical arena, such failures are taken to heart and personalized. Unlike trials that involve drugs, surgical research is more proximate. It is not just the failure of a drug or of pharmacology; it is also possibly the failure of the operator, the surgeon who did not achieve the desired goal because of poor execution of surgical technique.

This crucial difference in medical versus surgical cultures is captured by Charles Bosk in his magisterial sociological study of surgery, Forgive and Remember: Managing Medical Failure. In a discussion of morbidity and mortality rounds, Bosk writes:

The specific nature of surgical treatment links the action of the physician and the response of the patient more intimately than in other areas of medicine....When the patient of an internist dies, the natural question his colleagues ask is, “What happened?” When the patient of a surgeon dies, his colleagues ask, “What did you do?”16

As in clinical surgical practice, in surgical research, it is the personal and individualized mediation of the surgeon that is central to the intervention. Here the intermediary is neither a drug nor its bioavailability; rather, it is the operator’s technique plus or minus the operative design and the reliability of an instrument or a device. In either case, the contribution is more proximate and personal, stemming from the actions of individual surgeons and the work of their hands.

History is instructive on this theme of surgical causality and personal culpability if we consider the life of Harvey Cushing, a Cleveland native whose ashes are buried nearby in Lake View Cemetery.17 Cushing was a gifted and innovative surgeon whose technique handling tissues changed how the brain was approached operatively. He is acknowledged as the father of neurosurgery, having created a professional nexus to institutionalize and carry on his innovative work.18

Cushing’s greatest innovation was probably in his individual efforts as a working surgeon. Over the course of his lifetime, he made the resection of brain tumors a safe and sometimes effective treatment for an otherwise dread disease. Michael Bliss, Cushing’s most recent biographer, reports mortality data from more than 2,400 surgeries done by Cushing during his operative lifetime.17 Early in his career (from 1896 to 1911), while he was at Johns Hopkins, Cushing’s case mortality rate was 24.7%. During his later years at the Brigham Hospital, it was 16.2%. By 1930–1931 it was down to 8.8%.

These were extraordinary statistics: no one matched Cushing’s numbers, or his ability to do what he did. Bliss cites mortality data from his surgical contemporaries in the late 1920s as ranging from approximately 35% to 45%. By the numbers Bliss compares Cushing’s talent—his truly brilliant outlier performance—to that of his Jazz Age contemporary, Babe Ruth, who also had outsized talent compared with his peers.17

Cushing himself, a collegiate second baseman at Yale, linked sport and statistics in a most telling way. Documenting his ongoing surgical progress was a hedge against failure and lightened the emotional burdens of the surgical suite. Cushing observed: “A neurosurgeon’s responsibilities would be insufferable if he did not feel that his knowledge of an intricate subject was constantly growing—that his game was improving.”17

This quote and Cushing’s operative statistics point to his nascent effort to engage in evidence-based research and speaks to the spectacular difference that a surgical innovator can make. The extraordinary results achieved by Cushing in his day also suggest that surgeons are not fungible at the vanguard of discovery. History tells us, as contemporary assessments of current research cannot, that only Harvey Cushing could achieve Cushingoid results.

A second point that stems from Cushing’s comment about the burdens of operative work and surgical research is how personally taxing that responsibility can be. Without making progress, he said, the “responsibilities would be insufferable17 (my italics).

Even the great Harvey Cushing perceived the weight of these burdens, suggesting that any effort to depersonalize the ethics of surgical innovation would be naïve. The singularity of Cushing’s surgical accomplishments (his operative excellence as compared with his peer group) and the felt weight of these achievements suggest that surgical innovation is highly personal and proximate to the surgical researcher in a way that is distinct for surgical innovation. This relationship of operative causality and personal culpability can be subsumed under what I will call surgical proximity.

 

 

SURGICAL PROXIMITY

Surgical proximity has several implications for the conduct of research. In this section I will address two issues: conflicts of interest and clinical equipoise.

Surgical proximity and conflicts of interest

As the Cushing example illustrates, at least at the outset of a clinical trial the surgeon himself is part of the actual design of the trial. The same surgical method in the hands of one of his contemporaries would have led to a dramatically different result. The surgeon who is at the forefront of innovation becomes an experimental variable until the methods can be generalized.

The importance of the operator as an essential ingredient in early surgical research points to a key difference with pharmaceutical trials, where the purity of the drug-based intervention can be maintained. This difference has implications for the “rebuttable presumption” stance promulgated by the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC), which looks askance at innovators conducting clinical trials if they have a conflict of interest, such as intellectual property rights for their discoveries.19,20

In many cases, the work that surgical innovators do, as in the case of device development, could not be done without collaborations with industry. Taking the surgical talent of the potentially conflicted—but highly talented—innovator out of the equation may be counterproductive.

Time does not allow me to fully address the conflict-of-interest issue in this forum; suffice it to say that the differential knowledge, skill, and talent of early surgical innovators may be the difference between a trial’s early success or failure. The role of such innovators should neither be truncated or precluded nor be viewed a priori in a prejudicial fashion. Instead, their talents and vision should be welcomed as instrumental to the potential success of the work, managed of course with the proper degree of transparency and disclosure.

As I have noted previously,4,21 if the rationale for a conflict of interest is to allow laudable work to continue that otherwise could not occur without the personal intervention, and talents, of a surgical innovator, it seems prejudicial to view the conflict of interest as disqualifying until proven otherwise. This view is consistent with the legal framework of the US Constitution, which explicitly authorizes Congress “to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”22 It is also embedded in the Patent Act of 1790,23 which balances the patent’s period of exclusivity against the inventor’s obligation to share and disseminate expertise. This role for the innovator is also consistent with the intent and incentives within the framework of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980,24 which was passed with the expectation that industrial partnerships would move ideas from the bench to the bedside.

I hope that others at this conference will be able to return to the issue of conflicts of interest and how the question of surgical proximity may, or may not, alter our ethical judgments about the surgeon’s role in research where there may be a conflict of interest.

Surgical proximity and equipoise

Surgical proximity also has an impact on clinical equipoise, the ethical neutrality about outcomes felt necessary for the conduct of clinical trials.25 The surgeon’s sense of causality and proximity to the operative act makes surgical research different because the equipoise, which exists objectively about the research questions at hand, may not exist in the mind of the surgical researcher. Let me explain.

Taking a patient to surgery is highly consequential. As we have seen from Bosk’s work,16 surgeons feel a sense of responsibility for their operative acts and surgical work. This felt responsibility, inculcated in surgical training and surgical culture, obligates the surgeon to make a proportionality judgment about bringing a patient to the operating room, be it for research or for clinical practice. In this way, surgical investigators have determined, at least in their own minds, that net benefits outweigh net risks, thus breaching clinical equipoise.

It is hard for a surgeon to commit to an operative procedure—be it for clinical care or for research— with all its attendant risks if he or she does not believe that the intervention is safe and effective. We can appreciate the importance of the surgeon’s perspective on the utility of any proposed operation if we consider the opposing question of futility in clinical practice.26 Whereas internists or intensivists might be compelled by families to continue aggressive intensive care, surgeons cannot be compelled to take a patient to the operating room when they deem that the risks outweigh the benefits. Because the surgeon is such a proximate moral agent, he or she will be held culpable for the actions that occur in theater. This degree of responsibility is accompanied by a retained degree of discretion—an almost old-world paternalistic discretion27—to counter the demands for disproportionate care.

This same sense of culpability and responsibility informs the surgeon’s willingness to take any patient to the operating room. In the case of research, this willingness becomes an issue of concern because it means that in the surgeon’s mind, favorable operative proportionality has been achieved.

This process of self-regulation28 can have implications for the informed-consent process because surgeons believe in their work and can exert a strong dynamic transference on subjects who may be desperate for cure.29 Because of this potential bias, surgical research may become especially prone to a therapeutic misconception. That is, if the surgeon is willing to take the risks of doing an innovative procedure in the operating room, then it has crossed some sort of internal threshold of proportionality in which the risks, whatever they are, have become acceptable given the putative benefits. Given what Bosk has written about surgical failure,16 a high bar is crossed when a surgeon takes a patient to the operating room for a novel procedure, even though motivations at that bar may occasionally be mixed.* (*Lest I be misconstrued as too idealistic, this burdens-vs-benefits equation may be fueled by a complex mosaic of motivations and may not always be informed fully by patient-centered benefits. If the surgeon is the innovator and the inventor, these benefits may be for the pursuit of a hypothesis and associated with potential fame or fortune. But even in these cases, judgments about proportionality are informed by surgical proximity. [For more on the ethics of conflicts of interest, see references 4 and 21.])

 

 

FROM SURGICAL RESEARCH TO EDUCATION

This leads to my closing observations about transitions in surgical research, when the work of the pioneering surgeon is bequeathed to the broader surgical community to pick up the torch—or scalpel—and expand the work.

This takes me away from research and, fittingly here at a medical school dedicated to research training, brings me to medical education. To transcend the personal dimensions of surgical innovation—and the courage and vision of the founders—and sustain it more broadly, innovators also have to become educators of future surgeons, organizers of talent, and moral exemplars for the next generation. They have to appreciate that the work that they started, if it is important, will not be completed during their tenure but that future generations will carry it forward and expand upon it. They also have to prepare the next generation with the tools and orientation to appreciate their vision and to embrace what Thomas Kuhn might call new scientific paradigms.30

On several occasions Wilder Penfield, who founded the Montreal Neurological Institute, wrote with regret about Victor Horsley, the neurosurgeon at Queens Square in London. Penfield viewed Horsley as the founder of his field, but Horsley left no disciples. In his autobiography, fittingly entitled No Man Alone, Penfield noted that Horsley, “the most distinguished pioneer neurosurgeon, had died in 1916 without having established a school of neurosurgery.”5 This is in contrast to the discipline-building work of Cushing.

It is not an accident that Dr. Cushing founded a field full of trainees and protégés, of which my co-panelists are descendants. It was intentional and part of his ethos of being truly innovative. And it is not an accident that the distinguished surgical innovators at this symposium have also created institutional structures to continue their work for decades to come. Their achievements have transcended the individual innovator and have become systematic. It is said that Dr. Thomas Starzl launched a field.31 Dr. Denton Cooley founded the Texas Heart Institute.32 Dr. Thomas Fogarty started the Fogarty Institute for Innovation, whose mission statement explicitly notes that it is “an educational non-profit that mentors, trains and inspires the next generation of medical innovators.”33 Each of these pioneers, I believe, appreciates the need for continuity and dissemination.

But even here there is something that we nonsurgeons need to understand: although the work transcends the individual surgeon, the ties remain personal and linked to the impact and legacy of founders. Take, for example, highly prized membership in the Denton A. Cooley Cardiovascular Surgical Society.34 This too is about the importance of individuals and surgical proximity, but here it is transgenerational.

CONCLUSION

If we truly want to continue the dialogue begun here today, we need to understand these social and professional networks and the importance of surgical proximity in transmitting both methods and values. The proximate nature of surgical research—and the causality and responsibility that accrues to the surgeon—makes surgical research different than other areas of biomedical inquiry. This difference has implications for risk-benefit analysis, conflicts of interest, and clinical equipoise. I hope that my colleagues return to these themes in the coming days so that the regulation of this important area of research can be informed by a deeper understanding of the ethics of surgical discovery and innovation.35

Acknowledgments

Dr. Fins gratefully acknowledges the invitation to participate in this symposium, the helpful suggestions of Dr. Eric Kodish, and partial grant support of the Weill Cornell Medical College Research Ethics Core, NIH Clinical & Translational Science Center UL1-RR024966.

No! I am not Prince Hamlet, nor was meant to be;
Am an attendant lord, one that will do
To swell a progress, start a scene or two…

—T.S. Eliot, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock

Let me start by thanking the organizers for their invitation to be here and to start this off. I am not sure if that invitation was an act of kindness or of throwing a fellow bioethicist to the lions, as we will be addressing a complicated set of issues upon which well-intentioned folks disagree and sometimes disagree with a passion.

What I would like to do is to lay out some of the inherent ethical problems related to surgical innovation. I will argue that some of these problems are unique to surgery and that others relate to how we have chosen to define categories like research and practice. Other problems involve how we view the proportionality of risks and benefits in surgical research. I will argue that we have falsely analogized surgical progress to progress made in other areas of biomedical research and misunderstood the highly personal, or proximate, nature of surgical inquiry. Without appreciating the import of what I will call “surgical proximity,” we will be unable to adequately address ethical issues in surgical innovation.

PROBLEMS OR DILEMMAS?

So let me begin with the title of our session, “Surgical Innovation and Ethical Dilemmas,” and why this juxta position is counterproductive. A colleague long ago taught me to distinguish problems from dilemmas—the former being resolvable, the latter intractable, often involving a choice between two equally unfavorable choices.

Although I may be making too much of the semantics, I do think the title betrays a presumption that surgical innovation invariably forces adversarial choices. It tends to dichotomize ethical reflection, pitting those who favor prudence against those who endorse progress, or it creates too stark a difference between ethical issues in surgical practice and those encountered in the conduct of surgical research.

Even therapeutic, validated surgery in many ways has the potential to become innovative, if not outright experimental. Patients may have anatomical differences that require surgical improvisation, or complications may arise during “routine” surgery, creating the need for an imaginative response.1 At what point do these departures from expected care become novel interventions, innovative or even experimental? A routine case with an unexpected turn can even become a case report opening up a new field of endeavor.

For instance, the field of stereotactic functional neurosurgery was born out of a “routine” case of ablative surgery for Parkinson’s disease in the 1980s, when the French neurosurgeon Alim Benabid was using electrodes to determine which areas of the brain should be destroyed. As he was mapping the thalamus, he noted that the tremor of his patient abated. This led him to wonder if one could treat drug-resistant Parkinson’s with electrical stimulation instead of destructive lesioning.2 Benabid’s translational insight during an ordinary case led to the development of the rather extraordinary field of stereotactic functional neurosurgery and neuromodulation.3,4

Another example from an earlier era comes from the life work of neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield, who did pioneering work in the surgical treatment of epilepsy. Here, the accumulation of experience from “routine care” led to generalizable knowledge, much like hypotheses are validated in experimental work. In Penfield’s case, his clinical use of electrical stimulation to plan resections of scar tissue causing epilepsy led him to map the human homunculus, a magnificent achievement of profound importance.5,6

So let us avoid simplistic and confounding demarcations. Instead of dichotomizing innovation and prudence—or surgical research and surgical practice—let us try to start our deliberations with an eye toward a more synthetic approach. Like most things in nature and in biology, ethics too is on a continuum with gradations that can fit into an Aristotelian taxonomy. Let us emulate what Aristotle called phronesis, or practical wisdom, these next 2 days so that we achieve constructive outcomes, or what the pragmatists would call instrumental goods.7

If we are successful in laying out the ethical issues in this clinically pragmatic fashion, we can turn intractable “dilemmas” into problems amenable to resolution through the particularistic invocation of ethical principles as they relate to the surgical context.8 If we follow this inductive method of moral problem solving, we will avoid sweeping ethical generalizations, or categoricals, that can misrepresent the complexity of innovative research and deprive society of its benefits.9

 

 

INNOVATION VS PRUDENCE: A FALSE DICHOTOMY

So let us start by understanding the presuppositions that led to the expectation that dilemmas will descend upon those who engage in surgical innovation. In my view, this expectation begins with what is called the precautionary principle, a concept with some currency in the realm of environmental ethics.10

The precautionary principle urges caution and prudence when facing unknowns and is an antecedent sort of utilitarianism. One makes judgments about the advisability of actions based on a prior assessment of foreseeable risks and benefits. If the risks are excessive or exceed benefits, the precautionary principle urges care, caution, and even avoidance of a given course of action.

When the precautionary principle is implicitly invoked in making judgments about research, the objective is to pursue a degree of safety that is comparable to that of established therapy. But interventions that have progressed to being deemed “therapeutic” have of course achieved a requisite degree of both safety and efficacy—that is what makes them therapeutic, as opposed to investigational, interventions. One cannot know before one has conducted a clinical trial, and completed statistical analysis, whether a new surgical advance or device meets these expectations. Because of this lack of knowledge, there is an inherent degree of risk in any novel intervention.

The challenge posed by innovation or novelty creates the possibility of untoward events. It leads to invocation of the precautionary principle, which, echoing the admonitions of the philosopher Hans Jonas, urges us to “give greater weight to the prognosis of doom than to that of bliss.”11,12

This is not a bad way to go through life, assuming one wants to emulate T.S. Eliot’s J. Alfred Prufrock, who lamentably “measured out my life with coffee spoons.”13 Unlike the surgeon, who must make decisions in real time, Eliot’s protagonist could not move forward. Despite his desire to avoid the indecision of Prince Hamlet, alluded to in this paper’s epigraph, Prufrock was paralyzed by doubts and fears, with “time yet for a hundred indecisions, and for a hundred visions and revisions.”13

Despite Eliot’s invocation of “a patient etherised upon a table,”13 the poem shares little with the surgical life. It has much more in common with the precautionary principle. Like Prufrock, the precautionary principle favors what is known— the status quo—as what is unknown is invariably more risky than the familiar. Needless to say, this is antithetical to innovation because discovery invariably requires scenarios that involve novelty and unknown risks. When faced with the certain security of stasis or the potential dangers of innovation, the precautionary principle will invariably choose stasis, leading us, as the legal scholar Cass Sunstein notes, “in no direction at all.”14

Seen through the prism of the precautionary principle, then, surgical innovation invariably presents a dilemma. Discovery and innovation are fundamentally at odds with the precautionary principle, because of their potential for risk.15

The challenge posed by the precautionary principle—which, to be fair, is seen in all areas of clinical research—becomes even more pronounced in surgical research because of the size and scope of clinical trials. As is well appreciated here, compared with drug trials, surgical trials are small. Sometimes they can involve a single subject, whereas drug trials may include thousands of participants. Because of drug trials’ large volume of subjects, therapeutic effects can be small to justify ongoing research. In a surgical trial or a device trial, the number of subjects is smaller, so the therapeutic impact has to be larger to warrant further development and ongoing study. This burden of scale increases the probability of reciprocally large adverse effects. This potential for disaster magnifies the impact of the precautionary principle and may lead to a distortion in ethical judgment along the lines of Hans Jonas’ admonition.12

By all of this I am not suggesting that we abandon precautions and prudence. Instead, my point is to explicate the additional challenges faced by surgical research and the sway of the precautionary principle over this area of inquiry and innovation. By being explicit about the impact of this principle, we can be cognizant of its potential to distort judgments about risks and benefits. Only then can we hope to balance the pursuit of progress with that of safety.

SURGICAL RESPONSIBILITY

These distortions also need to be recognized, and made explicit, because surgical research, more so than pharmacologic research, is much more personal and intimate. This point becomes clear if we consider a surgical trial that does not succeed.

In the surgical arena, such failures are taken to heart and personalized. Unlike trials that involve drugs, surgical research is more proximate. It is not just the failure of a drug or of pharmacology; it is also possibly the failure of the operator, the surgeon who did not achieve the desired goal because of poor execution of surgical technique.

This crucial difference in medical versus surgical cultures is captured by Charles Bosk in his magisterial sociological study of surgery, Forgive and Remember: Managing Medical Failure. In a discussion of morbidity and mortality rounds, Bosk writes:

The specific nature of surgical treatment links the action of the physician and the response of the patient more intimately than in other areas of medicine....When the patient of an internist dies, the natural question his colleagues ask is, “What happened?” When the patient of a surgeon dies, his colleagues ask, “What did you do?”16

As in clinical surgical practice, in surgical research, it is the personal and individualized mediation of the surgeon that is central to the intervention. Here the intermediary is neither a drug nor its bioavailability; rather, it is the operator’s technique plus or minus the operative design and the reliability of an instrument or a device. In either case, the contribution is more proximate and personal, stemming from the actions of individual surgeons and the work of their hands.

History is instructive on this theme of surgical causality and personal culpability if we consider the life of Harvey Cushing, a Cleveland native whose ashes are buried nearby in Lake View Cemetery.17 Cushing was a gifted and innovative surgeon whose technique handling tissues changed how the brain was approached operatively. He is acknowledged as the father of neurosurgery, having created a professional nexus to institutionalize and carry on his innovative work.18

Cushing’s greatest innovation was probably in his individual efforts as a working surgeon. Over the course of his lifetime, he made the resection of brain tumors a safe and sometimes effective treatment for an otherwise dread disease. Michael Bliss, Cushing’s most recent biographer, reports mortality data from more than 2,400 surgeries done by Cushing during his operative lifetime.17 Early in his career (from 1896 to 1911), while he was at Johns Hopkins, Cushing’s case mortality rate was 24.7%. During his later years at the Brigham Hospital, it was 16.2%. By 1930–1931 it was down to 8.8%.

These were extraordinary statistics: no one matched Cushing’s numbers, or his ability to do what he did. Bliss cites mortality data from his surgical contemporaries in the late 1920s as ranging from approximately 35% to 45%. By the numbers Bliss compares Cushing’s talent—his truly brilliant outlier performance—to that of his Jazz Age contemporary, Babe Ruth, who also had outsized talent compared with his peers.17

Cushing himself, a collegiate second baseman at Yale, linked sport and statistics in a most telling way. Documenting his ongoing surgical progress was a hedge against failure and lightened the emotional burdens of the surgical suite. Cushing observed: “A neurosurgeon’s responsibilities would be insufferable if he did not feel that his knowledge of an intricate subject was constantly growing—that his game was improving.”17

This quote and Cushing’s operative statistics point to his nascent effort to engage in evidence-based research and speaks to the spectacular difference that a surgical innovator can make. The extraordinary results achieved by Cushing in his day also suggest that surgeons are not fungible at the vanguard of discovery. History tells us, as contemporary assessments of current research cannot, that only Harvey Cushing could achieve Cushingoid results.

A second point that stems from Cushing’s comment about the burdens of operative work and surgical research is how personally taxing that responsibility can be. Without making progress, he said, the “responsibilities would be insufferable17 (my italics).

Even the great Harvey Cushing perceived the weight of these burdens, suggesting that any effort to depersonalize the ethics of surgical innovation would be naïve. The singularity of Cushing’s surgical accomplishments (his operative excellence as compared with his peer group) and the felt weight of these achievements suggest that surgical innovation is highly personal and proximate to the surgical researcher in a way that is distinct for surgical innovation. This relationship of operative causality and personal culpability can be subsumed under what I will call surgical proximity.

 

 

SURGICAL PROXIMITY

Surgical proximity has several implications for the conduct of research. In this section I will address two issues: conflicts of interest and clinical equipoise.

Surgical proximity and conflicts of interest

As the Cushing example illustrates, at least at the outset of a clinical trial the surgeon himself is part of the actual design of the trial. The same surgical method in the hands of one of his contemporaries would have led to a dramatically different result. The surgeon who is at the forefront of innovation becomes an experimental variable until the methods can be generalized.

The importance of the operator as an essential ingredient in early surgical research points to a key difference with pharmaceutical trials, where the purity of the drug-based intervention can be maintained. This difference has implications for the “rebuttable presumption” stance promulgated by the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC), which looks askance at innovators conducting clinical trials if they have a conflict of interest, such as intellectual property rights for their discoveries.19,20

In many cases, the work that surgical innovators do, as in the case of device development, could not be done without collaborations with industry. Taking the surgical talent of the potentially conflicted—but highly talented—innovator out of the equation may be counterproductive.

Time does not allow me to fully address the conflict-of-interest issue in this forum; suffice it to say that the differential knowledge, skill, and talent of early surgical innovators may be the difference between a trial’s early success or failure. The role of such innovators should neither be truncated or precluded nor be viewed a priori in a prejudicial fashion. Instead, their talents and vision should be welcomed as instrumental to the potential success of the work, managed of course with the proper degree of transparency and disclosure.

As I have noted previously,4,21 if the rationale for a conflict of interest is to allow laudable work to continue that otherwise could not occur without the personal intervention, and talents, of a surgical innovator, it seems prejudicial to view the conflict of interest as disqualifying until proven otherwise. This view is consistent with the legal framework of the US Constitution, which explicitly authorizes Congress “to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”22 It is also embedded in the Patent Act of 1790,23 which balances the patent’s period of exclusivity against the inventor’s obligation to share and disseminate expertise. This role for the innovator is also consistent with the intent and incentives within the framework of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980,24 which was passed with the expectation that industrial partnerships would move ideas from the bench to the bedside.

I hope that others at this conference will be able to return to the issue of conflicts of interest and how the question of surgical proximity may, or may not, alter our ethical judgments about the surgeon’s role in research where there may be a conflict of interest.

Surgical proximity and equipoise

Surgical proximity also has an impact on clinical equipoise, the ethical neutrality about outcomes felt necessary for the conduct of clinical trials.25 The surgeon’s sense of causality and proximity to the operative act makes surgical research different because the equipoise, which exists objectively about the research questions at hand, may not exist in the mind of the surgical researcher. Let me explain.

Taking a patient to surgery is highly consequential. As we have seen from Bosk’s work,16 surgeons feel a sense of responsibility for their operative acts and surgical work. This felt responsibility, inculcated in surgical training and surgical culture, obligates the surgeon to make a proportionality judgment about bringing a patient to the operating room, be it for research or for clinical practice. In this way, surgical investigators have determined, at least in their own minds, that net benefits outweigh net risks, thus breaching clinical equipoise.

It is hard for a surgeon to commit to an operative procedure—be it for clinical care or for research— with all its attendant risks if he or she does not believe that the intervention is safe and effective. We can appreciate the importance of the surgeon’s perspective on the utility of any proposed operation if we consider the opposing question of futility in clinical practice.26 Whereas internists or intensivists might be compelled by families to continue aggressive intensive care, surgeons cannot be compelled to take a patient to the operating room when they deem that the risks outweigh the benefits. Because the surgeon is such a proximate moral agent, he or she will be held culpable for the actions that occur in theater. This degree of responsibility is accompanied by a retained degree of discretion—an almost old-world paternalistic discretion27—to counter the demands for disproportionate care.

This same sense of culpability and responsibility informs the surgeon’s willingness to take any patient to the operating room. In the case of research, this willingness becomes an issue of concern because it means that in the surgeon’s mind, favorable operative proportionality has been achieved.

This process of self-regulation28 can have implications for the informed-consent process because surgeons believe in their work and can exert a strong dynamic transference on subjects who may be desperate for cure.29 Because of this potential bias, surgical research may become especially prone to a therapeutic misconception. That is, if the surgeon is willing to take the risks of doing an innovative procedure in the operating room, then it has crossed some sort of internal threshold of proportionality in which the risks, whatever they are, have become acceptable given the putative benefits. Given what Bosk has written about surgical failure,16 a high bar is crossed when a surgeon takes a patient to the operating room for a novel procedure, even though motivations at that bar may occasionally be mixed.* (*Lest I be misconstrued as too idealistic, this burdens-vs-benefits equation may be fueled by a complex mosaic of motivations and may not always be informed fully by patient-centered benefits. If the surgeon is the innovator and the inventor, these benefits may be for the pursuit of a hypothesis and associated with potential fame or fortune. But even in these cases, judgments about proportionality are informed by surgical proximity. [For more on the ethics of conflicts of interest, see references 4 and 21.])

 

 

FROM SURGICAL RESEARCH TO EDUCATION

This leads to my closing observations about transitions in surgical research, when the work of the pioneering surgeon is bequeathed to the broader surgical community to pick up the torch—or scalpel—and expand the work.

This takes me away from research and, fittingly here at a medical school dedicated to research training, brings me to medical education. To transcend the personal dimensions of surgical innovation—and the courage and vision of the founders—and sustain it more broadly, innovators also have to become educators of future surgeons, organizers of talent, and moral exemplars for the next generation. They have to appreciate that the work that they started, if it is important, will not be completed during their tenure but that future generations will carry it forward and expand upon it. They also have to prepare the next generation with the tools and orientation to appreciate their vision and to embrace what Thomas Kuhn might call new scientific paradigms.30

On several occasions Wilder Penfield, who founded the Montreal Neurological Institute, wrote with regret about Victor Horsley, the neurosurgeon at Queens Square in London. Penfield viewed Horsley as the founder of his field, but Horsley left no disciples. In his autobiography, fittingly entitled No Man Alone, Penfield noted that Horsley, “the most distinguished pioneer neurosurgeon, had died in 1916 without having established a school of neurosurgery.”5 This is in contrast to the discipline-building work of Cushing.

It is not an accident that Dr. Cushing founded a field full of trainees and protégés, of which my co-panelists are descendants. It was intentional and part of his ethos of being truly innovative. And it is not an accident that the distinguished surgical innovators at this symposium have also created institutional structures to continue their work for decades to come. Their achievements have transcended the individual innovator and have become systematic. It is said that Dr. Thomas Starzl launched a field.31 Dr. Denton Cooley founded the Texas Heart Institute.32 Dr. Thomas Fogarty started the Fogarty Institute for Innovation, whose mission statement explicitly notes that it is “an educational non-profit that mentors, trains and inspires the next generation of medical innovators.”33 Each of these pioneers, I believe, appreciates the need for continuity and dissemination.

But even here there is something that we nonsurgeons need to understand: although the work transcends the individual surgeon, the ties remain personal and linked to the impact and legacy of founders. Take, for example, highly prized membership in the Denton A. Cooley Cardiovascular Surgical Society.34 This too is about the importance of individuals and surgical proximity, but here it is transgenerational.

CONCLUSION

If we truly want to continue the dialogue begun here today, we need to understand these social and professional networks and the importance of surgical proximity in transmitting both methods and values. The proximate nature of surgical research—and the causality and responsibility that accrues to the surgeon—makes surgical research different than other areas of biomedical inquiry. This difference has implications for risk-benefit analysis, conflicts of interest, and clinical equipoise. I hope that my colleagues return to these themes in the coming days so that the regulation of this important area of research can be informed by a deeper understanding of the ethics of surgical discovery and innovation.35

Acknowledgments

Dr. Fins gratefully acknowledges the invitation to participate in this symposium, the helpful suggestions of Dr. Eric Kodish, and partial grant support of the Weill Cornell Medical College Research Ethics Core, NIH Clinical & Translational Science Center UL1-RR024966.

References
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  3. Holstein WJ. Rewiring the brain: how a bright idea became an innovative medical device. US News & World Report. March 1, 1999:52–53.
  4. Fins JJ, Schachter M. Investigators, industry, and the heuristic device: ethics, patent law, and clinical innovation. Account Res 2001; 8:219–233.
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  12. Jonas H. The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; 1985:34.
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  14. Sunstein CR. The paralyzing principle. Regulation. Winter 2002– 2003; 25(4):32–37.
  15. Holm S, Harris J. Precautionary principle stifles discovery. Nature 1999; 400:398.
  16. Bosk C. Forgive and Remember: Managing Medical Failure. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; 1979:29–30.
  17. Bliss M. Harvey Cushing: A Life in Surgery. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; 2005.
  18. Pinkus RL. Mistakes as a social construct: an historical approach. Kennedy Inst Ethics J 2001; 11:117–133.
  19. AAMC Task Force on Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research. Protecting subjects, preserving trust, promoting progress I: policy and guidelines for the oversight of individual financial interests in human subjects research. Acad Med 2003; 78:225–236.
  20. AAMC Task Force on Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research. Protecting subjects, preserving trust, promoting progress II: principles and recommendations for oversight of an institution’s financial interests in human subjects research. Acad Med 2003; 78:237– 245.
  21. Fins JJ. Disclose and justify: intellectual property, conflicts of interest, and neurosurgery. Congress Quarterly (Official Newsmagazine of the Congress of Neurological Surgeons) 2007; 8(3):34–36.
  22. U.S. Constitution, art. I, §8, cl. 8; see also id. at art. I, §8, cl. 18.
  23. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–111 (1790).
  24. Patent and Trademark Act Amendments of 1980 (Bayh-Dole Act); Pub L No. 96-517. Codified as 35 USC §§200–212 (1994).
  25. Freedman B. Equipoise and the ethics of clinical research. N Engl J Med 1987; 317:141–145.
  26. Callahan D. Necessity, futility, and the good society. J Am Geriatr Soc 1994; 42:866–867.
  27. Katz J. The Silent World of Doctor and Patient. New York, NY: Free Press; 1984.
  28. Jones RS, Fletcher JC. Self-regulation of surgical practice and research. In: McCullough LB, Jones JW, Brody BA, eds. Surgical Ethics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press; 1998:255–279.
  29. Kim SY. Assessing and communicating the risks and benefits of gene transfer clinical trials. Curr Opin Mol Ther 2006; 8:384– 389.
  30. Kuhn TS. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd ed. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; 1970.
  31. Starzl TE. The Puzzle People: Memoirs of a Transplant Surgeon. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press; 2003.
  32. Twenty Five Years of Excellence: A History of the Texas Heart Institute. Houston, TX: Texas Heart Institute Foundation; 1989.
  33. Fogarty Institute for Innovation Web site. Available at: http://01659a8. netsolhost.com/aboutus.html. Accessed June 6, 2008.
  34. Denton A. Cooley Cardiovascular Surgical Society Web site. Available at: http://www.cooleysociety.com/about.html. Accessed June 6, 2008.
  35. de Melo-Martín I, Palmer LI, Fins JJ. Viewpoint: developing a research ethics consultation service to foster responsive and responsible clinical research. Acad Med 2007; 82:900–904.
References
  1. Frader JE, Caniano DA. Research and innovation in surgery. In: McCullough LB, Jones JW, Brody BA, eds. Surgical Ethics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press; 1998:216–241.
  2. Speelman JD, Bosch DA. Resurgence of functional neurosurgery for Parkinson’s disease: a historical perspective. Mov Disord 1998; 13:582–588.
  3. Holstein WJ. Rewiring the brain: how a bright idea became an innovative medical device. US News & World Report. March 1, 1999:52–53.
  4. Fins JJ, Schachter M. Investigators, industry, and the heuristic device: ethics, patent law, and clinical innovation. Account Res 2001; 8:219–233.
  5. Penfield W. No Man Alone: A Neurosurgeon’s Life. Boston, MA: Little Brown; 1977.
  6. Feindel W. The contributions of Wilder Penfield to the functional anatomy of the human brain. Hum Neurobiol 1982; 1:231–234.
  7. Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. Weldon JEC, trans. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books; 1987.
  8. Fins JJ, Bacchetta MD, Miller FG. Clinical pragmatism: a method of moral problem solving. Kennedy Inst Ethics J 1997; 7:129–145.
  9. Miller FG, Fins JJ. Protecting human subjects in brain research: a pragmatic perspective. In: Illes J, ed. Neuroethics: Defining the Issues in Theory, Practice and Policy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press; 2005.
  10. Pollan M. The year in ideas: A to Z.; precautionary principle. New York Times. December 9, 2001.
  11. van den Belt H. Debating the precautionary principle: “guilty until proven innocent” or “innocent until proven guilty”? Plant Physiol 2003; 132:1122–1126.
  12. Jonas H. The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; 1985:34.
  13. Eliot TS. The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock. In: Abrams MH, ed. The Norton Anthology of English Literature. Vol 2. 4th ed. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co; 1979:2259–2264.
  14. Sunstein CR. The paralyzing principle. Regulation. Winter 2002– 2003; 25(4):32–37.
  15. Holm S, Harris J. Precautionary principle stifles discovery. Nature 1999; 400:398.
  16. Bosk C. Forgive and Remember: Managing Medical Failure. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; 1979:29–30.
  17. Bliss M. Harvey Cushing: A Life in Surgery. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; 2005.
  18. Pinkus RL. Mistakes as a social construct: an historical approach. Kennedy Inst Ethics J 2001; 11:117–133.
  19. AAMC Task Force on Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research. Protecting subjects, preserving trust, promoting progress I: policy and guidelines for the oversight of individual financial interests in human subjects research. Acad Med 2003; 78:225–236.
  20. AAMC Task Force on Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research. Protecting subjects, preserving trust, promoting progress II: principles and recommendations for oversight of an institution’s financial interests in human subjects research. Acad Med 2003; 78:237– 245.
  21. Fins JJ. Disclose and justify: intellectual property, conflicts of interest, and neurosurgery. Congress Quarterly (Official Newsmagazine of the Congress of Neurological Surgeons) 2007; 8(3):34–36.
  22. U.S. Constitution, art. I, §8, cl. 8; see also id. at art. I, §8, cl. 18.
  23. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–111 (1790).
  24. Patent and Trademark Act Amendments of 1980 (Bayh-Dole Act); Pub L No. 96-517. Codified as 35 USC §§200–212 (1994).
  25. Freedman B. Equipoise and the ethics of clinical research. N Engl J Med 1987; 317:141–145.
  26. Callahan D. Necessity, futility, and the good society. J Am Geriatr Soc 1994; 42:866–867.
  27. Katz J. The Silent World of Doctor and Patient. New York, NY: Free Press; 1984.
  28. Jones RS, Fletcher JC. Self-regulation of surgical practice and research. In: McCullough LB, Jones JW, Brody BA, eds. Surgical Ethics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press; 1998:255–279.
  29. Kim SY. Assessing and communicating the risks and benefits of gene transfer clinical trials. Curr Opin Mol Ther 2006; 8:384– 389.
  30. Kuhn TS. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd ed. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; 1970.
  31. Starzl TE. The Puzzle People: Memoirs of a Transplant Surgeon. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press; 2003.
  32. Twenty Five Years of Excellence: A History of the Texas Heart Institute. Houston, TX: Texas Heart Institute Foundation; 1989.
  33. Fogarty Institute for Innovation Web site. Available at: http://01659a8. netsolhost.com/aboutus.html. Accessed June 6, 2008.
  34. Denton A. Cooley Cardiovascular Surgical Society Web site. Available at: http://www.cooleysociety.com/about.html. Accessed June 6, 2008.
  35. de Melo-Martín I, Palmer LI, Fins JJ. Viewpoint: developing a research ethics consultation service to foster responsive and responsible clinical research. Acad Med 2007; 82:900–904.
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Surgical innovation and ethical dilemmas: A panel discussion

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Surgical innovation and ethical dilemmas: A panel discussion

END RESULTS: WHY SO ELUSIVE STILL?

Dr. Isador Lieberman, Moderator: Let me begin this discussion with a 1910 quote from Ernest Codman, a general surgeon at Massachusetts General Hospital, who stated:

In 1900 I became interested in what I called the “end result” idea, which was merely the commonsense notion that every hospital should follow every patient it treats long enough to determine whether or not the treatment has been successful, and then should inquire, “If not, why not?” with a view to preventing similar failure in the future.

My questions to the panel are: What has changed in the last 100 years? Are we documenting our end results? Have we gone wrong and, if so, where have we gone wrong?

Dr. James Herndon: Although Codman’s ideas in this area were not well received at the time, today we do have some “end result” ideas. We have outcomes data, but I would argue that they are far too limited and not to the level required in the 21st century. I have asked myself many times why the surgical profession has not focused on this issue more than it has. I agree with Dr. [Joseph] Fins’ comments in his presentation [see previous article in this supplement] that it would be nice to have a bottom-up approach rather than a top-down approach, but I do not see a change until we as physicians step up to the plate and make a change.

Why haven’t we? There are a number of reasons. The malpractice climate in the United States has been one major factor. Surgeons fear disclosure. The relationship between a surgeon and the patient is professional and private, and physicians do not want transparency—they do not want their patient or anyone to know that an adverse event or bad outcome has occurred.

Also, doctors, especially surgeons, are reluctant to use guidelines or follow protocols. I participated a number of years ago in an American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons project called MODEMS; it was an attempt to set up guidelines for orthopedic surgeons to manage back pain, shoulder pain, and other orthopedic conditions. By the time we finished we had accomplished nothing, because the protocols and guidelines were so extensive that almost any type of management for any patient would be compliant.

Additionally, hospitals in the United States have become more like for-profit businesses, with a focus on short-term profits and with short tenures for their chief executive officers (CEOs)—4 or 5 years, on average. With nearly 50% of US hospitals bordering on bankruptcy, they are not able or willing to invest in major patient safety protocols and guidelines because the CEOs do not see a short-term benefit to them. Witness the fact that only 15% of US hospitals have computerized physician order entry systems and electronic medical records. From what I have read, it takes about 5 years before a hospital recoups such investments from the resulting safety improvements and efficiencies.

These are some, but by no means all, of the reasons we do not have appropriate outcomes in all specialty fields. My plea is that physicians lead the effort to measure and report outcomes down the road.

Dr. Lieberman: Dr. Hahn, why do you think we have not kept up with Dr. Codman’s premise from 100 years ago?

Dr. Joseph Hahn: We hold a yearly Medical Innovation Summit at the Cleveland Clinic, and what has emerged from many of those meetings is a lack of interest in paying for outcomes analyses. The providers, the government, and industry all say that they do not have the money for these analyses. So the first reason that Codman’s premise has not been lived up to is that the source of funding remains undetermined. Second, most surgical innovations have been geared toward inventing devices to overcome very specific problems that arise during or following surgery rather than toward substantiating the worth of a procedure through collection of evidence. A third reason involves the pressure that investors place on industry to make money, which tends to lead to investments in getting products to market rather than outcomes research. With all of these factors and the pressures from so many directions, the surgical profession hasn’t stepped back to thoroughly consider what we are doing to our patients and just how worthwhile it is.

Dr. Lieberman: Who do you think should be paying for outcomes analyses?

Dr. Hahn: I think the government should. The role of government is to take care of its citizens. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) does its best with the information it has, but it admits that it pays for some procedures without knowing whether or not they are truly worthwhile. An example is the use of artificial discs in the cervical spine. I am sure that the artificial disc manufacturers made a case for their product to CMS by claiming it was associated with less pain and resulted in a superior outcome compared to fusion using bone from the hip, regardless of whether they had the scientific evidence to prove it.

Dr. Lieberman: Dr. Fins, would you like to weigh in on Codman’s “end result” premise?

Dr. Joseph Fins: I would just point out that the history is not homogeneous. I have been involved in deep brain stimulation work, and the legacy of psychosurgery has been an egregious lack of outcomes studies, but now we do have outcomes studies and scales. For example, there is now the Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale to rate the severity of symptoms in obsessive-compulsive disorder. In our deep brain stimulation study,1 we are using a coma recovery scale, and the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) investigational device exemption (IDE) process requires us to produce outcomes data to protect potential subjects. It may be an example of neuropsychiatric exceptionalism that neurology and psychiatry are areas of increased focus while somatic therapies are somehow presumed to be okay.

Dr. Hahn: FDA may be requiring the outcomes data, but I have not heard that they are willing to pay for it.

Dr. Fins: You are correct.

Dr. Ali Rezai: Part of the problem is the translation of rapid scientific discoveries and technological advances into the field, and education has a role here. Surgeons’ reluctance to integrate guidelines and outcomes measures into practice must be addressed very early in their training—in medical school—and then continued throughout residency and fellowship programs. The same early and continuing approach should be taken with respect to how to conduct and properly interpret a clinical trial.

Dr. Herndon: That is a good point. Surgical education programs have slipped a bit in the past 5 to 10 years, at least in orthopedics. With the reductions in residents’ work hours and the fast pace of residency programs, our residents spend most of their time in the operating room, struggling to master the multitude of procedures in orthopedics. As a result, they are not discussing outcomes or adequately following patients long-term after surgery. I have a hard time getting our faculty to bring residents into their offices so that the residents can examine patients and see why they are operating on certain kinds of patients, as well as the types of follow-up information that can and should be obtained from patients. Training today is so oriented to operative techniques that residencies have difficulty dealing with these other important issues.

 

 

WHO DEFINES THE INDICATIONS?

Dr. Lieberman: As new devices and new techniques emerge, who defines their indications? The inventor of the device, a government authority that may or may not have the medical background, patient advocacy groups, or the device manufacturer? And how should we regulate those indications?

Dr. Fins: I would echo Dr. Wilder Penfield’s words, “No man alone.” The orthopedic surgeon or neurosurgeon does not have to do this alone; it is really about teams. And those teams can and should include biostatisticians, recognizing that the biostatistician needs to fully understand what the surgeon is doing. There also has to be attention given to patients’ individualistic outcomes. I recently met with some FDA staff and learned that the FDA is very interested in novel methodologies to better understand what counts as an outcome for individual patients. So I think indications should be guided by individualistic outcomes coupled with the surgical possibilities and with the rigorous biostatistical methods that are now evolving. A conference like this represents an opportunity to generalize the conversation and support more collaboration on indications going forward.

Dr. Rezai: Indications should be defined using a team-oriented approach. Part of the problem of psychosurgery in the past was that the surgeon was defining indications without collaborating with the psychiatrist. In my field of deep brain stimulation and brain pacemakers, everything we have done for the past 20 years—surgery for Parkinson’s disease, depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, traumatic brain injury, epilepsy—has involved working closely with neurologists, epileptologists, brain injury specialists, psychiatrists, and psychologists to agree on indications. These teams also need to have close partnerships with ethicists. Teamwork is a vital aspect of proper development of an indication.

Dr. Hahn: It has to be the clinicians who set forth the indications. Of course, that may be done by a team of clinicians, but as a surgeon I certainly do not want the manufacturers of an artificial disc telling me what they think the indications for an artificial disc are.

As for the role of patients, some of them are very well informed about their problem. I cannot tell you how many have shown up in my office with reprints of articles I have written. This is a trend that has really mushroomed over the past 10 years. But even though patients are catching up, they are still at a disadvantage. Patients are going to have a say, but it is still the clinicians whose role is to decide the indications and then provide patients with a risk-benefit analysis.

Dr. Herndon: I agree. Although patients are becoming more involved in the process, real shared decision-making has not yet happened in my field.

More broadly, I feel that our professional organizations have to become more actively involved in the process of defining indications. Otherwise, after the innovators develop a device or procedure that will significantly change the approach to a particular problem, it will enter the market at large without any critical assessment of the technology involved and without accounting for the learning curve for each individual surgeon.

Take the example of minimally invasive total hip replacement, which involves a 1-inch incision in the front of the hip and a 1-inch incision in the back of the hip. The learning curve for this procedure appears to be about 40 cases, based on the opinion of experts around the country. Yet when this minimally invasive approach emerged, every surgeon who had been performing total hip replacements wanted this new operation at his or her fingertips because patients were demanding it. Some surgeons adopted it too quickly, without adequate training. I know one distraught surgeon who abandoned the procedure because of numerous failures during his first 100 cases. He returned to the standard hip replacement approach.

Our profession cannot let this experience continue or proliferate. Yet the professional organizations in orthopedics have walked away from technology assessment because industry does not want it; technology assessment is not in industry’s best interest. We have had a number of conflicts in our professional organizations when attempting to move technology assessment forward. It is also very expensive to do.

Finally, indications can sometimes be governed more by economics than by science. I was asked to write a letter to the editor about two technologies for managing intertrochanteric fractures of the hip that were recently featured in the Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery.2,3 One technology involves a compression screw that has been shown to be effective in outcomes studies. The other is an intramedullary nail that has not been well studied and has no proven benefit over the compression screw. In doing research for my letter,4 I found that Medicare assigns more relative value units (RVUs) for the intramedullary nail than for the compression screw. In Boston, the total dollar difference in RVUs between the two is $300: the surgeon makes $1,500 for the procedure that involves the intramedullary nail versus $1,200 for using the compression screw. Not surprisingly, use of the intramedullary nail has been climbing rapidly in the United States without any evidence to justify its use over the other, less expensive technique.

 

 

CREDENTIALING: CAN IT KEEP PACE WITH INNOVATION?

Dr. Fins: I agree that surgical competence and regulation—self-regulation or professional regulation—are big issues. One of my greatest fears is that surgeons will do procedures they are not trained to do, and cause great harm as a result. We are hearing about this now with the resurgence of psychosurgery in China.

It strikes me as interesting that the field of neurosurgery is as yet undifferentiated and that there is no subspecialty certification in stereotactic neurosurgery. This is in contrast to invasive cardiology on the medical side, where physicians who do catheterizations and electrophysiologic studies have special additional training.

As innovations develop, we have to track qualifications and credentialing along the way. There should be provisions to grandfather surgeons in if they are in a post-training point in their career, but we have to ensure that the new technology is matched by the operator’s skill. This is particularly pertinent in light of the concept of “surgical proximity”5 and the importance of the individual operator; this is not comparable to just disseminating a new drug.

Dr. Lieberman: Who should do the credentialing? Should it be the government or our profession?

Dr. Fins: Recertification or credentialing should be by peers—the American College of Surgeons and the surgical boards. Of course, funders or payors may request an additional level of certification to do certain procedures, which I would endorse as a safety measure and to help ensure a minimal standard of care for innovative interventions.

Dr. Hahn: But it is not so simple. There is a blurring of surgical expertise once surgeons complete their training. Spine surgery used to be done by either neurosurgeons or orthopedic surgeons; now we have spine surgeons. What we neurosurgeons started to see with that change was that our neurosurgery trainees were being told they could not get on hospital staffs because they did not have credentials in spine surgery or, to take another example, in pediatric surgery. Well, the neurosurgery board made a conscious decision to not offer certificates of added qualification (CAQs). We challenged the hospitals in court and won. But the overriding message is that it is all about economics.

Dr. Herndon: In orthopedics we now have two CAQs—one in hand surgery and one (starting in 2009) in sports medicine. The hand surgeons have not noticed any adverse effect because they do not generate as much revenue as the spine surgeons do. Most orthopedic surgeons start as general orthopedists and then change their practice characteristics as their practices mature. Over time they may focus on one particular area, such as arthroscopic knee surgery or total hip or knee replacement, which makes it difficult for them to pass a general orthopedic examination. Our board recognized this trend and developed oral and written board exams with case reviews concentrating on the surgeon’s self-chosen specialty. We do not need the CAQs because they have been misused, and we as a profession have been letting others misuse them. Again, I think we need to get back to controlling the process ourselves.

Dr. Hahn: What do you do when a surgeon has finished training and then becomes interested in performing a new procedure developed since the time of his or her training? This can really be a challenge when the surgeon hears of a new procedure, goes and takes a 3-day training seminar on it, and comes back believing that he or she is ready to perform the procedure. I have had creative surgeons on staff who want to try a new procedure but have never done any cases, believing that the new technology alone will suffice. What we finally decided to do in these instances was to put in place other staff to proctor these cases to ensure that no harm was coming to patients.

Dr. Herndon: I admire that approach, because we as a profession have to educate our colleagues about whatever new procedures they are about to use in their practice. There is a learning curve for every operation, and learning on one’s own, at the expense of patients, is not appropriate. Should we have experienced colleagues work with surgeons on new procedures until they have performed the 40 or so cases necessary to be proficient? Should we send surgeons to other institutions to do their 40 cases under experienced supervision? I am not sure what the best approach is, but this is a question that a forum like this should begin to address.

 

 

HOW MUCH RISK IS ACCEPTABLE?

Dr. Lieberman: Let’s build on this issue of credentialing by turning to the concept of risk. What is an acceptable level of risk with a new device? Is a 50% risk of an adverse outcome appropriate? What about 10%? And who determines the acceptable risk? The profession? The regulatory bodies? Patients?

Dr. Fins: Our expectation about risks in clinical practice should evolve from what was anticipated and actually observed in the clinical trial of an intervention. Adverse events should be envisioned prospectively in the design of a trial, with the magnitude of risks delineated in the protocol. Any unexpected risks that occur, even if small, could be a major reporting issue. Beyond that, it is difficult to say what an acceptable level of risk is without a particularistic clinical trial. Whatever the risk of an intervention, the assessment of the risk must account for regional variation, variation among surgeons, and also systems issues.

The Institute of Medicine report, To Err is Human, attributed medical errors to faulty systems, processes, and conditions. So when we think about errors and risk, we have to consider more than just the individual operator. Just as To Err is Human analogized medical errors to airplane crashes, we might think of surgical retraining in the context of how pilots get retrained using flight simulators. If pilots have not flown a particular aircraft in a long time, they lose their flight certification for that type of craft and then must be retrained to operate it.

As surgical technology gets more advanced, specific, and nuanced, the discordance between one’s training and the potential things one can do becomes greater. Paradoxically, innovation can at least potentially make situations more dangerous in that the operator may not be able to perform the task with the improved technology. For example, pilots who know how to fly a Cessna can fly another simply constructed plane, but if they attempt to fly a higher-technology aircraft, like an F-16, they have a greater risk of having a catastrophic event even though the F-16 flies better, faster, and higher.

Dr. Lieberman: But are you willing to identify a level of acceptable risk?

Dr. Fins: It is based on the patient’s preference, after informed consent. An acceptable level of risk is the level that people are willing to accept. What I am concerned about is the variance around a known risk, whatever it may be, that is attributable to human errors that may be preventable through training or by solving systems problems.

Dr. Lieberman: Dr. Rezai, you place needles into the brain. Who should decide the risk of that action? You? The patient? And what do you feel is an acceptable risk level?

Dr. Rezai: It is a complex question, of course, and a number of variables come into play. Whether or not the patient’s condition is life-threatening or disabling is a very important factor in the risk-benefit ratio. Regulatory guidance from the FDA is strong with respect to defining device-related adverse effects as serious or nonserious, and our peers, both surgeons and nonsurgeons, help to further dictate the risk and tolerability of a procedure and its alternatives. For example, in considering a surgical procedure, one must weigh its risk against the risks of medications to treat the disorder, such as side effects, the ease of medication adherence, and the number of emergency room visits that may result from adverse effects of the medications.

Determining acceptable risk rests fundamentally and first with the patient and then with the surgeon and his or her peers (surgeons and nonsurgeons) in conjunction with regulatory components and oversight. All of these factors contribute.

In my field of deep brain stimulation, the threshold for acceptable risk can be high since we see patients with chronic conditions in whom all previous medication attempts have failed, many of whom are disabled, intractable to current therapies, and with a significant compromise of quality of life. Examples include wheelchair-dependent patients with severe Parkinson’s disease, severely depressed patients who will not leave the house and have attempted suicide, and obsessive-compulsive disorder patients who need 10 hours just to take a shower. This type of intractability to current therapies and the suffering of patients and families with limited options and little hope infl uence assessments of procedural risk.

Dr. Hahn: Performing a controlled clinical trial of a surgical procedure is difficult at best. I recall a clinical trial in which patients with parkinsonism were to be randomized either to have stem cells implanted in their brain or to undergo a sham operation with no stem cells. Well, very few patients signed up for the trial because everyone wanted the stem cells. So, obtaining a large enough denominator to define the risk of, for example, hemorrhage from sticking a needle into a vessel is almost impossible.

Dr. Herndon: Except when there are risks of serious life-threatening events, I believe the patient is the one who makes the decision after having the risks fully explained to him or her. Surgeons are educated in a system in which we learn to accept complications. It is the risk of doing business. We have not learned very well how to differentiate a complication from an adverse event or an error. We must learn to do that. We live with complications every day. Those complications must be conveyed to patients so that they understand what they are about to undergo, what can happen, and what cannot happen. The patient is the ultimate decider, in my opinion.

Dr. Lieberman: That reminds me of something one of my mentors often said: “If you are going to run with the big dogs, expect to get bitten in the butt once in a while.”

 

 

ETHICAL DILEMMAS ARISING FROM NEW OPTIONS

Question from audience: In my specialty, we have a non-life-threatening condition with a well-established 25% recurrence rate after traditional surgery with sutures, and a 25% rate of reoperation. A device comes along and it improves the outcomes so that the recurrence rate declines to 10%, but along with the extra costs of doing the procedure with the device, there is also a complication rate of about 10% that requires reoperation with the device, and a few of those patients actually end up worse. Ethically, how should the clinician proceed in this situation? The old way, or the new way that improves outcomes but at a higher cost and risk?

Dr. Fins: Based on the size of the populations, is the difference in the combined rates of recurrence and complications between the traditional and new methods (25% vs 20%) statistically significant?

Response from questioner: The difference is probably not statistically significant.

Dr. Fins: Okay, so you are saying that the numbers are basically equal. That is the first consideration, but there is a nuance to one of the variables, and that is an improvement in quality of life with one of the treatments. Measuring its significance is subjective. A patient may place greater emphasis on quality of life than would somebody who is not a beneficiary of the operation. That is why I said before that biostatistical input that goes beyond crude measures of mortality or reoperation rates can be very helpful. The risk of reoperation may be one that the patient is willing to take for a chance at an improvement in quality of life.

There is a wonderful book by Howard Brody called The Healer’s Power6 in which he writes about the physician’s power to frame a question so as to engineer outcomes. While that is not something that Brody endorses, he does endorse the use of the physician’s power to guide patients using good informed consent, providing direction without being so determinative that patients feel compelled to choose the physician’s recommendation. Patients should be able to decline your recommendation while still having the benefit of your counsel. And in a case like this, your counsel should include variables that may seem “softer” or more difficult to quantify than crude measures such as mortality or reoperation rates.

Dr. Rezai: You have to compare multiple outcomes between the two approaches—surgical time, recovery time, patient quality of life (as assessed by scales), family quality of life, time to return to work, etc. I think it is important to try new technologies because the failure rate or the complication rate may be reduced over time, but only if you evaluate the failures and then restrategize. Only in doing so can you reduce risk, and if the benefit profile and the risk profile prove to be good, then the new technology should be pushed forward.

Dr. Herndon: If the volume of procedures performed by the surgeon is important with respect to outcomes with either one of these two procedures, that should be taken into account. Also, if a new procedure carries a higher complication rate than the traditional procedure, I think that more cohort studies from large centers are needed to gauge the true complication rate before the new technology enters the general market. Continued surveillance, such as with a postmarket registry of outcomes with these procedures, would also be helpful to make adjustments in the future if necessary.

Dr. Hahn: If you looked at the early experience of Med tronic with pacers, you would be amazed at the number of deaths and complications that occurred during the first 3 years. But we do not even think about that now.

CAN INNOVATION HAPPEN WITHOUT INCENTIVES?

Question from audience: Dr. Hahn alluded earlier to the infl uence of money. All of you on the panel are institutionally based, and you are used to practicing with colleagues. I would suggest that surgery today is really not an individual sport, but that is the way it is practiced in much of the nation. Would we be better off if we developed a system that removed us from direct financial influence? Can we get the money out of the equation so that people have motives other than direct personal gain?

Dr. Hahn: I went to an institutional review board (IRB) retreat that included, of course, some IRB members who were not clinicians. They asked the same question that you just did: Why would you even expect to get anything for what you invent? I think that is naïve. People who work hard and invent things deserve to reap a reward. The challenge lies in working with industry, which may try to convince us to use its innovations without our input, as opposed to working with us to identify a clinical problem and trying to solve it together. In that way, the end product and the logic behind its use will be better.

I will give you an example from when I was head of surgery here. A company made a voice-activated table that would obey the surgeon’s commands, such as “left,” “right,” “up,” or “down.” I asked the representative why such a product was needed, and he responded that the surgeon wants to be in total control of the operating room. I told him we do not change the position of the table very often. After a 2-week trial, the table was a dud. He fired the entire group that was working on the project. It was a case of a company simply trying to come up with a product it could sell.

The opposite scenario is if I invent the latest and greatest stent for the carotids and I want to use it. The question becomes how to strike a balance: how to protect the patients while at the same time rewarding the inventor. Another challenge is that device companies want you to stay on their scientific advisory board and they will pay you for it.

These questions are a big concern, and we have spent a lot of time on these issues at Cleveland Clinic. In fact, we held our own conference on biomedical confl icts of interest in September 2006 with attendees from around the country to discuss the necessary firewalls for ensuring that data are not contaminated, that the surgeon-inventor does not fudge data so that his innovation will make it to the marketplace, etc. At that conference, a number of people spoke about Vioxx. I am a surgeon, and my take on the COX-2 inhibitors is that a lot of my patients take these drugs and think they are wonderful, but there are some problems and risks. What is wrong with explaining to patients the risks and complications of these drugs, making your own recommendation about their use (unless you are receiving money from their manufacturers, which you would need to disclose to patients), and then letting patients make their own informed decisions? Personally, I was on Bextra for 3 years and was furious when it was pulled from the market because nobody gave me a choice whether or not to continue using it.

Dr. Lieberman: Let’s explore this concept a little deeper. We know that innovation is so important, but how do we encourage clinicians to innovate in this environment? Dr. Hahn, you served as chairman of CC Innovations, which is Cleveland Clinic’s technology commercialization arm. What were some of the strategies you came across in that role?

Dr. Hahn: We look for creative staff. We tell them up front that we want them to come to Cleveland Clinic and invent things. Our mission is literally to work on problems and take solutions to our patients. The culture here is meant to be creative. As a part of that culture, we welcome working with industry, as opposed to industry thrusting its innovations on us.

We are averaging more than 200 invention disclosures per year. More than 500 of our staff are involved with various industrial partners, and we are not going to hide that. In fact, we are going to make it public. The thought is that we owe it to our patients to work on their problems. At the same time, we owe it to our patients to say when we are working with industry on a particular product and explain to them why we think it would work in their case, if we think it would. While doing so, we need to make it clear that we will be happy to refer them for a second opinion if they would like. If I have a patient who wants a second opinion, I will offer to make the phone call for them and get them in. I think that is an advantage of the model we have here.

The reality is that there are some procedures that can only be done by one surgeon here, a surgeon who may have helped develop the procedure or some technology involved in it. Are we going to tell that surgeon that he or she cannot perform the procedure on anyone? That does not make sense. So you need to have a management plan that puts in place firewalls to protect the data on that procedure from any possible contamination.

So yes, we do reward staff who are doing innovation, and we do work with industry, and we do tell our patients we are doing it, and we do build firewalls to protect the data.

Dr. Lieberman: How about the rest of the panel? What are your thoughts on providing incentives for innovation?

Dr. Fins: Money is a key issue. The way the landscape is now structured, collaborations with industry are part of the mix. Under the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, institutions are granted intellectual property rights to ideas or inventions developed by their researchers, and then the institutions can enter into contracts with industry to move the innovations forward. If industry support of research were removed, we would have to double the budget of the National Institutes of Health to compensate.

On the other hand, industry support can sometimes prove to be a disincentive to innovation in that it may engineer certain kinds of research or deprive investigators of tools they may need to do more basic science types of research. It is an academic freedom issue. At a translational level, industry may be helpful and catalytic. But sometimes it pushes an investigator to work for a short-term innovative application at the expense of a more speculative, riskier innovation.

We need to acknowledge that industry collaborations are part and parcel of the universe and focus on working with industry to moderate its influences. At the same time, we must use our leverage on the investigative side of the equation to pursue academic freedom and to leverage industry resources to perhaps pay for some of the care that innovative devices make possible. For example, contracting agreements could be drawn up so that money came back to the populations that participated in a clinical trial, or to a community that otherwise may need the device but cannot afford it. I think we have to create some type of charitable impulse to moderate the excesses of the profits and use them for the common good.

Dr. Herndon: I would like to touch on disclosure. The orthopedic implant industry has been required by law to disclose its relationships with orthopedic surgeons, including the amount of money that surgeons may be getting from industry. This requirement has had unintended consequences that underscore the importance of disclosure. First, some of the monetary awards, whether market-driven or not, are quite excessive. Second, reviewing the contracts for royalties has led to the discovery that many are not supported by patents or intellectual property rights. Third, these disclosures have revealed that certain surgeons who work at major US institutions, and who thus have an obligation to pay the institution some of the monies from their research, have not disclosed their relationships for years and have kept those monies solely for themselves. So this disclosure requirement has brought many things to light.

Dr. Rezai: As long as there is human disease and suffering, innovation will continue. It has in the past and it will in the future. Most innovators have it in their genes and in their blood. They can be taught to innovate, but they have to have the intrinsic curiosity and the creative mind to be an innovator. Institutional support of innovation is important, as is respect for the process that must be followed, including transparency and disclosure. If you put all these together, then innovation can be facilitated.

 

 

IF TESTING MOVES OFFSHORE, CAN ETHICS FOLLOW?

Dr. Lieberman: I am going to paint a scenario on which I would like each panelist to briefly comment. New Device X is backed by a big vendor. It is a great device, but because of all the regulatory issues in the United States, it is taken to China or South America and is being implanted there, where the regulatory environment is much more lenient. Can we rationalize this practice? How is it possibly ethical?

Dr. Fins: I can answer in 5 seconds: we shouldn’t do it.

Dr. Rezai: This is a reality we are facing with increasing rules and regulations in the United States. You have to engage the process, and it takes time. If you have colleagues who can follow clinical trials outside the United States, you can have the device tested outside and then bring it back to the United States. Unfortunately, the reality is that the regulatory process can be slow, so more testing will be done abroad, in my opinion.

Dr. Hahn: I disagree with Dr. Fins. This may be the only way to get the trials started, and we then are able to use some of the offshore data to approach the FDA for approval. I do not think that it is taking advantage of anybody; it is a way of getting things through the system.

Dr. Herndon: The door has been opened, and it is only going to increase. My only request would be that the investigators who do this function as they would here in the United States, under IRB controls and the other kinds of oversight that they would expect and demand of themselves in their own institutions.

References
  1. Schiff ND, Giacino JT, Kalmar K, et al. Behavioral improvements with thalamic stimulation after severe traumatic brain injury. Nature 2007; 448:600–603.
  2. Forte ML, Virnig BA, Kane RL, et al. Geographic variation in device use for intertrochanteric hip fractures. J Bone Joint Surg Am 2008; 90:691–699.
  3. Anglen JO, Weinstein JN. Nail or plate fixation of intertrochanteric hip fractures: changing pattern of practice. A review of the American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery database. J Bone Joint Surg Am 2008; 90:700–707.
  4. Herndon JH. Technology assessment and adoption in orthopaedics [letter]. J Bone Joint Surg Am 2008; 90e. http://www.ejbjs.org/cgi/eletters/90/4/689. Published April 1, 2008. Accessed August 25, 2008.
  5. Fins JJ. Surgical innovation and ethical dilemmas: precautions and proximity. Cleve Clin J Med 2008; 75(suppl 6):S7–S12.
  6. Brody H. The Healer’s Power. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; 1992.
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Author and Disclosure Information

James Herndon, MD
Chairman Emeritus, Department of Orthopaedic Surgery, Partners HealthCare (Massachusetts General Hospital and Brigham and Women’s Hospital) and Professor of Orthopaedic Surgery, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA 

Joseph Hahn, MD
Chief of Staff, Cleveland Clinic Health System and Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors, Cleveland Clinic; Surgeon, Department of Neurosurgery, Cleveland Clinic

Joseph J. Fins, MD 
Chief, Division of Medical Ethics, Professor of Medicine, Professor of Public Health, and Professor of Medicine in Psychiatry, Weill Cornell Medical College, New York, NY

Ali Rezai, MD
Director, Center for Neurological Restoration, Cleveland Clinic and Professor of Neurosurgery, Cleveland Clinic Lerner College of Medicine of Case Western Reserve University

Dr. Lieberman reported relationships with Merlot OrthopediX (management, founder, inventor, board member), Axiomed Spine Corp. (consultant, teacher/speaker, advisory committee member, inventor), Trans1 (consultant, teacher/speaker, advisory committee member, inventor), CrossTrees Medical (consultant, advisory committee member, inventor), Kyphon (consultant, advisory committee member, teacher/speaker), Mazor Surgical Technologies (consultant, advisory committee member, inventor), DePuy Spine (inventor), and Stryker Spine (inventor).

Dr. Herndon reported relationships with the Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery (member of board of trustees), Revolution Health (employment), Dartmouth Medical Center (member of advisory committee), and the Bard Group (consultant).

Dr. Hahn reported no financial interests or relationships that pose a potential confict of interest with this article.

Dr. Fins reported that he is an unfunded co-investigator of research on the use of deep brain stimulation in the minimally conscious state funded by Intelect Medical Inc.

Dr. Rezai reported relationships with Medtronic (teacher/speaker, clinical trial funding) and Intelect Medical (ownership interest and consultant).

This article was developed from an audio transcript of a panel discussion. The transcript was edited by the Cleveland Clinic Journal of Medicine staff for clarity and conciseness, and was then reviewed and revised/approved by each of the panelists and the moderator.

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S13-S21
Author and Disclosure Information

James Herndon, MD
Chairman Emeritus, Department of Orthopaedic Surgery, Partners HealthCare (Massachusetts General Hospital and Brigham and Women’s Hospital) and Professor of Orthopaedic Surgery, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA 

Joseph Hahn, MD
Chief of Staff, Cleveland Clinic Health System and Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors, Cleveland Clinic; Surgeon, Department of Neurosurgery, Cleveland Clinic

Joseph J. Fins, MD 
Chief, Division of Medical Ethics, Professor of Medicine, Professor of Public Health, and Professor of Medicine in Psychiatry, Weill Cornell Medical College, New York, NY

Ali Rezai, MD
Director, Center for Neurological Restoration, Cleveland Clinic and Professor of Neurosurgery, Cleveland Clinic Lerner College of Medicine of Case Western Reserve University

Dr. Lieberman reported relationships with Merlot OrthopediX (management, founder, inventor, board member), Axiomed Spine Corp. (consultant, teacher/speaker, advisory committee member, inventor), Trans1 (consultant, teacher/speaker, advisory committee member, inventor), CrossTrees Medical (consultant, advisory committee member, inventor), Kyphon (consultant, advisory committee member, teacher/speaker), Mazor Surgical Technologies (consultant, advisory committee member, inventor), DePuy Spine (inventor), and Stryker Spine (inventor).

Dr. Herndon reported relationships with the Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery (member of board of trustees), Revolution Health (employment), Dartmouth Medical Center (member of advisory committee), and the Bard Group (consultant).

Dr. Hahn reported no financial interests or relationships that pose a potential confict of interest with this article.

Dr. Fins reported that he is an unfunded co-investigator of research on the use of deep brain stimulation in the minimally conscious state funded by Intelect Medical Inc.

Dr. Rezai reported relationships with Medtronic (teacher/speaker, clinical trial funding) and Intelect Medical (ownership interest and consultant).

This article was developed from an audio transcript of a panel discussion. The transcript was edited by the Cleveland Clinic Journal of Medicine staff for clarity and conciseness, and was then reviewed and revised/approved by each of the panelists and the moderator.

Author and Disclosure Information

James Herndon, MD
Chairman Emeritus, Department of Orthopaedic Surgery, Partners HealthCare (Massachusetts General Hospital and Brigham and Women’s Hospital) and Professor of Orthopaedic Surgery, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA 

Joseph Hahn, MD
Chief of Staff, Cleveland Clinic Health System and Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors, Cleveland Clinic; Surgeon, Department of Neurosurgery, Cleveland Clinic

Joseph J. Fins, MD 
Chief, Division of Medical Ethics, Professor of Medicine, Professor of Public Health, and Professor of Medicine in Psychiatry, Weill Cornell Medical College, New York, NY

Ali Rezai, MD
Director, Center for Neurological Restoration, Cleveland Clinic and Professor of Neurosurgery, Cleveland Clinic Lerner College of Medicine of Case Western Reserve University

Dr. Lieberman reported relationships with Merlot OrthopediX (management, founder, inventor, board member), Axiomed Spine Corp. (consultant, teacher/speaker, advisory committee member, inventor), Trans1 (consultant, teacher/speaker, advisory committee member, inventor), CrossTrees Medical (consultant, advisory committee member, inventor), Kyphon (consultant, advisory committee member, teacher/speaker), Mazor Surgical Technologies (consultant, advisory committee member, inventor), DePuy Spine (inventor), and Stryker Spine (inventor).

Dr. Herndon reported relationships with the Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery (member of board of trustees), Revolution Health (employment), Dartmouth Medical Center (member of advisory committee), and the Bard Group (consultant).

Dr. Hahn reported no financial interests or relationships that pose a potential confict of interest with this article.

Dr. Fins reported that he is an unfunded co-investigator of research on the use of deep brain stimulation in the minimally conscious state funded by Intelect Medical Inc.

Dr. Rezai reported relationships with Medtronic (teacher/speaker, clinical trial funding) and Intelect Medical (ownership interest and consultant).

This article was developed from an audio transcript of a panel discussion. The transcript was edited by the Cleveland Clinic Journal of Medicine staff for clarity and conciseness, and was then reviewed and revised/approved by each of the panelists and the moderator.

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END RESULTS: WHY SO ELUSIVE STILL?

Dr. Isador Lieberman, Moderator: Let me begin this discussion with a 1910 quote from Ernest Codman, a general surgeon at Massachusetts General Hospital, who stated:

In 1900 I became interested in what I called the “end result” idea, which was merely the commonsense notion that every hospital should follow every patient it treats long enough to determine whether or not the treatment has been successful, and then should inquire, “If not, why not?” with a view to preventing similar failure in the future.

My questions to the panel are: What has changed in the last 100 years? Are we documenting our end results? Have we gone wrong and, if so, where have we gone wrong?

Dr. James Herndon: Although Codman’s ideas in this area were not well received at the time, today we do have some “end result” ideas. We have outcomes data, but I would argue that they are far too limited and not to the level required in the 21st century. I have asked myself many times why the surgical profession has not focused on this issue more than it has. I agree with Dr. [Joseph] Fins’ comments in his presentation [see previous article in this supplement] that it would be nice to have a bottom-up approach rather than a top-down approach, but I do not see a change until we as physicians step up to the plate and make a change.

Why haven’t we? There are a number of reasons. The malpractice climate in the United States has been one major factor. Surgeons fear disclosure. The relationship between a surgeon and the patient is professional and private, and physicians do not want transparency—they do not want their patient or anyone to know that an adverse event or bad outcome has occurred.

Also, doctors, especially surgeons, are reluctant to use guidelines or follow protocols. I participated a number of years ago in an American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons project called MODEMS; it was an attempt to set up guidelines for orthopedic surgeons to manage back pain, shoulder pain, and other orthopedic conditions. By the time we finished we had accomplished nothing, because the protocols and guidelines were so extensive that almost any type of management for any patient would be compliant.

Additionally, hospitals in the United States have become more like for-profit businesses, with a focus on short-term profits and with short tenures for their chief executive officers (CEOs)—4 or 5 years, on average. With nearly 50% of US hospitals bordering on bankruptcy, they are not able or willing to invest in major patient safety protocols and guidelines because the CEOs do not see a short-term benefit to them. Witness the fact that only 15% of US hospitals have computerized physician order entry systems and electronic medical records. From what I have read, it takes about 5 years before a hospital recoups such investments from the resulting safety improvements and efficiencies.

These are some, but by no means all, of the reasons we do not have appropriate outcomes in all specialty fields. My plea is that physicians lead the effort to measure and report outcomes down the road.

Dr. Lieberman: Dr. Hahn, why do you think we have not kept up with Dr. Codman’s premise from 100 years ago?

Dr. Joseph Hahn: We hold a yearly Medical Innovation Summit at the Cleveland Clinic, and what has emerged from many of those meetings is a lack of interest in paying for outcomes analyses. The providers, the government, and industry all say that they do not have the money for these analyses. So the first reason that Codman’s premise has not been lived up to is that the source of funding remains undetermined. Second, most surgical innovations have been geared toward inventing devices to overcome very specific problems that arise during or following surgery rather than toward substantiating the worth of a procedure through collection of evidence. A third reason involves the pressure that investors place on industry to make money, which tends to lead to investments in getting products to market rather than outcomes research. With all of these factors and the pressures from so many directions, the surgical profession hasn’t stepped back to thoroughly consider what we are doing to our patients and just how worthwhile it is.

Dr. Lieberman: Who do you think should be paying for outcomes analyses?

Dr. Hahn: I think the government should. The role of government is to take care of its citizens. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) does its best with the information it has, but it admits that it pays for some procedures without knowing whether or not they are truly worthwhile. An example is the use of artificial discs in the cervical spine. I am sure that the artificial disc manufacturers made a case for their product to CMS by claiming it was associated with less pain and resulted in a superior outcome compared to fusion using bone from the hip, regardless of whether they had the scientific evidence to prove it.

Dr. Lieberman: Dr. Fins, would you like to weigh in on Codman’s “end result” premise?

Dr. Joseph Fins: I would just point out that the history is not homogeneous. I have been involved in deep brain stimulation work, and the legacy of psychosurgery has been an egregious lack of outcomes studies, but now we do have outcomes studies and scales. For example, there is now the Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale to rate the severity of symptoms in obsessive-compulsive disorder. In our deep brain stimulation study,1 we are using a coma recovery scale, and the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) investigational device exemption (IDE) process requires us to produce outcomes data to protect potential subjects. It may be an example of neuropsychiatric exceptionalism that neurology and psychiatry are areas of increased focus while somatic therapies are somehow presumed to be okay.

Dr. Hahn: FDA may be requiring the outcomes data, but I have not heard that they are willing to pay for it.

Dr. Fins: You are correct.

Dr. Ali Rezai: Part of the problem is the translation of rapid scientific discoveries and technological advances into the field, and education has a role here. Surgeons’ reluctance to integrate guidelines and outcomes measures into practice must be addressed very early in their training—in medical school—and then continued throughout residency and fellowship programs. The same early and continuing approach should be taken with respect to how to conduct and properly interpret a clinical trial.

Dr. Herndon: That is a good point. Surgical education programs have slipped a bit in the past 5 to 10 years, at least in orthopedics. With the reductions in residents’ work hours and the fast pace of residency programs, our residents spend most of their time in the operating room, struggling to master the multitude of procedures in orthopedics. As a result, they are not discussing outcomes or adequately following patients long-term after surgery. I have a hard time getting our faculty to bring residents into their offices so that the residents can examine patients and see why they are operating on certain kinds of patients, as well as the types of follow-up information that can and should be obtained from patients. Training today is so oriented to operative techniques that residencies have difficulty dealing with these other important issues.

 

 

WHO DEFINES THE INDICATIONS?

Dr. Lieberman: As new devices and new techniques emerge, who defines their indications? The inventor of the device, a government authority that may or may not have the medical background, patient advocacy groups, or the device manufacturer? And how should we regulate those indications?

Dr. Fins: I would echo Dr. Wilder Penfield’s words, “No man alone.” The orthopedic surgeon or neurosurgeon does not have to do this alone; it is really about teams. And those teams can and should include biostatisticians, recognizing that the biostatistician needs to fully understand what the surgeon is doing. There also has to be attention given to patients’ individualistic outcomes. I recently met with some FDA staff and learned that the FDA is very interested in novel methodologies to better understand what counts as an outcome for individual patients. So I think indications should be guided by individualistic outcomes coupled with the surgical possibilities and with the rigorous biostatistical methods that are now evolving. A conference like this represents an opportunity to generalize the conversation and support more collaboration on indications going forward.

Dr. Rezai: Indications should be defined using a team-oriented approach. Part of the problem of psychosurgery in the past was that the surgeon was defining indications without collaborating with the psychiatrist. In my field of deep brain stimulation and brain pacemakers, everything we have done for the past 20 years—surgery for Parkinson’s disease, depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, traumatic brain injury, epilepsy—has involved working closely with neurologists, epileptologists, brain injury specialists, psychiatrists, and psychologists to agree on indications. These teams also need to have close partnerships with ethicists. Teamwork is a vital aspect of proper development of an indication.

Dr. Hahn: It has to be the clinicians who set forth the indications. Of course, that may be done by a team of clinicians, but as a surgeon I certainly do not want the manufacturers of an artificial disc telling me what they think the indications for an artificial disc are.

As for the role of patients, some of them are very well informed about their problem. I cannot tell you how many have shown up in my office with reprints of articles I have written. This is a trend that has really mushroomed over the past 10 years. But even though patients are catching up, they are still at a disadvantage. Patients are going to have a say, but it is still the clinicians whose role is to decide the indications and then provide patients with a risk-benefit analysis.

Dr. Herndon: I agree. Although patients are becoming more involved in the process, real shared decision-making has not yet happened in my field.

More broadly, I feel that our professional organizations have to become more actively involved in the process of defining indications. Otherwise, after the innovators develop a device or procedure that will significantly change the approach to a particular problem, it will enter the market at large without any critical assessment of the technology involved and without accounting for the learning curve for each individual surgeon.

Take the example of minimally invasive total hip replacement, which involves a 1-inch incision in the front of the hip and a 1-inch incision in the back of the hip. The learning curve for this procedure appears to be about 40 cases, based on the opinion of experts around the country. Yet when this minimally invasive approach emerged, every surgeon who had been performing total hip replacements wanted this new operation at his or her fingertips because patients were demanding it. Some surgeons adopted it too quickly, without adequate training. I know one distraught surgeon who abandoned the procedure because of numerous failures during his first 100 cases. He returned to the standard hip replacement approach.

Our profession cannot let this experience continue or proliferate. Yet the professional organizations in orthopedics have walked away from technology assessment because industry does not want it; technology assessment is not in industry’s best interest. We have had a number of conflicts in our professional organizations when attempting to move technology assessment forward. It is also very expensive to do.

Finally, indications can sometimes be governed more by economics than by science. I was asked to write a letter to the editor about two technologies for managing intertrochanteric fractures of the hip that were recently featured in the Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery.2,3 One technology involves a compression screw that has been shown to be effective in outcomes studies. The other is an intramedullary nail that has not been well studied and has no proven benefit over the compression screw. In doing research for my letter,4 I found that Medicare assigns more relative value units (RVUs) for the intramedullary nail than for the compression screw. In Boston, the total dollar difference in RVUs between the two is $300: the surgeon makes $1,500 for the procedure that involves the intramedullary nail versus $1,200 for using the compression screw. Not surprisingly, use of the intramedullary nail has been climbing rapidly in the United States without any evidence to justify its use over the other, less expensive technique.

 

 

CREDENTIALING: CAN IT KEEP PACE WITH INNOVATION?

Dr. Fins: I agree that surgical competence and regulation—self-regulation or professional regulation—are big issues. One of my greatest fears is that surgeons will do procedures they are not trained to do, and cause great harm as a result. We are hearing about this now with the resurgence of psychosurgery in China.

It strikes me as interesting that the field of neurosurgery is as yet undifferentiated and that there is no subspecialty certification in stereotactic neurosurgery. This is in contrast to invasive cardiology on the medical side, where physicians who do catheterizations and electrophysiologic studies have special additional training.

As innovations develop, we have to track qualifications and credentialing along the way. There should be provisions to grandfather surgeons in if they are in a post-training point in their career, but we have to ensure that the new technology is matched by the operator’s skill. This is particularly pertinent in light of the concept of “surgical proximity”5 and the importance of the individual operator; this is not comparable to just disseminating a new drug.

Dr. Lieberman: Who should do the credentialing? Should it be the government or our profession?

Dr. Fins: Recertification or credentialing should be by peers—the American College of Surgeons and the surgical boards. Of course, funders or payors may request an additional level of certification to do certain procedures, which I would endorse as a safety measure and to help ensure a minimal standard of care for innovative interventions.

Dr. Hahn: But it is not so simple. There is a blurring of surgical expertise once surgeons complete their training. Spine surgery used to be done by either neurosurgeons or orthopedic surgeons; now we have spine surgeons. What we neurosurgeons started to see with that change was that our neurosurgery trainees were being told they could not get on hospital staffs because they did not have credentials in spine surgery or, to take another example, in pediatric surgery. Well, the neurosurgery board made a conscious decision to not offer certificates of added qualification (CAQs). We challenged the hospitals in court and won. But the overriding message is that it is all about economics.

Dr. Herndon: In orthopedics we now have two CAQs—one in hand surgery and one (starting in 2009) in sports medicine. The hand surgeons have not noticed any adverse effect because they do not generate as much revenue as the spine surgeons do. Most orthopedic surgeons start as general orthopedists and then change their practice characteristics as their practices mature. Over time they may focus on one particular area, such as arthroscopic knee surgery or total hip or knee replacement, which makes it difficult for them to pass a general orthopedic examination. Our board recognized this trend and developed oral and written board exams with case reviews concentrating on the surgeon’s self-chosen specialty. We do not need the CAQs because they have been misused, and we as a profession have been letting others misuse them. Again, I think we need to get back to controlling the process ourselves.

Dr. Hahn: What do you do when a surgeon has finished training and then becomes interested in performing a new procedure developed since the time of his or her training? This can really be a challenge when the surgeon hears of a new procedure, goes and takes a 3-day training seminar on it, and comes back believing that he or she is ready to perform the procedure. I have had creative surgeons on staff who want to try a new procedure but have never done any cases, believing that the new technology alone will suffice. What we finally decided to do in these instances was to put in place other staff to proctor these cases to ensure that no harm was coming to patients.

Dr. Herndon: I admire that approach, because we as a profession have to educate our colleagues about whatever new procedures they are about to use in their practice. There is a learning curve for every operation, and learning on one’s own, at the expense of patients, is not appropriate. Should we have experienced colleagues work with surgeons on new procedures until they have performed the 40 or so cases necessary to be proficient? Should we send surgeons to other institutions to do their 40 cases under experienced supervision? I am not sure what the best approach is, but this is a question that a forum like this should begin to address.

 

 

HOW MUCH RISK IS ACCEPTABLE?

Dr. Lieberman: Let’s build on this issue of credentialing by turning to the concept of risk. What is an acceptable level of risk with a new device? Is a 50% risk of an adverse outcome appropriate? What about 10%? And who determines the acceptable risk? The profession? The regulatory bodies? Patients?

Dr. Fins: Our expectation about risks in clinical practice should evolve from what was anticipated and actually observed in the clinical trial of an intervention. Adverse events should be envisioned prospectively in the design of a trial, with the magnitude of risks delineated in the protocol. Any unexpected risks that occur, even if small, could be a major reporting issue. Beyond that, it is difficult to say what an acceptable level of risk is without a particularistic clinical trial. Whatever the risk of an intervention, the assessment of the risk must account for regional variation, variation among surgeons, and also systems issues.

The Institute of Medicine report, To Err is Human, attributed medical errors to faulty systems, processes, and conditions. So when we think about errors and risk, we have to consider more than just the individual operator. Just as To Err is Human analogized medical errors to airplane crashes, we might think of surgical retraining in the context of how pilots get retrained using flight simulators. If pilots have not flown a particular aircraft in a long time, they lose their flight certification for that type of craft and then must be retrained to operate it.

As surgical technology gets more advanced, specific, and nuanced, the discordance between one’s training and the potential things one can do becomes greater. Paradoxically, innovation can at least potentially make situations more dangerous in that the operator may not be able to perform the task with the improved technology. For example, pilots who know how to fly a Cessna can fly another simply constructed plane, but if they attempt to fly a higher-technology aircraft, like an F-16, they have a greater risk of having a catastrophic event even though the F-16 flies better, faster, and higher.

Dr. Lieberman: But are you willing to identify a level of acceptable risk?

Dr. Fins: It is based on the patient’s preference, after informed consent. An acceptable level of risk is the level that people are willing to accept. What I am concerned about is the variance around a known risk, whatever it may be, that is attributable to human errors that may be preventable through training or by solving systems problems.

Dr. Lieberman: Dr. Rezai, you place needles into the brain. Who should decide the risk of that action? You? The patient? And what do you feel is an acceptable risk level?

Dr. Rezai: It is a complex question, of course, and a number of variables come into play. Whether or not the patient’s condition is life-threatening or disabling is a very important factor in the risk-benefit ratio. Regulatory guidance from the FDA is strong with respect to defining device-related adverse effects as serious or nonserious, and our peers, both surgeons and nonsurgeons, help to further dictate the risk and tolerability of a procedure and its alternatives. For example, in considering a surgical procedure, one must weigh its risk against the risks of medications to treat the disorder, such as side effects, the ease of medication adherence, and the number of emergency room visits that may result from adverse effects of the medications.

Determining acceptable risk rests fundamentally and first with the patient and then with the surgeon and his or her peers (surgeons and nonsurgeons) in conjunction with regulatory components and oversight. All of these factors contribute.

In my field of deep brain stimulation, the threshold for acceptable risk can be high since we see patients with chronic conditions in whom all previous medication attempts have failed, many of whom are disabled, intractable to current therapies, and with a significant compromise of quality of life. Examples include wheelchair-dependent patients with severe Parkinson’s disease, severely depressed patients who will not leave the house and have attempted suicide, and obsessive-compulsive disorder patients who need 10 hours just to take a shower. This type of intractability to current therapies and the suffering of patients and families with limited options and little hope infl uence assessments of procedural risk.

Dr. Hahn: Performing a controlled clinical trial of a surgical procedure is difficult at best. I recall a clinical trial in which patients with parkinsonism were to be randomized either to have stem cells implanted in their brain or to undergo a sham operation with no stem cells. Well, very few patients signed up for the trial because everyone wanted the stem cells. So, obtaining a large enough denominator to define the risk of, for example, hemorrhage from sticking a needle into a vessel is almost impossible.

Dr. Herndon: Except when there are risks of serious life-threatening events, I believe the patient is the one who makes the decision after having the risks fully explained to him or her. Surgeons are educated in a system in which we learn to accept complications. It is the risk of doing business. We have not learned very well how to differentiate a complication from an adverse event or an error. We must learn to do that. We live with complications every day. Those complications must be conveyed to patients so that they understand what they are about to undergo, what can happen, and what cannot happen. The patient is the ultimate decider, in my opinion.

Dr. Lieberman: That reminds me of something one of my mentors often said: “If you are going to run with the big dogs, expect to get bitten in the butt once in a while.”

 

 

ETHICAL DILEMMAS ARISING FROM NEW OPTIONS

Question from audience: In my specialty, we have a non-life-threatening condition with a well-established 25% recurrence rate after traditional surgery with sutures, and a 25% rate of reoperation. A device comes along and it improves the outcomes so that the recurrence rate declines to 10%, but along with the extra costs of doing the procedure with the device, there is also a complication rate of about 10% that requires reoperation with the device, and a few of those patients actually end up worse. Ethically, how should the clinician proceed in this situation? The old way, or the new way that improves outcomes but at a higher cost and risk?

Dr. Fins: Based on the size of the populations, is the difference in the combined rates of recurrence and complications between the traditional and new methods (25% vs 20%) statistically significant?

Response from questioner: The difference is probably not statistically significant.

Dr. Fins: Okay, so you are saying that the numbers are basically equal. That is the first consideration, but there is a nuance to one of the variables, and that is an improvement in quality of life with one of the treatments. Measuring its significance is subjective. A patient may place greater emphasis on quality of life than would somebody who is not a beneficiary of the operation. That is why I said before that biostatistical input that goes beyond crude measures of mortality or reoperation rates can be very helpful. The risk of reoperation may be one that the patient is willing to take for a chance at an improvement in quality of life.

There is a wonderful book by Howard Brody called The Healer’s Power6 in which he writes about the physician’s power to frame a question so as to engineer outcomes. While that is not something that Brody endorses, he does endorse the use of the physician’s power to guide patients using good informed consent, providing direction without being so determinative that patients feel compelled to choose the physician’s recommendation. Patients should be able to decline your recommendation while still having the benefit of your counsel. And in a case like this, your counsel should include variables that may seem “softer” or more difficult to quantify than crude measures such as mortality or reoperation rates.

Dr. Rezai: You have to compare multiple outcomes between the two approaches—surgical time, recovery time, patient quality of life (as assessed by scales), family quality of life, time to return to work, etc. I think it is important to try new technologies because the failure rate or the complication rate may be reduced over time, but only if you evaluate the failures and then restrategize. Only in doing so can you reduce risk, and if the benefit profile and the risk profile prove to be good, then the new technology should be pushed forward.

Dr. Herndon: If the volume of procedures performed by the surgeon is important with respect to outcomes with either one of these two procedures, that should be taken into account. Also, if a new procedure carries a higher complication rate than the traditional procedure, I think that more cohort studies from large centers are needed to gauge the true complication rate before the new technology enters the general market. Continued surveillance, such as with a postmarket registry of outcomes with these procedures, would also be helpful to make adjustments in the future if necessary.

Dr. Hahn: If you looked at the early experience of Med tronic with pacers, you would be amazed at the number of deaths and complications that occurred during the first 3 years. But we do not even think about that now.

CAN INNOVATION HAPPEN WITHOUT INCENTIVES?

Question from audience: Dr. Hahn alluded earlier to the infl uence of money. All of you on the panel are institutionally based, and you are used to practicing with colleagues. I would suggest that surgery today is really not an individual sport, but that is the way it is practiced in much of the nation. Would we be better off if we developed a system that removed us from direct financial influence? Can we get the money out of the equation so that people have motives other than direct personal gain?

Dr. Hahn: I went to an institutional review board (IRB) retreat that included, of course, some IRB members who were not clinicians. They asked the same question that you just did: Why would you even expect to get anything for what you invent? I think that is naïve. People who work hard and invent things deserve to reap a reward. The challenge lies in working with industry, which may try to convince us to use its innovations without our input, as opposed to working with us to identify a clinical problem and trying to solve it together. In that way, the end product and the logic behind its use will be better.

I will give you an example from when I was head of surgery here. A company made a voice-activated table that would obey the surgeon’s commands, such as “left,” “right,” “up,” or “down.” I asked the representative why such a product was needed, and he responded that the surgeon wants to be in total control of the operating room. I told him we do not change the position of the table very often. After a 2-week trial, the table was a dud. He fired the entire group that was working on the project. It was a case of a company simply trying to come up with a product it could sell.

The opposite scenario is if I invent the latest and greatest stent for the carotids and I want to use it. The question becomes how to strike a balance: how to protect the patients while at the same time rewarding the inventor. Another challenge is that device companies want you to stay on their scientific advisory board and they will pay you for it.

These questions are a big concern, and we have spent a lot of time on these issues at Cleveland Clinic. In fact, we held our own conference on biomedical confl icts of interest in September 2006 with attendees from around the country to discuss the necessary firewalls for ensuring that data are not contaminated, that the surgeon-inventor does not fudge data so that his innovation will make it to the marketplace, etc. At that conference, a number of people spoke about Vioxx. I am a surgeon, and my take on the COX-2 inhibitors is that a lot of my patients take these drugs and think they are wonderful, but there are some problems and risks. What is wrong with explaining to patients the risks and complications of these drugs, making your own recommendation about their use (unless you are receiving money from their manufacturers, which you would need to disclose to patients), and then letting patients make their own informed decisions? Personally, I was on Bextra for 3 years and was furious when it was pulled from the market because nobody gave me a choice whether or not to continue using it.

Dr. Lieberman: Let’s explore this concept a little deeper. We know that innovation is so important, but how do we encourage clinicians to innovate in this environment? Dr. Hahn, you served as chairman of CC Innovations, which is Cleveland Clinic’s technology commercialization arm. What were some of the strategies you came across in that role?

Dr. Hahn: We look for creative staff. We tell them up front that we want them to come to Cleveland Clinic and invent things. Our mission is literally to work on problems and take solutions to our patients. The culture here is meant to be creative. As a part of that culture, we welcome working with industry, as opposed to industry thrusting its innovations on us.

We are averaging more than 200 invention disclosures per year. More than 500 of our staff are involved with various industrial partners, and we are not going to hide that. In fact, we are going to make it public. The thought is that we owe it to our patients to work on their problems. At the same time, we owe it to our patients to say when we are working with industry on a particular product and explain to them why we think it would work in their case, if we think it would. While doing so, we need to make it clear that we will be happy to refer them for a second opinion if they would like. If I have a patient who wants a second opinion, I will offer to make the phone call for them and get them in. I think that is an advantage of the model we have here.

The reality is that there are some procedures that can only be done by one surgeon here, a surgeon who may have helped develop the procedure or some technology involved in it. Are we going to tell that surgeon that he or she cannot perform the procedure on anyone? That does not make sense. So you need to have a management plan that puts in place firewalls to protect the data on that procedure from any possible contamination.

So yes, we do reward staff who are doing innovation, and we do work with industry, and we do tell our patients we are doing it, and we do build firewalls to protect the data.

Dr. Lieberman: How about the rest of the panel? What are your thoughts on providing incentives for innovation?

Dr. Fins: Money is a key issue. The way the landscape is now structured, collaborations with industry are part of the mix. Under the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, institutions are granted intellectual property rights to ideas or inventions developed by their researchers, and then the institutions can enter into contracts with industry to move the innovations forward. If industry support of research were removed, we would have to double the budget of the National Institutes of Health to compensate.

On the other hand, industry support can sometimes prove to be a disincentive to innovation in that it may engineer certain kinds of research or deprive investigators of tools they may need to do more basic science types of research. It is an academic freedom issue. At a translational level, industry may be helpful and catalytic. But sometimes it pushes an investigator to work for a short-term innovative application at the expense of a more speculative, riskier innovation.

We need to acknowledge that industry collaborations are part and parcel of the universe and focus on working with industry to moderate its influences. At the same time, we must use our leverage on the investigative side of the equation to pursue academic freedom and to leverage industry resources to perhaps pay for some of the care that innovative devices make possible. For example, contracting agreements could be drawn up so that money came back to the populations that participated in a clinical trial, or to a community that otherwise may need the device but cannot afford it. I think we have to create some type of charitable impulse to moderate the excesses of the profits and use them for the common good.

Dr. Herndon: I would like to touch on disclosure. The orthopedic implant industry has been required by law to disclose its relationships with orthopedic surgeons, including the amount of money that surgeons may be getting from industry. This requirement has had unintended consequences that underscore the importance of disclosure. First, some of the monetary awards, whether market-driven or not, are quite excessive. Second, reviewing the contracts for royalties has led to the discovery that many are not supported by patents or intellectual property rights. Third, these disclosures have revealed that certain surgeons who work at major US institutions, and who thus have an obligation to pay the institution some of the monies from their research, have not disclosed their relationships for years and have kept those monies solely for themselves. So this disclosure requirement has brought many things to light.

Dr. Rezai: As long as there is human disease and suffering, innovation will continue. It has in the past and it will in the future. Most innovators have it in their genes and in their blood. They can be taught to innovate, but they have to have the intrinsic curiosity and the creative mind to be an innovator. Institutional support of innovation is important, as is respect for the process that must be followed, including transparency and disclosure. If you put all these together, then innovation can be facilitated.

 

 

IF TESTING MOVES OFFSHORE, CAN ETHICS FOLLOW?

Dr. Lieberman: I am going to paint a scenario on which I would like each panelist to briefly comment. New Device X is backed by a big vendor. It is a great device, but because of all the regulatory issues in the United States, it is taken to China or South America and is being implanted there, where the regulatory environment is much more lenient. Can we rationalize this practice? How is it possibly ethical?

Dr. Fins: I can answer in 5 seconds: we shouldn’t do it.

Dr. Rezai: This is a reality we are facing with increasing rules and regulations in the United States. You have to engage the process, and it takes time. If you have colleagues who can follow clinical trials outside the United States, you can have the device tested outside and then bring it back to the United States. Unfortunately, the reality is that the regulatory process can be slow, so more testing will be done abroad, in my opinion.

Dr. Hahn: I disagree with Dr. Fins. This may be the only way to get the trials started, and we then are able to use some of the offshore data to approach the FDA for approval. I do not think that it is taking advantage of anybody; it is a way of getting things through the system.

Dr. Herndon: The door has been opened, and it is only going to increase. My only request would be that the investigators who do this function as they would here in the United States, under IRB controls and the other kinds of oversight that they would expect and demand of themselves in their own institutions.

END RESULTS: WHY SO ELUSIVE STILL?

Dr. Isador Lieberman, Moderator: Let me begin this discussion with a 1910 quote from Ernest Codman, a general surgeon at Massachusetts General Hospital, who stated:

In 1900 I became interested in what I called the “end result” idea, which was merely the commonsense notion that every hospital should follow every patient it treats long enough to determine whether or not the treatment has been successful, and then should inquire, “If not, why not?” with a view to preventing similar failure in the future.

My questions to the panel are: What has changed in the last 100 years? Are we documenting our end results? Have we gone wrong and, if so, where have we gone wrong?

Dr. James Herndon: Although Codman’s ideas in this area were not well received at the time, today we do have some “end result” ideas. We have outcomes data, but I would argue that they are far too limited and not to the level required in the 21st century. I have asked myself many times why the surgical profession has not focused on this issue more than it has. I agree with Dr. [Joseph] Fins’ comments in his presentation [see previous article in this supplement] that it would be nice to have a bottom-up approach rather than a top-down approach, but I do not see a change until we as physicians step up to the plate and make a change.

Why haven’t we? There are a number of reasons. The malpractice climate in the United States has been one major factor. Surgeons fear disclosure. The relationship between a surgeon and the patient is professional and private, and physicians do not want transparency—they do not want their patient or anyone to know that an adverse event or bad outcome has occurred.

Also, doctors, especially surgeons, are reluctant to use guidelines or follow protocols. I participated a number of years ago in an American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons project called MODEMS; it was an attempt to set up guidelines for orthopedic surgeons to manage back pain, shoulder pain, and other orthopedic conditions. By the time we finished we had accomplished nothing, because the protocols and guidelines were so extensive that almost any type of management for any patient would be compliant.

Additionally, hospitals in the United States have become more like for-profit businesses, with a focus on short-term profits and with short tenures for their chief executive officers (CEOs)—4 or 5 years, on average. With nearly 50% of US hospitals bordering on bankruptcy, they are not able or willing to invest in major patient safety protocols and guidelines because the CEOs do not see a short-term benefit to them. Witness the fact that only 15% of US hospitals have computerized physician order entry systems and electronic medical records. From what I have read, it takes about 5 years before a hospital recoups such investments from the resulting safety improvements and efficiencies.

These are some, but by no means all, of the reasons we do not have appropriate outcomes in all specialty fields. My plea is that physicians lead the effort to measure and report outcomes down the road.

Dr. Lieberman: Dr. Hahn, why do you think we have not kept up with Dr. Codman’s premise from 100 years ago?

Dr. Joseph Hahn: We hold a yearly Medical Innovation Summit at the Cleveland Clinic, and what has emerged from many of those meetings is a lack of interest in paying for outcomes analyses. The providers, the government, and industry all say that they do not have the money for these analyses. So the first reason that Codman’s premise has not been lived up to is that the source of funding remains undetermined. Second, most surgical innovations have been geared toward inventing devices to overcome very specific problems that arise during or following surgery rather than toward substantiating the worth of a procedure through collection of evidence. A third reason involves the pressure that investors place on industry to make money, which tends to lead to investments in getting products to market rather than outcomes research. With all of these factors and the pressures from so many directions, the surgical profession hasn’t stepped back to thoroughly consider what we are doing to our patients and just how worthwhile it is.

Dr. Lieberman: Who do you think should be paying for outcomes analyses?

Dr. Hahn: I think the government should. The role of government is to take care of its citizens. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) does its best with the information it has, but it admits that it pays for some procedures without knowing whether or not they are truly worthwhile. An example is the use of artificial discs in the cervical spine. I am sure that the artificial disc manufacturers made a case for their product to CMS by claiming it was associated with less pain and resulted in a superior outcome compared to fusion using bone from the hip, regardless of whether they had the scientific evidence to prove it.

Dr. Lieberman: Dr. Fins, would you like to weigh in on Codman’s “end result” premise?

Dr. Joseph Fins: I would just point out that the history is not homogeneous. I have been involved in deep brain stimulation work, and the legacy of psychosurgery has been an egregious lack of outcomes studies, but now we do have outcomes studies and scales. For example, there is now the Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale to rate the severity of symptoms in obsessive-compulsive disorder. In our deep brain stimulation study,1 we are using a coma recovery scale, and the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) investigational device exemption (IDE) process requires us to produce outcomes data to protect potential subjects. It may be an example of neuropsychiatric exceptionalism that neurology and psychiatry are areas of increased focus while somatic therapies are somehow presumed to be okay.

Dr. Hahn: FDA may be requiring the outcomes data, but I have not heard that they are willing to pay for it.

Dr. Fins: You are correct.

Dr. Ali Rezai: Part of the problem is the translation of rapid scientific discoveries and technological advances into the field, and education has a role here. Surgeons’ reluctance to integrate guidelines and outcomes measures into practice must be addressed very early in their training—in medical school—and then continued throughout residency and fellowship programs. The same early and continuing approach should be taken with respect to how to conduct and properly interpret a clinical trial.

Dr. Herndon: That is a good point. Surgical education programs have slipped a bit in the past 5 to 10 years, at least in orthopedics. With the reductions in residents’ work hours and the fast pace of residency programs, our residents spend most of their time in the operating room, struggling to master the multitude of procedures in orthopedics. As a result, they are not discussing outcomes or adequately following patients long-term after surgery. I have a hard time getting our faculty to bring residents into their offices so that the residents can examine patients and see why they are operating on certain kinds of patients, as well as the types of follow-up information that can and should be obtained from patients. Training today is so oriented to operative techniques that residencies have difficulty dealing with these other important issues.

 

 

WHO DEFINES THE INDICATIONS?

Dr. Lieberman: As new devices and new techniques emerge, who defines their indications? The inventor of the device, a government authority that may or may not have the medical background, patient advocacy groups, or the device manufacturer? And how should we regulate those indications?

Dr. Fins: I would echo Dr. Wilder Penfield’s words, “No man alone.” The orthopedic surgeon or neurosurgeon does not have to do this alone; it is really about teams. And those teams can and should include biostatisticians, recognizing that the biostatistician needs to fully understand what the surgeon is doing. There also has to be attention given to patients’ individualistic outcomes. I recently met with some FDA staff and learned that the FDA is very interested in novel methodologies to better understand what counts as an outcome for individual patients. So I think indications should be guided by individualistic outcomes coupled with the surgical possibilities and with the rigorous biostatistical methods that are now evolving. A conference like this represents an opportunity to generalize the conversation and support more collaboration on indications going forward.

Dr. Rezai: Indications should be defined using a team-oriented approach. Part of the problem of psychosurgery in the past was that the surgeon was defining indications without collaborating with the psychiatrist. In my field of deep brain stimulation and brain pacemakers, everything we have done for the past 20 years—surgery for Parkinson’s disease, depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, traumatic brain injury, epilepsy—has involved working closely with neurologists, epileptologists, brain injury specialists, psychiatrists, and psychologists to agree on indications. These teams also need to have close partnerships with ethicists. Teamwork is a vital aspect of proper development of an indication.

Dr. Hahn: It has to be the clinicians who set forth the indications. Of course, that may be done by a team of clinicians, but as a surgeon I certainly do not want the manufacturers of an artificial disc telling me what they think the indications for an artificial disc are.

As for the role of patients, some of them are very well informed about their problem. I cannot tell you how many have shown up in my office with reprints of articles I have written. This is a trend that has really mushroomed over the past 10 years. But even though patients are catching up, they are still at a disadvantage. Patients are going to have a say, but it is still the clinicians whose role is to decide the indications and then provide patients with a risk-benefit analysis.

Dr. Herndon: I agree. Although patients are becoming more involved in the process, real shared decision-making has not yet happened in my field.

More broadly, I feel that our professional organizations have to become more actively involved in the process of defining indications. Otherwise, after the innovators develop a device or procedure that will significantly change the approach to a particular problem, it will enter the market at large without any critical assessment of the technology involved and without accounting for the learning curve for each individual surgeon.

Take the example of minimally invasive total hip replacement, which involves a 1-inch incision in the front of the hip and a 1-inch incision in the back of the hip. The learning curve for this procedure appears to be about 40 cases, based on the opinion of experts around the country. Yet when this minimally invasive approach emerged, every surgeon who had been performing total hip replacements wanted this new operation at his or her fingertips because patients were demanding it. Some surgeons adopted it too quickly, without adequate training. I know one distraught surgeon who abandoned the procedure because of numerous failures during his first 100 cases. He returned to the standard hip replacement approach.

Our profession cannot let this experience continue or proliferate. Yet the professional organizations in orthopedics have walked away from technology assessment because industry does not want it; technology assessment is not in industry’s best interest. We have had a number of conflicts in our professional organizations when attempting to move technology assessment forward. It is also very expensive to do.

Finally, indications can sometimes be governed more by economics than by science. I was asked to write a letter to the editor about two technologies for managing intertrochanteric fractures of the hip that were recently featured in the Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery.2,3 One technology involves a compression screw that has been shown to be effective in outcomes studies. The other is an intramedullary nail that has not been well studied and has no proven benefit over the compression screw. In doing research for my letter,4 I found that Medicare assigns more relative value units (RVUs) for the intramedullary nail than for the compression screw. In Boston, the total dollar difference in RVUs between the two is $300: the surgeon makes $1,500 for the procedure that involves the intramedullary nail versus $1,200 for using the compression screw. Not surprisingly, use of the intramedullary nail has been climbing rapidly in the United States without any evidence to justify its use over the other, less expensive technique.

 

 

CREDENTIALING: CAN IT KEEP PACE WITH INNOVATION?

Dr. Fins: I agree that surgical competence and regulation—self-regulation or professional regulation—are big issues. One of my greatest fears is that surgeons will do procedures they are not trained to do, and cause great harm as a result. We are hearing about this now with the resurgence of psychosurgery in China.

It strikes me as interesting that the field of neurosurgery is as yet undifferentiated and that there is no subspecialty certification in stereotactic neurosurgery. This is in contrast to invasive cardiology on the medical side, where physicians who do catheterizations and electrophysiologic studies have special additional training.

As innovations develop, we have to track qualifications and credentialing along the way. There should be provisions to grandfather surgeons in if they are in a post-training point in their career, but we have to ensure that the new technology is matched by the operator’s skill. This is particularly pertinent in light of the concept of “surgical proximity”5 and the importance of the individual operator; this is not comparable to just disseminating a new drug.

Dr. Lieberman: Who should do the credentialing? Should it be the government or our profession?

Dr. Fins: Recertification or credentialing should be by peers—the American College of Surgeons and the surgical boards. Of course, funders or payors may request an additional level of certification to do certain procedures, which I would endorse as a safety measure and to help ensure a minimal standard of care for innovative interventions.

Dr. Hahn: But it is not so simple. There is a blurring of surgical expertise once surgeons complete their training. Spine surgery used to be done by either neurosurgeons or orthopedic surgeons; now we have spine surgeons. What we neurosurgeons started to see with that change was that our neurosurgery trainees were being told they could not get on hospital staffs because they did not have credentials in spine surgery or, to take another example, in pediatric surgery. Well, the neurosurgery board made a conscious decision to not offer certificates of added qualification (CAQs). We challenged the hospitals in court and won. But the overriding message is that it is all about economics.

Dr. Herndon: In orthopedics we now have two CAQs—one in hand surgery and one (starting in 2009) in sports medicine. The hand surgeons have not noticed any adverse effect because they do not generate as much revenue as the spine surgeons do. Most orthopedic surgeons start as general orthopedists and then change their practice characteristics as their practices mature. Over time they may focus on one particular area, such as arthroscopic knee surgery or total hip or knee replacement, which makes it difficult for them to pass a general orthopedic examination. Our board recognized this trend and developed oral and written board exams with case reviews concentrating on the surgeon’s self-chosen specialty. We do not need the CAQs because they have been misused, and we as a profession have been letting others misuse them. Again, I think we need to get back to controlling the process ourselves.

Dr. Hahn: What do you do when a surgeon has finished training and then becomes interested in performing a new procedure developed since the time of his or her training? This can really be a challenge when the surgeon hears of a new procedure, goes and takes a 3-day training seminar on it, and comes back believing that he or she is ready to perform the procedure. I have had creative surgeons on staff who want to try a new procedure but have never done any cases, believing that the new technology alone will suffice. What we finally decided to do in these instances was to put in place other staff to proctor these cases to ensure that no harm was coming to patients.

Dr. Herndon: I admire that approach, because we as a profession have to educate our colleagues about whatever new procedures they are about to use in their practice. There is a learning curve for every operation, and learning on one’s own, at the expense of patients, is not appropriate. Should we have experienced colleagues work with surgeons on new procedures until they have performed the 40 or so cases necessary to be proficient? Should we send surgeons to other institutions to do their 40 cases under experienced supervision? I am not sure what the best approach is, but this is a question that a forum like this should begin to address.

 

 

HOW MUCH RISK IS ACCEPTABLE?

Dr. Lieberman: Let’s build on this issue of credentialing by turning to the concept of risk. What is an acceptable level of risk with a new device? Is a 50% risk of an adverse outcome appropriate? What about 10%? And who determines the acceptable risk? The profession? The regulatory bodies? Patients?

Dr. Fins: Our expectation about risks in clinical practice should evolve from what was anticipated and actually observed in the clinical trial of an intervention. Adverse events should be envisioned prospectively in the design of a trial, with the magnitude of risks delineated in the protocol. Any unexpected risks that occur, even if small, could be a major reporting issue. Beyond that, it is difficult to say what an acceptable level of risk is without a particularistic clinical trial. Whatever the risk of an intervention, the assessment of the risk must account for regional variation, variation among surgeons, and also systems issues.

The Institute of Medicine report, To Err is Human, attributed medical errors to faulty systems, processes, and conditions. So when we think about errors and risk, we have to consider more than just the individual operator. Just as To Err is Human analogized medical errors to airplane crashes, we might think of surgical retraining in the context of how pilots get retrained using flight simulators. If pilots have not flown a particular aircraft in a long time, they lose their flight certification for that type of craft and then must be retrained to operate it.

As surgical technology gets more advanced, specific, and nuanced, the discordance between one’s training and the potential things one can do becomes greater. Paradoxically, innovation can at least potentially make situations more dangerous in that the operator may not be able to perform the task with the improved technology. For example, pilots who know how to fly a Cessna can fly another simply constructed plane, but if they attempt to fly a higher-technology aircraft, like an F-16, they have a greater risk of having a catastrophic event even though the F-16 flies better, faster, and higher.

Dr. Lieberman: But are you willing to identify a level of acceptable risk?

Dr. Fins: It is based on the patient’s preference, after informed consent. An acceptable level of risk is the level that people are willing to accept. What I am concerned about is the variance around a known risk, whatever it may be, that is attributable to human errors that may be preventable through training or by solving systems problems.

Dr. Lieberman: Dr. Rezai, you place needles into the brain. Who should decide the risk of that action? You? The patient? And what do you feel is an acceptable risk level?

Dr. Rezai: It is a complex question, of course, and a number of variables come into play. Whether or not the patient’s condition is life-threatening or disabling is a very important factor in the risk-benefit ratio. Regulatory guidance from the FDA is strong with respect to defining device-related adverse effects as serious or nonserious, and our peers, both surgeons and nonsurgeons, help to further dictate the risk and tolerability of a procedure and its alternatives. For example, in considering a surgical procedure, one must weigh its risk against the risks of medications to treat the disorder, such as side effects, the ease of medication adherence, and the number of emergency room visits that may result from adverse effects of the medications.

Determining acceptable risk rests fundamentally and first with the patient and then with the surgeon and his or her peers (surgeons and nonsurgeons) in conjunction with regulatory components and oversight. All of these factors contribute.

In my field of deep brain stimulation, the threshold for acceptable risk can be high since we see patients with chronic conditions in whom all previous medication attempts have failed, many of whom are disabled, intractable to current therapies, and with a significant compromise of quality of life. Examples include wheelchair-dependent patients with severe Parkinson’s disease, severely depressed patients who will not leave the house and have attempted suicide, and obsessive-compulsive disorder patients who need 10 hours just to take a shower. This type of intractability to current therapies and the suffering of patients and families with limited options and little hope infl uence assessments of procedural risk.

Dr. Hahn: Performing a controlled clinical trial of a surgical procedure is difficult at best. I recall a clinical trial in which patients with parkinsonism were to be randomized either to have stem cells implanted in their brain or to undergo a sham operation with no stem cells. Well, very few patients signed up for the trial because everyone wanted the stem cells. So, obtaining a large enough denominator to define the risk of, for example, hemorrhage from sticking a needle into a vessel is almost impossible.

Dr. Herndon: Except when there are risks of serious life-threatening events, I believe the patient is the one who makes the decision after having the risks fully explained to him or her. Surgeons are educated in a system in which we learn to accept complications. It is the risk of doing business. We have not learned very well how to differentiate a complication from an adverse event or an error. We must learn to do that. We live with complications every day. Those complications must be conveyed to patients so that they understand what they are about to undergo, what can happen, and what cannot happen. The patient is the ultimate decider, in my opinion.

Dr. Lieberman: That reminds me of something one of my mentors often said: “If you are going to run with the big dogs, expect to get bitten in the butt once in a while.”

 

 

ETHICAL DILEMMAS ARISING FROM NEW OPTIONS

Question from audience: In my specialty, we have a non-life-threatening condition with a well-established 25% recurrence rate after traditional surgery with sutures, and a 25% rate of reoperation. A device comes along and it improves the outcomes so that the recurrence rate declines to 10%, but along with the extra costs of doing the procedure with the device, there is also a complication rate of about 10% that requires reoperation with the device, and a few of those patients actually end up worse. Ethically, how should the clinician proceed in this situation? The old way, or the new way that improves outcomes but at a higher cost and risk?

Dr. Fins: Based on the size of the populations, is the difference in the combined rates of recurrence and complications between the traditional and new methods (25% vs 20%) statistically significant?

Response from questioner: The difference is probably not statistically significant.

Dr. Fins: Okay, so you are saying that the numbers are basically equal. That is the first consideration, but there is a nuance to one of the variables, and that is an improvement in quality of life with one of the treatments. Measuring its significance is subjective. A patient may place greater emphasis on quality of life than would somebody who is not a beneficiary of the operation. That is why I said before that biostatistical input that goes beyond crude measures of mortality or reoperation rates can be very helpful. The risk of reoperation may be one that the patient is willing to take for a chance at an improvement in quality of life.

There is a wonderful book by Howard Brody called The Healer’s Power6 in which he writes about the physician’s power to frame a question so as to engineer outcomes. While that is not something that Brody endorses, he does endorse the use of the physician’s power to guide patients using good informed consent, providing direction without being so determinative that patients feel compelled to choose the physician’s recommendation. Patients should be able to decline your recommendation while still having the benefit of your counsel. And in a case like this, your counsel should include variables that may seem “softer” or more difficult to quantify than crude measures such as mortality or reoperation rates.

Dr. Rezai: You have to compare multiple outcomes between the two approaches—surgical time, recovery time, patient quality of life (as assessed by scales), family quality of life, time to return to work, etc. I think it is important to try new technologies because the failure rate or the complication rate may be reduced over time, but only if you evaluate the failures and then restrategize. Only in doing so can you reduce risk, and if the benefit profile and the risk profile prove to be good, then the new technology should be pushed forward.

Dr. Herndon: If the volume of procedures performed by the surgeon is important with respect to outcomes with either one of these two procedures, that should be taken into account. Also, if a new procedure carries a higher complication rate than the traditional procedure, I think that more cohort studies from large centers are needed to gauge the true complication rate before the new technology enters the general market. Continued surveillance, such as with a postmarket registry of outcomes with these procedures, would also be helpful to make adjustments in the future if necessary.

Dr. Hahn: If you looked at the early experience of Med tronic with pacers, you would be amazed at the number of deaths and complications that occurred during the first 3 years. But we do not even think about that now.

CAN INNOVATION HAPPEN WITHOUT INCENTIVES?

Question from audience: Dr. Hahn alluded earlier to the infl uence of money. All of you on the panel are institutionally based, and you are used to practicing with colleagues. I would suggest that surgery today is really not an individual sport, but that is the way it is practiced in much of the nation. Would we be better off if we developed a system that removed us from direct financial influence? Can we get the money out of the equation so that people have motives other than direct personal gain?

Dr. Hahn: I went to an institutional review board (IRB) retreat that included, of course, some IRB members who were not clinicians. They asked the same question that you just did: Why would you even expect to get anything for what you invent? I think that is naïve. People who work hard and invent things deserve to reap a reward. The challenge lies in working with industry, which may try to convince us to use its innovations without our input, as opposed to working with us to identify a clinical problem and trying to solve it together. In that way, the end product and the logic behind its use will be better.

I will give you an example from when I was head of surgery here. A company made a voice-activated table that would obey the surgeon’s commands, such as “left,” “right,” “up,” or “down.” I asked the representative why such a product was needed, and he responded that the surgeon wants to be in total control of the operating room. I told him we do not change the position of the table very often. After a 2-week trial, the table was a dud. He fired the entire group that was working on the project. It was a case of a company simply trying to come up with a product it could sell.

The opposite scenario is if I invent the latest and greatest stent for the carotids and I want to use it. The question becomes how to strike a balance: how to protect the patients while at the same time rewarding the inventor. Another challenge is that device companies want you to stay on their scientific advisory board and they will pay you for it.

These questions are a big concern, and we have spent a lot of time on these issues at Cleveland Clinic. In fact, we held our own conference on biomedical confl icts of interest in September 2006 with attendees from around the country to discuss the necessary firewalls for ensuring that data are not contaminated, that the surgeon-inventor does not fudge data so that his innovation will make it to the marketplace, etc. At that conference, a number of people spoke about Vioxx. I am a surgeon, and my take on the COX-2 inhibitors is that a lot of my patients take these drugs and think they are wonderful, but there are some problems and risks. What is wrong with explaining to patients the risks and complications of these drugs, making your own recommendation about their use (unless you are receiving money from their manufacturers, which you would need to disclose to patients), and then letting patients make their own informed decisions? Personally, I was on Bextra for 3 years and was furious when it was pulled from the market because nobody gave me a choice whether or not to continue using it.

Dr. Lieberman: Let’s explore this concept a little deeper. We know that innovation is so important, but how do we encourage clinicians to innovate in this environment? Dr. Hahn, you served as chairman of CC Innovations, which is Cleveland Clinic’s technology commercialization arm. What were some of the strategies you came across in that role?

Dr. Hahn: We look for creative staff. We tell them up front that we want them to come to Cleveland Clinic and invent things. Our mission is literally to work on problems and take solutions to our patients. The culture here is meant to be creative. As a part of that culture, we welcome working with industry, as opposed to industry thrusting its innovations on us.

We are averaging more than 200 invention disclosures per year. More than 500 of our staff are involved with various industrial partners, and we are not going to hide that. In fact, we are going to make it public. The thought is that we owe it to our patients to work on their problems. At the same time, we owe it to our patients to say when we are working with industry on a particular product and explain to them why we think it would work in their case, if we think it would. While doing so, we need to make it clear that we will be happy to refer them for a second opinion if they would like. If I have a patient who wants a second opinion, I will offer to make the phone call for them and get them in. I think that is an advantage of the model we have here.

The reality is that there are some procedures that can only be done by one surgeon here, a surgeon who may have helped develop the procedure or some technology involved in it. Are we going to tell that surgeon that he or she cannot perform the procedure on anyone? That does not make sense. So you need to have a management plan that puts in place firewalls to protect the data on that procedure from any possible contamination.

So yes, we do reward staff who are doing innovation, and we do work with industry, and we do tell our patients we are doing it, and we do build firewalls to protect the data.

Dr. Lieberman: How about the rest of the panel? What are your thoughts on providing incentives for innovation?

Dr. Fins: Money is a key issue. The way the landscape is now structured, collaborations with industry are part of the mix. Under the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, institutions are granted intellectual property rights to ideas or inventions developed by their researchers, and then the institutions can enter into contracts with industry to move the innovations forward. If industry support of research were removed, we would have to double the budget of the National Institutes of Health to compensate.

On the other hand, industry support can sometimes prove to be a disincentive to innovation in that it may engineer certain kinds of research or deprive investigators of tools they may need to do more basic science types of research. It is an academic freedom issue. At a translational level, industry may be helpful and catalytic. But sometimes it pushes an investigator to work for a short-term innovative application at the expense of a more speculative, riskier innovation.

We need to acknowledge that industry collaborations are part and parcel of the universe and focus on working with industry to moderate its influences. At the same time, we must use our leverage on the investigative side of the equation to pursue academic freedom and to leverage industry resources to perhaps pay for some of the care that innovative devices make possible. For example, contracting agreements could be drawn up so that money came back to the populations that participated in a clinical trial, or to a community that otherwise may need the device but cannot afford it. I think we have to create some type of charitable impulse to moderate the excesses of the profits and use them for the common good.

Dr. Herndon: I would like to touch on disclosure. The orthopedic implant industry has been required by law to disclose its relationships with orthopedic surgeons, including the amount of money that surgeons may be getting from industry. This requirement has had unintended consequences that underscore the importance of disclosure. First, some of the monetary awards, whether market-driven or not, are quite excessive. Second, reviewing the contracts for royalties has led to the discovery that many are not supported by patents or intellectual property rights. Third, these disclosures have revealed that certain surgeons who work at major US institutions, and who thus have an obligation to pay the institution some of the monies from their research, have not disclosed their relationships for years and have kept those monies solely for themselves. So this disclosure requirement has brought many things to light.

Dr. Rezai: As long as there is human disease and suffering, innovation will continue. It has in the past and it will in the future. Most innovators have it in their genes and in their blood. They can be taught to innovate, but they have to have the intrinsic curiosity and the creative mind to be an innovator. Institutional support of innovation is important, as is respect for the process that must be followed, including transparency and disclosure. If you put all these together, then innovation can be facilitated.

 

 

IF TESTING MOVES OFFSHORE, CAN ETHICS FOLLOW?

Dr. Lieberman: I am going to paint a scenario on which I would like each panelist to briefly comment. New Device X is backed by a big vendor. It is a great device, but because of all the regulatory issues in the United States, it is taken to China or South America and is being implanted there, where the regulatory environment is much more lenient. Can we rationalize this practice? How is it possibly ethical?

Dr. Fins: I can answer in 5 seconds: we shouldn’t do it.

Dr. Rezai: This is a reality we are facing with increasing rules and regulations in the United States. You have to engage the process, and it takes time. If you have colleagues who can follow clinical trials outside the United States, you can have the device tested outside and then bring it back to the United States. Unfortunately, the reality is that the regulatory process can be slow, so more testing will be done abroad, in my opinion.

Dr. Hahn: I disagree with Dr. Fins. This may be the only way to get the trials started, and we then are able to use some of the offshore data to approach the FDA for approval. I do not think that it is taking advantage of anybody; it is a way of getting things through the system.

Dr. Herndon: The door has been opened, and it is only going to increase. My only request would be that the investigators who do this function as they would here in the United States, under IRB controls and the other kinds of oversight that they would expect and demand of themselves in their own institutions.

References
  1. Schiff ND, Giacino JT, Kalmar K, et al. Behavioral improvements with thalamic stimulation after severe traumatic brain injury. Nature 2007; 448:600–603.
  2. Forte ML, Virnig BA, Kane RL, et al. Geographic variation in device use for intertrochanteric hip fractures. J Bone Joint Surg Am 2008; 90:691–699.
  3. Anglen JO, Weinstein JN. Nail or plate fixation of intertrochanteric hip fractures: changing pattern of practice. A review of the American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery database. J Bone Joint Surg Am 2008; 90:700–707.
  4. Herndon JH. Technology assessment and adoption in orthopaedics [letter]. J Bone Joint Surg Am 2008; 90e. http://www.ejbjs.org/cgi/eletters/90/4/689. Published April 1, 2008. Accessed August 25, 2008.
  5. Fins JJ. Surgical innovation and ethical dilemmas: precautions and proximity. Cleve Clin J Med 2008; 75(suppl 6):S7–S12.
  6. Brody H. The Healer’s Power. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; 1992.
References
  1. Schiff ND, Giacino JT, Kalmar K, et al. Behavioral improvements with thalamic stimulation after severe traumatic brain injury. Nature 2007; 448:600–603.
  2. Forte ML, Virnig BA, Kane RL, et al. Geographic variation in device use for intertrochanteric hip fractures. J Bone Joint Surg Am 2008; 90:691–699.
  3. Anglen JO, Weinstein JN. Nail or plate fixation of intertrochanteric hip fractures: changing pattern of practice. A review of the American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery database. J Bone Joint Surg Am 2008; 90:700–707.
  4. Herndon JH. Technology assessment and adoption in orthopaedics [letter]. J Bone Joint Surg Am 2008; 90e. http://www.ejbjs.org/cgi/eletters/90/4/689. Published April 1, 2008. Accessed August 25, 2008.
  5. Fins JJ. Surgical innovation and ethical dilemmas: precautions and proximity. Cleve Clin J Med 2008; 75(suppl 6):S7–S12.
  6. Brody H. The Healer’s Power. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; 1992.
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Pushing the envelope in transplantation: Three lives at stake

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Pushing the envelope in transplantation: Three lives at stake

Anyone involved in transplantation has witnessed the Lazarean awakening of many of our patients. On the verge of dying, these patients receive a transplant then go home to their loved ones, to their communities, and to the rest of their life.

Transplantation has always straddled the border between life and death; it has always pushed the biological envelope.

But it has also always pushed the ethical envelope.

How? In forcing all of us, not just transplant surgeons, to reconsider some of our most fundamental ethical dilemmas:

  • What is death?
  • Can we extend life?
  • Whose life do we extend?
  • At what price the extension of life?
  • Just because we can extend life, should we?

And every one of these dilemmas is further complicated by another issue unique to transplantation. At stake in every transplant is not just the patient’s life, but three lives—the patient, the donor, and the person on the waiting list who likely died because the organ went to your patient, not her or him.

While we are not focusing today on organ donation or allocation, let us not forget that transplantation is unique in this regard. There are always three patients to consider.

What we will focus on today are transplant and post-transplant innovations. To help introduce the discussion, I would like to share a narrative that I believe illuminates ethical dilemmas that go hand-in-hand with transplantation’s innovations.

THE STORY OF MAX

Max was the tiny embodiment of a biological keystone cop. In utero he had developed a gaping defect of his abdominal wall. His intestines twisted around themselves, and the obstetricians had to deliver Max emergently. The pediatric surgeons immediately removed the gangrenous remnants of nearly his entire bowel.

At 10 months, Max received a liver and small bowel transplant. The transplanted organs worked initially; with a small feeding tube inserted directly into his gut, Max digested for the first time in his life tablespoons of food, albeit a chalky liquid supplement.

But Max, within 2 months of his transplant, had again become a permanent resident in the pediatric intensive care unit. Achieving the right balance of immunosuppression so Max could keep the transplanted organs and yet maintain sufficient immunity to fight off infection had become an impossible task.

I was in my fellowship at the time of Max’s transplant; and Eric, an attending surgeon with a square jaw and dark Dick Tracy looks, led the surgical team’s management of Max’s case.

As Max became sicker, Eric spent more hours with his tiny patient. I found him by Max’s bedside at 3:00 in the morning and then at 7:00 the next night, his hair, clothes, and personal aura in a state that reflected obliviousness to his own care. Just by being with Max so much, Eric knew all the particularities of that baby, all his idiosyncratic reactions, every significant lab result of Max’s entire life.

At first I found Eric’s dedication inspiring, almost thrilling in a martyred saint kind of way. And Max seemed to call out to any of us who hoped to be divinely touched. During rounds, Max giggled at me, as if he understood that playing with him was infinitely more interesting than arguing over doses of medication with other doctors. Spurred on by Max’s cause, I raced to uncover test results before Eric, as if my quicker response would translate into an equal or greater enthusiasm for Max’s plight. I nagged the radiology technicians to give me Max’s x-rays hot off the presses. I set the alarms on my beeper to see Max in the middle of the night and on mornings long before any member of the surgical team, particularly Eric, arrived.

Despite my enthusiastic attentions, Max became sicker. We gave Max higher doses of steroids, and his big, shiny black eyes turned into a pair of hyphens on the rolling swells of his face. His tiny body became engorged with fluid from repeated infections, and Max’s once buttery skin slowly became the ridiculously inadequate biological grounding for monitors and catheters. The nurses took to using the bed around him to clip wires and anchor dressings, and they hung mechanized pumps on tall IV poles which stood like skeletal beasts of burden crowded around Max’s bed.

Through all of Max’s crises, Eric never let up. But Max was going to die soon if we could not find the source of his infections. Eric finally decided to take Max to the operating room, worried about a hidden infection around his transplanted intestines. “We’ve got to take him back to the OR,” he said to us. Eric looked at us then asked rhetorically, “I mean, is there any other option?” We all understood what Eric was really asking. Were we doing enough? Was it our fault?

That trip to the OR would be the first of almost a dozen. Under searing heat lamps we snipped the sutures that held a plastic abdominal patch in place and uncovered the small cavity filled with congealed organs. We picked away at the block-like mass, terrified of inadvertently cutting a hole in his transplanted intestine and creating another source of infection. Then, finding nothing and too scared to cause any more damage, we whipstitched a piece of plastic back to the edge of Max’s abdominal wall. Over time, it became harder and harder to find untouched flesh where we could place a new stitch.

Over a month later Max died of a massive fungal infection. I mentioned his death to Jaimie, a pragmatic and brilliant head nurse who possessed more insight into our patients and hospital politics than most of the physicians.

“Maybe it was a good thing, huh?” Jaimie responded flatly. She walked out of the room and I could hear her asking aloud, “I mean, how much can you do to a person?”

THE EARLY TRANSPLANT ERA, DESPITE BLEAKER OUTCOMES, HAS LESSONS TO TEACH

I grew up, surgically speaking, at a time when transplant science fiction had become standard of care, when patients transplanted a decade or more earlier would routinely drop by clinic to say hello, and when patients on the brink of death could expect a full recovery.

But it was not always this way. And it took courageous individuals navigating the difficult relationship between innovation and ethics to get us here.

What is extraordinary about this panel is that these surgeons not only were at the forefront of transplantation’s history but also remain deeply involved in its future. Over the next hour roughly, they will give us an extraordinary look into the intersection of innovation and ethics in the past, present, and future of transplant surgery.

I hope you are eager as I am to hear what they have to share with us.

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Dr. Chen is the bestselling author of Final Exam: A Surgeon’s Reflections on Mortality (Vintage 2008) and a transplant surgeon most recently on faculty at the University of California, Los Angeles.

“The Story of Max” is an abridged excerpt from Final Exam: A Surgeon’s Refections on Mortality by Pauline W. Chen, Copyright © 2007 by Pauline W. Chen. Excerpted by permission of Vintage, a division of Random House, Inc. All rights reserved.

Dr. Chen reported that she has no financial interests or relationships that pose a potential confict of interest with this article.

Correspondence: [email protected]

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Pauline W. Chen, MD
Dr. Chen is the bestselling author of Final Exam: A Surgeon’s Reflections on Mortality (Vintage 2008) and a transplant surgeon most recently on faculty at the University of California, Los Angeles.

“The Story of Max” is an abridged excerpt from Final Exam: A Surgeon’s Refections on Mortality by Pauline W. Chen, Copyright © 2007 by Pauline W. Chen. Excerpted by permission of Vintage, a division of Random House, Inc. All rights reserved.

Dr. Chen reported that she has no financial interests or relationships that pose a potential confict of interest with this article.

Correspondence: [email protected]

Author and Disclosure Information

Pauline W. Chen, MD
Dr. Chen is the bestselling author of Final Exam: A Surgeon’s Reflections on Mortality (Vintage 2008) and a transplant surgeon most recently on faculty at the University of California, Los Angeles.

“The Story of Max” is an abridged excerpt from Final Exam: A Surgeon’s Refections on Mortality by Pauline W. Chen, Copyright © 2007 by Pauline W. Chen. Excerpted by permission of Vintage, a division of Random House, Inc. All rights reserved.

Dr. Chen reported that she has no financial interests or relationships that pose a potential confict of interest with this article.

Correspondence: [email protected]

Article PDF
Article PDF

Anyone involved in transplantation has witnessed the Lazarean awakening of many of our patients. On the verge of dying, these patients receive a transplant then go home to their loved ones, to their communities, and to the rest of their life.

Transplantation has always straddled the border between life and death; it has always pushed the biological envelope.

But it has also always pushed the ethical envelope.

How? In forcing all of us, not just transplant surgeons, to reconsider some of our most fundamental ethical dilemmas:

  • What is death?
  • Can we extend life?
  • Whose life do we extend?
  • At what price the extension of life?
  • Just because we can extend life, should we?

And every one of these dilemmas is further complicated by another issue unique to transplantation. At stake in every transplant is not just the patient’s life, but three lives—the patient, the donor, and the person on the waiting list who likely died because the organ went to your patient, not her or him.

While we are not focusing today on organ donation or allocation, let us not forget that transplantation is unique in this regard. There are always three patients to consider.

What we will focus on today are transplant and post-transplant innovations. To help introduce the discussion, I would like to share a narrative that I believe illuminates ethical dilemmas that go hand-in-hand with transplantation’s innovations.

THE STORY OF MAX

Max was the tiny embodiment of a biological keystone cop. In utero he had developed a gaping defect of his abdominal wall. His intestines twisted around themselves, and the obstetricians had to deliver Max emergently. The pediatric surgeons immediately removed the gangrenous remnants of nearly his entire bowel.

At 10 months, Max received a liver and small bowel transplant. The transplanted organs worked initially; with a small feeding tube inserted directly into his gut, Max digested for the first time in his life tablespoons of food, albeit a chalky liquid supplement.

But Max, within 2 months of his transplant, had again become a permanent resident in the pediatric intensive care unit. Achieving the right balance of immunosuppression so Max could keep the transplanted organs and yet maintain sufficient immunity to fight off infection had become an impossible task.

I was in my fellowship at the time of Max’s transplant; and Eric, an attending surgeon with a square jaw and dark Dick Tracy looks, led the surgical team’s management of Max’s case.

As Max became sicker, Eric spent more hours with his tiny patient. I found him by Max’s bedside at 3:00 in the morning and then at 7:00 the next night, his hair, clothes, and personal aura in a state that reflected obliviousness to his own care. Just by being with Max so much, Eric knew all the particularities of that baby, all his idiosyncratic reactions, every significant lab result of Max’s entire life.

At first I found Eric’s dedication inspiring, almost thrilling in a martyred saint kind of way. And Max seemed to call out to any of us who hoped to be divinely touched. During rounds, Max giggled at me, as if he understood that playing with him was infinitely more interesting than arguing over doses of medication with other doctors. Spurred on by Max’s cause, I raced to uncover test results before Eric, as if my quicker response would translate into an equal or greater enthusiasm for Max’s plight. I nagged the radiology technicians to give me Max’s x-rays hot off the presses. I set the alarms on my beeper to see Max in the middle of the night and on mornings long before any member of the surgical team, particularly Eric, arrived.

Despite my enthusiastic attentions, Max became sicker. We gave Max higher doses of steroids, and his big, shiny black eyes turned into a pair of hyphens on the rolling swells of his face. His tiny body became engorged with fluid from repeated infections, and Max’s once buttery skin slowly became the ridiculously inadequate biological grounding for monitors and catheters. The nurses took to using the bed around him to clip wires and anchor dressings, and they hung mechanized pumps on tall IV poles which stood like skeletal beasts of burden crowded around Max’s bed.

Through all of Max’s crises, Eric never let up. But Max was going to die soon if we could not find the source of his infections. Eric finally decided to take Max to the operating room, worried about a hidden infection around his transplanted intestines. “We’ve got to take him back to the OR,” he said to us. Eric looked at us then asked rhetorically, “I mean, is there any other option?” We all understood what Eric was really asking. Were we doing enough? Was it our fault?

That trip to the OR would be the first of almost a dozen. Under searing heat lamps we snipped the sutures that held a plastic abdominal patch in place and uncovered the small cavity filled with congealed organs. We picked away at the block-like mass, terrified of inadvertently cutting a hole in his transplanted intestine and creating another source of infection. Then, finding nothing and too scared to cause any more damage, we whipstitched a piece of plastic back to the edge of Max’s abdominal wall. Over time, it became harder and harder to find untouched flesh where we could place a new stitch.

Over a month later Max died of a massive fungal infection. I mentioned his death to Jaimie, a pragmatic and brilliant head nurse who possessed more insight into our patients and hospital politics than most of the physicians.

“Maybe it was a good thing, huh?” Jaimie responded flatly. She walked out of the room and I could hear her asking aloud, “I mean, how much can you do to a person?”

THE EARLY TRANSPLANT ERA, DESPITE BLEAKER OUTCOMES, HAS LESSONS TO TEACH

I grew up, surgically speaking, at a time when transplant science fiction had become standard of care, when patients transplanted a decade or more earlier would routinely drop by clinic to say hello, and when patients on the brink of death could expect a full recovery.

But it was not always this way. And it took courageous individuals navigating the difficult relationship between innovation and ethics to get us here.

What is extraordinary about this panel is that these surgeons not only were at the forefront of transplantation’s history but also remain deeply involved in its future. Over the next hour roughly, they will give us an extraordinary look into the intersection of innovation and ethics in the past, present, and future of transplant surgery.

I hope you are eager as I am to hear what they have to share with us.

Anyone involved in transplantation has witnessed the Lazarean awakening of many of our patients. On the verge of dying, these patients receive a transplant then go home to their loved ones, to their communities, and to the rest of their life.

Transplantation has always straddled the border between life and death; it has always pushed the biological envelope.

But it has also always pushed the ethical envelope.

How? In forcing all of us, not just transplant surgeons, to reconsider some of our most fundamental ethical dilemmas:

  • What is death?
  • Can we extend life?
  • Whose life do we extend?
  • At what price the extension of life?
  • Just because we can extend life, should we?

And every one of these dilemmas is further complicated by another issue unique to transplantation. At stake in every transplant is not just the patient’s life, but three lives—the patient, the donor, and the person on the waiting list who likely died because the organ went to your patient, not her or him.

While we are not focusing today on organ donation or allocation, let us not forget that transplantation is unique in this regard. There are always three patients to consider.

What we will focus on today are transplant and post-transplant innovations. To help introduce the discussion, I would like to share a narrative that I believe illuminates ethical dilemmas that go hand-in-hand with transplantation’s innovations.

THE STORY OF MAX

Max was the tiny embodiment of a biological keystone cop. In utero he had developed a gaping defect of his abdominal wall. His intestines twisted around themselves, and the obstetricians had to deliver Max emergently. The pediatric surgeons immediately removed the gangrenous remnants of nearly his entire bowel.

At 10 months, Max received a liver and small bowel transplant. The transplanted organs worked initially; with a small feeding tube inserted directly into his gut, Max digested for the first time in his life tablespoons of food, albeit a chalky liquid supplement.

But Max, within 2 months of his transplant, had again become a permanent resident in the pediatric intensive care unit. Achieving the right balance of immunosuppression so Max could keep the transplanted organs and yet maintain sufficient immunity to fight off infection had become an impossible task.

I was in my fellowship at the time of Max’s transplant; and Eric, an attending surgeon with a square jaw and dark Dick Tracy looks, led the surgical team’s management of Max’s case.

As Max became sicker, Eric spent more hours with his tiny patient. I found him by Max’s bedside at 3:00 in the morning and then at 7:00 the next night, his hair, clothes, and personal aura in a state that reflected obliviousness to his own care. Just by being with Max so much, Eric knew all the particularities of that baby, all his idiosyncratic reactions, every significant lab result of Max’s entire life.

At first I found Eric’s dedication inspiring, almost thrilling in a martyred saint kind of way. And Max seemed to call out to any of us who hoped to be divinely touched. During rounds, Max giggled at me, as if he understood that playing with him was infinitely more interesting than arguing over doses of medication with other doctors. Spurred on by Max’s cause, I raced to uncover test results before Eric, as if my quicker response would translate into an equal or greater enthusiasm for Max’s plight. I nagged the radiology technicians to give me Max’s x-rays hot off the presses. I set the alarms on my beeper to see Max in the middle of the night and on mornings long before any member of the surgical team, particularly Eric, arrived.

Despite my enthusiastic attentions, Max became sicker. We gave Max higher doses of steroids, and his big, shiny black eyes turned into a pair of hyphens on the rolling swells of his face. His tiny body became engorged with fluid from repeated infections, and Max’s once buttery skin slowly became the ridiculously inadequate biological grounding for monitors and catheters. The nurses took to using the bed around him to clip wires and anchor dressings, and they hung mechanized pumps on tall IV poles which stood like skeletal beasts of burden crowded around Max’s bed.

Through all of Max’s crises, Eric never let up. But Max was going to die soon if we could not find the source of his infections. Eric finally decided to take Max to the operating room, worried about a hidden infection around his transplanted intestines. “We’ve got to take him back to the OR,” he said to us. Eric looked at us then asked rhetorically, “I mean, is there any other option?” We all understood what Eric was really asking. Were we doing enough? Was it our fault?

That trip to the OR would be the first of almost a dozen. Under searing heat lamps we snipped the sutures that held a plastic abdominal patch in place and uncovered the small cavity filled with congealed organs. We picked away at the block-like mass, terrified of inadvertently cutting a hole in his transplanted intestine and creating another source of infection. Then, finding nothing and too scared to cause any more damage, we whipstitched a piece of plastic back to the edge of Max’s abdominal wall. Over time, it became harder and harder to find untouched flesh where we could place a new stitch.

Over a month later Max died of a massive fungal infection. I mentioned his death to Jaimie, a pragmatic and brilliant head nurse who possessed more insight into our patients and hospital politics than most of the physicians.

“Maybe it was a good thing, huh?” Jaimie responded flatly. She walked out of the room and I could hear her asking aloud, “I mean, how much can you do to a person?”

THE EARLY TRANSPLANT ERA, DESPITE BLEAKER OUTCOMES, HAS LESSONS TO TEACH

I grew up, surgically speaking, at a time when transplant science fiction had become standard of care, when patients transplanted a decade or more earlier would routinely drop by clinic to say hello, and when patients on the brink of death could expect a full recovery.

But it was not always this way. And it took courageous individuals navigating the difficult relationship between innovation and ethics to get us here.

What is extraordinary about this panel is that these surgeons not only were at the forefront of transplantation’s history but also remain deeply involved in its future. Over the next hour roughly, they will give us an extraordinary look into the intersection of innovation and ethics in the past, present, and future of transplant surgery.

I hope you are eager as I am to hear what they have to share with us.

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Transplant innovation and ethical challenges: What have we learned?

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Transplant innovation and ethical challenges: What have we learned?
A collection of perspectives and panel discussion

We have come far, but selecting organ recipients remains an ethical minefield

By Denton A. Cooley, MD

Only 40 years ago, on December 3, 1967, the world was electrified by news of the first cardiac transplantation, performed in Cape Town, South Africa, by the renowned Dr. Christiaan Barnard.

We have progressed considerably since that time, but not all issues have been settled. After several attempts by Dr. Norman Shumway and by Dr. Adrian Kantrowitz in this country, we in Houston performed the first successful cardiac transplantation in the United States in April 1968. Initially we were impressed with the results, and we embarked upon a very active cardiac transplant program, performing as many as had been done in total around the world. But after we had done some 15 or 20 cardiac transplants, the discouraging news began to emerge that the patients were not surviving long: our longest survived for only 2 years.

As a result, our group in Houston, like others, declared a moratorium on cardiac transplantation. The only group that continued throughout this era was at Stanford University under Shumway, who had some success with immunosuppressive drugs. In the early 1980s, a new immunosuppressant, cyclosporine, appeared that was used for kidney transplantation, which reinvigorated us and others to use this drug for cardiac transplantation. Since then, under the direction of my colleague, Dr. Bud Frazier, we have performed more than 1,000 cardiac transplantations at the Texas Heart Institute.

From the beginning, we were called upon to identify appropriate donors and suitable recipients. Although we rely on certain objective factors, such as age, weight, body size, gender, and blood type, many other issues must also be considered. Fortunately, the modern concept of brain death has now been accepted not only by the public and ethicists, but also by the legal community; in contrast, at one time it was considered homicidal to remove a beating heart. I credit Christiaan Barnard with having the courage to remove a beating heart from a 26-year-old donor who had suffered irreversible brain damage. Many of us had wanted to get into the transplant program but we could not identify a donor.

The following case illustrates some of the other ethical complexities that we continue to struggle with today.

CASE STUDY: A 17-YEAR-OLD WITH HEART FAILURE AND A DESTRUCTIVE LIFESTYLE

Several years ago, a 17-year-old Latin American boy came to our clinic in heart failure. He was very disarming, but when we looked into his background we found that he had dropped out of high school after 1 year and was living with a girlfriend who was 2 months pregnant by him and already had a 2-year-old child. The patient’s cardiomyopathy was related to cocaine and alcohol abuse. Nevertheless, his stepfather was eligible for Texas Medicaid, and he was accepted for cardiac transplantation.

After the transplantation, he abided by the immunosuppressive drug regimen while he was under our care. Then he moved to Fort Wayne, Indiana, where Indiana Medicaid would not honor his Texas Medicaid coverage. So our hospital had to send him his immunosuppressive drugs, which he used rather sporadically.

While in Indiana, he was incarcerated for assault and battery on his girlfriend. He began to have heart failure but did not qualify to have the biopsies required for proper study of rejection of his heart. He returned to our clinic and was scheduled for catheterization the next day when he went into acute cardiac failure. He had emergency late-night implantation of a percutaneous ventricular assist device, which required catheterizing the left atrium by perforating the interatrial septum, taking the oxygenated blood out of the left atrium, and pumping it back into the aorta with a centrifugal pump. His heart began to recover, and the device was removed after 72 hours.

At this point he needed another transplantation. Our medical review board considered his eligibility and turned him down, citing that others on our waiting list were more deserving of a transplant and that retransplantation has a poorer success rate than initial transplantation.

EACH CASE POSES PROBLEMS, BUT A RECORD OF SUCCESS EMERGES

Although this patient could be viewed as a sort of sociopath, he nevertheless is a young man who is incapacitated and in need of heroic measures. His case illustrates the kind of nonmedical problems that face those of us who are actively involved in cardiac transplantation. It can be very difficult to find solutions to the myriad social, economic, legal, and ethical issues.

We perform about 50 transplants a year in our institution, and every one of them has some issue. Nevertheless, we just honored 25 patients who have survived more than 20 years with cardiac transplantation.

 

 

Despite the odds, the transplant field has progressed rapidly

By John J. Fung, MD, PhD

Dr. Pauline Chen’s clinical vignette [see previous article in this supplement] unfortunately still typifies small bowel transplantation. One would not expect to hear that kind of story today for a kidney or liver transplant, but in the early 1970s it was typical.

‘WHY WOULD ANY YOUNG PHYSICIAN WANT TO GET INVOLVED IN THIS?’ 

Dr. Cooley’s comments about the moratorium on cardiac transplantation brought back memories for me, particularly from when I was studying liver transplantation in the 1970s. There was almost uniform mortality in transplants performed in the late 1960s and early ’70s. One wonders why any young physician would have wanted to get involved in transplantation at that time. I was a fellow training with Dr. Thomas Starzl at the University of Pittsburgh and remember him saying, “Just make it work, then let everybody else figure out why.” I think that typifies the surgical mentality.

We perform transplantations because we know that the alternative is prolonged morbidity and death. Knowing that we can provide a touch of hope is why we move forward in this field.

The technology of transplantation has developed through aggressive scientific developments in the laboratory. It is fascinating that all this has developed in only 50 years. If we had proceeded in a very stepwise manner, we probably would not be even a tenth as far along in the field as we are now.

Heart, lung, liver, and kidney transplantation are now all pretty routine. Intestinal transplantation is in the developing phase. The Cleveland Clinic is currently involved in facial transplantation, which has some different ethical issues related to identity.

Everything in transplantation relates to ethics, from issues about using marginal donor grafts or using beating-heart donors when someone has not been declared brain dead, to issues in patient selection, which often depends on social, economic (ie, insurance coverage), and psychosocial factors such as substance abuse and nonadherence issues.

ETHICAL INSIGHTS FROM TRANSPLANTS IN HIV-POSITIVE PATIENTS

An ethical area of particular interest to me that the Cleveland Clinic has also been involved with is transplanting patients who are HIV-positive. This has always been an enigma: why would we want to transplant an HIV-positive patient? Before the advent of antiviral therapies for HIV in the mid-1990s, mortality rates were very high, with patients suffering miserable deaths from Kaposi sarcoma, the JC virus leukoencephalopathies, and other debilitating opportunistic infections.

When I first arrived at the University of Pittsburgh as a fellow, Dr. Starzl was telling us about this mystery virus disease; when they retrospectively analyzed specimens from organ recipients and donors, they realized that HIV was being transmitted to patients from donors as well as from blood transfusions. The exposure to health care providers was also substantial: an average of 20 to 30 units of blood was used for a liver transplant.

Patients who were HIV-positive were excluded from transplants even through the mid-1990s. I remember evaluating standard listing criteria for transplant recipients at a conference and hearing transplant surgeons say that HIV is an absolute contraindication to transplant. I said, “Wait a minute, this is 1997; you cannot say that. Given that attitude, patients with HIV will never be transplanted.” The New England Journal of Medicine had just published a major paper about the extent of survival in patients being treated with highly active antiretroviral therapy.

So we then started a prospective study of transplantation in HIV-positive patients, and long-term follow-up has shown that these patients can do very well. Interestingly, transplantation offers a new approach to treating HIV-positive patients, in terms of immune reconstitution and the ability of immunosuppressive agents to restore immune competency by preventing the T-cell apoptosis initiated by HIV infection.

 

 

A continued need for evidence-based guidance

By James B. Young, MD

Speaking as the lone internist on this panel, and also as a clinical trialist and evidence-based clinical practitioner, the greatest ethical challenge I see for transplantation is how to move the field forward in terms of garnering evidence that can help us treat patients and keep them alive. Nobody will deny that heart transplantation is life-saving therapy: my patients with end-stage ischemic cardiomyopathy can be dramatically transformed by a heart transplant after being near death. The questions now are how best to gain the data to guide the next round of innovations in transplant medicine and how to know when the time is right to attempt those innovations.

A HISTORICAL GLANCE AT HEART TRANSPLANTATION

Dr. Sharon Hunt, who was one of the first heart transplant cardiologists and worked with Dr. Norman Shumway, almost singlehandedly moved the field of cardiac transplantation forward. She recently chronicled its history,1 and this sort of historical review yields a couple of insights. First, fewer heart transplants are being done in the United States in this decade than in the 1990s,2 in large part because other effective interventions for heart failure have been developed. However, the number of heart transplants is in fact on the rise again.2 Second, survival rates in heart transplant have improved substantially in recent years compared with earlier eras, as documented by registry data from the International Society for Heart and Lung Transplantation.3

Among other things, we have learned how to improve the operation, better choose and preserve hearts, and better match hearts to recipients. We now can use hearts from older donors and allow older patients to undergo transplantation. One of the keys to the better survival rates is a dramatic change in the use of medications. Cyclosporine allowed for successful heart transplantation in the 1980s, and we have since seen the advent of agents such as tacrolimus, rapamycin, and mycophenolate mofetil. We rely less on the early immunosuppressants, such as prednisone and azathioprine.

Despite these successes from a survival standpoint, problems still need to be addressed. For instance, at 5 years, virtually every patient following a heart transplant develops hypertension and dyslipidemia, 1 in 3 has renal dysfunction (some requiring dialysis or transplant), 1 in 3 has diabetes, and some develop a strange allograft arteriopathy.3

THE CHALLENGE OF EVALUATING A BOUTIQUE SCIENCE

Heart transplantation is a bit of a boutique science. Although relatively few heart transplants are performed compared with liver or kidney transplants, heart transplantation is a dramatic operation limited by many ethical challenges surrounding organ donor supply and utilization.

As for any boutique science, questions arise about how to evaluate it with the rigor of regulatory authority—from both the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) perspective and the institutional review board (IRB) perspective—without large clinical trials. Suppose that Dr. Cooley wants to make a minor modification in his immunosuppressive protocol because of an observation of a high incidence of renal failure at the 5-year point; does that ethically demand a large randomized clinical trial?

How can we design clinical trials to help determine which direction to take in immunosuppression intensification or utilization protocols? Other challenges include evaluating outcomes (such as coronary artery vasculopathy) from databases, and then figuring out good and bad practices. For example, databases show us that a donor history of diabetes increases the recipient’s long-term risk of developing coronary artery vasculopathy.3 Receiving a heart from a male donor also increases risk.3 Better understanding the panoply of adverse events and what leads to better outcomes will give us a sense of how to proceed and can drive the design of clinical trials.

OTHER ETHICAL CHALLENGES

From an ethical standpoint, how do we change practice? We have data on outcomes at 5, 10, and even 20 years. The half-life of a heart transplanted today is 12.5 years, whereas it used to be about 7 years.3 Although it is clear that we have made progress, it is a challenge to determine exactly how to make subtle changes in practice, such as addressing polypharmacy post-transplant.

Developing schemes that enable major innovation, particularly through coordination among medical and surgical teams, is another challenge. For example, we are working with preservation techniques that use a beating heart for transplantation. From solid evidence based on animal models, we believe this preparation can allow preservation of a heart for up to 12 hours. To some, that may beg a number of questions: Why do we need to do a clinical trial in humans? Why does the FDA need to regulate us? Why do we even need to answer to an IRB? Why not just make the change to alleviate the problem of donor organ supply?

Figure 1. Flow chart of evidence-based medical practice. The drive for new knowledge is circuitous, beginning with clinical experience and observation and ultimately feeding back into clinical practice and further research prompted by new experience.
My perspective is that I believe in evidence-based medicine and in clinical trials. I believe we should try to ethically move the field forward by taking a clinical experience or an observation and moving it through all the necessary elements of evaluation and treatment strategy development (Figure 1) to drive knowledge. I believe this applies to post-heart transplant patients as much as it does to patients with conditions such as heart failure or ischemic heart disease.

 

 

What does—and does not—spur innovation?

By Thomas E. Starzl, MD, PhD

LESSONS FROM THE CODMAN ANALYSIS OF FAILURES

Dr. Ernest Codman was a Harvard Medical School professor in the early 20th century who tried to introduce a system of analyzing failures at Massachusetts General Hospital and other Harvard-affiliated hospitals. As a result, he was metaphorically ridden out of town on a rail.

Codman recommended that complications and failures be classified as one of the following:

  • An error in diagnosis
  • An error in judgment
  • An error in technique (if a surgical or a medicalproblem)
  • An error in management.

Only one escape hatch existed that did not indictthe surgical or medical team as culpable: the disease. At the time, nothing could be done for many diseases, including cancer, heart disease, renal failure, and bowel insufficiency.

This is a type of analysis that can be brought to a mortality and morbidity conference and will not accept a lot of alibis; it forces the group to always look at what could have been done to prevent a complication or death. Some practitioners always want to blame some factor other than themselves: sometimes the patient, by being deemed noncompliant, is even held responsible for his or her own complication or death.

I think the Codman analysis of failures is a good starting point for discussing innovations, especially since true breakthroughs come in those cases where the failure falls into the category of being caused by the disease itself, not by a medical or surgical error. And that is surely where transplantation falls.

PROGRESS DOES NOT ALWAYS REQUIRE FULL UNDERSTANDING

Transplantation was first successfully performed in the context of breaking through the donor-recipient genetic barrier on January 6, 1959, when Joseph Murray and his team at the the Brigham Hospital performed a kidney transplant using the patient’s fraternal twin as a donor. This event was reproduced in Paris by Jean Hamburger and his team on June 14, 1959, and then on three or four other occasions in the next several years in patients who received sublethal total body irradiation. This was at a time when no pharmacological immunosuppression was available, so no follow-up treatment was offered.

Astoundingly, the first case—the fraternal twin— lived for more than 20 years, and the French case for 25 years, without ever being treated with immunosuppression. They were inexplicably tolerant. When immunosuppressive drugs were developed and survival rates improved, the questions around these early cases were never answered: Why did those transplantations work? What were the mechanisms of engraftment? What was the relationship of engraftment to tolerance? Without answering those questions, there was no way to make other big leaps in improvement of what was already proved in principle—that is, the feasibility of actually doing this kind of treatment. Improvements in patient and graft survival were dependent almost entirely on better drugs.

RANDOMIZED TRIALS HAVE A DUBIOUS RECORD IN TRANSPLANTATION

I know this will offend just about everyone here, but I have no confidence in evidence-based therapy if we are talking about randomized trials. None of the great advances in transplantation has had anything to do with randomized trials. In my opinion, randomized trials in transplantation have done nothing but confuse the issue and have very nearly made it impossible for the better immunosuppressants to be brought on board. Cyclosporine offered a tremendous step forward, but the randomized trials, carried out mostly in Europe, did not reveal much difference in outcome from treatment with azathioprine, at least as assessed by patient and graft survival. The same thing occurred when tacrolimus emerged; randomized multicenter trials actually delayed the widespread use of this superior drug for at least half a dozen years.

IN THE BIG PICTURE, MONEY IS HOBBLING INNOVATION

Earlier it was debated whether money drives everything. I do not believe that money drives everything in medicine in Europe, and it certainly has little to do with driving improvements in Asia. But money does drive everything in the United States, although the real question is whether it has to be that way.

I believe that innovation is somehow built within our genome. Many of the great advances in transplantation, the elucidation of principles, and the relatively recent discovery of the mechanisms of alloengraftment were achieved without grant support. The researchers involved could not have asked for National Institutes of Health funding because their ideas were so far out of the box that they probably would have been rejected or stolen.

I wonder to what extent the vast amount of money available for research is actually a disincentive for genuine advancements. Part of the problem is that the power of allocation is put in the hands of anonymous peer-review committees. That system generates droves of people to pursue money allocated to a certain area to learn more and more about less and less, in the vague hope that acquiring enough details will result in a realistic concept. Sometimes the picture simply becomes more confused.

Another problem is that we have produced far more scientists than jobs, so that funding becomes the first priority because it is the only means of employment. In earlier days, what drove people more often was that they were confronted with a child who was dying and the central questions was, “How can I treat this patient?” They did laboratory research on their own to produce evidence that a new innovative idea could work. I believe that if you have experiments that show that you can keep a heart beating on a preservation device for 12 hours, and you can put it in a dog and it works well, that is the evidence you need to proceed. How are you going to do a randomized trial—hang on to an organ and let it beat for 12 hours just so it conforms with some protocol? That is nonsense.

There was a period when clinical journals—Surgery of Gynecology and Obstetrics, Annals of Surgery, Annals of Internal Medicine, New England Journal of Medicine, and others—published front-running discoveries. That ended about 25 years ago when it became more important to learn about details. The journals then became superfluous, and for another reason as well: money drove the wheel more and more. Hospital and program administrators expected the publications to be advertisements, and the minute that articles started promoting something rather than reporting facts, they lost value. Today the impact factors of the surgical journals are at about 2 or 3, meaning that their articles are cited infrequently and have little real influence on the practice of medicine.

How did we reach this point where money drives everything? I think the page was turned in the very early 1990s, and it had to do with how medical practice is governed, especially in academic hospitals. Half of the health care in this country is now provided by hospitals that are associated with medical schools. Those hospitals and basic research laboratories are where our young people will assimilate their ideals. If that climate is not right, then we are raising the wrong kind of doctors.

Earlier researchers looked at a problem and thought, “Here’s a question that has to do with this patient before my eyes, and I must find some way to solve it. Let’s go to the laboratory.” Today there is a real danger that they are thinking, “I need to advance my career, so let’s see how I can get some money. A little research will be a stepping stone to my professional development.” Our discussion of medical and surgical ethics today should take place within this framework.

 

 

Panel discussion

Moderated by Mark Siegler, MD

WERE FINANCES A DRIVER OF EARLY TRANSPLANT INNOVATION?

Dr. Mark Siegler: It is clear that there are more ethical and less ethical ways to introduce innovations. I am reminded of an article in JAMA by Francis Moore in the late 1980s in which he warned that one of the things to look at for any new innovation was the ethical climate of the institution.4 He cautioned us to be very aware of the driving force behind an innovation. Is it to improve patient care? To save lives that otherwise would be lost? Or is it primarily for the self-aggrandizement of an investigator or the financial goals of an institution?

I also remember the chapter in Dr. Starzl’s book The Puzzle People5 about the anguish involved in introducing liver transplantation. It seems that financial considerations were not the driver of major steps forward in introducing liver transplantation, in Dr. Starzl’s case, or heart transplantation, in Dr. Cooley’s case. Would you comment?

Dr. Thomas Starzl: Actually, not only were we not driven by economic gain, we expected fi nancial penalty for focusing on transplantation. If ever there was a field that developed against the grain, that was costly to people who worked in it, whose engagement meant that for most of their career they would work for substandard income compared with their peers—even those peers in academic medicine, let alone those in private practice—it would be transplantation.

It was not until 1973, when the end-stage renal disease (ESRD) program began under Medicare, that cash for transplantation started to become available. The real cash streams did not start until the middle to late 1980s when nonrenal organs became the cash cows. To be fair, no new technology can be assimilated into the health care system unless it at least pays for itself. But you can go beyond that and create baronial kingdoms, and I think that is where you can go wrong.

Dr. Denton Cooley: I would add that those of us privileged to spend our entire career in academic settings have an opportunity that others may not have. A lot of brilliant people in private practice are capable of doing many things but do not have an institution to represent and protect them. I have also always felt that those of us in these positions have an obligation to become innovators. Surgeons who merely see how many appendectomies or cholecystectomies they can perform are being very derelict of their responsibility to the institution.

MEASURING SUCCESS IN HEART TRANSPLANTATION

Dr. Siegler: Dr. Cooley, what is the current success rate for heart transplants?

Dr. Cooley: Nationwide, around 90% of recipients survive 12 months. Of those, maybe half are still alive 5 years later. Of course, we do not know what the future will hold. It is interesting that the fi rst sign of rejection seems to be coronary occlusive disease. It is a different type of coronary occlusive disease than is seen in atherosclerosis: it is diffuse, involving the entire extent of the coronary circulation, and is not really amenable to coronary bypass or other interventional procedures.

Dr. Siegler: We are now at about the 40th anniversary of the first human heart transplants, an extraordinary and historic innovation. Dr. Cooley, do you think the timing was right in 1968 when you did the fi rst heart transplant in the United States? In retrospect, would you have done the first transplant sooner or maybe even a couple of years later?

Dr. Cooley: You can argue it both ways. Should we have waited for further developments? At the time, heart transplantation seemed to work fairly well in animals, but we never really know until it reaches the clinical level. It was probably as opportune a time as any. We knew something about organ rejection at the time, and we had immunosuppressive drugs, although they were not as effective as they are today. The news electrified the world. I think we were pretty well prepared for this spectacular event.

Dr. Siegler: When would have been the optimal time to do a clinical trial in order to achieve evidence-based medicine in heart transplantation? Would it have been during the big breakthroughs of Shumway, Barnard, and Cooley, or now, when we have the general strategy and can find out how we can do better?

Dr. James Young: I would not have done a randomized trial at that time. The patients who were getting transplanted then were nearly dead; all other management was futile. In 1970, Life magazine listed the 102 heart transplants that had been done around the world up to that point, and maybe only 2 or 3 of the patients were still alive. That prompted the moratorium that Dr. Cooley referred to.

As ethical clinicians, we are supposed to do our best to make our patients feel better and make them live longer. Sometimes you have to do something radical. On that basis, one can argue that we should not transplant “the walking wounded,” that instead we should save organs for patients who are truly terminal without some sort of ventricular replacement therapy. But today we are getting away from transplanting only dying patients, so we need randomized trials to find out how we are doing in transplanting outpatients. That is the setting in which trials are now needed.

THE ETHICS OF ‘LETTING GO’

Question from audience: Dr. Chen’s story [see previous article] raised the issue of the ethics of “letting go” of one’s patient. I wonder if in transplantation, especially when innovative procedures are involved, a commitment to the procedure itself might sometimes conflict with the need to let go of the patient.

Dr. John Fung: In the United States, we measure efficacy and benefits in different ways than people do in other parts of the world. Here, for a child with a biliary atresia—the most common reason for liver transplantation—we expend hundreds of thousands of dollars for a liver transplant, which is usually able to save the child’s life. But in China, a severely ill child is viewed as a medical and economic liability and will be allowed to die so the family can have another child.

It is also not only the ethics of letting go. We all deal with letting go, not just in transplant medicine. It is also the ethics of actually getting a patient into the system. In the case of transplanting a newborn, as in Dr. Chen’s narrative, should they even have embarked on that?

Dr. Pauline Chen: For me, the story illustrates the remarkable connection and profound attachment between a surgeon and his or her patient. The fact that three patients are really involved in transplantation—the donor, the recipient, and the patient still on the waiting list because the organ went to the recipient instead—also motivates the team with a sense of obligation to the two unseen patients.

If there is a lesson about the ethics of letting go, I think it is that we often fail to talk about these issues among ourselves. Perhaps if we had discussed end-of-life care or palliative care in Max’s case, we might have had more insight into the pressures we felt in considering the lives of three separate people. And those discussions might have—or might not have— changed the situation.

Dr. Starzl: I agree completely with the preceding comments. All kinds of motivations might cause a surgeon to cling too long—the ones that were mentioned as well as some ignoble ones, such as vanity, in terms of looking at one’s survival numbers.

I would also like to take a much larger view. Some years ago in Colorado, the governor at the time, Richard Lamm, thought that intensive care units (ICUs) were harmful—that they were economically draining, did not serve society, and prolonged suffering. My position, which was really the opposite, was that maybe he was right in his philosophy but transplantation had, in a sense, changed all that. Transplantation took desperate people who were in the ICU, with no chance of coming out, and dramatically returned them to wonderful health.

As procedures get better, this scenario happens more and more often. I agree that there is a time when you realize that no intervention will work and you should stop treatment. That is a bitter pill. But it is very hard to define when that moment occurs.

Dr. Chen: There also may be somewhat of a generational difference in approach.

Most surgeons will fully acknowledge that they stand on the shoulders of giants, and that holds particularly true in a field like transplantation. When I was training in liver transplantation, for example, 80% to 90% of the patients could fully expect to survive 5 years. For my vintage of surgeons, then, death and failure were rarities and they were truly a sort of enemy, whereas surgeons like Dr. Starzl and Dr. Cooley have seen so much more and are far more used to all the variations of outcomes. Because of that breadth of experience that you have, I think you are wiser than my generation of surgeons, for whom death often has to be ablated at all costs. I think it follows, then, that you would also have a better sense of when to stop.

Dr. Starzl: There is a generational change—there is no doubt about it.

IS TRANSPLANT ETHICAL WHEN A LIFE IS NOT AT STAKE?

Question from audience: What are the ethical implications of non-lifesaving transplants, specifically of the hand and face?

Dr. Young: I have been on many peer-review committees charged with looking at this issue. Although the ethics can be very troubling, I have resolved important questions in my mind by examining them through the context of human suffering. Our mission as physicians and caregivers is to relieve suffering, which can take the form of pain, a shortened lifespan, or even a debilitating disfigurement of the face or a severe limitation, such as after traumatic amputation. Looking at the issue this way, I am less troubled than I was initially, when I viewed these kinds of transplantations as simply altering physical appearance or extending ability.

Dr. Starzl: The next big movement in transplantation is going to be in composite tissue allotransplantation—that is, transplantation of the face, limbs, etc. Mechanisms of alloengraftment have recently been uncovered such that it is now possible to formulate protocols that use either very light immunosuppression (avoiding the 20% or 25% rate of renal failure at 5 years that we heard about from Dr. Young) or no immunosuppression at all.6 Without the heavy burden of immunosuppression, this type of transplantation can become worthwhile. Putting a new hand or face on someone is astounding: it changes the morphology of the brain, which can be observed with functional magnetic resonance imaging. It changes the soul, if that is what you want to think of when talking about the brain. I think it will be very important.

Dr. Siegler: This extraordinary panel has not only discussed events from 50 years ago; each of the panelists spoke of a future that is rich in promise and innovation—and in ethical issues. It reminds me of a remarkable letter written in 1794 by Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, which says, “We should never return to earlier times when all scientific progress was proscribed as innovation.” More than 200 years later, Jefferson’s insight remains modern and relevant.

References
  1. Hunt SA. Taking heart—cardiac transplantation past, present, and future. N Engl J Med 2006; 355:231–235.
  2. Heart and Lung Transplantation in the United States, 1997-2006(Chapter VI). In: 2007 Annual Report of the U.S. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network and the Scientific Registry of Transplant Data 1997-2006. Health Resources and Services Administration, Healthcare Systems Bureau, Division of Transplantation, Rockville, MD. Available at: http://www.ustransplant.org/annual_reports/current. Accessed July 22, 2008.
  3. Taylor DO, Edwards LB, Boucek MM, et al. Registry of the International Society for Heart and Lung Transplantation: twenty-second official adult heart transplant report—2005. J Heart Lung Transplant 2005; 24:945–955.
  4. Moore FD. The desperate case: CARE (costs, applicability, research, ethics). JAMA 1989; 261:1483–1484.
  5. Starzl TE. The Puzzle People: Memoirs of a Transplant Surgeon.Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press; 1992.
  6. Starzl TE. Immunosuppressive therapy and tolerance of organ allografts. N Engl J Med 2008; 358:407–411.
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Author and Disclosure Information

Denton A. Cooley, MD
Founder, President, and Surgeon-in-Chief, Texas Heart Institute, St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, Houston, TX

John J. Fung, MD, PhD
Chairman, Departments of General Surgery and Hepato-pancreatic-biliary Surgery; and Director, Transplantation Center, Cleveland Clinic

James B. Young, MD
Chairman, Endocrinology and Metabolism Institute; Director, Kaufman Center for Heart Failure; and Chairman, Academic Department of Medicine, Cleveland Clinic

Thomas E. Starzl, MD, PhD
Distinguished Service Professor of Surgery, University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, and Director Emeritus, Thomas E. Starzl Transplantation Institute, Pittsburgh, PA

Mark Siegler, MD
Lindy Bergman Distinguished Service Professor of Medicine and Surgery; Director, MacLean Center for Clinical Medical Ethics, University of Chicago, IL

Pauline W. Chen, MD
Bestselling author of Final Exam: A Surgeon’s Refections on Mortality (Vintage 2008) and a transplant surgeon most recently on faculty in the Division of Liver and Pancreas Transplantation, University of California, Los Angeles.

All authors reported that they have no financial interests or relationships that pose a potential conflict of interest with this article.

This article was developed from an audio transcript of the panelists’ presentations and a panel discussion. The transcript was edited by the Cleveland Clinic Journal of Medicine staff for clarity and conciseness, and was then reviewed and revised/approved by each of the panelists and the moderator.

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Author and Disclosure Information

Denton A. Cooley, MD
Founder, President, and Surgeon-in-Chief, Texas Heart Institute, St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, Houston, TX

John J. Fung, MD, PhD
Chairman, Departments of General Surgery and Hepato-pancreatic-biliary Surgery; and Director, Transplantation Center, Cleveland Clinic

James B. Young, MD
Chairman, Endocrinology and Metabolism Institute; Director, Kaufman Center for Heart Failure; and Chairman, Academic Department of Medicine, Cleveland Clinic

Thomas E. Starzl, MD, PhD
Distinguished Service Professor of Surgery, University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, and Director Emeritus, Thomas E. Starzl Transplantation Institute, Pittsburgh, PA

Mark Siegler, MD
Lindy Bergman Distinguished Service Professor of Medicine and Surgery; Director, MacLean Center for Clinical Medical Ethics, University of Chicago, IL

Pauline W. Chen, MD
Bestselling author of Final Exam: A Surgeon’s Refections on Mortality (Vintage 2008) and a transplant surgeon most recently on faculty in the Division of Liver and Pancreas Transplantation, University of California, Los Angeles.

All authors reported that they have no financial interests or relationships that pose a potential conflict of interest with this article.

This article was developed from an audio transcript of the panelists’ presentations and a panel discussion. The transcript was edited by the Cleveland Clinic Journal of Medicine staff for clarity and conciseness, and was then reviewed and revised/approved by each of the panelists and the moderator.

Author and Disclosure Information

Denton A. Cooley, MD
Founder, President, and Surgeon-in-Chief, Texas Heart Institute, St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, Houston, TX

John J. Fung, MD, PhD
Chairman, Departments of General Surgery and Hepato-pancreatic-biliary Surgery; and Director, Transplantation Center, Cleveland Clinic

James B. Young, MD
Chairman, Endocrinology and Metabolism Institute; Director, Kaufman Center for Heart Failure; and Chairman, Academic Department of Medicine, Cleveland Clinic

Thomas E. Starzl, MD, PhD
Distinguished Service Professor of Surgery, University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, and Director Emeritus, Thomas E. Starzl Transplantation Institute, Pittsburgh, PA

Mark Siegler, MD
Lindy Bergman Distinguished Service Professor of Medicine and Surgery; Director, MacLean Center for Clinical Medical Ethics, University of Chicago, IL

Pauline W. Chen, MD
Bestselling author of Final Exam: A Surgeon’s Refections on Mortality (Vintage 2008) and a transplant surgeon most recently on faculty in the Division of Liver and Pancreas Transplantation, University of California, Los Angeles.

All authors reported that they have no financial interests or relationships that pose a potential conflict of interest with this article.

This article was developed from an audio transcript of the panelists’ presentations and a panel discussion. The transcript was edited by the Cleveland Clinic Journal of Medicine staff for clarity and conciseness, and was then reviewed and revised/approved by each of the panelists and the moderator.

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A collection of perspectives and panel discussion
A collection of perspectives and panel discussion

We have come far, but selecting organ recipients remains an ethical minefield

By Denton A. Cooley, MD

Only 40 years ago, on December 3, 1967, the world was electrified by news of the first cardiac transplantation, performed in Cape Town, South Africa, by the renowned Dr. Christiaan Barnard.

We have progressed considerably since that time, but not all issues have been settled. After several attempts by Dr. Norman Shumway and by Dr. Adrian Kantrowitz in this country, we in Houston performed the first successful cardiac transplantation in the United States in April 1968. Initially we were impressed with the results, and we embarked upon a very active cardiac transplant program, performing as many as had been done in total around the world. But after we had done some 15 or 20 cardiac transplants, the discouraging news began to emerge that the patients were not surviving long: our longest survived for only 2 years.

As a result, our group in Houston, like others, declared a moratorium on cardiac transplantation. The only group that continued throughout this era was at Stanford University under Shumway, who had some success with immunosuppressive drugs. In the early 1980s, a new immunosuppressant, cyclosporine, appeared that was used for kidney transplantation, which reinvigorated us and others to use this drug for cardiac transplantation. Since then, under the direction of my colleague, Dr. Bud Frazier, we have performed more than 1,000 cardiac transplantations at the Texas Heart Institute.

From the beginning, we were called upon to identify appropriate donors and suitable recipients. Although we rely on certain objective factors, such as age, weight, body size, gender, and blood type, many other issues must also be considered. Fortunately, the modern concept of brain death has now been accepted not only by the public and ethicists, but also by the legal community; in contrast, at one time it was considered homicidal to remove a beating heart. I credit Christiaan Barnard with having the courage to remove a beating heart from a 26-year-old donor who had suffered irreversible brain damage. Many of us had wanted to get into the transplant program but we could not identify a donor.

The following case illustrates some of the other ethical complexities that we continue to struggle with today.

CASE STUDY: A 17-YEAR-OLD WITH HEART FAILURE AND A DESTRUCTIVE LIFESTYLE

Several years ago, a 17-year-old Latin American boy came to our clinic in heart failure. He was very disarming, but when we looked into his background we found that he had dropped out of high school after 1 year and was living with a girlfriend who was 2 months pregnant by him and already had a 2-year-old child. The patient’s cardiomyopathy was related to cocaine and alcohol abuse. Nevertheless, his stepfather was eligible for Texas Medicaid, and he was accepted for cardiac transplantation.

After the transplantation, he abided by the immunosuppressive drug regimen while he was under our care. Then he moved to Fort Wayne, Indiana, where Indiana Medicaid would not honor his Texas Medicaid coverage. So our hospital had to send him his immunosuppressive drugs, which he used rather sporadically.

While in Indiana, he was incarcerated for assault and battery on his girlfriend. He began to have heart failure but did not qualify to have the biopsies required for proper study of rejection of his heart. He returned to our clinic and was scheduled for catheterization the next day when he went into acute cardiac failure. He had emergency late-night implantation of a percutaneous ventricular assist device, which required catheterizing the left atrium by perforating the interatrial septum, taking the oxygenated blood out of the left atrium, and pumping it back into the aorta with a centrifugal pump. His heart began to recover, and the device was removed after 72 hours.

At this point he needed another transplantation. Our medical review board considered his eligibility and turned him down, citing that others on our waiting list were more deserving of a transplant and that retransplantation has a poorer success rate than initial transplantation.

EACH CASE POSES PROBLEMS, BUT A RECORD OF SUCCESS EMERGES

Although this patient could be viewed as a sort of sociopath, he nevertheless is a young man who is incapacitated and in need of heroic measures. His case illustrates the kind of nonmedical problems that face those of us who are actively involved in cardiac transplantation. It can be very difficult to find solutions to the myriad social, economic, legal, and ethical issues.

We perform about 50 transplants a year in our institution, and every one of them has some issue. Nevertheless, we just honored 25 patients who have survived more than 20 years with cardiac transplantation.

 

 

Despite the odds, the transplant field has progressed rapidly

By John J. Fung, MD, PhD

Dr. Pauline Chen’s clinical vignette [see previous article in this supplement] unfortunately still typifies small bowel transplantation. One would not expect to hear that kind of story today for a kidney or liver transplant, but in the early 1970s it was typical.

‘WHY WOULD ANY YOUNG PHYSICIAN WANT TO GET INVOLVED IN THIS?’ 

Dr. Cooley’s comments about the moratorium on cardiac transplantation brought back memories for me, particularly from when I was studying liver transplantation in the 1970s. There was almost uniform mortality in transplants performed in the late 1960s and early ’70s. One wonders why any young physician would have wanted to get involved in transplantation at that time. I was a fellow training with Dr. Thomas Starzl at the University of Pittsburgh and remember him saying, “Just make it work, then let everybody else figure out why.” I think that typifies the surgical mentality.

We perform transplantations because we know that the alternative is prolonged morbidity and death. Knowing that we can provide a touch of hope is why we move forward in this field.

The technology of transplantation has developed through aggressive scientific developments in the laboratory. It is fascinating that all this has developed in only 50 years. If we had proceeded in a very stepwise manner, we probably would not be even a tenth as far along in the field as we are now.

Heart, lung, liver, and kidney transplantation are now all pretty routine. Intestinal transplantation is in the developing phase. The Cleveland Clinic is currently involved in facial transplantation, which has some different ethical issues related to identity.

Everything in transplantation relates to ethics, from issues about using marginal donor grafts or using beating-heart donors when someone has not been declared brain dead, to issues in patient selection, which often depends on social, economic (ie, insurance coverage), and psychosocial factors such as substance abuse and nonadherence issues.

ETHICAL INSIGHTS FROM TRANSPLANTS IN HIV-POSITIVE PATIENTS

An ethical area of particular interest to me that the Cleveland Clinic has also been involved with is transplanting patients who are HIV-positive. This has always been an enigma: why would we want to transplant an HIV-positive patient? Before the advent of antiviral therapies for HIV in the mid-1990s, mortality rates were very high, with patients suffering miserable deaths from Kaposi sarcoma, the JC virus leukoencephalopathies, and other debilitating opportunistic infections.

When I first arrived at the University of Pittsburgh as a fellow, Dr. Starzl was telling us about this mystery virus disease; when they retrospectively analyzed specimens from organ recipients and donors, they realized that HIV was being transmitted to patients from donors as well as from blood transfusions. The exposure to health care providers was also substantial: an average of 20 to 30 units of blood was used for a liver transplant.

Patients who were HIV-positive were excluded from transplants even through the mid-1990s. I remember evaluating standard listing criteria for transplant recipients at a conference and hearing transplant surgeons say that HIV is an absolute contraindication to transplant. I said, “Wait a minute, this is 1997; you cannot say that. Given that attitude, patients with HIV will never be transplanted.” The New England Journal of Medicine had just published a major paper about the extent of survival in patients being treated with highly active antiretroviral therapy.

So we then started a prospective study of transplantation in HIV-positive patients, and long-term follow-up has shown that these patients can do very well. Interestingly, transplantation offers a new approach to treating HIV-positive patients, in terms of immune reconstitution and the ability of immunosuppressive agents to restore immune competency by preventing the T-cell apoptosis initiated by HIV infection.

 

 

A continued need for evidence-based guidance

By James B. Young, MD

Speaking as the lone internist on this panel, and also as a clinical trialist and evidence-based clinical practitioner, the greatest ethical challenge I see for transplantation is how to move the field forward in terms of garnering evidence that can help us treat patients and keep them alive. Nobody will deny that heart transplantation is life-saving therapy: my patients with end-stage ischemic cardiomyopathy can be dramatically transformed by a heart transplant after being near death. The questions now are how best to gain the data to guide the next round of innovations in transplant medicine and how to know when the time is right to attempt those innovations.

A HISTORICAL GLANCE AT HEART TRANSPLANTATION

Dr. Sharon Hunt, who was one of the first heart transplant cardiologists and worked with Dr. Norman Shumway, almost singlehandedly moved the field of cardiac transplantation forward. She recently chronicled its history,1 and this sort of historical review yields a couple of insights. First, fewer heart transplants are being done in the United States in this decade than in the 1990s,2 in large part because other effective interventions for heart failure have been developed. However, the number of heart transplants is in fact on the rise again.2 Second, survival rates in heart transplant have improved substantially in recent years compared with earlier eras, as documented by registry data from the International Society for Heart and Lung Transplantation.3

Among other things, we have learned how to improve the operation, better choose and preserve hearts, and better match hearts to recipients. We now can use hearts from older donors and allow older patients to undergo transplantation. One of the keys to the better survival rates is a dramatic change in the use of medications. Cyclosporine allowed for successful heart transplantation in the 1980s, and we have since seen the advent of agents such as tacrolimus, rapamycin, and mycophenolate mofetil. We rely less on the early immunosuppressants, such as prednisone and azathioprine.

Despite these successes from a survival standpoint, problems still need to be addressed. For instance, at 5 years, virtually every patient following a heart transplant develops hypertension and dyslipidemia, 1 in 3 has renal dysfunction (some requiring dialysis or transplant), 1 in 3 has diabetes, and some develop a strange allograft arteriopathy.3

THE CHALLENGE OF EVALUATING A BOUTIQUE SCIENCE

Heart transplantation is a bit of a boutique science. Although relatively few heart transplants are performed compared with liver or kidney transplants, heart transplantation is a dramatic operation limited by many ethical challenges surrounding organ donor supply and utilization.

As for any boutique science, questions arise about how to evaluate it with the rigor of regulatory authority—from both the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) perspective and the institutional review board (IRB) perspective—without large clinical trials. Suppose that Dr. Cooley wants to make a minor modification in his immunosuppressive protocol because of an observation of a high incidence of renal failure at the 5-year point; does that ethically demand a large randomized clinical trial?

How can we design clinical trials to help determine which direction to take in immunosuppression intensification or utilization protocols? Other challenges include evaluating outcomes (such as coronary artery vasculopathy) from databases, and then figuring out good and bad practices. For example, databases show us that a donor history of diabetes increases the recipient’s long-term risk of developing coronary artery vasculopathy.3 Receiving a heart from a male donor also increases risk.3 Better understanding the panoply of adverse events and what leads to better outcomes will give us a sense of how to proceed and can drive the design of clinical trials.

OTHER ETHICAL CHALLENGES

From an ethical standpoint, how do we change practice? We have data on outcomes at 5, 10, and even 20 years. The half-life of a heart transplanted today is 12.5 years, whereas it used to be about 7 years.3 Although it is clear that we have made progress, it is a challenge to determine exactly how to make subtle changes in practice, such as addressing polypharmacy post-transplant.

Developing schemes that enable major innovation, particularly through coordination among medical and surgical teams, is another challenge. For example, we are working with preservation techniques that use a beating heart for transplantation. From solid evidence based on animal models, we believe this preparation can allow preservation of a heart for up to 12 hours. To some, that may beg a number of questions: Why do we need to do a clinical trial in humans? Why does the FDA need to regulate us? Why do we even need to answer to an IRB? Why not just make the change to alleviate the problem of donor organ supply?

Figure 1. Flow chart of evidence-based medical practice. The drive for new knowledge is circuitous, beginning with clinical experience and observation and ultimately feeding back into clinical practice and further research prompted by new experience.
My perspective is that I believe in evidence-based medicine and in clinical trials. I believe we should try to ethically move the field forward by taking a clinical experience or an observation and moving it through all the necessary elements of evaluation and treatment strategy development (Figure 1) to drive knowledge. I believe this applies to post-heart transplant patients as much as it does to patients with conditions such as heart failure or ischemic heart disease.

 

 

What does—and does not—spur innovation?

By Thomas E. Starzl, MD, PhD

LESSONS FROM THE CODMAN ANALYSIS OF FAILURES

Dr. Ernest Codman was a Harvard Medical School professor in the early 20th century who tried to introduce a system of analyzing failures at Massachusetts General Hospital and other Harvard-affiliated hospitals. As a result, he was metaphorically ridden out of town on a rail.

Codman recommended that complications and failures be classified as one of the following:

  • An error in diagnosis
  • An error in judgment
  • An error in technique (if a surgical or a medicalproblem)
  • An error in management.

Only one escape hatch existed that did not indictthe surgical or medical team as culpable: the disease. At the time, nothing could be done for many diseases, including cancer, heart disease, renal failure, and bowel insufficiency.

This is a type of analysis that can be brought to a mortality and morbidity conference and will not accept a lot of alibis; it forces the group to always look at what could have been done to prevent a complication or death. Some practitioners always want to blame some factor other than themselves: sometimes the patient, by being deemed noncompliant, is even held responsible for his or her own complication or death.

I think the Codman analysis of failures is a good starting point for discussing innovations, especially since true breakthroughs come in those cases where the failure falls into the category of being caused by the disease itself, not by a medical or surgical error. And that is surely where transplantation falls.

PROGRESS DOES NOT ALWAYS REQUIRE FULL UNDERSTANDING

Transplantation was first successfully performed in the context of breaking through the donor-recipient genetic barrier on January 6, 1959, when Joseph Murray and his team at the the Brigham Hospital performed a kidney transplant using the patient’s fraternal twin as a donor. This event was reproduced in Paris by Jean Hamburger and his team on June 14, 1959, and then on three or four other occasions in the next several years in patients who received sublethal total body irradiation. This was at a time when no pharmacological immunosuppression was available, so no follow-up treatment was offered.

Astoundingly, the first case—the fraternal twin— lived for more than 20 years, and the French case for 25 years, without ever being treated with immunosuppression. They were inexplicably tolerant. When immunosuppressive drugs were developed and survival rates improved, the questions around these early cases were never answered: Why did those transplantations work? What were the mechanisms of engraftment? What was the relationship of engraftment to tolerance? Without answering those questions, there was no way to make other big leaps in improvement of what was already proved in principle—that is, the feasibility of actually doing this kind of treatment. Improvements in patient and graft survival were dependent almost entirely on better drugs.

RANDOMIZED TRIALS HAVE A DUBIOUS RECORD IN TRANSPLANTATION

I know this will offend just about everyone here, but I have no confidence in evidence-based therapy if we are talking about randomized trials. None of the great advances in transplantation has had anything to do with randomized trials. In my opinion, randomized trials in transplantation have done nothing but confuse the issue and have very nearly made it impossible for the better immunosuppressants to be brought on board. Cyclosporine offered a tremendous step forward, but the randomized trials, carried out mostly in Europe, did not reveal much difference in outcome from treatment with azathioprine, at least as assessed by patient and graft survival. The same thing occurred when tacrolimus emerged; randomized multicenter trials actually delayed the widespread use of this superior drug for at least half a dozen years.

IN THE BIG PICTURE, MONEY IS HOBBLING INNOVATION

Earlier it was debated whether money drives everything. I do not believe that money drives everything in medicine in Europe, and it certainly has little to do with driving improvements in Asia. But money does drive everything in the United States, although the real question is whether it has to be that way.

I believe that innovation is somehow built within our genome. Many of the great advances in transplantation, the elucidation of principles, and the relatively recent discovery of the mechanisms of alloengraftment were achieved without grant support. The researchers involved could not have asked for National Institutes of Health funding because their ideas were so far out of the box that they probably would have been rejected or stolen.

I wonder to what extent the vast amount of money available for research is actually a disincentive for genuine advancements. Part of the problem is that the power of allocation is put in the hands of anonymous peer-review committees. That system generates droves of people to pursue money allocated to a certain area to learn more and more about less and less, in the vague hope that acquiring enough details will result in a realistic concept. Sometimes the picture simply becomes more confused.

Another problem is that we have produced far more scientists than jobs, so that funding becomes the first priority because it is the only means of employment. In earlier days, what drove people more often was that they were confronted with a child who was dying and the central questions was, “How can I treat this patient?” They did laboratory research on their own to produce evidence that a new innovative idea could work. I believe that if you have experiments that show that you can keep a heart beating on a preservation device for 12 hours, and you can put it in a dog and it works well, that is the evidence you need to proceed. How are you going to do a randomized trial—hang on to an organ and let it beat for 12 hours just so it conforms with some protocol? That is nonsense.

There was a period when clinical journals—Surgery of Gynecology and Obstetrics, Annals of Surgery, Annals of Internal Medicine, New England Journal of Medicine, and others—published front-running discoveries. That ended about 25 years ago when it became more important to learn about details. The journals then became superfluous, and for another reason as well: money drove the wheel more and more. Hospital and program administrators expected the publications to be advertisements, and the minute that articles started promoting something rather than reporting facts, they lost value. Today the impact factors of the surgical journals are at about 2 or 3, meaning that their articles are cited infrequently and have little real influence on the practice of medicine.

How did we reach this point where money drives everything? I think the page was turned in the very early 1990s, and it had to do with how medical practice is governed, especially in academic hospitals. Half of the health care in this country is now provided by hospitals that are associated with medical schools. Those hospitals and basic research laboratories are where our young people will assimilate their ideals. If that climate is not right, then we are raising the wrong kind of doctors.

Earlier researchers looked at a problem and thought, “Here’s a question that has to do with this patient before my eyes, and I must find some way to solve it. Let’s go to the laboratory.” Today there is a real danger that they are thinking, “I need to advance my career, so let’s see how I can get some money. A little research will be a stepping stone to my professional development.” Our discussion of medical and surgical ethics today should take place within this framework.

 

 

Panel discussion

Moderated by Mark Siegler, MD

WERE FINANCES A DRIVER OF EARLY TRANSPLANT INNOVATION?

Dr. Mark Siegler: It is clear that there are more ethical and less ethical ways to introduce innovations. I am reminded of an article in JAMA by Francis Moore in the late 1980s in which he warned that one of the things to look at for any new innovation was the ethical climate of the institution.4 He cautioned us to be very aware of the driving force behind an innovation. Is it to improve patient care? To save lives that otherwise would be lost? Or is it primarily for the self-aggrandizement of an investigator or the financial goals of an institution?

I also remember the chapter in Dr. Starzl’s book The Puzzle People5 about the anguish involved in introducing liver transplantation. It seems that financial considerations were not the driver of major steps forward in introducing liver transplantation, in Dr. Starzl’s case, or heart transplantation, in Dr. Cooley’s case. Would you comment?

Dr. Thomas Starzl: Actually, not only were we not driven by economic gain, we expected fi nancial penalty for focusing on transplantation. If ever there was a field that developed against the grain, that was costly to people who worked in it, whose engagement meant that for most of their career they would work for substandard income compared with their peers—even those peers in academic medicine, let alone those in private practice—it would be transplantation.

It was not until 1973, when the end-stage renal disease (ESRD) program began under Medicare, that cash for transplantation started to become available. The real cash streams did not start until the middle to late 1980s when nonrenal organs became the cash cows. To be fair, no new technology can be assimilated into the health care system unless it at least pays for itself. But you can go beyond that and create baronial kingdoms, and I think that is where you can go wrong.

Dr. Denton Cooley: I would add that those of us privileged to spend our entire career in academic settings have an opportunity that others may not have. A lot of brilliant people in private practice are capable of doing many things but do not have an institution to represent and protect them. I have also always felt that those of us in these positions have an obligation to become innovators. Surgeons who merely see how many appendectomies or cholecystectomies they can perform are being very derelict of their responsibility to the institution.

MEASURING SUCCESS IN HEART TRANSPLANTATION

Dr. Siegler: Dr. Cooley, what is the current success rate for heart transplants?

Dr. Cooley: Nationwide, around 90% of recipients survive 12 months. Of those, maybe half are still alive 5 years later. Of course, we do not know what the future will hold. It is interesting that the fi rst sign of rejection seems to be coronary occlusive disease. It is a different type of coronary occlusive disease than is seen in atherosclerosis: it is diffuse, involving the entire extent of the coronary circulation, and is not really amenable to coronary bypass or other interventional procedures.

Dr. Siegler: We are now at about the 40th anniversary of the first human heart transplants, an extraordinary and historic innovation. Dr. Cooley, do you think the timing was right in 1968 when you did the fi rst heart transplant in the United States? In retrospect, would you have done the first transplant sooner or maybe even a couple of years later?

Dr. Cooley: You can argue it both ways. Should we have waited for further developments? At the time, heart transplantation seemed to work fairly well in animals, but we never really know until it reaches the clinical level. It was probably as opportune a time as any. We knew something about organ rejection at the time, and we had immunosuppressive drugs, although they were not as effective as they are today. The news electrified the world. I think we were pretty well prepared for this spectacular event.

Dr. Siegler: When would have been the optimal time to do a clinical trial in order to achieve evidence-based medicine in heart transplantation? Would it have been during the big breakthroughs of Shumway, Barnard, and Cooley, or now, when we have the general strategy and can find out how we can do better?

Dr. James Young: I would not have done a randomized trial at that time. The patients who were getting transplanted then were nearly dead; all other management was futile. In 1970, Life magazine listed the 102 heart transplants that had been done around the world up to that point, and maybe only 2 or 3 of the patients were still alive. That prompted the moratorium that Dr. Cooley referred to.

As ethical clinicians, we are supposed to do our best to make our patients feel better and make them live longer. Sometimes you have to do something radical. On that basis, one can argue that we should not transplant “the walking wounded,” that instead we should save organs for patients who are truly terminal without some sort of ventricular replacement therapy. But today we are getting away from transplanting only dying patients, so we need randomized trials to find out how we are doing in transplanting outpatients. That is the setting in which trials are now needed.

THE ETHICS OF ‘LETTING GO’

Question from audience: Dr. Chen’s story [see previous article] raised the issue of the ethics of “letting go” of one’s patient. I wonder if in transplantation, especially when innovative procedures are involved, a commitment to the procedure itself might sometimes conflict with the need to let go of the patient.

Dr. John Fung: In the United States, we measure efficacy and benefits in different ways than people do in other parts of the world. Here, for a child with a biliary atresia—the most common reason for liver transplantation—we expend hundreds of thousands of dollars for a liver transplant, which is usually able to save the child’s life. But in China, a severely ill child is viewed as a medical and economic liability and will be allowed to die so the family can have another child.

It is also not only the ethics of letting go. We all deal with letting go, not just in transplant medicine. It is also the ethics of actually getting a patient into the system. In the case of transplanting a newborn, as in Dr. Chen’s narrative, should they even have embarked on that?

Dr. Pauline Chen: For me, the story illustrates the remarkable connection and profound attachment between a surgeon and his or her patient. The fact that three patients are really involved in transplantation—the donor, the recipient, and the patient still on the waiting list because the organ went to the recipient instead—also motivates the team with a sense of obligation to the two unseen patients.

If there is a lesson about the ethics of letting go, I think it is that we often fail to talk about these issues among ourselves. Perhaps if we had discussed end-of-life care or palliative care in Max’s case, we might have had more insight into the pressures we felt in considering the lives of three separate people. And those discussions might have—or might not have— changed the situation.

Dr. Starzl: I agree completely with the preceding comments. All kinds of motivations might cause a surgeon to cling too long—the ones that were mentioned as well as some ignoble ones, such as vanity, in terms of looking at one’s survival numbers.

I would also like to take a much larger view. Some years ago in Colorado, the governor at the time, Richard Lamm, thought that intensive care units (ICUs) were harmful—that they were economically draining, did not serve society, and prolonged suffering. My position, which was really the opposite, was that maybe he was right in his philosophy but transplantation had, in a sense, changed all that. Transplantation took desperate people who were in the ICU, with no chance of coming out, and dramatically returned them to wonderful health.

As procedures get better, this scenario happens more and more often. I agree that there is a time when you realize that no intervention will work and you should stop treatment. That is a bitter pill. But it is very hard to define when that moment occurs.

Dr. Chen: There also may be somewhat of a generational difference in approach.

Most surgeons will fully acknowledge that they stand on the shoulders of giants, and that holds particularly true in a field like transplantation. When I was training in liver transplantation, for example, 80% to 90% of the patients could fully expect to survive 5 years. For my vintage of surgeons, then, death and failure were rarities and they were truly a sort of enemy, whereas surgeons like Dr. Starzl and Dr. Cooley have seen so much more and are far more used to all the variations of outcomes. Because of that breadth of experience that you have, I think you are wiser than my generation of surgeons, for whom death often has to be ablated at all costs. I think it follows, then, that you would also have a better sense of when to stop.

Dr. Starzl: There is a generational change—there is no doubt about it.

IS TRANSPLANT ETHICAL WHEN A LIFE IS NOT AT STAKE?

Question from audience: What are the ethical implications of non-lifesaving transplants, specifically of the hand and face?

Dr. Young: I have been on many peer-review committees charged with looking at this issue. Although the ethics can be very troubling, I have resolved important questions in my mind by examining them through the context of human suffering. Our mission as physicians and caregivers is to relieve suffering, which can take the form of pain, a shortened lifespan, or even a debilitating disfigurement of the face or a severe limitation, such as after traumatic amputation. Looking at the issue this way, I am less troubled than I was initially, when I viewed these kinds of transplantations as simply altering physical appearance or extending ability.

Dr. Starzl: The next big movement in transplantation is going to be in composite tissue allotransplantation—that is, transplantation of the face, limbs, etc. Mechanisms of alloengraftment have recently been uncovered such that it is now possible to formulate protocols that use either very light immunosuppression (avoiding the 20% or 25% rate of renal failure at 5 years that we heard about from Dr. Young) or no immunosuppression at all.6 Without the heavy burden of immunosuppression, this type of transplantation can become worthwhile. Putting a new hand or face on someone is astounding: it changes the morphology of the brain, which can be observed with functional magnetic resonance imaging. It changes the soul, if that is what you want to think of when talking about the brain. I think it will be very important.

Dr. Siegler: This extraordinary panel has not only discussed events from 50 years ago; each of the panelists spoke of a future that is rich in promise and innovation—and in ethical issues. It reminds me of a remarkable letter written in 1794 by Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, which says, “We should never return to earlier times when all scientific progress was proscribed as innovation.” More than 200 years later, Jefferson’s insight remains modern and relevant.

We have come far, but selecting organ recipients remains an ethical minefield

By Denton A. Cooley, MD

Only 40 years ago, on December 3, 1967, the world was electrified by news of the first cardiac transplantation, performed in Cape Town, South Africa, by the renowned Dr. Christiaan Barnard.

We have progressed considerably since that time, but not all issues have been settled. After several attempts by Dr. Norman Shumway and by Dr. Adrian Kantrowitz in this country, we in Houston performed the first successful cardiac transplantation in the United States in April 1968. Initially we were impressed with the results, and we embarked upon a very active cardiac transplant program, performing as many as had been done in total around the world. But after we had done some 15 or 20 cardiac transplants, the discouraging news began to emerge that the patients were not surviving long: our longest survived for only 2 years.

As a result, our group in Houston, like others, declared a moratorium on cardiac transplantation. The only group that continued throughout this era was at Stanford University under Shumway, who had some success with immunosuppressive drugs. In the early 1980s, a new immunosuppressant, cyclosporine, appeared that was used for kidney transplantation, which reinvigorated us and others to use this drug for cardiac transplantation. Since then, under the direction of my colleague, Dr. Bud Frazier, we have performed more than 1,000 cardiac transplantations at the Texas Heart Institute.

From the beginning, we were called upon to identify appropriate donors and suitable recipients. Although we rely on certain objective factors, such as age, weight, body size, gender, and blood type, many other issues must also be considered. Fortunately, the modern concept of brain death has now been accepted not only by the public and ethicists, but also by the legal community; in contrast, at one time it was considered homicidal to remove a beating heart. I credit Christiaan Barnard with having the courage to remove a beating heart from a 26-year-old donor who had suffered irreversible brain damage. Many of us had wanted to get into the transplant program but we could not identify a donor.

The following case illustrates some of the other ethical complexities that we continue to struggle with today.

CASE STUDY: A 17-YEAR-OLD WITH HEART FAILURE AND A DESTRUCTIVE LIFESTYLE

Several years ago, a 17-year-old Latin American boy came to our clinic in heart failure. He was very disarming, but when we looked into his background we found that he had dropped out of high school after 1 year and was living with a girlfriend who was 2 months pregnant by him and already had a 2-year-old child. The patient’s cardiomyopathy was related to cocaine and alcohol abuse. Nevertheless, his stepfather was eligible for Texas Medicaid, and he was accepted for cardiac transplantation.

After the transplantation, he abided by the immunosuppressive drug regimen while he was under our care. Then he moved to Fort Wayne, Indiana, where Indiana Medicaid would not honor his Texas Medicaid coverage. So our hospital had to send him his immunosuppressive drugs, which he used rather sporadically.

While in Indiana, he was incarcerated for assault and battery on his girlfriend. He began to have heart failure but did not qualify to have the biopsies required for proper study of rejection of his heart. He returned to our clinic and was scheduled for catheterization the next day when he went into acute cardiac failure. He had emergency late-night implantation of a percutaneous ventricular assist device, which required catheterizing the left atrium by perforating the interatrial septum, taking the oxygenated blood out of the left atrium, and pumping it back into the aorta with a centrifugal pump. His heart began to recover, and the device was removed after 72 hours.

At this point he needed another transplantation. Our medical review board considered his eligibility and turned him down, citing that others on our waiting list were more deserving of a transplant and that retransplantation has a poorer success rate than initial transplantation.

EACH CASE POSES PROBLEMS, BUT A RECORD OF SUCCESS EMERGES

Although this patient could be viewed as a sort of sociopath, he nevertheless is a young man who is incapacitated and in need of heroic measures. His case illustrates the kind of nonmedical problems that face those of us who are actively involved in cardiac transplantation. It can be very difficult to find solutions to the myriad social, economic, legal, and ethical issues.

We perform about 50 transplants a year in our institution, and every one of them has some issue. Nevertheless, we just honored 25 patients who have survived more than 20 years with cardiac transplantation.

 

 

Despite the odds, the transplant field has progressed rapidly

By John J. Fung, MD, PhD

Dr. Pauline Chen’s clinical vignette [see previous article in this supplement] unfortunately still typifies small bowel transplantation. One would not expect to hear that kind of story today for a kidney or liver transplant, but in the early 1970s it was typical.

‘WHY WOULD ANY YOUNG PHYSICIAN WANT TO GET INVOLVED IN THIS?’ 

Dr. Cooley’s comments about the moratorium on cardiac transplantation brought back memories for me, particularly from when I was studying liver transplantation in the 1970s. There was almost uniform mortality in transplants performed in the late 1960s and early ’70s. One wonders why any young physician would have wanted to get involved in transplantation at that time. I was a fellow training with Dr. Thomas Starzl at the University of Pittsburgh and remember him saying, “Just make it work, then let everybody else figure out why.” I think that typifies the surgical mentality.

We perform transplantations because we know that the alternative is prolonged morbidity and death. Knowing that we can provide a touch of hope is why we move forward in this field.

The technology of transplantation has developed through aggressive scientific developments in the laboratory. It is fascinating that all this has developed in only 50 years. If we had proceeded in a very stepwise manner, we probably would not be even a tenth as far along in the field as we are now.

Heart, lung, liver, and kidney transplantation are now all pretty routine. Intestinal transplantation is in the developing phase. The Cleveland Clinic is currently involved in facial transplantation, which has some different ethical issues related to identity.

Everything in transplantation relates to ethics, from issues about using marginal donor grafts or using beating-heart donors when someone has not been declared brain dead, to issues in patient selection, which often depends on social, economic (ie, insurance coverage), and psychosocial factors such as substance abuse and nonadherence issues.

ETHICAL INSIGHTS FROM TRANSPLANTS IN HIV-POSITIVE PATIENTS

An ethical area of particular interest to me that the Cleveland Clinic has also been involved with is transplanting patients who are HIV-positive. This has always been an enigma: why would we want to transplant an HIV-positive patient? Before the advent of antiviral therapies for HIV in the mid-1990s, mortality rates were very high, with patients suffering miserable deaths from Kaposi sarcoma, the JC virus leukoencephalopathies, and other debilitating opportunistic infections.

When I first arrived at the University of Pittsburgh as a fellow, Dr. Starzl was telling us about this mystery virus disease; when they retrospectively analyzed specimens from organ recipients and donors, they realized that HIV was being transmitted to patients from donors as well as from blood transfusions. The exposure to health care providers was also substantial: an average of 20 to 30 units of blood was used for a liver transplant.

Patients who were HIV-positive were excluded from transplants even through the mid-1990s. I remember evaluating standard listing criteria for transplant recipients at a conference and hearing transplant surgeons say that HIV is an absolute contraindication to transplant. I said, “Wait a minute, this is 1997; you cannot say that. Given that attitude, patients with HIV will never be transplanted.” The New England Journal of Medicine had just published a major paper about the extent of survival in patients being treated with highly active antiretroviral therapy.

So we then started a prospective study of transplantation in HIV-positive patients, and long-term follow-up has shown that these patients can do very well. Interestingly, transplantation offers a new approach to treating HIV-positive patients, in terms of immune reconstitution and the ability of immunosuppressive agents to restore immune competency by preventing the T-cell apoptosis initiated by HIV infection.

 

 

A continued need for evidence-based guidance

By James B. Young, MD

Speaking as the lone internist on this panel, and also as a clinical trialist and evidence-based clinical practitioner, the greatest ethical challenge I see for transplantation is how to move the field forward in terms of garnering evidence that can help us treat patients and keep them alive. Nobody will deny that heart transplantation is life-saving therapy: my patients with end-stage ischemic cardiomyopathy can be dramatically transformed by a heart transplant after being near death. The questions now are how best to gain the data to guide the next round of innovations in transplant medicine and how to know when the time is right to attempt those innovations.

A HISTORICAL GLANCE AT HEART TRANSPLANTATION

Dr. Sharon Hunt, who was one of the first heart transplant cardiologists and worked with Dr. Norman Shumway, almost singlehandedly moved the field of cardiac transplantation forward. She recently chronicled its history,1 and this sort of historical review yields a couple of insights. First, fewer heart transplants are being done in the United States in this decade than in the 1990s,2 in large part because other effective interventions for heart failure have been developed. However, the number of heart transplants is in fact on the rise again.2 Second, survival rates in heart transplant have improved substantially in recent years compared with earlier eras, as documented by registry data from the International Society for Heart and Lung Transplantation.3

Among other things, we have learned how to improve the operation, better choose and preserve hearts, and better match hearts to recipients. We now can use hearts from older donors and allow older patients to undergo transplantation. One of the keys to the better survival rates is a dramatic change in the use of medications. Cyclosporine allowed for successful heart transplantation in the 1980s, and we have since seen the advent of agents such as tacrolimus, rapamycin, and mycophenolate mofetil. We rely less on the early immunosuppressants, such as prednisone and azathioprine.

Despite these successes from a survival standpoint, problems still need to be addressed. For instance, at 5 years, virtually every patient following a heart transplant develops hypertension and dyslipidemia, 1 in 3 has renal dysfunction (some requiring dialysis or transplant), 1 in 3 has diabetes, and some develop a strange allograft arteriopathy.3

THE CHALLENGE OF EVALUATING A BOUTIQUE SCIENCE

Heart transplantation is a bit of a boutique science. Although relatively few heart transplants are performed compared with liver or kidney transplants, heart transplantation is a dramatic operation limited by many ethical challenges surrounding organ donor supply and utilization.

As for any boutique science, questions arise about how to evaluate it with the rigor of regulatory authority—from both the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) perspective and the institutional review board (IRB) perspective—without large clinical trials. Suppose that Dr. Cooley wants to make a minor modification in his immunosuppressive protocol because of an observation of a high incidence of renal failure at the 5-year point; does that ethically demand a large randomized clinical trial?

How can we design clinical trials to help determine which direction to take in immunosuppression intensification or utilization protocols? Other challenges include evaluating outcomes (such as coronary artery vasculopathy) from databases, and then figuring out good and bad practices. For example, databases show us that a donor history of diabetes increases the recipient’s long-term risk of developing coronary artery vasculopathy.3 Receiving a heart from a male donor also increases risk.3 Better understanding the panoply of adverse events and what leads to better outcomes will give us a sense of how to proceed and can drive the design of clinical trials.

OTHER ETHICAL CHALLENGES

From an ethical standpoint, how do we change practice? We have data on outcomes at 5, 10, and even 20 years. The half-life of a heart transplanted today is 12.5 years, whereas it used to be about 7 years.3 Although it is clear that we have made progress, it is a challenge to determine exactly how to make subtle changes in practice, such as addressing polypharmacy post-transplant.

Developing schemes that enable major innovation, particularly through coordination among medical and surgical teams, is another challenge. For example, we are working with preservation techniques that use a beating heart for transplantation. From solid evidence based on animal models, we believe this preparation can allow preservation of a heart for up to 12 hours. To some, that may beg a number of questions: Why do we need to do a clinical trial in humans? Why does the FDA need to regulate us? Why do we even need to answer to an IRB? Why not just make the change to alleviate the problem of donor organ supply?

Figure 1. Flow chart of evidence-based medical practice. The drive for new knowledge is circuitous, beginning with clinical experience and observation and ultimately feeding back into clinical practice and further research prompted by new experience.
My perspective is that I believe in evidence-based medicine and in clinical trials. I believe we should try to ethically move the field forward by taking a clinical experience or an observation and moving it through all the necessary elements of evaluation and treatment strategy development (Figure 1) to drive knowledge. I believe this applies to post-heart transplant patients as much as it does to patients with conditions such as heart failure or ischemic heart disease.

 

 

What does—and does not—spur innovation?

By Thomas E. Starzl, MD, PhD

LESSONS FROM THE CODMAN ANALYSIS OF FAILURES

Dr. Ernest Codman was a Harvard Medical School professor in the early 20th century who tried to introduce a system of analyzing failures at Massachusetts General Hospital and other Harvard-affiliated hospitals. As a result, he was metaphorically ridden out of town on a rail.

Codman recommended that complications and failures be classified as one of the following:

  • An error in diagnosis
  • An error in judgment
  • An error in technique (if a surgical or a medicalproblem)
  • An error in management.

Only one escape hatch existed that did not indictthe surgical or medical team as culpable: the disease. At the time, nothing could be done for many diseases, including cancer, heart disease, renal failure, and bowel insufficiency.

This is a type of analysis that can be brought to a mortality and morbidity conference and will not accept a lot of alibis; it forces the group to always look at what could have been done to prevent a complication or death. Some practitioners always want to blame some factor other than themselves: sometimes the patient, by being deemed noncompliant, is even held responsible for his or her own complication or death.

I think the Codman analysis of failures is a good starting point for discussing innovations, especially since true breakthroughs come in those cases where the failure falls into the category of being caused by the disease itself, not by a medical or surgical error. And that is surely where transplantation falls.

PROGRESS DOES NOT ALWAYS REQUIRE FULL UNDERSTANDING

Transplantation was first successfully performed in the context of breaking through the donor-recipient genetic barrier on January 6, 1959, when Joseph Murray and his team at the the Brigham Hospital performed a kidney transplant using the patient’s fraternal twin as a donor. This event was reproduced in Paris by Jean Hamburger and his team on June 14, 1959, and then on three or four other occasions in the next several years in patients who received sublethal total body irradiation. This was at a time when no pharmacological immunosuppression was available, so no follow-up treatment was offered.

Astoundingly, the first case—the fraternal twin— lived for more than 20 years, and the French case for 25 years, without ever being treated with immunosuppression. They were inexplicably tolerant. When immunosuppressive drugs were developed and survival rates improved, the questions around these early cases were never answered: Why did those transplantations work? What were the mechanisms of engraftment? What was the relationship of engraftment to tolerance? Without answering those questions, there was no way to make other big leaps in improvement of what was already proved in principle—that is, the feasibility of actually doing this kind of treatment. Improvements in patient and graft survival were dependent almost entirely on better drugs.

RANDOMIZED TRIALS HAVE A DUBIOUS RECORD IN TRANSPLANTATION

I know this will offend just about everyone here, but I have no confidence in evidence-based therapy if we are talking about randomized trials. None of the great advances in transplantation has had anything to do with randomized trials. In my opinion, randomized trials in transplantation have done nothing but confuse the issue and have very nearly made it impossible for the better immunosuppressants to be brought on board. Cyclosporine offered a tremendous step forward, but the randomized trials, carried out mostly in Europe, did not reveal much difference in outcome from treatment with azathioprine, at least as assessed by patient and graft survival. The same thing occurred when tacrolimus emerged; randomized multicenter trials actually delayed the widespread use of this superior drug for at least half a dozen years.

IN THE BIG PICTURE, MONEY IS HOBBLING INNOVATION

Earlier it was debated whether money drives everything. I do not believe that money drives everything in medicine in Europe, and it certainly has little to do with driving improvements in Asia. But money does drive everything in the United States, although the real question is whether it has to be that way.

I believe that innovation is somehow built within our genome. Many of the great advances in transplantation, the elucidation of principles, and the relatively recent discovery of the mechanisms of alloengraftment were achieved without grant support. The researchers involved could not have asked for National Institutes of Health funding because their ideas were so far out of the box that they probably would have been rejected or stolen.

I wonder to what extent the vast amount of money available for research is actually a disincentive for genuine advancements. Part of the problem is that the power of allocation is put in the hands of anonymous peer-review committees. That system generates droves of people to pursue money allocated to a certain area to learn more and more about less and less, in the vague hope that acquiring enough details will result in a realistic concept. Sometimes the picture simply becomes more confused.

Another problem is that we have produced far more scientists than jobs, so that funding becomes the first priority because it is the only means of employment. In earlier days, what drove people more often was that they were confronted with a child who was dying and the central questions was, “How can I treat this patient?” They did laboratory research on their own to produce evidence that a new innovative idea could work. I believe that if you have experiments that show that you can keep a heart beating on a preservation device for 12 hours, and you can put it in a dog and it works well, that is the evidence you need to proceed. How are you going to do a randomized trial—hang on to an organ and let it beat for 12 hours just so it conforms with some protocol? That is nonsense.

There was a period when clinical journals—Surgery of Gynecology and Obstetrics, Annals of Surgery, Annals of Internal Medicine, New England Journal of Medicine, and others—published front-running discoveries. That ended about 25 years ago when it became more important to learn about details. The journals then became superfluous, and for another reason as well: money drove the wheel more and more. Hospital and program administrators expected the publications to be advertisements, and the minute that articles started promoting something rather than reporting facts, they lost value. Today the impact factors of the surgical journals are at about 2 or 3, meaning that their articles are cited infrequently and have little real influence on the practice of medicine.

How did we reach this point where money drives everything? I think the page was turned in the very early 1990s, and it had to do with how medical practice is governed, especially in academic hospitals. Half of the health care in this country is now provided by hospitals that are associated with medical schools. Those hospitals and basic research laboratories are where our young people will assimilate their ideals. If that climate is not right, then we are raising the wrong kind of doctors.

Earlier researchers looked at a problem and thought, “Here’s a question that has to do with this patient before my eyes, and I must find some way to solve it. Let’s go to the laboratory.” Today there is a real danger that they are thinking, “I need to advance my career, so let’s see how I can get some money. A little research will be a stepping stone to my professional development.” Our discussion of medical and surgical ethics today should take place within this framework.

 

 

Panel discussion

Moderated by Mark Siegler, MD

WERE FINANCES A DRIVER OF EARLY TRANSPLANT INNOVATION?

Dr. Mark Siegler: It is clear that there are more ethical and less ethical ways to introduce innovations. I am reminded of an article in JAMA by Francis Moore in the late 1980s in which he warned that one of the things to look at for any new innovation was the ethical climate of the institution.4 He cautioned us to be very aware of the driving force behind an innovation. Is it to improve patient care? To save lives that otherwise would be lost? Or is it primarily for the self-aggrandizement of an investigator or the financial goals of an institution?

I also remember the chapter in Dr. Starzl’s book The Puzzle People5 about the anguish involved in introducing liver transplantation. It seems that financial considerations were not the driver of major steps forward in introducing liver transplantation, in Dr. Starzl’s case, or heart transplantation, in Dr. Cooley’s case. Would you comment?

Dr. Thomas Starzl: Actually, not only were we not driven by economic gain, we expected fi nancial penalty for focusing on transplantation. If ever there was a field that developed against the grain, that was costly to people who worked in it, whose engagement meant that for most of their career they would work for substandard income compared with their peers—even those peers in academic medicine, let alone those in private practice—it would be transplantation.

It was not until 1973, when the end-stage renal disease (ESRD) program began under Medicare, that cash for transplantation started to become available. The real cash streams did not start until the middle to late 1980s when nonrenal organs became the cash cows. To be fair, no new technology can be assimilated into the health care system unless it at least pays for itself. But you can go beyond that and create baronial kingdoms, and I think that is where you can go wrong.

Dr. Denton Cooley: I would add that those of us privileged to spend our entire career in academic settings have an opportunity that others may not have. A lot of brilliant people in private practice are capable of doing many things but do not have an institution to represent and protect them. I have also always felt that those of us in these positions have an obligation to become innovators. Surgeons who merely see how many appendectomies or cholecystectomies they can perform are being very derelict of their responsibility to the institution.

MEASURING SUCCESS IN HEART TRANSPLANTATION

Dr. Siegler: Dr. Cooley, what is the current success rate for heart transplants?

Dr. Cooley: Nationwide, around 90% of recipients survive 12 months. Of those, maybe half are still alive 5 years later. Of course, we do not know what the future will hold. It is interesting that the fi rst sign of rejection seems to be coronary occlusive disease. It is a different type of coronary occlusive disease than is seen in atherosclerosis: it is diffuse, involving the entire extent of the coronary circulation, and is not really amenable to coronary bypass or other interventional procedures.

Dr. Siegler: We are now at about the 40th anniversary of the first human heart transplants, an extraordinary and historic innovation. Dr. Cooley, do you think the timing was right in 1968 when you did the fi rst heart transplant in the United States? In retrospect, would you have done the first transplant sooner or maybe even a couple of years later?

Dr. Cooley: You can argue it both ways. Should we have waited for further developments? At the time, heart transplantation seemed to work fairly well in animals, but we never really know until it reaches the clinical level. It was probably as opportune a time as any. We knew something about organ rejection at the time, and we had immunosuppressive drugs, although they were not as effective as they are today. The news electrified the world. I think we were pretty well prepared for this spectacular event.

Dr. Siegler: When would have been the optimal time to do a clinical trial in order to achieve evidence-based medicine in heart transplantation? Would it have been during the big breakthroughs of Shumway, Barnard, and Cooley, or now, when we have the general strategy and can find out how we can do better?

Dr. James Young: I would not have done a randomized trial at that time. The patients who were getting transplanted then were nearly dead; all other management was futile. In 1970, Life magazine listed the 102 heart transplants that had been done around the world up to that point, and maybe only 2 or 3 of the patients were still alive. That prompted the moratorium that Dr. Cooley referred to.

As ethical clinicians, we are supposed to do our best to make our patients feel better and make them live longer. Sometimes you have to do something radical. On that basis, one can argue that we should not transplant “the walking wounded,” that instead we should save organs for patients who are truly terminal without some sort of ventricular replacement therapy. But today we are getting away from transplanting only dying patients, so we need randomized trials to find out how we are doing in transplanting outpatients. That is the setting in which trials are now needed.

THE ETHICS OF ‘LETTING GO’

Question from audience: Dr. Chen’s story [see previous article] raised the issue of the ethics of “letting go” of one’s patient. I wonder if in transplantation, especially when innovative procedures are involved, a commitment to the procedure itself might sometimes conflict with the need to let go of the patient.

Dr. John Fung: In the United States, we measure efficacy and benefits in different ways than people do in other parts of the world. Here, for a child with a biliary atresia—the most common reason for liver transplantation—we expend hundreds of thousands of dollars for a liver transplant, which is usually able to save the child’s life. But in China, a severely ill child is viewed as a medical and economic liability and will be allowed to die so the family can have another child.

It is also not only the ethics of letting go. We all deal with letting go, not just in transplant medicine. It is also the ethics of actually getting a patient into the system. In the case of transplanting a newborn, as in Dr. Chen’s narrative, should they even have embarked on that?

Dr. Pauline Chen: For me, the story illustrates the remarkable connection and profound attachment between a surgeon and his or her patient. The fact that three patients are really involved in transplantation—the donor, the recipient, and the patient still on the waiting list because the organ went to the recipient instead—also motivates the team with a sense of obligation to the two unseen patients.

If there is a lesson about the ethics of letting go, I think it is that we often fail to talk about these issues among ourselves. Perhaps if we had discussed end-of-life care or palliative care in Max’s case, we might have had more insight into the pressures we felt in considering the lives of three separate people. And those discussions might have—or might not have— changed the situation.

Dr. Starzl: I agree completely with the preceding comments. All kinds of motivations might cause a surgeon to cling too long—the ones that were mentioned as well as some ignoble ones, such as vanity, in terms of looking at one’s survival numbers.

I would also like to take a much larger view. Some years ago in Colorado, the governor at the time, Richard Lamm, thought that intensive care units (ICUs) were harmful—that they were economically draining, did not serve society, and prolonged suffering. My position, which was really the opposite, was that maybe he was right in his philosophy but transplantation had, in a sense, changed all that. Transplantation took desperate people who were in the ICU, with no chance of coming out, and dramatically returned them to wonderful health.

As procedures get better, this scenario happens more and more often. I agree that there is a time when you realize that no intervention will work and you should stop treatment. That is a bitter pill. But it is very hard to define when that moment occurs.

Dr. Chen: There also may be somewhat of a generational difference in approach.

Most surgeons will fully acknowledge that they stand on the shoulders of giants, and that holds particularly true in a field like transplantation. When I was training in liver transplantation, for example, 80% to 90% of the patients could fully expect to survive 5 years. For my vintage of surgeons, then, death and failure were rarities and they were truly a sort of enemy, whereas surgeons like Dr. Starzl and Dr. Cooley have seen so much more and are far more used to all the variations of outcomes. Because of that breadth of experience that you have, I think you are wiser than my generation of surgeons, for whom death often has to be ablated at all costs. I think it follows, then, that you would also have a better sense of when to stop.

Dr. Starzl: There is a generational change—there is no doubt about it.

IS TRANSPLANT ETHICAL WHEN A LIFE IS NOT AT STAKE?

Question from audience: What are the ethical implications of non-lifesaving transplants, specifically of the hand and face?

Dr. Young: I have been on many peer-review committees charged with looking at this issue. Although the ethics can be very troubling, I have resolved important questions in my mind by examining them through the context of human suffering. Our mission as physicians and caregivers is to relieve suffering, which can take the form of pain, a shortened lifespan, or even a debilitating disfigurement of the face or a severe limitation, such as after traumatic amputation. Looking at the issue this way, I am less troubled than I was initially, when I viewed these kinds of transplantations as simply altering physical appearance or extending ability.

Dr. Starzl: The next big movement in transplantation is going to be in composite tissue allotransplantation—that is, transplantation of the face, limbs, etc. Mechanisms of alloengraftment have recently been uncovered such that it is now possible to formulate protocols that use either very light immunosuppression (avoiding the 20% or 25% rate of renal failure at 5 years that we heard about from Dr. Young) or no immunosuppression at all.6 Without the heavy burden of immunosuppression, this type of transplantation can become worthwhile. Putting a new hand or face on someone is astounding: it changes the morphology of the brain, which can be observed with functional magnetic resonance imaging. It changes the soul, if that is what you want to think of when talking about the brain. I think it will be very important.

Dr. Siegler: This extraordinary panel has not only discussed events from 50 years ago; each of the panelists spoke of a future that is rich in promise and innovation—and in ethical issues. It reminds me of a remarkable letter written in 1794 by Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, which says, “We should never return to earlier times when all scientific progress was proscribed as innovation.” More than 200 years later, Jefferson’s insight remains modern and relevant.

References
  1. Hunt SA. Taking heart—cardiac transplantation past, present, and future. N Engl J Med 2006; 355:231–235.
  2. Heart and Lung Transplantation in the United States, 1997-2006(Chapter VI). In: 2007 Annual Report of the U.S. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network and the Scientific Registry of Transplant Data 1997-2006. Health Resources and Services Administration, Healthcare Systems Bureau, Division of Transplantation, Rockville, MD. Available at: http://www.ustransplant.org/annual_reports/current. Accessed July 22, 2008.
  3. Taylor DO, Edwards LB, Boucek MM, et al. Registry of the International Society for Heart and Lung Transplantation: twenty-second official adult heart transplant report—2005. J Heart Lung Transplant 2005; 24:945–955.
  4. Moore FD. The desperate case: CARE (costs, applicability, research, ethics). JAMA 1989; 261:1483–1484.
  5. Starzl TE. The Puzzle People: Memoirs of a Transplant Surgeon.Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press; 1992.
  6. Starzl TE. Immunosuppressive therapy and tolerance of organ allografts. N Engl J Med 2008; 358:407–411.
References
  1. Hunt SA. Taking heart—cardiac transplantation past, present, and future. N Engl J Med 2006; 355:231–235.
  2. Heart and Lung Transplantation in the United States, 1997-2006(Chapter VI). In: 2007 Annual Report of the U.S. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network and the Scientific Registry of Transplant Data 1997-2006. Health Resources and Services Administration, Healthcare Systems Bureau, Division of Transplantation, Rockville, MD. Available at: http://www.ustransplant.org/annual_reports/current. Accessed July 22, 2008.
  3. Taylor DO, Edwards LB, Boucek MM, et al. Registry of the International Society for Heart and Lung Transplantation: twenty-second official adult heart transplant report—2005. J Heart Lung Transplant 2005; 24:945–955.
  4. Moore FD. The desperate case: CARE (costs, applicability, research, ethics). JAMA 1989; 261:1483–1484.
  5. Starzl TE. The Puzzle People: Memoirs of a Transplant Surgeon.Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press; 1992.
  6. Starzl TE. Immunosuppressive therapy and tolerance of organ allografts. N Engl J Med 2008; 358:407–411.
Page Number
S24-S32
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S24-S32
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Transplant innovation and ethical challenges: What have we learned?
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Transplant innovation and ethical challenges: What have we learned?
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Cleveland Clinic Journal of Medicine 2008 November;75(suppl 6):S24-S32
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