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Paradigms shift rapidly in antipsychotic treatment
Like the “paradigm shift” Thomas Kuhn coined in his seminal book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,1 paradigm shifts have been occurring at a breathless pace in psychiatry. Thanks to ongoing research, changes in the clinical standard of care for schizophrenia in the past 20 years are a case in point.
Old paradigm: Clozapine is ‘last resort’
Let’s take 1988 as a starting point. That’s when clozapine was “resurrected” as the only drug with proven efficacy in refractory schizophrenia after several first-generation antipsychotics (FGAs) had been tried.2 However, because of its potentially fatal side effect (agranulocytosis), clozapine was designated as an absolute last-resort agent. It also was stigmatized for its many other side effects, including serious metabolic complications.
In the 1990s, several more-tolerable second-generation antipsychotics (SGAs) modeled after the clozapine receptor-binding paradigm with “broader efficacy” were launched and quickly became the standard of care. Then in 2000, the field was jolted by a meta-analysis claiming that SGAs are not superior to FGAs in either efficacy or tolerability.3 The 5-year Clinical Antipsychotic Trials of Intervention Effectiveness (CATIE) study, completed in 2004, confirmed that FGA and SGA discontinuation rates were not different,4 but it also showed that clozapine’s superior efficacy to FGAs also extended to SGAs.
Emerging research into neuroplasticity and neurogenesis later indicated that SGAs are neuroprotective, whereas FGAs are not.5 As a class, SGAs appeared to have repaired their tarnished image but still suffered from the fact that several are associated with metabolic syndrome risk factors,6 which are linked to early mortality.
New paradigm: Clozapine should be ‘first-line’
Then a report by Ray et al7 showing a significant increase in sudden cardiac death associated with both FGAs and SGAs appeared in January 2009. This put all antipsychotics in a negative light again. But in July 2009, a massive 11-year study by Tiihonen et al8 of 66,881 schizophrenia patients in Finland introduced yet another paradigm shift. It strongly suggested that clozapine was the safest antipsychotic, with the lowest mortality from all causes compared with any FGA or SGA, and that it should be considered as first-line treatment! That study also reported that mortality in antipsychotic-treated patients was lower than in untreated ones, which neutralized the cardiac death findings of Ray et al.
The greatest paradigm shift from the Tiihonen et al8 study is the stunning conclusion that clozapine should be a first-line antipsychotic, not a last resort for refractory patients. Clozapine has not only the highest efficacy (a very important outcome measure) but also the lowest mortality (death is the most important outcome measure in medicine!). Not a single practice guideline has ever recommended clozapine as a first-line antipsychotic. It is puzzling why the obesity, hyperglycemia, and hyperlipidemia observed with clozapine do not increase mortality. The low suicide rate with clozapine is not surprising, however, because clozapine received FDA approval for the treatment of suicidality in schizophrenia based on the InterSePT study.9
The bottom line: Evidence-based research leads to paradigm shifts in treatment that can shatter clinical dogmas. Stay tuned; ongoing psychiatric research will certainly generate new paradigms, and our patients will be better for it.
1. Kuhn TS. The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; 1962.
2. Kane JM, Honigfeld G, Singer J, et al. Clozapine for the treatment-resistant schizophrenia: a double-blind comparison with chlorpromazine. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1988;45:789-796.
3. Geddes J, Freemantle N, Harrison P, et al. Atypical antipsychotics in the treatment of schizophrenia: systemic overview and meta-regression analysis. BMJ. 2000;321:1371-1376.
4. Lieberman JA, Stroup TS, McEvoy JP, et al. Effectiveness of antipsychotic drugs in patients with chronic schizophrenia. N Engl J Med. 2005;353:1209-1223.
5. Nasrallah HA. Impaired neuroplasticity in schizophrenia and the neurogenerative effects of atypical antipsychotics. Medscape CME. Available at: http://cme.medscape.com/viewarticle/569521. Accessed August 11, 2009.
6. Meyer JM, Davis VG, Goff DC, et al. Change in metabolic syndrome parameters with antipsychotic treatment in the CATIE schizophrenia trial: prospective data from phase 1. Schizophr Res. 2008;101:273-286.
7. Ray WA, Chung CP, Murray KT, et al. Atypical antipsychotic drugs and the risk of sudden cardiac death. N Engl J Med. 2009;360:225-235.
8. Tiihonen J, Lönnqvist J, Wahlbeck K, et al. 11-year follow-up of mortality in patients with schizophrenia: a population-based cohort study (FIN11 study). Lancet. 2009;July 10. [Epub ahead of print].
9. Meltzer HY, Alphs L, Green AI, et al. Clozapine treatment for suicidality in schizophrenia: International Suicide Prevention Trial (InterSePT). Arch Gen Psychiatry. 2003;60:82-91.
Like the “paradigm shift” Thomas Kuhn coined in his seminal book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,1 paradigm shifts have been occurring at a breathless pace in psychiatry. Thanks to ongoing research, changes in the clinical standard of care for schizophrenia in the past 20 years are a case in point.
Old paradigm: Clozapine is ‘last resort’
Let’s take 1988 as a starting point. That’s when clozapine was “resurrected” as the only drug with proven efficacy in refractory schizophrenia after several first-generation antipsychotics (FGAs) had been tried.2 However, because of its potentially fatal side effect (agranulocytosis), clozapine was designated as an absolute last-resort agent. It also was stigmatized for its many other side effects, including serious metabolic complications.
In the 1990s, several more-tolerable second-generation antipsychotics (SGAs) modeled after the clozapine receptor-binding paradigm with “broader efficacy” were launched and quickly became the standard of care. Then in 2000, the field was jolted by a meta-analysis claiming that SGAs are not superior to FGAs in either efficacy or tolerability.3 The 5-year Clinical Antipsychotic Trials of Intervention Effectiveness (CATIE) study, completed in 2004, confirmed that FGA and SGA discontinuation rates were not different,4 but it also showed that clozapine’s superior efficacy to FGAs also extended to SGAs.
Emerging research into neuroplasticity and neurogenesis later indicated that SGAs are neuroprotective, whereas FGAs are not.5 As a class, SGAs appeared to have repaired their tarnished image but still suffered from the fact that several are associated with metabolic syndrome risk factors,6 which are linked to early mortality.
New paradigm: Clozapine should be ‘first-line’
Then a report by Ray et al7 showing a significant increase in sudden cardiac death associated with both FGAs and SGAs appeared in January 2009. This put all antipsychotics in a negative light again. But in July 2009, a massive 11-year study by Tiihonen et al8 of 66,881 schizophrenia patients in Finland introduced yet another paradigm shift. It strongly suggested that clozapine was the safest antipsychotic, with the lowest mortality from all causes compared with any FGA or SGA, and that it should be considered as first-line treatment! That study also reported that mortality in antipsychotic-treated patients was lower than in untreated ones, which neutralized the cardiac death findings of Ray et al.
The greatest paradigm shift from the Tiihonen et al8 study is the stunning conclusion that clozapine should be a first-line antipsychotic, not a last resort for refractory patients. Clozapine has not only the highest efficacy (a very important outcome measure) but also the lowest mortality (death is the most important outcome measure in medicine!). Not a single practice guideline has ever recommended clozapine as a first-line antipsychotic. It is puzzling why the obesity, hyperglycemia, and hyperlipidemia observed with clozapine do not increase mortality. The low suicide rate with clozapine is not surprising, however, because clozapine received FDA approval for the treatment of suicidality in schizophrenia based on the InterSePT study.9
The bottom line: Evidence-based research leads to paradigm shifts in treatment that can shatter clinical dogmas. Stay tuned; ongoing psychiatric research will certainly generate new paradigms, and our patients will be better for it.
Like the “paradigm shift” Thomas Kuhn coined in his seminal book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,1 paradigm shifts have been occurring at a breathless pace in psychiatry. Thanks to ongoing research, changes in the clinical standard of care for schizophrenia in the past 20 years are a case in point.
Old paradigm: Clozapine is ‘last resort’
Let’s take 1988 as a starting point. That’s when clozapine was “resurrected” as the only drug with proven efficacy in refractory schizophrenia after several first-generation antipsychotics (FGAs) had been tried.2 However, because of its potentially fatal side effect (agranulocytosis), clozapine was designated as an absolute last-resort agent. It also was stigmatized for its many other side effects, including serious metabolic complications.
In the 1990s, several more-tolerable second-generation antipsychotics (SGAs) modeled after the clozapine receptor-binding paradigm with “broader efficacy” were launched and quickly became the standard of care. Then in 2000, the field was jolted by a meta-analysis claiming that SGAs are not superior to FGAs in either efficacy or tolerability.3 The 5-year Clinical Antipsychotic Trials of Intervention Effectiveness (CATIE) study, completed in 2004, confirmed that FGA and SGA discontinuation rates were not different,4 but it also showed that clozapine’s superior efficacy to FGAs also extended to SGAs.
Emerging research into neuroplasticity and neurogenesis later indicated that SGAs are neuroprotective, whereas FGAs are not.5 As a class, SGAs appeared to have repaired their tarnished image but still suffered from the fact that several are associated with metabolic syndrome risk factors,6 which are linked to early mortality.
New paradigm: Clozapine should be ‘first-line’
Then a report by Ray et al7 showing a significant increase in sudden cardiac death associated with both FGAs and SGAs appeared in January 2009. This put all antipsychotics in a negative light again. But in July 2009, a massive 11-year study by Tiihonen et al8 of 66,881 schizophrenia patients in Finland introduced yet another paradigm shift. It strongly suggested that clozapine was the safest antipsychotic, with the lowest mortality from all causes compared with any FGA or SGA, and that it should be considered as first-line treatment! That study also reported that mortality in antipsychotic-treated patients was lower than in untreated ones, which neutralized the cardiac death findings of Ray et al.
The greatest paradigm shift from the Tiihonen et al8 study is the stunning conclusion that clozapine should be a first-line antipsychotic, not a last resort for refractory patients. Clozapine has not only the highest efficacy (a very important outcome measure) but also the lowest mortality (death is the most important outcome measure in medicine!). Not a single practice guideline has ever recommended clozapine as a first-line antipsychotic. It is puzzling why the obesity, hyperglycemia, and hyperlipidemia observed with clozapine do not increase mortality. The low suicide rate with clozapine is not surprising, however, because clozapine received FDA approval for the treatment of suicidality in schizophrenia based on the InterSePT study.9
The bottom line: Evidence-based research leads to paradigm shifts in treatment that can shatter clinical dogmas. Stay tuned; ongoing psychiatric research will certainly generate new paradigms, and our patients will be better for it.
1. Kuhn TS. The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; 1962.
2. Kane JM, Honigfeld G, Singer J, et al. Clozapine for the treatment-resistant schizophrenia: a double-blind comparison with chlorpromazine. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1988;45:789-796.
3. Geddes J, Freemantle N, Harrison P, et al. Atypical antipsychotics in the treatment of schizophrenia: systemic overview and meta-regression analysis. BMJ. 2000;321:1371-1376.
4. Lieberman JA, Stroup TS, McEvoy JP, et al. Effectiveness of antipsychotic drugs in patients with chronic schizophrenia. N Engl J Med. 2005;353:1209-1223.
5. Nasrallah HA. Impaired neuroplasticity in schizophrenia and the neurogenerative effects of atypical antipsychotics. Medscape CME. Available at: http://cme.medscape.com/viewarticle/569521. Accessed August 11, 2009.
6. Meyer JM, Davis VG, Goff DC, et al. Change in metabolic syndrome parameters with antipsychotic treatment in the CATIE schizophrenia trial: prospective data from phase 1. Schizophr Res. 2008;101:273-286.
7. Ray WA, Chung CP, Murray KT, et al. Atypical antipsychotic drugs and the risk of sudden cardiac death. N Engl J Med. 2009;360:225-235.
8. Tiihonen J, Lönnqvist J, Wahlbeck K, et al. 11-year follow-up of mortality in patients with schizophrenia: a population-based cohort study (FIN11 study). Lancet. 2009;July 10. [Epub ahead of print].
9. Meltzer HY, Alphs L, Green AI, et al. Clozapine treatment for suicidality in schizophrenia: International Suicide Prevention Trial (InterSePT). Arch Gen Psychiatry. 2003;60:82-91.
1. Kuhn TS. The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; 1962.
2. Kane JM, Honigfeld G, Singer J, et al. Clozapine for the treatment-resistant schizophrenia: a double-blind comparison with chlorpromazine. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1988;45:789-796.
3. Geddes J, Freemantle N, Harrison P, et al. Atypical antipsychotics in the treatment of schizophrenia: systemic overview and meta-regression analysis. BMJ. 2000;321:1371-1376.
4. Lieberman JA, Stroup TS, McEvoy JP, et al. Effectiveness of antipsychotic drugs in patients with chronic schizophrenia. N Engl J Med. 2005;353:1209-1223.
5. Nasrallah HA. Impaired neuroplasticity in schizophrenia and the neurogenerative effects of atypical antipsychotics. Medscape CME. Available at: http://cme.medscape.com/viewarticle/569521. Accessed August 11, 2009.
6. Meyer JM, Davis VG, Goff DC, et al. Change in metabolic syndrome parameters with antipsychotic treatment in the CATIE schizophrenia trial: prospective data from phase 1. Schizophr Res. 2008;101:273-286.
7. Ray WA, Chung CP, Murray KT, et al. Atypical antipsychotic drugs and the risk of sudden cardiac death. N Engl J Med. 2009;360:225-235.
8. Tiihonen J, Lönnqvist J, Wahlbeck K, et al. 11-year follow-up of mortality in patients with schizophrenia: a population-based cohort study (FIN11 study). Lancet. 2009;July 10. [Epub ahead of print].
9. Meltzer HY, Alphs L, Green AI, et al. Clozapine treatment for suicidality in schizophrenia: International Suicide Prevention Trial (InterSePT). Arch Gen Psychiatry. 2003;60:82-91.
The patient who didn’t know
CASE: Unable to communicate
Mrs. A, age 44, is airlifted to the emergency room after a motor vehicle accident in which she was the restrained front seat passenger. She was on the way to a mental health follow-up appointment with her husband, who died on the scene, and 24-year-old son, who sustained multiple injuries. At the accident scene, Mrs. A was awake and responded to all questions by saying, “I don’t know.” No other history could be obtained. She was carrying documents from a local psychiatric facility that stated she had been discharged 1 month ago with a diagnosis of psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified (NOS). Her discharge medications were olanzapine, 15 mg at bedtime; escitalopram, 20 mg/d; lamotrigine, 100 mg/d; zolpidem, 10 mg as needed at bedtime; and diazepam, 5 mg tid.
Initial assessment reveals mild concussion, nondisplaced fractures of the left C7 and T1 transverse processes, and fracture of the posterior left first rib. Mrs. A is admitted to the trauma surgery service. Soon after, nurses report that Mrs. A is not able to report symptoms. Psychiatry service is consulted to evaluate her continued confusion and inability to communicate.
The authors’ observations
Mrs. A seems anxious because of my repeated attempts to communicate. Her affect is restricted, and her speech is limited to “I don’t know” but fluent. She does not appear to be responding to internal stimuli. Neurologic examination, including cranial nerves and reflexes, is normal. A chart review reveals that her psychiatric medications have been continued upon admission.
HISTORY: Always nervous
We contact Mrs. A’s son, who also was admitted to the hospital, for more information. He reports that his mother has a long history of “nerve problems,” which he describes as “crying and feeling sad and nervous.” He says Mrs. A’s mother also had these problems, and Mrs. A’s childhood was difficult (Table 1). Because of this condition, Mrs. A lives alone in a trailer next to the house where her husband and children live.
Mrs. A’s son said that she had a “nervous breakdown” a few months ago, was admitted to the local psychiatric facility, and since then had been saying only, “I don’t know.” She can communicate her wishes by pointing at “Yes” or “No” written on paper. At home, she can perform all activities of daily living (ADLs), including paying bills. He denies that his mother engages in drug abuse.
We obtain Mrs. A’s treatment records from the psychiatric facility and learn she was admitted with a history of confusion, auditory and visual hallucinations, and crying episodes. She had a history of noncompliance with outpatient medications, which included diazepam, duloxetine, and ziprasidone. Upon admission to that facility, Mrs. A was alert but disoriented to place and time. She answered questions slowly but was brief, sometimes incoherent, and having auditory and visual hallucinations.
During that hospitalization, clinicians established a working diagnosis of psychotic disorder, NOS. Mrs. A was noted to have a urinary tract infection, which they treated with amoxicillin/clavulanate. Ziprasidone was discontinued and olanzapine was started. Escitalopram and lamotrigine were added. Mrs. A’s hallucinations gradually resolved, and she was able to perform ADLs. However, she did not communicate much and started answering most questions with “I don’t know.” At discharge, she was sent home to the care of her sister and husband.
Since then, Mrs. A had been taking her medications regularly but did not show improvement in her speech or methods of communication.
The authors’ observations
7 and frontotemporal8 and stroke-related9 speech disorder. Neuroimaging studies may be helpful in differentiating language disorders from psychosis. For example, evidence of lesions in the language centers of the brain is found in some cases of aphasia, and enlarged ventricles is a common finding in patients with schizophrenia. We considered all of these possibilities when evaluating Mrs. A (Table 2).
Table 1
Mrs. A’s family and personal history of ‘nerve problems’
| Childhood | Mrs. A’s mother had ‘nerve problems.’ Her father physically abused Mrs. A. She received a ninth-grade education |
| Adult life | Married at age 17, Mrs. A had her first child at age 19, second child at age 20, and third child at age 21. She never obtained employment but raised her children with her husband |
| Last 2 years | Mrs. A lived in a trailer next to the house where her husband lived with 2 of their children. Family reports Mrs. A’s ’nerve problems’ were the reason for the separation. They state they took care of her needs and made sure she took her medications |
| Last 2 months | Mrs. A was admitted to a local psychiatric facility with confusion, hallucinations, crying spells, and decreased speech. After discharge, she could perform activities of daily living, but her speech did not improve |
| Present | Mrs. A is a passenger in a motor vehicle accident that results in her husband’s death and multiple injuries to her son. She is admitted to our hospital |
What is the cause of Mrs. A’s speech difficulties?
| Possible diagnosis | Finding that ruled it out |
|---|---|
| Primary progressive aphasia | Subacute onset with rapid progression |
| Frontotemporal dementia | Inconclusive mild frontotemporal atrophy on brain MRI |
| Nonconvulsive status epilepticus | Normal EEG |
| Conversion disorder | Uncommon presentation: Mrs. A is beyond usual age of onset, and symptoms have lasted >1 month |
| Broca’s aphasia/CVA | No corresponding organic lesions on MRI |
| Factitious disorder | No motivation to assume the sick role |
| Psychotic speech | No other evidence of psychosis |
| CVA: cerebrovascular accident; EEG: electroencephalography; MRI: magnetic resonance imaging | |
TREATMENT: An abbreviated stay
A week after admission, Mrs. A is deemed medically stable. Head CT reveals a small, calcified left parietal meningioma that did not correlate with her symptoms (Table 3). Brain MRI shows mild frontotemporal atrophy that was considered inconclusive evidence for a diagnosis of frontotemporal dementia; there is no evidence of infarction, tumors, or other enhancing lesions that may have explained Mrs. A’s symptoms. A 12-lead EEG shows no abnormalities, which rules out a seizure disorder.
Neurology consult rules out concussion syndrome. Over several different evaluations, Mrs. A is noted to follow commands, perform ADLs, and walk. She is able to write her name legibly but is unable to write anything else or to perform a clock-drawing test.
A speech pathology evaluation is requested. A speech pathologist diagnoses Mrs. A with expressive aphasia—impaired ability to speak and write—with some receptive component, meaning her ability to comprehend spoken words also is impaired.
Mrs. A’s speech status does not change, and she remains unable to communicate. She is discharged 10 days after admission with scheduled outpatient follow-up.
Table 3
Findings of Mrs. A’s neurologic testing
| Test | Result |
|---|---|
| Head CT | 1-cm dural-based lesion in the left posterior parietal region |
| Brain MRI | Mild, inconclusive frontotemporal atrophy |
| EEG | Normal |
| CT: computed tomography; EEG: electroencephalography; MRI: magnetic resonance imaging | |
The authors’ observations
At discharge, it seemed likely that Mrs. A may have early symptoms of a neurodegenerative illness, such as frontotemporal dementia, or the aphasia may be a manifestation of chronic psychotic depression. We wanted to follow up with neuropsychological testing and PET scan before establishing a definitive psychiatric diagnosis and modifying the treatment plan.
Related resources
- The Academy of Aphasia. www.academyofaphasia.org.
- The National Aphasia Association. www.aphasia.org.
- Amoxicillin/clavulanate • Augmentin
- Diazepam • Valium
- Duloxetine • Cymbalta
- Escitalopram • Lexapro
- Lamotrigine • Lamictal
- Olanzapine • Zyprexa
- Ziprasidone • Geodon
- Zolpidem • Ambien
The authors report no financial relationship with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
1. Jodzio K, Gasecki D, Drumm DA, et al. Neuroanatomical correlates of the post-stroke aphasias studied with cerebral blood flow SPECT scanning. Med Sci Monit. 2003;9(3):MT32-41.
2. Stein M, Cantrell SB. Nonfluent aphasia after closed head trauma: report of a case. J Oral Maxillofac Surg. 1999;57(6):745-748.
3. Piñol-Ripoll G, Pérez-Lázaro C, Beltrán-Marín I, et al. Aphasia as the sole symptom of partial status epilepticus [in Spanish]. Rev Neurol. 2004;39(11):1096-1097.
4. Balafouta MJ, Kouvaris JR, Miliadou AC, et al. Primitive neuroectodermal tumour in a 60-year-old man: a case report and literature review. Br J Radiol. 2003;76(901):62-65.
5. Kuramoto S, Hirano T, Uyama E, et al. A case of slowly progressive aphasia accompanied with auditory agnosia [in Japanese]. Rinsho Shinkeigaku. 2002;42(4):299-303.
6. Bulandra R, Medvighi O, Ninosu N. Aphasia or psychotic speech (discussion of a case) [in Romanian]. Neurol Psihiatr Neurochir. 1970;15(6):553-558.
7. Lawson B, Quintana JC. Non convulsive status epilepticus: an heterogeneous disease with a difficult diagnosis. Report of 2 cases with unusual presentation [in Spanish]. Rev Med Chil. 2003;131(9):1045-1050.
8. Vanderzeypen F, Bier JC, Genevrois C, et al. Frontal dementia or dementia praecox? A case report of a psychotic disorder with a severe decline [in French]. Encephale. 2003;29(2):172-180.
9. Sambunaris A, Hyde TM. Stroke-related aphasias mistaken for psychotic speech: two case reports. J Geriatr Psychiatry Neurol. 1994;7(3):144-147.
CASE: Unable to communicate
Mrs. A, age 44, is airlifted to the emergency room after a motor vehicle accident in which she was the restrained front seat passenger. She was on the way to a mental health follow-up appointment with her husband, who died on the scene, and 24-year-old son, who sustained multiple injuries. At the accident scene, Mrs. A was awake and responded to all questions by saying, “I don’t know.” No other history could be obtained. She was carrying documents from a local psychiatric facility that stated she had been discharged 1 month ago with a diagnosis of psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified (NOS). Her discharge medications were olanzapine, 15 mg at bedtime; escitalopram, 20 mg/d; lamotrigine, 100 mg/d; zolpidem, 10 mg as needed at bedtime; and diazepam, 5 mg tid.
Initial assessment reveals mild concussion, nondisplaced fractures of the left C7 and T1 transverse processes, and fracture of the posterior left first rib. Mrs. A is admitted to the trauma surgery service. Soon after, nurses report that Mrs. A is not able to report symptoms. Psychiatry service is consulted to evaluate her continued confusion and inability to communicate.
The authors’ observations
Mrs. A seems anxious because of my repeated attempts to communicate. Her affect is restricted, and her speech is limited to “I don’t know” but fluent. She does not appear to be responding to internal stimuli. Neurologic examination, including cranial nerves and reflexes, is normal. A chart review reveals that her psychiatric medications have been continued upon admission.
HISTORY: Always nervous
We contact Mrs. A’s son, who also was admitted to the hospital, for more information. He reports that his mother has a long history of “nerve problems,” which he describes as “crying and feeling sad and nervous.” He says Mrs. A’s mother also had these problems, and Mrs. A’s childhood was difficult (Table 1). Because of this condition, Mrs. A lives alone in a trailer next to the house where her husband and children live.
Mrs. A’s son said that she had a “nervous breakdown” a few months ago, was admitted to the local psychiatric facility, and since then had been saying only, “I don’t know.” She can communicate her wishes by pointing at “Yes” or “No” written on paper. At home, she can perform all activities of daily living (ADLs), including paying bills. He denies that his mother engages in drug abuse.
We obtain Mrs. A’s treatment records from the psychiatric facility and learn she was admitted with a history of confusion, auditory and visual hallucinations, and crying episodes. She had a history of noncompliance with outpatient medications, which included diazepam, duloxetine, and ziprasidone. Upon admission to that facility, Mrs. A was alert but disoriented to place and time. She answered questions slowly but was brief, sometimes incoherent, and having auditory and visual hallucinations.
During that hospitalization, clinicians established a working diagnosis of psychotic disorder, NOS. Mrs. A was noted to have a urinary tract infection, which they treated with amoxicillin/clavulanate. Ziprasidone was discontinued and olanzapine was started. Escitalopram and lamotrigine were added. Mrs. A’s hallucinations gradually resolved, and she was able to perform ADLs. However, she did not communicate much and started answering most questions with “I don’t know.” At discharge, she was sent home to the care of her sister and husband.
Since then, Mrs. A had been taking her medications regularly but did not show improvement in her speech or methods of communication.
The authors’ observations
7 and frontotemporal8 and stroke-related9 speech disorder. Neuroimaging studies may be helpful in differentiating language disorders from psychosis. For example, evidence of lesions in the language centers of the brain is found in some cases of aphasia, and enlarged ventricles is a common finding in patients with schizophrenia. We considered all of these possibilities when evaluating Mrs. A (Table 2).
Table 1
Mrs. A’s family and personal history of ‘nerve problems’
| Childhood | Mrs. A’s mother had ‘nerve problems.’ Her father physically abused Mrs. A. She received a ninth-grade education |
| Adult life | Married at age 17, Mrs. A had her first child at age 19, second child at age 20, and third child at age 21. She never obtained employment but raised her children with her husband |
| Last 2 years | Mrs. A lived in a trailer next to the house where her husband lived with 2 of their children. Family reports Mrs. A’s ’nerve problems’ were the reason for the separation. They state they took care of her needs and made sure she took her medications |
| Last 2 months | Mrs. A was admitted to a local psychiatric facility with confusion, hallucinations, crying spells, and decreased speech. After discharge, she could perform activities of daily living, but her speech did not improve |
| Present | Mrs. A is a passenger in a motor vehicle accident that results in her husband’s death and multiple injuries to her son. She is admitted to our hospital |
What is the cause of Mrs. A’s speech difficulties?
| Possible diagnosis | Finding that ruled it out |
|---|---|
| Primary progressive aphasia | Subacute onset with rapid progression |
| Frontotemporal dementia | Inconclusive mild frontotemporal atrophy on brain MRI |
| Nonconvulsive status epilepticus | Normal EEG |
| Conversion disorder | Uncommon presentation: Mrs. A is beyond usual age of onset, and symptoms have lasted >1 month |
| Broca’s aphasia/CVA | No corresponding organic lesions on MRI |
| Factitious disorder | No motivation to assume the sick role |
| Psychotic speech | No other evidence of psychosis |
| CVA: cerebrovascular accident; EEG: electroencephalography; MRI: magnetic resonance imaging | |
TREATMENT: An abbreviated stay
A week after admission, Mrs. A is deemed medically stable. Head CT reveals a small, calcified left parietal meningioma that did not correlate with her symptoms (Table 3). Brain MRI shows mild frontotemporal atrophy that was considered inconclusive evidence for a diagnosis of frontotemporal dementia; there is no evidence of infarction, tumors, or other enhancing lesions that may have explained Mrs. A’s symptoms. A 12-lead EEG shows no abnormalities, which rules out a seizure disorder.
Neurology consult rules out concussion syndrome. Over several different evaluations, Mrs. A is noted to follow commands, perform ADLs, and walk. She is able to write her name legibly but is unable to write anything else or to perform a clock-drawing test.
A speech pathology evaluation is requested. A speech pathologist diagnoses Mrs. A with expressive aphasia—impaired ability to speak and write—with some receptive component, meaning her ability to comprehend spoken words also is impaired.
Mrs. A’s speech status does not change, and she remains unable to communicate. She is discharged 10 days after admission with scheduled outpatient follow-up.
Table 3
Findings of Mrs. A’s neurologic testing
| Test | Result |
|---|---|
| Head CT | 1-cm dural-based lesion in the left posterior parietal region |
| Brain MRI | Mild, inconclusive frontotemporal atrophy |
| EEG | Normal |
| CT: computed tomography; EEG: electroencephalography; MRI: magnetic resonance imaging | |
The authors’ observations
At discharge, it seemed likely that Mrs. A may have early symptoms of a neurodegenerative illness, such as frontotemporal dementia, or the aphasia may be a manifestation of chronic psychotic depression. We wanted to follow up with neuropsychological testing and PET scan before establishing a definitive psychiatric diagnosis and modifying the treatment plan.
Related resources
- The Academy of Aphasia. www.academyofaphasia.org.
- The National Aphasia Association. www.aphasia.org.
- Amoxicillin/clavulanate • Augmentin
- Diazepam • Valium
- Duloxetine • Cymbalta
- Escitalopram • Lexapro
- Lamotrigine • Lamictal
- Olanzapine • Zyprexa
- Ziprasidone • Geodon
- Zolpidem • Ambien
The authors report no financial relationship with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
CASE: Unable to communicate
Mrs. A, age 44, is airlifted to the emergency room after a motor vehicle accident in which she was the restrained front seat passenger. She was on the way to a mental health follow-up appointment with her husband, who died on the scene, and 24-year-old son, who sustained multiple injuries. At the accident scene, Mrs. A was awake and responded to all questions by saying, “I don’t know.” No other history could be obtained. She was carrying documents from a local psychiatric facility that stated she had been discharged 1 month ago with a diagnosis of psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified (NOS). Her discharge medications were olanzapine, 15 mg at bedtime; escitalopram, 20 mg/d; lamotrigine, 100 mg/d; zolpidem, 10 mg as needed at bedtime; and diazepam, 5 mg tid.
Initial assessment reveals mild concussion, nondisplaced fractures of the left C7 and T1 transverse processes, and fracture of the posterior left first rib. Mrs. A is admitted to the trauma surgery service. Soon after, nurses report that Mrs. A is not able to report symptoms. Psychiatry service is consulted to evaluate her continued confusion and inability to communicate.
The authors’ observations
Mrs. A seems anxious because of my repeated attempts to communicate. Her affect is restricted, and her speech is limited to “I don’t know” but fluent. She does not appear to be responding to internal stimuli. Neurologic examination, including cranial nerves and reflexes, is normal. A chart review reveals that her psychiatric medications have been continued upon admission.
HISTORY: Always nervous
We contact Mrs. A’s son, who also was admitted to the hospital, for more information. He reports that his mother has a long history of “nerve problems,” which he describes as “crying and feeling sad and nervous.” He says Mrs. A’s mother also had these problems, and Mrs. A’s childhood was difficult (Table 1). Because of this condition, Mrs. A lives alone in a trailer next to the house where her husband and children live.
Mrs. A’s son said that she had a “nervous breakdown” a few months ago, was admitted to the local psychiatric facility, and since then had been saying only, “I don’t know.” She can communicate her wishes by pointing at “Yes” or “No” written on paper. At home, she can perform all activities of daily living (ADLs), including paying bills. He denies that his mother engages in drug abuse.
We obtain Mrs. A’s treatment records from the psychiatric facility and learn she was admitted with a history of confusion, auditory and visual hallucinations, and crying episodes. She had a history of noncompliance with outpatient medications, which included diazepam, duloxetine, and ziprasidone. Upon admission to that facility, Mrs. A was alert but disoriented to place and time. She answered questions slowly but was brief, sometimes incoherent, and having auditory and visual hallucinations.
During that hospitalization, clinicians established a working diagnosis of psychotic disorder, NOS. Mrs. A was noted to have a urinary tract infection, which they treated with amoxicillin/clavulanate. Ziprasidone was discontinued and olanzapine was started. Escitalopram and lamotrigine were added. Mrs. A’s hallucinations gradually resolved, and she was able to perform ADLs. However, she did not communicate much and started answering most questions with “I don’t know.” At discharge, she was sent home to the care of her sister and husband.
Since then, Mrs. A had been taking her medications regularly but did not show improvement in her speech or methods of communication.
The authors’ observations
7 and frontotemporal8 and stroke-related9 speech disorder. Neuroimaging studies may be helpful in differentiating language disorders from psychosis. For example, evidence of lesions in the language centers of the brain is found in some cases of aphasia, and enlarged ventricles is a common finding in patients with schizophrenia. We considered all of these possibilities when evaluating Mrs. A (Table 2).
Table 1
Mrs. A’s family and personal history of ‘nerve problems’
| Childhood | Mrs. A’s mother had ‘nerve problems.’ Her father physically abused Mrs. A. She received a ninth-grade education |
| Adult life | Married at age 17, Mrs. A had her first child at age 19, second child at age 20, and third child at age 21. She never obtained employment but raised her children with her husband |
| Last 2 years | Mrs. A lived in a trailer next to the house where her husband lived with 2 of their children. Family reports Mrs. A’s ’nerve problems’ were the reason for the separation. They state they took care of her needs and made sure she took her medications |
| Last 2 months | Mrs. A was admitted to a local psychiatric facility with confusion, hallucinations, crying spells, and decreased speech. After discharge, she could perform activities of daily living, but her speech did not improve |
| Present | Mrs. A is a passenger in a motor vehicle accident that results in her husband’s death and multiple injuries to her son. She is admitted to our hospital |
What is the cause of Mrs. A’s speech difficulties?
| Possible diagnosis | Finding that ruled it out |
|---|---|
| Primary progressive aphasia | Subacute onset with rapid progression |
| Frontotemporal dementia | Inconclusive mild frontotemporal atrophy on brain MRI |
| Nonconvulsive status epilepticus | Normal EEG |
| Conversion disorder | Uncommon presentation: Mrs. A is beyond usual age of onset, and symptoms have lasted >1 month |
| Broca’s aphasia/CVA | No corresponding organic lesions on MRI |
| Factitious disorder | No motivation to assume the sick role |
| Psychotic speech | No other evidence of psychosis |
| CVA: cerebrovascular accident; EEG: electroencephalography; MRI: magnetic resonance imaging | |
TREATMENT: An abbreviated stay
A week after admission, Mrs. A is deemed medically stable. Head CT reveals a small, calcified left parietal meningioma that did not correlate with her symptoms (Table 3). Brain MRI shows mild frontotemporal atrophy that was considered inconclusive evidence for a diagnosis of frontotemporal dementia; there is no evidence of infarction, tumors, or other enhancing lesions that may have explained Mrs. A’s symptoms. A 12-lead EEG shows no abnormalities, which rules out a seizure disorder.
Neurology consult rules out concussion syndrome. Over several different evaluations, Mrs. A is noted to follow commands, perform ADLs, and walk. She is able to write her name legibly but is unable to write anything else or to perform a clock-drawing test.
A speech pathology evaluation is requested. A speech pathologist diagnoses Mrs. A with expressive aphasia—impaired ability to speak and write—with some receptive component, meaning her ability to comprehend spoken words also is impaired.
Mrs. A’s speech status does not change, and she remains unable to communicate. She is discharged 10 days after admission with scheduled outpatient follow-up.
Table 3
Findings of Mrs. A’s neurologic testing
| Test | Result |
|---|---|
| Head CT | 1-cm dural-based lesion in the left posterior parietal region |
| Brain MRI | Mild, inconclusive frontotemporal atrophy |
| EEG | Normal |
| CT: computed tomography; EEG: electroencephalography; MRI: magnetic resonance imaging | |
The authors’ observations
At discharge, it seemed likely that Mrs. A may have early symptoms of a neurodegenerative illness, such as frontotemporal dementia, or the aphasia may be a manifestation of chronic psychotic depression. We wanted to follow up with neuropsychological testing and PET scan before establishing a definitive psychiatric diagnosis and modifying the treatment plan.
Related resources
- The Academy of Aphasia. www.academyofaphasia.org.
- The National Aphasia Association. www.aphasia.org.
- Amoxicillin/clavulanate • Augmentin
- Diazepam • Valium
- Duloxetine • Cymbalta
- Escitalopram • Lexapro
- Lamotrigine • Lamictal
- Olanzapine • Zyprexa
- Ziprasidone • Geodon
- Zolpidem • Ambien
The authors report no financial relationship with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
1. Jodzio K, Gasecki D, Drumm DA, et al. Neuroanatomical correlates of the post-stroke aphasias studied with cerebral blood flow SPECT scanning. Med Sci Monit. 2003;9(3):MT32-41.
2. Stein M, Cantrell SB. Nonfluent aphasia after closed head trauma: report of a case. J Oral Maxillofac Surg. 1999;57(6):745-748.
3. Piñol-Ripoll G, Pérez-Lázaro C, Beltrán-Marín I, et al. Aphasia as the sole symptom of partial status epilepticus [in Spanish]. Rev Neurol. 2004;39(11):1096-1097.
4. Balafouta MJ, Kouvaris JR, Miliadou AC, et al. Primitive neuroectodermal tumour in a 60-year-old man: a case report and literature review. Br J Radiol. 2003;76(901):62-65.
5. Kuramoto S, Hirano T, Uyama E, et al. A case of slowly progressive aphasia accompanied with auditory agnosia [in Japanese]. Rinsho Shinkeigaku. 2002;42(4):299-303.
6. Bulandra R, Medvighi O, Ninosu N. Aphasia or psychotic speech (discussion of a case) [in Romanian]. Neurol Psihiatr Neurochir. 1970;15(6):553-558.
7. Lawson B, Quintana JC. Non convulsive status epilepticus: an heterogeneous disease with a difficult diagnosis. Report of 2 cases with unusual presentation [in Spanish]. Rev Med Chil. 2003;131(9):1045-1050.
8. Vanderzeypen F, Bier JC, Genevrois C, et al. Frontal dementia or dementia praecox? A case report of a psychotic disorder with a severe decline [in French]. Encephale. 2003;29(2):172-180.
9. Sambunaris A, Hyde TM. Stroke-related aphasias mistaken for psychotic speech: two case reports. J Geriatr Psychiatry Neurol. 1994;7(3):144-147.
1. Jodzio K, Gasecki D, Drumm DA, et al. Neuroanatomical correlates of the post-stroke aphasias studied with cerebral blood flow SPECT scanning. Med Sci Monit. 2003;9(3):MT32-41.
2. Stein M, Cantrell SB. Nonfluent aphasia after closed head trauma: report of a case. J Oral Maxillofac Surg. 1999;57(6):745-748.
3. Piñol-Ripoll G, Pérez-Lázaro C, Beltrán-Marín I, et al. Aphasia as the sole symptom of partial status epilepticus [in Spanish]. Rev Neurol. 2004;39(11):1096-1097.
4. Balafouta MJ, Kouvaris JR, Miliadou AC, et al. Primitive neuroectodermal tumour in a 60-year-old man: a case report and literature review. Br J Radiol. 2003;76(901):62-65.
5. Kuramoto S, Hirano T, Uyama E, et al. A case of slowly progressive aphasia accompanied with auditory agnosia [in Japanese]. Rinsho Shinkeigaku. 2002;42(4):299-303.
6. Bulandra R, Medvighi O, Ninosu N. Aphasia or psychotic speech (discussion of a case) [in Romanian]. Neurol Psihiatr Neurochir. 1970;15(6):553-558.
7. Lawson B, Quintana JC. Non convulsive status epilepticus: an heterogeneous disease with a difficult diagnosis. Report of 2 cases with unusual presentation [in Spanish]. Rev Med Chil. 2003;131(9):1045-1050.
8. Vanderzeypen F, Bier JC, Genevrois C, et al. Frontal dementia or dementia praecox? A case report of a psychotic disorder with a severe decline [in French]. Encephale. 2003;29(2):172-180.
9. Sambunaris A, Hyde TM. Stroke-related aphasias mistaken for psychotic speech: two case reports. J Geriatr Psychiatry Neurol. 1994;7(3):144-147.
Dissociative identity disorder: Time to remove it from DSM-V?
What is it about dissociative identity disorder (DID) that makes it a polarizing diagnosis? Why does it split professionals into believers and nonbelievers, stirring up heated debates, high emotions, and fervor similar to what we see in religion?
The DID controversy is likely to continue beyond the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V), slated for publication in 2012. Proponents and opponents claim to have the upper hand in arguments about the validity of the DID diagnosis and benefits vs harm of treatment. This article examines the logic of previous and new arguments.
1. The fallacy of equal-footing arguments
When 301 board-certified U.S. psychiatrists were surveyed in 1999 about their attitudes toward DSM-IV dissociative disorders diagnoses:
- 35% had no reservations about DID
- 43% were skeptical
- 15% indicated the diagnosis should not be included in the DSM.1
Only 21% believed there was strong evidence for DID’s scientific validity. On balance, published papers appear skeptical about DID’s core components: dissociative amnesia and recovered-memory therapy.2
DID skeptics are sometimes accused of “denial” or “reluctance” to accept this diagnosis. Informed skepticism is acceptable—even encouraged—in making a diagnosis of malingering, factitious disorder, some personality disorders, substance abuse, and psychotic states, to name a few. Why is informed skepticism about DID frowned on?
In medical and surgical specialties, informed skepticism is encouraged so that the practitioner challenges his or her assumptions about a possible diagnosis through a methodical process of inclusion, exclusion, and hypothesis testing. I argue that little or no skepticism is substandard practice, if not negligence.
Bertrand Russell’s celestial teapot parable (Box 1)3 exposed the fallacy of equal-footing arguments (ie, in any debate or argument that has 2 sides, the 2 sides are not necessarily on equal footing). Russell’s argument is valid for any belief system relying on faith. Now that DID is in the “ancient book” (DSM-IV), the burden of proof by some magical logic has shifted to “nonbelievers.” In law that is called precedent, but law is even less scientific than psychiatry and not the best example to follow. A mistake made 100 years ago is still a mistake.
In 1952, British philosopher Bertrand Russell used the analogy of a teapot in space to illustrate the difficulty skeptics face when questioning unfalsifiable claims. Russell’s argument involved religious belief, but it is valid for other belief systems relying on faith. Here is the celestial teapot analogy:
“If I were to suggest that between Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the Sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. If, however, the existence of such a teapot were affirmed in ancient books, taught as the sacred truth every Sunday, and instilled into the minds of children at school, hesitation to believe in its existence would be a mark of eccentricity and entitle the doubter to the attention of the psychiatrist in an enlightened age or of the Inquisitor in an earlier time.”
Source: Reference 3
2. Illogic of causation
Piper and Merskey’s extensive literature review4,5 examined the presumed association between DID and childhood abuse (mostly sexual). They found:
- no proof that DID results from childhood trauma or that DID cases in children are almost never reported
- “consistent evidence of blatant iatrogenesis” in the practice of some DID proponents.
One can easily turn the logic around by claiming that a DID diagnosis causes memories of childhood sexual abuse.
As for patients’ presumed reluctance to report childhood abuse, I witnessed in every one of my 15 alleged cases of DID (all female) not reluctance but a strong tendency to flaunt their diagnosis and symptoms and an eagerness to re-tell their stories with graphic detail, usually unprovoked. Patients with a DID diagnosis seem to have a “powerful vested interest”—to borrow Paul McHugh’s expression6—in sustaining the DID diagnosis, symptoms, behaviors, and therapy as an end in itself.
DID proponents acknowledge that iatrogenic artifacts may exist in the diagnosis and treatment. However, they almost immediately insinuate that DID patients’ “subtle defensive strategies” generate these artifacts. Greaves’ discussion of multiple personality disorder7 acknowledged that overdiagnosis may be driven by therapists’ desire to “attain narcissistic gratification at ‘having a multiple [sic] of their own’” but blamed this on “neophytes.”
3. Tautology in DID’s definition
DSM-IV’s criterion A for DID is in fact a definition: “the presence of 2 or more distinct identities or personality states (each with its own relatively enduring pattern of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment and self).”8 Together, criteria A and B show circularity and redundancy. If A is met, then B must be met because “a person’s behavior” is part of her or his identity and personality state, which was established in A.
Tautology is a major shortcoming of the descriptive system for psychopathology in general. Of greater clinical value are observing a patient’s actions, listening to his or her words, learning his or her history, studying his or her expressions, and noting his or her relationships.9
4. Bewitchment by language
Psychiatrists could spend hours over strong cups of coffee arguing the meanings of terms such as “dissociation,” “presence,” “identity,” “personality state,” etc. Psychiatry has been targeted unfairly regarding where it falls on the subjectivity-objectivity axis, but it has not fared that differently from other medical specialties.10 Psychiatry, however, depends much more on language.
Consider slippery terms such as personality, identity, self, dissociation, integration, alters, ego, ego states, trance states, personality states, unconscious, etc. Lack of precision, variability in use of words and their meaning, and variability in understanding the concept that these terms try to communicate make speaking a common language extremely difficult. To borrow from Wittgenstein, psychiatrists’ intellect is bewitched by language.11
Words fail to communicate experiences such as the taste of red wine or the feeling of sand beneath bare feet. It is almost futile to try to define dissociation, identity, personality states, etc., using words or even pictures. More definitions and agreement on stricter definitions would not provide greater clarity or solve the problem of first-person authority.
An example is found in DID’s criterion B: “at least 2 of these identities or personality states recurrently take control of the person’s behavior” [italics mine]. “Possession” seems to be a fitting word! Whether it is an alter or the devil taking control is a technicality. Even more acceptable would be possessed by inconsolable anger, possessed by fierce jealousy, possessed by lust, possessed by hatred and vengeance, possessed by and obsessed with love, possessed by cocaine, etc.
Dissociation is used to describe so many things that it has become almost meaningless (Table). I refer not only to definitional imprecision but also to a lack of consensus on the nature of the concept itself.
The word “control” is another term on whose meaning almost no 2 psychiatrists agree. Consensus on definitions is elusive when words become divorced from the concepts they were intended to describe.
Table
A meaningless word? ‘Dissociation’ is used to describe many things
| Daydreaming or fantasizing |
| Memory lapses caused by benzodiazepines |
| Preoccupation with everyday worries |
| Preoccupation with internal stimuli (such as auditory hallucinations or delusional thoughts) |
| Poor attentiveness |
| Histrionic/theatrical behavior to avoid upsetting the patient or to provide a face-saving explanation |
| Daydreaming while driving (‘highway dissociation’ or ‘highway hypnosis’) |
| Getting engrossed/captivated by a novel, a movie, or a piece of radio journalism or music |
5. Validity of first-person authority
The skeptic’s attempt to investigate a subjective phenomena—especially DID—is bound to break on the rocks of the first-person authority, to borrow Donald Davidson’s words.9 To support reliability and validity of the diagnosis, dissociation researchers rely on “scales” and “instruments” to give the impression of objectivity, empiricism, and “science” hard at work. However, a quick look at some of the questions on these “instruments” reveals their assault on reason and intellect (Box 2).12
Proponents who claim DID is “sufficiently validated for inclusion in the current and future versions of DSM” are to be commended for adding “much more research is needed in several areas.”13 Piper and Merskey’s review4,5 concluded that DID could not be reliably diagnosed.
A-DES: I get so wrapped up in watching TV, reading, or playing a video game that I don’t have any idea what’s going on around me.
Comment: Although this item seems like a joke, it is not meant as one. It is meant to be part of the serious business of science. Isn’t that what any ‘normal’ human would do if he or she has enough attention and concentration?
A-DES: People tell me I do or say things that I don’t remember doing or saying.
I get confused about whether I have done something or only thought about doing it.
I can’t figure out if things really happened or if I only dreamed or thought about them.
People tell me that I sometimes act so differently that I seem like a different person.
Comment: These items are crafted in a way to encourage false positives. First, ‘people tell me’ does not qualify as an ‘experience.’ Second, one wonders why the scale was made up of declarative statements instead of questions. Third, ‘I seem like a different person’ is a leading statement.
A-DES: I am so good at lying and acting that I believe it myself.
Comment: This should be an immediate tip-off that the reporter is unreliable.
A-DES: I feel like my past is a puzzle and some of the pieces are missing.
Comment: Isn’t this the human condition?
*A-DES statements are italicized; comments by Dr. Gharaibeh are in plain text
Source: Reference 12
6. Does a DID diagnosis do harm?
Webster’s14 defines iatrogenic as: “Resulting from the activity of a physician. Originally applied to a disorder or disorders inadvertently induced in the patient by the manner of the physician’s examination, discussion, or treatment, it now applies to any condition occurring in a patient as result of medical treatment, such as a drug reaction.”
A DID diagnosis has been blamed for misdiagnosis of other entities,15 patient mismanagement,16 and inadequate treatment of depression.17 Even when DID is treated with the best of intentions, undesired negative effects may result from psychotherapy, and some patients experience worsening of symptoms and/or deterioration of functioning.18,19
In Creating Hysteria, Acocella20 cites examples of harm done to [alleged DID] patients and their families, including 2 high-profile cases under the care of a member of the DSM-IV work group on dissociation.
7. How is self-deception possible?
The ability to self-deceive has advantages and disadvantages,21 and widespread deception is possible. Richard Dawkins’s The God Delusion,22 Christopher Hitchens’s God is Not Great,23 and Michael Shermer’s Why People Believe Weird Things24 are recent exposés of how self-deception and deception by charismatic figures occurs despite the progress “reason” has made.
As with other belief systems that become entrenched in the face of criticism, DID proponents accuse critics of denial, reluctance, and adopting “defense[s] against dealing with the reality of child abuse in North America.”20 One wonders why just North America! Why not Africa, with its children in Sudan, Somalia, Zimbabwe—to name a few—enduring enough abuse to spread around the world several times over?
Proponents also allege that part of the reason for “professionals’ reluctance” to embrace DID is the “subtle presentation of the symptoms.”25 In other words, it is not reluctance; it is ignorance, with the insinuation that nonbelievers or skeptics are not smart enough to pick up on the subtle clinical presentation. I can’t see why professionals would be ignorant when it comes to dissociation as opposed to schizophrenia, depression, bipolar disorder, and almost all DSM-IV disorders. Why this selective ignorance exists remains unexplained.
8. Experts and conflict of interest
DSM-V’s guidelines on conflict of interest are very welcome. One hopes conflict of interest does not refer only to financial relationships with pharmaceutical companies. Conflicts of interest can exert unseen influence, which—if made clear—would have a direct bearing of the reliability and trustworthiness of the published literature. Strong adherents have a lot to gain from perpetuating DID. Nonbelievers, skeptics, and opponents would gain nothing if DID disappeared from DSM today or in 2012.
The first potential conflict of interest for DID “experts” is financial gain. For example, a psychologist saw 1 of my patients (before I came to the scene) for 5 years for 3 sessions a week (2 for adult alters and 1 for childhood alters), with annual earnings of nearly $20,000. A self-declared expert would need only 10 patients to be better off than most psychiatrists.
The second potential conflict of interest is personal gain in the form of narcissistic gratification, as mentioned above. Although DID proponents blame neophytes, “teachers” are no less prone to narcissistic gratification. Under this umbrella falls the DID experts’ interest in recognition, fame, and easily acquired expertise. One may argue that self-arrogated expertise in this realm is much ado about nothing.
The third potential conflict of interest is the very process of becoming an “expert.” The bias of this process is evident because if one does not accept a priori the presence of DID, he or she will never be admitted to the exclusive club of “DID experts.” To attain the status of authority or expert on this subject, one must be a believer. Otherwise, how would one claim to have diagnosed and treated hundreds of DID cases? It is a feedback loop that can’t be broken.
Related resources
- Borch-Jacobsen M. Making minds and madness: from hysteria to depression. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press; 2009.
- Memory and reality. False Memory Syndrome Foundation. www.fmsfonline.org.
Disclosure
Dr. Gharaibeh reports no financial relationship with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
1. Pope HG, Jr, Oliva PS, Hudson JI, et al. Attitudes toward DSMIV dissociative disorders diagnoses among board-certified American psychiatrists. Am J Psychiatry. 1999;156(2):321-323.
2. Pope HG, Jr, Barry S, Bodkin A, et al. Tracking scientific interest in the dissociative disorders: a study of scientific publication output 1984-2003. Psychother Psychosom. 2006;75:19-24.
3. Russell B. Is there a God? Available at: http://www.cfpf.org.uk/articles/religion/br/br_god.html. Accessed June 25, 2009.
4. Piper A, Merskey H. The persistence of folly: a critical examination of dissociative identity disorder. Part I. The excesses of an improbable concept. Can J Psychiatry. 2004;49(9):592-600.
5. Piper A, Merskey H. The persistence of folly: critical examination of dissociative identity disorder. Part II. The defense and decline of multiple personality or dissociative identity disorder. Can J Psychiatry. 2004;49(10):678-683.
6. McHugh PR. Multiple personality disorder (dissociative identity disorder). Available at: http://www.psycom.net/mchugh.html. Accessed August 5, 2009.
7. Greaves GB. Observations on the claim of iatrogenesis of MPD: a discussion. Dissociation. 1989;2(2):99-104.
8. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders 4th ed. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association; 1994.
9. Davidson D. Subjective, intersubjective, objective. New York, NY: Oxford University Press; 2001:15.
10. Pies R. Psychiatry clearly meets the ‘objectivity’ test. Psychiatric News. 2005;40(19):17.-
11. Sluga H, Stern DG. The Cambridge companion to Wittgenstein. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press; 1966.
12. Armstrong JG, Putnam FW, Carlson EB, et al. Development and validation of a measure of adolescent dissociation: The Adolescent Dissociative Experience Scale. J Nerv Ment Dis. 1997;185:491-497.
13. Gleaves DH, May MC, Cardeña E. An examination of the diagnostic validity of dissociative identity disorder. Clin Psychol Rev. 2001;21(4):577-608.
14. The new Webster’s international comprehensive dictionary of the English language. New York, NY: American International Press; 1991.
15. Freeland A, Manchanda R, Chiu S, et al. Four cases of supposed multiple personality disorder: evidence of unjustified diagnoses. Can J Psychiatry. 1993;23:245-247.
16. McHugh PR. Try to remember: psychiatry’s clash over meaning, memory, and mind. Washington, DC: Dana Press; 2008.
17. Fetkewicz J, Sharma V, Merskey H. A note on suicidal deterioration with recovered memory treatment. J Affect Disord. 2000;58:155-159.
18. Hadley SW, Strupp HH. Contemporary views of negative effects in psychotherapy. An integrated account. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1976;33(11):1291-1302.
19. Bergin AE. The deterioration effect: a reply to Braucht. J Abnorm Psychol. 1970;75(3):300-302.
20. Acocella J. Creating hysteria: women and multiple personality disorder. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers; 1999:81.
21. Nasrallah HA. Self-deception: a double-edged trait. Current Psychiatry. 2008;7(7):14-16.
22. Dawkins R. The God delusion. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin; 2006.
23. Hitchens C. God is not great: how religion poisons everything. New York, NY: Twelve/Hachette Book Group; 2007.
24. Shermer M. Why people believe weird things: pseudoscience, superstition, and other confusions of our time. New York, NY: W.H. Freeman and Company; 1997.
25. Coons PM. Child abuse and multiple personality disorder: review of the literature and suggestions for treatment. Child Abuse Negl. 1986;10(4):455-462.
What is it about dissociative identity disorder (DID) that makes it a polarizing diagnosis? Why does it split professionals into believers and nonbelievers, stirring up heated debates, high emotions, and fervor similar to what we see in religion?
The DID controversy is likely to continue beyond the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V), slated for publication in 2012. Proponents and opponents claim to have the upper hand in arguments about the validity of the DID diagnosis and benefits vs harm of treatment. This article examines the logic of previous and new arguments.
1. The fallacy of equal-footing arguments
When 301 board-certified U.S. psychiatrists were surveyed in 1999 about their attitudes toward DSM-IV dissociative disorders diagnoses:
- 35% had no reservations about DID
- 43% were skeptical
- 15% indicated the diagnosis should not be included in the DSM.1
Only 21% believed there was strong evidence for DID’s scientific validity. On balance, published papers appear skeptical about DID’s core components: dissociative amnesia and recovered-memory therapy.2
DID skeptics are sometimes accused of “denial” or “reluctance” to accept this diagnosis. Informed skepticism is acceptable—even encouraged—in making a diagnosis of malingering, factitious disorder, some personality disorders, substance abuse, and psychotic states, to name a few. Why is informed skepticism about DID frowned on?
In medical and surgical specialties, informed skepticism is encouraged so that the practitioner challenges his or her assumptions about a possible diagnosis through a methodical process of inclusion, exclusion, and hypothesis testing. I argue that little or no skepticism is substandard practice, if not negligence.
Bertrand Russell’s celestial teapot parable (Box 1)3 exposed the fallacy of equal-footing arguments (ie, in any debate or argument that has 2 sides, the 2 sides are not necessarily on equal footing). Russell’s argument is valid for any belief system relying on faith. Now that DID is in the “ancient book” (DSM-IV), the burden of proof by some magical logic has shifted to “nonbelievers.” In law that is called precedent, but law is even less scientific than psychiatry and not the best example to follow. A mistake made 100 years ago is still a mistake.
In 1952, British philosopher Bertrand Russell used the analogy of a teapot in space to illustrate the difficulty skeptics face when questioning unfalsifiable claims. Russell’s argument involved religious belief, but it is valid for other belief systems relying on faith. Here is the celestial teapot analogy:
“If I were to suggest that between Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the Sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. If, however, the existence of such a teapot were affirmed in ancient books, taught as the sacred truth every Sunday, and instilled into the minds of children at school, hesitation to believe in its existence would be a mark of eccentricity and entitle the doubter to the attention of the psychiatrist in an enlightened age or of the Inquisitor in an earlier time.”
Source: Reference 3
2. Illogic of causation
Piper and Merskey’s extensive literature review4,5 examined the presumed association between DID and childhood abuse (mostly sexual). They found:
- no proof that DID results from childhood trauma or that DID cases in children are almost never reported
- “consistent evidence of blatant iatrogenesis” in the practice of some DID proponents.
One can easily turn the logic around by claiming that a DID diagnosis causes memories of childhood sexual abuse.
As for patients’ presumed reluctance to report childhood abuse, I witnessed in every one of my 15 alleged cases of DID (all female) not reluctance but a strong tendency to flaunt their diagnosis and symptoms and an eagerness to re-tell their stories with graphic detail, usually unprovoked. Patients with a DID diagnosis seem to have a “powerful vested interest”—to borrow Paul McHugh’s expression6—in sustaining the DID diagnosis, symptoms, behaviors, and therapy as an end in itself.
DID proponents acknowledge that iatrogenic artifacts may exist in the diagnosis and treatment. However, they almost immediately insinuate that DID patients’ “subtle defensive strategies” generate these artifacts. Greaves’ discussion of multiple personality disorder7 acknowledged that overdiagnosis may be driven by therapists’ desire to “attain narcissistic gratification at ‘having a multiple [sic] of their own’” but blamed this on “neophytes.”
3. Tautology in DID’s definition
DSM-IV’s criterion A for DID is in fact a definition: “the presence of 2 or more distinct identities or personality states (each with its own relatively enduring pattern of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment and self).”8 Together, criteria A and B show circularity and redundancy. If A is met, then B must be met because “a person’s behavior” is part of her or his identity and personality state, which was established in A.
Tautology is a major shortcoming of the descriptive system for psychopathology in general. Of greater clinical value are observing a patient’s actions, listening to his or her words, learning his or her history, studying his or her expressions, and noting his or her relationships.9
4. Bewitchment by language
Psychiatrists could spend hours over strong cups of coffee arguing the meanings of terms such as “dissociation,” “presence,” “identity,” “personality state,” etc. Psychiatry has been targeted unfairly regarding where it falls on the subjectivity-objectivity axis, but it has not fared that differently from other medical specialties.10 Psychiatry, however, depends much more on language.
Consider slippery terms such as personality, identity, self, dissociation, integration, alters, ego, ego states, trance states, personality states, unconscious, etc. Lack of precision, variability in use of words and their meaning, and variability in understanding the concept that these terms try to communicate make speaking a common language extremely difficult. To borrow from Wittgenstein, psychiatrists’ intellect is bewitched by language.11
Words fail to communicate experiences such as the taste of red wine or the feeling of sand beneath bare feet. It is almost futile to try to define dissociation, identity, personality states, etc., using words or even pictures. More definitions and agreement on stricter definitions would not provide greater clarity or solve the problem of first-person authority.
An example is found in DID’s criterion B: “at least 2 of these identities or personality states recurrently take control of the person’s behavior” [italics mine]. “Possession” seems to be a fitting word! Whether it is an alter or the devil taking control is a technicality. Even more acceptable would be possessed by inconsolable anger, possessed by fierce jealousy, possessed by lust, possessed by hatred and vengeance, possessed by and obsessed with love, possessed by cocaine, etc.
Dissociation is used to describe so many things that it has become almost meaningless (Table). I refer not only to definitional imprecision but also to a lack of consensus on the nature of the concept itself.
The word “control” is another term on whose meaning almost no 2 psychiatrists agree. Consensus on definitions is elusive when words become divorced from the concepts they were intended to describe.
Table
A meaningless word? ‘Dissociation’ is used to describe many things
| Daydreaming or fantasizing |
| Memory lapses caused by benzodiazepines |
| Preoccupation with everyday worries |
| Preoccupation with internal stimuli (such as auditory hallucinations or delusional thoughts) |
| Poor attentiveness |
| Histrionic/theatrical behavior to avoid upsetting the patient or to provide a face-saving explanation |
| Daydreaming while driving (‘highway dissociation’ or ‘highway hypnosis’) |
| Getting engrossed/captivated by a novel, a movie, or a piece of radio journalism or music |
5. Validity of first-person authority
The skeptic’s attempt to investigate a subjective phenomena—especially DID—is bound to break on the rocks of the first-person authority, to borrow Donald Davidson’s words.9 To support reliability and validity of the diagnosis, dissociation researchers rely on “scales” and “instruments” to give the impression of objectivity, empiricism, and “science” hard at work. However, a quick look at some of the questions on these “instruments” reveals their assault on reason and intellect (Box 2).12
Proponents who claim DID is “sufficiently validated for inclusion in the current and future versions of DSM” are to be commended for adding “much more research is needed in several areas.”13 Piper and Merskey’s review4,5 concluded that DID could not be reliably diagnosed.
A-DES: I get so wrapped up in watching TV, reading, or playing a video game that I don’t have any idea what’s going on around me.
Comment: Although this item seems like a joke, it is not meant as one. It is meant to be part of the serious business of science. Isn’t that what any ‘normal’ human would do if he or she has enough attention and concentration?
A-DES: People tell me I do or say things that I don’t remember doing or saying.
I get confused about whether I have done something or only thought about doing it.
I can’t figure out if things really happened or if I only dreamed or thought about them.
People tell me that I sometimes act so differently that I seem like a different person.
Comment: These items are crafted in a way to encourage false positives. First, ‘people tell me’ does not qualify as an ‘experience.’ Second, one wonders why the scale was made up of declarative statements instead of questions. Third, ‘I seem like a different person’ is a leading statement.
A-DES: I am so good at lying and acting that I believe it myself.
Comment: This should be an immediate tip-off that the reporter is unreliable.
A-DES: I feel like my past is a puzzle and some of the pieces are missing.
Comment: Isn’t this the human condition?
*A-DES statements are italicized; comments by Dr. Gharaibeh are in plain text
Source: Reference 12
6. Does a DID diagnosis do harm?
Webster’s14 defines iatrogenic as: “Resulting from the activity of a physician. Originally applied to a disorder or disorders inadvertently induced in the patient by the manner of the physician’s examination, discussion, or treatment, it now applies to any condition occurring in a patient as result of medical treatment, such as a drug reaction.”
A DID diagnosis has been blamed for misdiagnosis of other entities,15 patient mismanagement,16 and inadequate treatment of depression.17 Even when DID is treated with the best of intentions, undesired negative effects may result from psychotherapy, and some patients experience worsening of symptoms and/or deterioration of functioning.18,19
In Creating Hysteria, Acocella20 cites examples of harm done to [alleged DID] patients and their families, including 2 high-profile cases under the care of a member of the DSM-IV work group on dissociation.
7. How is self-deception possible?
The ability to self-deceive has advantages and disadvantages,21 and widespread deception is possible. Richard Dawkins’s The God Delusion,22 Christopher Hitchens’s God is Not Great,23 and Michael Shermer’s Why People Believe Weird Things24 are recent exposés of how self-deception and deception by charismatic figures occurs despite the progress “reason” has made.
As with other belief systems that become entrenched in the face of criticism, DID proponents accuse critics of denial, reluctance, and adopting “defense[s] against dealing with the reality of child abuse in North America.”20 One wonders why just North America! Why not Africa, with its children in Sudan, Somalia, Zimbabwe—to name a few—enduring enough abuse to spread around the world several times over?
Proponents also allege that part of the reason for “professionals’ reluctance” to embrace DID is the “subtle presentation of the symptoms.”25 In other words, it is not reluctance; it is ignorance, with the insinuation that nonbelievers or skeptics are not smart enough to pick up on the subtle clinical presentation. I can’t see why professionals would be ignorant when it comes to dissociation as opposed to schizophrenia, depression, bipolar disorder, and almost all DSM-IV disorders. Why this selective ignorance exists remains unexplained.
8. Experts and conflict of interest
DSM-V’s guidelines on conflict of interest are very welcome. One hopes conflict of interest does not refer only to financial relationships with pharmaceutical companies. Conflicts of interest can exert unseen influence, which—if made clear—would have a direct bearing of the reliability and trustworthiness of the published literature. Strong adherents have a lot to gain from perpetuating DID. Nonbelievers, skeptics, and opponents would gain nothing if DID disappeared from DSM today or in 2012.
The first potential conflict of interest for DID “experts” is financial gain. For example, a psychologist saw 1 of my patients (before I came to the scene) for 5 years for 3 sessions a week (2 for adult alters and 1 for childhood alters), with annual earnings of nearly $20,000. A self-declared expert would need only 10 patients to be better off than most psychiatrists.
The second potential conflict of interest is personal gain in the form of narcissistic gratification, as mentioned above. Although DID proponents blame neophytes, “teachers” are no less prone to narcissistic gratification. Under this umbrella falls the DID experts’ interest in recognition, fame, and easily acquired expertise. One may argue that self-arrogated expertise in this realm is much ado about nothing.
The third potential conflict of interest is the very process of becoming an “expert.” The bias of this process is evident because if one does not accept a priori the presence of DID, he or she will never be admitted to the exclusive club of “DID experts.” To attain the status of authority or expert on this subject, one must be a believer. Otherwise, how would one claim to have diagnosed and treated hundreds of DID cases? It is a feedback loop that can’t be broken.
Related resources
- Borch-Jacobsen M. Making minds and madness: from hysteria to depression. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press; 2009.
- Memory and reality. False Memory Syndrome Foundation. www.fmsfonline.org.
Disclosure
Dr. Gharaibeh reports no financial relationship with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
What is it about dissociative identity disorder (DID) that makes it a polarizing diagnosis? Why does it split professionals into believers and nonbelievers, stirring up heated debates, high emotions, and fervor similar to what we see in religion?
The DID controversy is likely to continue beyond the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V), slated for publication in 2012. Proponents and opponents claim to have the upper hand in arguments about the validity of the DID diagnosis and benefits vs harm of treatment. This article examines the logic of previous and new arguments.
1. The fallacy of equal-footing arguments
When 301 board-certified U.S. psychiatrists were surveyed in 1999 about their attitudes toward DSM-IV dissociative disorders diagnoses:
- 35% had no reservations about DID
- 43% were skeptical
- 15% indicated the diagnosis should not be included in the DSM.1
Only 21% believed there was strong evidence for DID’s scientific validity. On balance, published papers appear skeptical about DID’s core components: dissociative amnesia and recovered-memory therapy.2
DID skeptics are sometimes accused of “denial” or “reluctance” to accept this diagnosis. Informed skepticism is acceptable—even encouraged—in making a diagnosis of malingering, factitious disorder, some personality disorders, substance abuse, and psychotic states, to name a few. Why is informed skepticism about DID frowned on?
In medical and surgical specialties, informed skepticism is encouraged so that the practitioner challenges his or her assumptions about a possible diagnosis through a methodical process of inclusion, exclusion, and hypothesis testing. I argue that little or no skepticism is substandard practice, if not negligence.
Bertrand Russell’s celestial teapot parable (Box 1)3 exposed the fallacy of equal-footing arguments (ie, in any debate or argument that has 2 sides, the 2 sides are not necessarily on equal footing). Russell’s argument is valid for any belief system relying on faith. Now that DID is in the “ancient book” (DSM-IV), the burden of proof by some magical logic has shifted to “nonbelievers.” In law that is called precedent, but law is even less scientific than psychiatry and not the best example to follow. A mistake made 100 years ago is still a mistake.
In 1952, British philosopher Bertrand Russell used the analogy of a teapot in space to illustrate the difficulty skeptics face when questioning unfalsifiable claims. Russell’s argument involved religious belief, but it is valid for other belief systems relying on faith. Here is the celestial teapot analogy:
“If I were to suggest that between Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the Sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. If, however, the existence of such a teapot were affirmed in ancient books, taught as the sacred truth every Sunday, and instilled into the minds of children at school, hesitation to believe in its existence would be a mark of eccentricity and entitle the doubter to the attention of the psychiatrist in an enlightened age or of the Inquisitor in an earlier time.”
Source: Reference 3
2. Illogic of causation
Piper and Merskey’s extensive literature review4,5 examined the presumed association between DID and childhood abuse (mostly sexual). They found:
- no proof that DID results from childhood trauma or that DID cases in children are almost never reported
- “consistent evidence of blatant iatrogenesis” in the practice of some DID proponents.
One can easily turn the logic around by claiming that a DID diagnosis causes memories of childhood sexual abuse.
As for patients’ presumed reluctance to report childhood abuse, I witnessed in every one of my 15 alleged cases of DID (all female) not reluctance but a strong tendency to flaunt their diagnosis and symptoms and an eagerness to re-tell their stories with graphic detail, usually unprovoked. Patients with a DID diagnosis seem to have a “powerful vested interest”—to borrow Paul McHugh’s expression6—in sustaining the DID diagnosis, symptoms, behaviors, and therapy as an end in itself.
DID proponents acknowledge that iatrogenic artifacts may exist in the diagnosis and treatment. However, they almost immediately insinuate that DID patients’ “subtle defensive strategies” generate these artifacts. Greaves’ discussion of multiple personality disorder7 acknowledged that overdiagnosis may be driven by therapists’ desire to “attain narcissistic gratification at ‘having a multiple [sic] of their own’” but blamed this on “neophytes.”
3. Tautology in DID’s definition
DSM-IV’s criterion A for DID is in fact a definition: “the presence of 2 or more distinct identities or personality states (each with its own relatively enduring pattern of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment and self).”8 Together, criteria A and B show circularity and redundancy. If A is met, then B must be met because “a person’s behavior” is part of her or his identity and personality state, which was established in A.
Tautology is a major shortcoming of the descriptive system for psychopathology in general. Of greater clinical value are observing a patient’s actions, listening to his or her words, learning his or her history, studying his or her expressions, and noting his or her relationships.9
4. Bewitchment by language
Psychiatrists could spend hours over strong cups of coffee arguing the meanings of terms such as “dissociation,” “presence,” “identity,” “personality state,” etc. Psychiatry has been targeted unfairly regarding where it falls on the subjectivity-objectivity axis, but it has not fared that differently from other medical specialties.10 Psychiatry, however, depends much more on language.
Consider slippery terms such as personality, identity, self, dissociation, integration, alters, ego, ego states, trance states, personality states, unconscious, etc. Lack of precision, variability in use of words and their meaning, and variability in understanding the concept that these terms try to communicate make speaking a common language extremely difficult. To borrow from Wittgenstein, psychiatrists’ intellect is bewitched by language.11
Words fail to communicate experiences such as the taste of red wine or the feeling of sand beneath bare feet. It is almost futile to try to define dissociation, identity, personality states, etc., using words or even pictures. More definitions and agreement on stricter definitions would not provide greater clarity or solve the problem of first-person authority.
An example is found in DID’s criterion B: “at least 2 of these identities or personality states recurrently take control of the person’s behavior” [italics mine]. “Possession” seems to be a fitting word! Whether it is an alter or the devil taking control is a technicality. Even more acceptable would be possessed by inconsolable anger, possessed by fierce jealousy, possessed by lust, possessed by hatred and vengeance, possessed by and obsessed with love, possessed by cocaine, etc.
Dissociation is used to describe so many things that it has become almost meaningless (Table). I refer not only to definitional imprecision but also to a lack of consensus on the nature of the concept itself.
The word “control” is another term on whose meaning almost no 2 psychiatrists agree. Consensus on definitions is elusive when words become divorced from the concepts they were intended to describe.
Table
A meaningless word? ‘Dissociation’ is used to describe many things
| Daydreaming or fantasizing |
| Memory lapses caused by benzodiazepines |
| Preoccupation with everyday worries |
| Preoccupation with internal stimuli (such as auditory hallucinations or delusional thoughts) |
| Poor attentiveness |
| Histrionic/theatrical behavior to avoid upsetting the patient or to provide a face-saving explanation |
| Daydreaming while driving (‘highway dissociation’ or ‘highway hypnosis’) |
| Getting engrossed/captivated by a novel, a movie, or a piece of radio journalism or music |
5. Validity of first-person authority
The skeptic’s attempt to investigate a subjective phenomena—especially DID—is bound to break on the rocks of the first-person authority, to borrow Donald Davidson’s words.9 To support reliability and validity of the diagnosis, dissociation researchers rely on “scales” and “instruments” to give the impression of objectivity, empiricism, and “science” hard at work. However, a quick look at some of the questions on these “instruments” reveals their assault on reason and intellect (Box 2).12
Proponents who claim DID is “sufficiently validated for inclusion in the current and future versions of DSM” are to be commended for adding “much more research is needed in several areas.”13 Piper and Merskey’s review4,5 concluded that DID could not be reliably diagnosed.
A-DES: I get so wrapped up in watching TV, reading, or playing a video game that I don’t have any idea what’s going on around me.
Comment: Although this item seems like a joke, it is not meant as one. It is meant to be part of the serious business of science. Isn’t that what any ‘normal’ human would do if he or she has enough attention and concentration?
A-DES: People tell me I do or say things that I don’t remember doing or saying.
I get confused about whether I have done something or only thought about doing it.
I can’t figure out if things really happened or if I only dreamed or thought about them.
People tell me that I sometimes act so differently that I seem like a different person.
Comment: These items are crafted in a way to encourage false positives. First, ‘people tell me’ does not qualify as an ‘experience.’ Second, one wonders why the scale was made up of declarative statements instead of questions. Third, ‘I seem like a different person’ is a leading statement.
A-DES: I am so good at lying and acting that I believe it myself.
Comment: This should be an immediate tip-off that the reporter is unreliable.
A-DES: I feel like my past is a puzzle and some of the pieces are missing.
Comment: Isn’t this the human condition?
*A-DES statements are italicized; comments by Dr. Gharaibeh are in plain text
Source: Reference 12
6. Does a DID diagnosis do harm?
Webster’s14 defines iatrogenic as: “Resulting from the activity of a physician. Originally applied to a disorder or disorders inadvertently induced in the patient by the manner of the physician’s examination, discussion, or treatment, it now applies to any condition occurring in a patient as result of medical treatment, such as a drug reaction.”
A DID diagnosis has been blamed for misdiagnosis of other entities,15 patient mismanagement,16 and inadequate treatment of depression.17 Even when DID is treated with the best of intentions, undesired negative effects may result from psychotherapy, and some patients experience worsening of symptoms and/or deterioration of functioning.18,19
In Creating Hysteria, Acocella20 cites examples of harm done to [alleged DID] patients and their families, including 2 high-profile cases under the care of a member of the DSM-IV work group on dissociation.
7. How is self-deception possible?
The ability to self-deceive has advantages and disadvantages,21 and widespread deception is possible. Richard Dawkins’s The God Delusion,22 Christopher Hitchens’s God is Not Great,23 and Michael Shermer’s Why People Believe Weird Things24 are recent exposés of how self-deception and deception by charismatic figures occurs despite the progress “reason” has made.
As with other belief systems that become entrenched in the face of criticism, DID proponents accuse critics of denial, reluctance, and adopting “defense[s] against dealing with the reality of child abuse in North America.”20 One wonders why just North America! Why not Africa, with its children in Sudan, Somalia, Zimbabwe—to name a few—enduring enough abuse to spread around the world several times over?
Proponents also allege that part of the reason for “professionals’ reluctance” to embrace DID is the “subtle presentation of the symptoms.”25 In other words, it is not reluctance; it is ignorance, with the insinuation that nonbelievers or skeptics are not smart enough to pick up on the subtle clinical presentation. I can’t see why professionals would be ignorant when it comes to dissociation as opposed to schizophrenia, depression, bipolar disorder, and almost all DSM-IV disorders. Why this selective ignorance exists remains unexplained.
8. Experts and conflict of interest
DSM-V’s guidelines on conflict of interest are very welcome. One hopes conflict of interest does not refer only to financial relationships with pharmaceutical companies. Conflicts of interest can exert unseen influence, which—if made clear—would have a direct bearing of the reliability and trustworthiness of the published literature. Strong adherents have a lot to gain from perpetuating DID. Nonbelievers, skeptics, and opponents would gain nothing if DID disappeared from DSM today or in 2012.
The first potential conflict of interest for DID “experts” is financial gain. For example, a psychologist saw 1 of my patients (before I came to the scene) for 5 years for 3 sessions a week (2 for adult alters and 1 for childhood alters), with annual earnings of nearly $20,000. A self-declared expert would need only 10 patients to be better off than most psychiatrists.
The second potential conflict of interest is personal gain in the form of narcissistic gratification, as mentioned above. Although DID proponents blame neophytes, “teachers” are no less prone to narcissistic gratification. Under this umbrella falls the DID experts’ interest in recognition, fame, and easily acquired expertise. One may argue that self-arrogated expertise in this realm is much ado about nothing.
The third potential conflict of interest is the very process of becoming an “expert.” The bias of this process is evident because if one does not accept a priori the presence of DID, he or she will never be admitted to the exclusive club of “DID experts.” To attain the status of authority or expert on this subject, one must be a believer. Otherwise, how would one claim to have diagnosed and treated hundreds of DID cases? It is a feedback loop that can’t be broken.
Related resources
- Borch-Jacobsen M. Making minds and madness: from hysteria to depression. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press; 2009.
- Memory and reality. False Memory Syndrome Foundation. www.fmsfonline.org.
Disclosure
Dr. Gharaibeh reports no financial relationship with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
1. Pope HG, Jr, Oliva PS, Hudson JI, et al. Attitudes toward DSMIV dissociative disorders diagnoses among board-certified American psychiatrists. Am J Psychiatry. 1999;156(2):321-323.
2. Pope HG, Jr, Barry S, Bodkin A, et al. Tracking scientific interest in the dissociative disorders: a study of scientific publication output 1984-2003. Psychother Psychosom. 2006;75:19-24.
3. Russell B. Is there a God? Available at: http://www.cfpf.org.uk/articles/religion/br/br_god.html. Accessed June 25, 2009.
4. Piper A, Merskey H. The persistence of folly: a critical examination of dissociative identity disorder. Part I. The excesses of an improbable concept. Can J Psychiatry. 2004;49(9):592-600.
5. Piper A, Merskey H. The persistence of folly: critical examination of dissociative identity disorder. Part II. The defense and decline of multiple personality or dissociative identity disorder. Can J Psychiatry. 2004;49(10):678-683.
6. McHugh PR. Multiple personality disorder (dissociative identity disorder). Available at: http://www.psycom.net/mchugh.html. Accessed August 5, 2009.
7. Greaves GB. Observations on the claim of iatrogenesis of MPD: a discussion. Dissociation. 1989;2(2):99-104.
8. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders 4th ed. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association; 1994.
9. Davidson D. Subjective, intersubjective, objective. New York, NY: Oxford University Press; 2001:15.
10. Pies R. Psychiatry clearly meets the ‘objectivity’ test. Psychiatric News. 2005;40(19):17.-
11. Sluga H, Stern DG. The Cambridge companion to Wittgenstein. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press; 1966.
12. Armstrong JG, Putnam FW, Carlson EB, et al. Development and validation of a measure of adolescent dissociation: The Adolescent Dissociative Experience Scale. J Nerv Ment Dis. 1997;185:491-497.
13. Gleaves DH, May MC, Cardeña E. An examination of the diagnostic validity of dissociative identity disorder. Clin Psychol Rev. 2001;21(4):577-608.
14. The new Webster’s international comprehensive dictionary of the English language. New York, NY: American International Press; 1991.
15. Freeland A, Manchanda R, Chiu S, et al. Four cases of supposed multiple personality disorder: evidence of unjustified diagnoses. Can J Psychiatry. 1993;23:245-247.
16. McHugh PR. Try to remember: psychiatry’s clash over meaning, memory, and mind. Washington, DC: Dana Press; 2008.
17. Fetkewicz J, Sharma V, Merskey H. A note on suicidal deterioration with recovered memory treatment. J Affect Disord. 2000;58:155-159.
18. Hadley SW, Strupp HH. Contemporary views of negative effects in psychotherapy. An integrated account. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1976;33(11):1291-1302.
19. Bergin AE. The deterioration effect: a reply to Braucht. J Abnorm Psychol. 1970;75(3):300-302.
20. Acocella J. Creating hysteria: women and multiple personality disorder. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers; 1999:81.
21. Nasrallah HA. Self-deception: a double-edged trait. Current Psychiatry. 2008;7(7):14-16.
22. Dawkins R. The God delusion. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin; 2006.
23. Hitchens C. God is not great: how religion poisons everything. New York, NY: Twelve/Hachette Book Group; 2007.
24. Shermer M. Why people believe weird things: pseudoscience, superstition, and other confusions of our time. New York, NY: W.H. Freeman and Company; 1997.
25. Coons PM. Child abuse and multiple personality disorder: review of the literature and suggestions for treatment. Child Abuse Negl. 1986;10(4):455-462.
1. Pope HG, Jr, Oliva PS, Hudson JI, et al. Attitudes toward DSMIV dissociative disorders diagnoses among board-certified American psychiatrists. Am J Psychiatry. 1999;156(2):321-323.
2. Pope HG, Jr, Barry S, Bodkin A, et al. Tracking scientific interest in the dissociative disorders: a study of scientific publication output 1984-2003. Psychother Psychosom. 2006;75:19-24.
3. Russell B. Is there a God? Available at: http://www.cfpf.org.uk/articles/religion/br/br_god.html. Accessed June 25, 2009.
4. Piper A, Merskey H. The persistence of folly: a critical examination of dissociative identity disorder. Part I. The excesses of an improbable concept. Can J Psychiatry. 2004;49(9):592-600.
5. Piper A, Merskey H. The persistence of folly: critical examination of dissociative identity disorder. Part II. The defense and decline of multiple personality or dissociative identity disorder. Can J Psychiatry. 2004;49(10):678-683.
6. McHugh PR. Multiple personality disorder (dissociative identity disorder). Available at: http://www.psycom.net/mchugh.html. Accessed August 5, 2009.
7. Greaves GB. Observations on the claim of iatrogenesis of MPD: a discussion. Dissociation. 1989;2(2):99-104.
8. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders 4th ed. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association; 1994.
9. Davidson D. Subjective, intersubjective, objective. New York, NY: Oxford University Press; 2001:15.
10. Pies R. Psychiatry clearly meets the ‘objectivity’ test. Psychiatric News. 2005;40(19):17.-
11. Sluga H, Stern DG. The Cambridge companion to Wittgenstein. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press; 1966.
12. Armstrong JG, Putnam FW, Carlson EB, et al. Development and validation of a measure of adolescent dissociation: The Adolescent Dissociative Experience Scale. J Nerv Ment Dis. 1997;185:491-497.
13. Gleaves DH, May MC, Cardeña E. An examination of the diagnostic validity of dissociative identity disorder. Clin Psychol Rev. 2001;21(4):577-608.
14. The new Webster’s international comprehensive dictionary of the English language. New York, NY: American International Press; 1991.
15. Freeland A, Manchanda R, Chiu S, et al. Four cases of supposed multiple personality disorder: evidence of unjustified diagnoses. Can J Psychiatry. 1993;23:245-247.
16. McHugh PR. Try to remember: psychiatry’s clash over meaning, memory, and mind. Washington, DC: Dana Press; 2008.
17. Fetkewicz J, Sharma V, Merskey H. A note on suicidal deterioration with recovered memory treatment. J Affect Disord. 2000;58:155-159.
18. Hadley SW, Strupp HH. Contemporary views of negative effects in psychotherapy. An integrated account. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1976;33(11):1291-1302.
19. Bergin AE. The deterioration effect: a reply to Braucht. J Abnorm Psychol. 1970;75(3):300-302.
20. Acocella J. Creating hysteria: women and multiple personality disorder. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers; 1999:81.
21. Nasrallah HA. Self-deception: a double-edged trait. Current Psychiatry. 2008;7(7):14-16.
22. Dawkins R. The God delusion. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin; 2006.
23. Hitchens C. God is not great: how religion poisons everything. New York, NY: Twelve/Hachette Book Group; 2007.
24. Shermer M. Why people believe weird things: pseudoscience, superstition, and other confusions of our time. New York, NY: W.H. Freeman and Company; 1997.
25. Coons PM. Child abuse and multiple personality disorder: review of the literature and suggestions for treatment. Child Abuse Negl. 1986;10(4):455-462.
Help your bipolar disorder patients remain employed
Mrs. S, age 34, worked as an office manager with responsibilities for more than 40 employees for 5 years. Starting in her mid 20s she had repeated periods of depression, binge drinking, and risk-taking that were treated ineffectively with antidepressants. Ultimately, she was fired from her job.
Eventually Mrs. S was diagnosed as bipolar and over time responded well to a mood-stabilizing regimen. She now desires to return to work, both for financial reasons and for the sense of accomplishment that comes from working. Initially, personnel managers review her résumé and tell her she would be bored by the routine nature of entry-level positions, or they offer her jobs with major responsibilities. She accepts a high-level position but soon leaves, feeling overwhelmed by the stress.
Bipolar disorder’s long-term course presents a therapeutic challenge when patients desire to remain employed, seek temporary or permanent disability status, or—most commonly—attempt to return to employment after a period of inability to work. As the experience of Mrs. S illustrates, previous capabilities that appear higher than the person’s present or recent work experience are a key issue to address in interpersonal therapy.
Evidence-based research is informative, but ultimately you must apply judgment and flexibility in setting and revising goals with the bipolar individual. Attention to the disorder’s core characteristics can help you equip patients for work that contributes to their pursuit of health.
Obstacles to employment
Role function. Bipolar disorder impairs family and social function in approximately one-half of persons with this diagnosis, a higher impairment rate than in persons with major depression.1
Cognitive function. Bipolar disorder patients have subtle sustained impairments in cognitive function, particularly working memory.2,3 These deficits—although generally much less severe than in persons with schizophrenia—contribute to workplace and educational difficulties.
Unstable mood. Some symptoms associated with elevated mood contribute to functional impairment. These are not limited to mania or hypomania but also can be prominent in mixed states and depression.
A study from the Systematic Treatment Enhancement Program for Bipolar Disorder (STEP-BD) found that two-thirds of 1,380 depressed bipolar I and II patients had ?1 concomitant symptoms principally associated with manic states. The most prominent were distractibility, pressured speech and thoughts, risky behavior, and agitation.4 Each of these—or, more often, all of these—can interfere with work responsibilities.
Circadian rhythm pattern. Sleep disturbances in bipolar disorder differ from those associated with other medical conditions. Bipolar patients’ tendency to increase their activity and interests in the evening may keep them awake into the early morning hours. Insufficient sleep and impaired daytime cognition and alertness related to idio syncratic circadian rhythms can interfere with job requirements.5 The structure of employment can help many bipolar patients maintain effective sleep patterns as well as waking activities (Box 1).
Some individuals recognize their disturbed activity pattern, but many view it simply as the way they approach a day. For the latter group, a sustained treatment effort is needed to help them recognize the adverse consequences of the pattern and develop a more effective daily routine.
Adverse treatment effects. Although important, this core medical issue is not central to the interpersonal focus of this article. The simple tolerability objective in prescribing medications—and less frequently therapies such as electroconvulsive treatment—is to avoid dosages that impair concentration, alertness, or motor speed and accuracy. Similarly, avoid medications that can cause physical changes noticeable to others—such as tremor, sleepiness, or significant weight gain—or adjust dosages to eliminate these side effects.
Work, defined as what we do to make a living, is useful for most individuals. For persons with bipolar disorder, work has additional benefits. Having a job aids in structuring their daily activities, which tend to be skewed by circadian rhythm-linked problems of inadequate sleep or sleep that starts too late and extends into the day. The routine expectations of a work schedule also can counteract the distractibility and unproductive multitasking common in some bipolar disorder patients.
These benefits are not guaranteed and vary considerably across occupational settings, but patients and family members readily understand this aspect of work. Its benefits can serve as an important impetus for patients to persist in efforts to attain employment, even in the face of obstacles.
Bipolar symptom domains
Anxiety is recognized as a separate and major domain in bipolar psychopathology,6 contributing strongly to poor outcomes. Although anxiety is somewhat more predominant in depression and mixed states, it is common in manic and recovered bipolar states as well.
Social anxiety and panic states appear to be most specifically associated with bipolar disorder.7 Because these types of anxiety entail excessive fearful responses, psychotherapeutic techniques including extinction approaches can be helpful.
Depression in bipolar disorder tends to manifest as slowed motor and cognitive function, which is likely to be evident in work situations. Additionally, loss of social interests—one of the most common and severe aspects of depression in bipolar disorders—is likely to be evident to coworkers and to negatively impact work effectiveness.
Irritability occurs most frequently in mixed bipolar states but also is characteristic of—though generally less intense in—depressed and manic clinical states. Even when strictly internal and subjective, irritability can reduce an individual’s confidence and work effectiveness. Expressed irritability, from minor annoyances to explosive outbursts, can have serious employment consequences, including termination.
Manic symptoms. The impulsivity that is common in bipolar mania can interfere with work. Acting without considering consequences, taking undue risks, or reaching conclusions on inadequate information can cause problems, including physical harm to self or coworkers. Excessive talking—usually associated with internally recognized racing thoughts—can be a nuisance when mild or problematic if it interferes with customer or coworker interactions.
Hyperactivity and increased energy may be perceived as behaviors that facilitate productivity at work (Box 2).8-10 The adaptive characteristics of many hypomanic states are infrequent or absent in depressive, manic, and mixed manic clinical states, however.
Psychosis is principally associated with manic episodes, but it can be a component of any symptomatic clinical state. Delusional ideas or persecutory thoughts are rarely compatible with a work environment, in part because of potential risks to others.
For some purposes, bipolar disease confers social and employment advantages. Common, frequently adaptive behavioral characteristics of hypomania include:
- perseverance
- high energy
- heightened perceptual sensitivity
- exuberance and playfulness
- optimism.
Increased energy and mild degrees of hyperactivity—as well as thinking along creative, multisystem lines—can benefit work productivity, customer interactions, and work group relations. Heightened confidence and social interests can be valuable in some sales and marketing activities.
Although these attitudes and behaviors can have constructive effects, patients need to understand their limits and destructive potential. This is not a straightforward issue, as patients may not have self-awareness of some adverse consequences of characteristics such as irritability, risk taking, or inappropriate sexual advances. A phenomenon little described in clinical literature but relatively common in biographical accounts of persons with bipolar disorder is that friends or coworkers may encourage, rationalize, and take advantage of an individual’s hypomanic energy, thwarting effective interventions.
Componential treatment
Bipolar disorder’s multiple symptom domains suggest a componential approach to treatment. It may be useful to convey this concept metaphorically to the patient. When working on a jigsaw puzzle, a section that has been put together can be largely left intact and attention turned to other sections of the puzzle. Similarly, once a particular bipolar component is well managed—whether via medication, lifestyle, attitudes, or combinations of these—that symptom is likely to remain stable, barring a new insult/stressor (such as a medical condition requiring drugs that interfere with the bipolar regimen).
If mood stabilizers control risky behavior, impulsivity, and affective lability, the regimen generally will remain effective. If residual or new problems develop in another area (such as anxiety, sleep cycle, or irritability), choose drug regimens and psychoeducation approaches that are compatible with the mood-stabilizing plan. This attitude toward treatment:
- is reassuring to most patients, who come to see a new or recurring problem in one domain as not inherently a harbinger of complete relapse
- can reduce patient- or clinician-initiated deletions and additions of medications in a regimen that has been established as effective.
Autobiographical accounts of persons with bipolar disorders can be useful in educating patients about the considerations presented here. Actress Patty Duke made these observations in describing the gradual development of an effective treatment for her severe bipolar disorder:
I work at not flying off the handle…and I’m much better at it. My general medical bills dropped by $50,000 a year since my bipolar diagnosis and treatment. Until then, I was always in the hospital for some phantom illness. I was there with real symptoms born of depression. I haven’t been in the hospital since I was diagnosed.
My recovery from manic-depression has been an evolution, not a sudden miracle. For someone who spent 50% of her life screaming and yelling about something, I am now down to, say, 5%.11
Psychosocial factors to consider
Stigma in the workplace. Although most coworkers are tolerant of and fair-minded about the functional difficulties common in symptomatic bipolar disorder, some will have biased, inaccurate views about psychiatric conditions. Advise bipolar individuals to make case-by-case decisions about whether to provide personal information to other employees and, if so, how much.
As with most medical conditions, the default choice will be to not discuss personal information in the workplace. Some coworkers, however, might appreciate learning of the bipolar condition (for example, a supervisor who seems empathic to an employee’s seeming stressed state).
Realistic expectations. Most clinicians recognize that relief from a syndromal bipolar state is achieved more quickly than a sustained recovered status in which symptoms are minimal. Attaining functional capacity in a normal range also lags, both in time and in the proportion of persons who ever achieve sustained good function.12 Patients, their families, and often employers may have unrealistic expectations about early resumption of work after a depressive or manic episode resolves.
Ethnic considerations. Some literature suggests ethnic differences in the initial presentation of bipolar disorder, with more severe manifestations in some populations particularly if psychosis is a component symptom.13 Additionally, some cultural views about stigma from illness can add to patients’ or family members’ reluctance to re-enter the workplace.
Socioeconomic status. Sometimes bipolar illness puts out of reach the occupational activities that an individual has previously undertaken or that are characteristic of the family’s experience and expectations. Resistance to a change in self-concept can add to the difficulty in successfully moving a patient to consider employment that is more routinized and less intellectual or decisional in nature (Box 3).14
Divergence in education vs work status. Persons with bipolar disorders often have substantial divergence between high educational attainment and lower work performance. When this is the case, all or most of the factors reviewed in this article probably have contributed. Mrs. S’s experience illustrates this aspect of our care for persons with bipolar disorders.
An employment barrier for some bipolar patients is that a brief, often long-past period of high intellectual or vocational performance serves as the benchmark for their capabilities. Patients with this characteristic resist revising their self-concept. Some treat the loss of this idealized image as an unfair consequence of their illness or society’s reaction to bipolar disorder. Their stubbornness tends to prevent realistic engagement socially or vocationally at levels that are presently feasible for them.
Resistance to change associated with this characteristic often is difficult to manage effectively with short, relatively infrequent medication-focused visits. Specific psychosocial interventions may be more effective.14
CASE CONTINUED: Finding a new balance
After leaving the stressful high-level job, Mrs. S next resolved to limit her search to half-time positions and took a job with limited responsibilities in a bookstore. Her work productivity was outstanding, but she became easily flustered when asked to assume additional responsibilities. Some of these required quick learning of new skills in inventory re-supply or interacting with dissatisfied customers.
As she became more confident and less fearful of being fired, Mrs. S talked with 2 supervisors about her illness management. This halted their well-intentioned efforts to promote her, based on their perception of her as talented and engaging.
Attention to these workplace issues took up approximately half of the time in her regular psychiatric appointments for more than 1 year. Through this process, Mrs. S developed increasingly effective insight into the complex mix of her accomplishments and resilience on one hand and her fluctuating social and vocational impairment on the other. She also recognized that subsyndromal symptoms continued at times, despite her overall good functional state. These insights and her greater self-confidence helped Mrs. S resolve and manage the divergences in her own and others’ perceptions of her capabilities and potential.
Related Resource
- Coping with depression or bipolar disorder at your job (patient information). Depression and Bipolar Support Alliance. www.dbsalliance.org/site/PageServer?pagename=Employment_Information.
Disclosure
Dr. Bowden reports no financial relationship with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
1. Ware JE, Jr, Kosinski M, Bayliss MS, et al. Comparison of methods for the scoring and statistical analysis of SF-36 health profile and summary measures: summary of results from the Medical Outcomes Study. Med Care. 1995;33(suppl 4):AS264-AS279.
2. Glahn D, Bearden CE, Barguil M, et al. The neurocognitive signature of psychotic bipolar disorder. Biol Psychiatry. 2007;62:910-916.
3. Goodwin G, Martinez-Aran A, Glahn DC, et al. Cognitive impairment in bipolar disorder: neurodevelopment or neurodegeneration? An ECNP expert meeting report. Eur Neuropsychopharm. 2008;18:787-793.
4. Goldberg JF, Perlis RH, Bowden CL, et al. Manic symptoms during depressive episodes in 1,380 patients with bipolar disorder: findings from the STEP-BD. Am J Psychiatry. 2009;166(2):173-181.
5. Mansour HA, Wood J, Chowdari KV, et al. Circadian phase variation in bipolar I disorder. Chronobiol Int. 2005;22(3):571-584.
6. Feske U, Frank E, Mallinger AG, et al. Anxiety as a correlate of response to the acute treatment of bipolar I disorder. Am J Psychiatry. 2000;57:956-962.
7. Mantere O, Melartin TK, Suominen K, et al. Difference in axis I and II comorbidities between bipolar I and II disorder and major depressive disorder. J Clin Psychiatry. 2006;67:584-593.
8. Bowden CL. Bipolar disorder and creativity. In: Shaw MP, Runco MA, eds. Creativity and affect. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp; 1994:73-86.
9. Andreasen N, Powers S. Overinclusive thinking in mania and schizophrenia. Br J Psychiatry. 1974;125:452-456.
10. Solovay MR, Shenton ME, Holzman PS. Comparative studies of thought disorders. I. Mania and schizophrenia. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1987;44:13-20.
11. Duke P, Hochman G. A brilliant madness: living with manic-depressive illness. New York, NY: Bantam Books; 1997.
12. Coryell W, Scheftner W, Keller M, et al. The enduring psychosocial consequences of mania and depression. Am J Psychiatry. 1993;150:720-727.
13. Kennedy N, Boydell J, van Os J, et al. Ethnic differences in first clinical presentation of bipolar disorder: results from an epidemiological study. J Affect Dis. 2004;83:161-168.
14. Mikowitz DJ, Goldstein MJ. Bipolar disorder: a family-focused approach. New York, NY: Guilford Press; 2006.
Mrs. S, age 34, worked as an office manager with responsibilities for more than 40 employees for 5 years. Starting in her mid 20s she had repeated periods of depression, binge drinking, and risk-taking that were treated ineffectively with antidepressants. Ultimately, she was fired from her job.
Eventually Mrs. S was diagnosed as bipolar and over time responded well to a mood-stabilizing regimen. She now desires to return to work, both for financial reasons and for the sense of accomplishment that comes from working. Initially, personnel managers review her résumé and tell her she would be bored by the routine nature of entry-level positions, or they offer her jobs with major responsibilities. She accepts a high-level position but soon leaves, feeling overwhelmed by the stress.
Bipolar disorder’s long-term course presents a therapeutic challenge when patients desire to remain employed, seek temporary or permanent disability status, or—most commonly—attempt to return to employment after a period of inability to work. As the experience of Mrs. S illustrates, previous capabilities that appear higher than the person’s present or recent work experience are a key issue to address in interpersonal therapy.
Evidence-based research is informative, but ultimately you must apply judgment and flexibility in setting and revising goals with the bipolar individual. Attention to the disorder’s core characteristics can help you equip patients for work that contributes to their pursuit of health.
Obstacles to employment
Role function. Bipolar disorder impairs family and social function in approximately one-half of persons with this diagnosis, a higher impairment rate than in persons with major depression.1
Cognitive function. Bipolar disorder patients have subtle sustained impairments in cognitive function, particularly working memory.2,3 These deficits—although generally much less severe than in persons with schizophrenia—contribute to workplace and educational difficulties.
Unstable mood. Some symptoms associated with elevated mood contribute to functional impairment. These are not limited to mania or hypomania but also can be prominent in mixed states and depression.
A study from the Systematic Treatment Enhancement Program for Bipolar Disorder (STEP-BD) found that two-thirds of 1,380 depressed bipolar I and II patients had ?1 concomitant symptoms principally associated with manic states. The most prominent were distractibility, pressured speech and thoughts, risky behavior, and agitation.4 Each of these—or, more often, all of these—can interfere with work responsibilities.
Circadian rhythm pattern. Sleep disturbances in bipolar disorder differ from those associated with other medical conditions. Bipolar patients’ tendency to increase their activity and interests in the evening may keep them awake into the early morning hours. Insufficient sleep and impaired daytime cognition and alertness related to idio syncratic circadian rhythms can interfere with job requirements.5 The structure of employment can help many bipolar patients maintain effective sleep patterns as well as waking activities (Box 1).
Some individuals recognize their disturbed activity pattern, but many view it simply as the way they approach a day. For the latter group, a sustained treatment effort is needed to help them recognize the adverse consequences of the pattern and develop a more effective daily routine.
Adverse treatment effects. Although important, this core medical issue is not central to the interpersonal focus of this article. The simple tolerability objective in prescribing medications—and less frequently therapies such as electroconvulsive treatment—is to avoid dosages that impair concentration, alertness, or motor speed and accuracy. Similarly, avoid medications that can cause physical changes noticeable to others—such as tremor, sleepiness, or significant weight gain—or adjust dosages to eliminate these side effects.
Work, defined as what we do to make a living, is useful for most individuals. For persons with bipolar disorder, work has additional benefits. Having a job aids in structuring their daily activities, which tend to be skewed by circadian rhythm-linked problems of inadequate sleep or sleep that starts too late and extends into the day. The routine expectations of a work schedule also can counteract the distractibility and unproductive multitasking common in some bipolar disorder patients.
These benefits are not guaranteed and vary considerably across occupational settings, but patients and family members readily understand this aspect of work. Its benefits can serve as an important impetus for patients to persist in efforts to attain employment, even in the face of obstacles.
Bipolar symptom domains
Anxiety is recognized as a separate and major domain in bipolar psychopathology,6 contributing strongly to poor outcomes. Although anxiety is somewhat more predominant in depression and mixed states, it is common in manic and recovered bipolar states as well.
Social anxiety and panic states appear to be most specifically associated with bipolar disorder.7 Because these types of anxiety entail excessive fearful responses, psychotherapeutic techniques including extinction approaches can be helpful.
Depression in bipolar disorder tends to manifest as slowed motor and cognitive function, which is likely to be evident in work situations. Additionally, loss of social interests—one of the most common and severe aspects of depression in bipolar disorders—is likely to be evident to coworkers and to negatively impact work effectiveness.
Irritability occurs most frequently in mixed bipolar states but also is characteristic of—though generally less intense in—depressed and manic clinical states. Even when strictly internal and subjective, irritability can reduce an individual’s confidence and work effectiveness. Expressed irritability, from minor annoyances to explosive outbursts, can have serious employment consequences, including termination.
Manic symptoms. The impulsivity that is common in bipolar mania can interfere with work. Acting without considering consequences, taking undue risks, or reaching conclusions on inadequate information can cause problems, including physical harm to self or coworkers. Excessive talking—usually associated with internally recognized racing thoughts—can be a nuisance when mild or problematic if it interferes with customer or coworker interactions.
Hyperactivity and increased energy may be perceived as behaviors that facilitate productivity at work (Box 2).8-10 The adaptive characteristics of many hypomanic states are infrequent or absent in depressive, manic, and mixed manic clinical states, however.
Psychosis is principally associated with manic episodes, but it can be a component of any symptomatic clinical state. Delusional ideas or persecutory thoughts are rarely compatible with a work environment, in part because of potential risks to others.
For some purposes, bipolar disease confers social and employment advantages. Common, frequently adaptive behavioral characteristics of hypomania include:
- perseverance
- high energy
- heightened perceptual sensitivity
- exuberance and playfulness
- optimism.
Increased energy and mild degrees of hyperactivity—as well as thinking along creative, multisystem lines—can benefit work productivity, customer interactions, and work group relations. Heightened confidence and social interests can be valuable in some sales and marketing activities.
Although these attitudes and behaviors can have constructive effects, patients need to understand their limits and destructive potential. This is not a straightforward issue, as patients may not have self-awareness of some adverse consequences of characteristics such as irritability, risk taking, or inappropriate sexual advances. A phenomenon little described in clinical literature but relatively common in biographical accounts of persons with bipolar disorder is that friends or coworkers may encourage, rationalize, and take advantage of an individual’s hypomanic energy, thwarting effective interventions.
Componential treatment
Bipolar disorder’s multiple symptom domains suggest a componential approach to treatment. It may be useful to convey this concept metaphorically to the patient. When working on a jigsaw puzzle, a section that has been put together can be largely left intact and attention turned to other sections of the puzzle. Similarly, once a particular bipolar component is well managed—whether via medication, lifestyle, attitudes, or combinations of these—that symptom is likely to remain stable, barring a new insult/stressor (such as a medical condition requiring drugs that interfere with the bipolar regimen).
If mood stabilizers control risky behavior, impulsivity, and affective lability, the regimen generally will remain effective. If residual or new problems develop in another area (such as anxiety, sleep cycle, or irritability), choose drug regimens and psychoeducation approaches that are compatible with the mood-stabilizing plan. This attitude toward treatment:
- is reassuring to most patients, who come to see a new or recurring problem in one domain as not inherently a harbinger of complete relapse
- can reduce patient- or clinician-initiated deletions and additions of medications in a regimen that has been established as effective.
Autobiographical accounts of persons with bipolar disorders can be useful in educating patients about the considerations presented here. Actress Patty Duke made these observations in describing the gradual development of an effective treatment for her severe bipolar disorder:
I work at not flying off the handle…and I’m much better at it. My general medical bills dropped by $50,000 a year since my bipolar diagnosis and treatment. Until then, I was always in the hospital for some phantom illness. I was there with real symptoms born of depression. I haven’t been in the hospital since I was diagnosed.
My recovery from manic-depression has been an evolution, not a sudden miracle. For someone who spent 50% of her life screaming and yelling about something, I am now down to, say, 5%.11
Psychosocial factors to consider
Stigma in the workplace. Although most coworkers are tolerant of and fair-minded about the functional difficulties common in symptomatic bipolar disorder, some will have biased, inaccurate views about psychiatric conditions. Advise bipolar individuals to make case-by-case decisions about whether to provide personal information to other employees and, if so, how much.
As with most medical conditions, the default choice will be to not discuss personal information in the workplace. Some coworkers, however, might appreciate learning of the bipolar condition (for example, a supervisor who seems empathic to an employee’s seeming stressed state).
Realistic expectations. Most clinicians recognize that relief from a syndromal bipolar state is achieved more quickly than a sustained recovered status in which symptoms are minimal. Attaining functional capacity in a normal range also lags, both in time and in the proportion of persons who ever achieve sustained good function.12 Patients, their families, and often employers may have unrealistic expectations about early resumption of work after a depressive or manic episode resolves.
Ethnic considerations. Some literature suggests ethnic differences in the initial presentation of bipolar disorder, with more severe manifestations in some populations particularly if psychosis is a component symptom.13 Additionally, some cultural views about stigma from illness can add to patients’ or family members’ reluctance to re-enter the workplace.
Socioeconomic status. Sometimes bipolar illness puts out of reach the occupational activities that an individual has previously undertaken or that are characteristic of the family’s experience and expectations. Resistance to a change in self-concept can add to the difficulty in successfully moving a patient to consider employment that is more routinized and less intellectual or decisional in nature (Box 3).14
Divergence in education vs work status. Persons with bipolar disorders often have substantial divergence between high educational attainment and lower work performance. When this is the case, all or most of the factors reviewed in this article probably have contributed. Mrs. S’s experience illustrates this aspect of our care for persons with bipolar disorders.
An employment barrier for some bipolar patients is that a brief, often long-past period of high intellectual or vocational performance serves as the benchmark for their capabilities. Patients with this characteristic resist revising their self-concept. Some treat the loss of this idealized image as an unfair consequence of their illness or society’s reaction to bipolar disorder. Their stubbornness tends to prevent realistic engagement socially or vocationally at levels that are presently feasible for them.
Resistance to change associated with this characteristic often is difficult to manage effectively with short, relatively infrequent medication-focused visits. Specific psychosocial interventions may be more effective.14
CASE CONTINUED: Finding a new balance
After leaving the stressful high-level job, Mrs. S next resolved to limit her search to half-time positions and took a job with limited responsibilities in a bookstore. Her work productivity was outstanding, but she became easily flustered when asked to assume additional responsibilities. Some of these required quick learning of new skills in inventory re-supply or interacting with dissatisfied customers.
As she became more confident and less fearful of being fired, Mrs. S talked with 2 supervisors about her illness management. This halted their well-intentioned efforts to promote her, based on their perception of her as talented and engaging.
Attention to these workplace issues took up approximately half of the time in her regular psychiatric appointments for more than 1 year. Through this process, Mrs. S developed increasingly effective insight into the complex mix of her accomplishments and resilience on one hand and her fluctuating social and vocational impairment on the other. She also recognized that subsyndromal symptoms continued at times, despite her overall good functional state. These insights and her greater self-confidence helped Mrs. S resolve and manage the divergences in her own and others’ perceptions of her capabilities and potential.
Related Resource
- Coping with depression or bipolar disorder at your job (patient information). Depression and Bipolar Support Alliance. www.dbsalliance.org/site/PageServer?pagename=Employment_Information.
Disclosure
Dr. Bowden reports no financial relationship with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
Mrs. S, age 34, worked as an office manager with responsibilities for more than 40 employees for 5 years. Starting in her mid 20s she had repeated periods of depression, binge drinking, and risk-taking that were treated ineffectively with antidepressants. Ultimately, she was fired from her job.
Eventually Mrs. S was diagnosed as bipolar and over time responded well to a mood-stabilizing regimen. She now desires to return to work, both for financial reasons and for the sense of accomplishment that comes from working. Initially, personnel managers review her résumé and tell her she would be bored by the routine nature of entry-level positions, or they offer her jobs with major responsibilities. She accepts a high-level position but soon leaves, feeling overwhelmed by the stress.
Bipolar disorder’s long-term course presents a therapeutic challenge when patients desire to remain employed, seek temporary or permanent disability status, or—most commonly—attempt to return to employment after a period of inability to work. As the experience of Mrs. S illustrates, previous capabilities that appear higher than the person’s present or recent work experience are a key issue to address in interpersonal therapy.
Evidence-based research is informative, but ultimately you must apply judgment and flexibility in setting and revising goals with the bipolar individual. Attention to the disorder’s core characteristics can help you equip patients for work that contributes to their pursuit of health.
Obstacles to employment
Role function. Bipolar disorder impairs family and social function in approximately one-half of persons with this diagnosis, a higher impairment rate than in persons with major depression.1
Cognitive function. Bipolar disorder patients have subtle sustained impairments in cognitive function, particularly working memory.2,3 These deficits—although generally much less severe than in persons with schizophrenia—contribute to workplace and educational difficulties.
Unstable mood. Some symptoms associated with elevated mood contribute to functional impairment. These are not limited to mania or hypomania but also can be prominent in mixed states and depression.
A study from the Systematic Treatment Enhancement Program for Bipolar Disorder (STEP-BD) found that two-thirds of 1,380 depressed bipolar I and II patients had ?1 concomitant symptoms principally associated with manic states. The most prominent were distractibility, pressured speech and thoughts, risky behavior, and agitation.4 Each of these—or, more often, all of these—can interfere with work responsibilities.
Circadian rhythm pattern. Sleep disturbances in bipolar disorder differ from those associated with other medical conditions. Bipolar patients’ tendency to increase their activity and interests in the evening may keep them awake into the early morning hours. Insufficient sleep and impaired daytime cognition and alertness related to idio syncratic circadian rhythms can interfere with job requirements.5 The structure of employment can help many bipolar patients maintain effective sleep patterns as well as waking activities (Box 1).
Some individuals recognize their disturbed activity pattern, but many view it simply as the way they approach a day. For the latter group, a sustained treatment effort is needed to help them recognize the adverse consequences of the pattern and develop a more effective daily routine.
Adverse treatment effects. Although important, this core medical issue is not central to the interpersonal focus of this article. The simple tolerability objective in prescribing medications—and less frequently therapies such as electroconvulsive treatment—is to avoid dosages that impair concentration, alertness, or motor speed and accuracy. Similarly, avoid medications that can cause physical changes noticeable to others—such as tremor, sleepiness, or significant weight gain—or adjust dosages to eliminate these side effects.
Work, defined as what we do to make a living, is useful for most individuals. For persons with bipolar disorder, work has additional benefits. Having a job aids in structuring their daily activities, which tend to be skewed by circadian rhythm-linked problems of inadequate sleep or sleep that starts too late and extends into the day. The routine expectations of a work schedule also can counteract the distractibility and unproductive multitasking common in some bipolar disorder patients.
These benefits are not guaranteed and vary considerably across occupational settings, but patients and family members readily understand this aspect of work. Its benefits can serve as an important impetus for patients to persist in efforts to attain employment, even in the face of obstacles.
Bipolar symptom domains
Anxiety is recognized as a separate and major domain in bipolar psychopathology,6 contributing strongly to poor outcomes. Although anxiety is somewhat more predominant in depression and mixed states, it is common in manic and recovered bipolar states as well.
Social anxiety and panic states appear to be most specifically associated with bipolar disorder.7 Because these types of anxiety entail excessive fearful responses, psychotherapeutic techniques including extinction approaches can be helpful.
Depression in bipolar disorder tends to manifest as slowed motor and cognitive function, which is likely to be evident in work situations. Additionally, loss of social interests—one of the most common and severe aspects of depression in bipolar disorders—is likely to be evident to coworkers and to negatively impact work effectiveness.
Irritability occurs most frequently in mixed bipolar states but also is characteristic of—though generally less intense in—depressed and manic clinical states. Even when strictly internal and subjective, irritability can reduce an individual’s confidence and work effectiveness. Expressed irritability, from minor annoyances to explosive outbursts, can have serious employment consequences, including termination.
Manic symptoms. The impulsivity that is common in bipolar mania can interfere with work. Acting without considering consequences, taking undue risks, or reaching conclusions on inadequate information can cause problems, including physical harm to self or coworkers. Excessive talking—usually associated with internally recognized racing thoughts—can be a nuisance when mild or problematic if it interferes with customer or coworker interactions.
Hyperactivity and increased energy may be perceived as behaviors that facilitate productivity at work (Box 2).8-10 The adaptive characteristics of many hypomanic states are infrequent or absent in depressive, manic, and mixed manic clinical states, however.
Psychosis is principally associated with manic episodes, but it can be a component of any symptomatic clinical state. Delusional ideas or persecutory thoughts are rarely compatible with a work environment, in part because of potential risks to others.
For some purposes, bipolar disease confers social and employment advantages. Common, frequently adaptive behavioral characteristics of hypomania include:
- perseverance
- high energy
- heightened perceptual sensitivity
- exuberance and playfulness
- optimism.
Increased energy and mild degrees of hyperactivity—as well as thinking along creative, multisystem lines—can benefit work productivity, customer interactions, and work group relations. Heightened confidence and social interests can be valuable in some sales and marketing activities.
Although these attitudes and behaviors can have constructive effects, patients need to understand their limits and destructive potential. This is not a straightforward issue, as patients may not have self-awareness of some adverse consequences of characteristics such as irritability, risk taking, or inappropriate sexual advances. A phenomenon little described in clinical literature but relatively common in biographical accounts of persons with bipolar disorder is that friends or coworkers may encourage, rationalize, and take advantage of an individual’s hypomanic energy, thwarting effective interventions.
Componential treatment
Bipolar disorder’s multiple symptom domains suggest a componential approach to treatment. It may be useful to convey this concept metaphorically to the patient. When working on a jigsaw puzzle, a section that has been put together can be largely left intact and attention turned to other sections of the puzzle. Similarly, once a particular bipolar component is well managed—whether via medication, lifestyle, attitudes, or combinations of these—that symptom is likely to remain stable, barring a new insult/stressor (such as a medical condition requiring drugs that interfere with the bipolar regimen).
If mood stabilizers control risky behavior, impulsivity, and affective lability, the regimen generally will remain effective. If residual or new problems develop in another area (such as anxiety, sleep cycle, or irritability), choose drug regimens and psychoeducation approaches that are compatible with the mood-stabilizing plan. This attitude toward treatment:
- is reassuring to most patients, who come to see a new or recurring problem in one domain as not inherently a harbinger of complete relapse
- can reduce patient- or clinician-initiated deletions and additions of medications in a regimen that has been established as effective.
Autobiographical accounts of persons with bipolar disorders can be useful in educating patients about the considerations presented here. Actress Patty Duke made these observations in describing the gradual development of an effective treatment for her severe bipolar disorder:
I work at not flying off the handle…and I’m much better at it. My general medical bills dropped by $50,000 a year since my bipolar diagnosis and treatment. Until then, I was always in the hospital for some phantom illness. I was there with real symptoms born of depression. I haven’t been in the hospital since I was diagnosed.
My recovery from manic-depression has been an evolution, not a sudden miracle. For someone who spent 50% of her life screaming and yelling about something, I am now down to, say, 5%.11
Psychosocial factors to consider
Stigma in the workplace. Although most coworkers are tolerant of and fair-minded about the functional difficulties common in symptomatic bipolar disorder, some will have biased, inaccurate views about psychiatric conditions. Advise bipolar individuals to make case-by-case decisions about whether to provide personal information to other employees and, if so, how much.
As with most medical conditions, the default choice will be to not discuss personal information in the workplace. Some coworkers, however, might appreciate learning of the bipolar condition (for example, a supervisor who seems empathic to an employee’s seeming stressed state).
Realistic expectations. Most clinicians recognize that relief from a syndromal bipolar state is achieved more quickly than a sustained recovered status in which symptoms are minimal. Attaining functional capacity in a normal range also lags, both in time and in the proportion of persons who ever achieve sustained good function.12 Patients, their families, and often employers may have unrealistic expectations about early resumption of work after a depressive or manic episode resolves.
Ethnic considerations. Some literature suggests ethnic differences in the initial presentation of bipolar disorder, with more severe manifestations in some populations particularly if psychosis is a component symptom.13 Additionally, some cultural views about stigma from illness can add to patients’ or family members’ reluctance to re-enter the workplace.
Socioeconomic status. Sometimes bipolar illness puts out of reach the occupational activities that an individual has previously undertaken or that are characteristic of the family’s experience and expectations. Resistance to a change in self-concept can add to the difficulty in successfully moving a patient to consider employment that is more routinized and less intellectual or decisional in nature (Box 3).14
Divergence in education vs work status. Persons with bipolar disorders often have substantial divergence between high educational attainment and lower work performance. When this is the case, all or most of the factors reviewed in this article probably have contributed. Mrs. S’s experience illustrates this aspect of our care for persons with bipolar disorders.
An employment barrier for some bipolar patients is that a brief, often long-past period of high intellectual or vocational performance serves as the benchmark for their capabilities. Patients with this characteristic resist revising their self-concept. Some treat the loss of this idealized image as an unfair consequence of their illness or society’s reaction to bipolar disorder. Their stubbornness tends to prevent realistic engagement socially or vocationally at levels that are presently feasible for them.
Resistance to change associated with this characteristic often is difficult to manage effectively with short, relatively infrequent medication-focused visits. Specific psychosocial interventions may be more effective.14
CASE CONTINUED: Finding a new balance
After leaving the stressful high-level job, Mrs. S next resolved to limit her search to half-time positions and took a job with limited responsibilities in a bookstore. Her work productivity was outstanding, but she became easily flustered when asked to assume additional responsibilities. Some of these required quick learning of new skills in inventory re-supply or interacting with dissatisfied customers.
As she became more confident and less fearful of being fired, Mrs. S talked with 2 supervisors about her illness management. This halted their well-intentioned efforts to promote her, based on their perception of her as talented and engaging.
Attention to these workplace issues took up approximately half of the time in her regular psychiatric appointments for more than 1 year. Through this process, Mrs. S developed increasingly effective insight into the complex mix of her accomplishments and resilience on one hand and her fluctuating social and vocational impairment on the other. She also recognized that subsyndromal symptoms continued at times, despite her overall good functional state. These insights and her greater self-confidence helped Mrs. S resolve and manage the divergences in her own and others’ perceptions of her capabilities and potential.
Related Resource
- Coping with depression or bipolar disorder at your job (patient information). Depression and Bipolar Support Alliance. www.dbsalliance.org/site/PageServer?pagename=Employment_Information.
Disclosure
Dr. Bowden reports no financial relationship with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
1. Ware JE, Jr, Kosinski M, Bayliss MS, et al. Comparison of methods for the scoring and statistical analysis of SF-36 health profile and summary measures: summary of results from the Medical Outcomes Study. Med Care. 1995;33(suppl 4):AS264-AS279.
2. Glahn D, Bearden CE, Barguil M, et al. The neurocognitive signature of psychotic bipolar disorder. Biol Psychiatry. 2007;62:910-916.
3. Goodwin G, Martinez-Aran A, Glahn DC, et al. Cognitive impairment in bipolar disorder: neurodevelopment or neurodegeneration? An ECNP expert meeting report. Eur Neuropsychopharm. 2008;18:787-793.
4. Goldberg JF, Perlis RH, Bowden CL, et al. Manic symptoms during depressive episodes in 1,380 patients with bipolar disorder: findings from the STEP-BD. Am J Psychiatry. 2009;166(2):173-181.
5. Mansour HA, Wood J, Chowdari KV, et al. Circadian phase variation in bipolar I disorder. Chronobiol Int. 2005;22(3):571-584.
6. Feske U, Frank E, Mallinger AG, et al. Anxiety as a correlate of response to the acute treatment of bipolar I disorder. Am J Psychiatry. 2000;57:956-962.
7. Mantere O, Melartin TK, Suominen K, et al. Difference in axis I and II comorbidities between bipolar I and II disorder and major depressive disorder. J Clin Psychiatry. 2006;67:584-593.
8. Bowden CL. Bipolar disorder and creativity. In: Shaw MP, Runco MA, eds. Creativity and affect. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp; 1994:73-86.
9. Andreasen N, Powers S. Overinclusive thinking in mania and schizophrenia. Br J Psychiatry. 1974;125:452-456.
10. Solovay MR, Shenton ME, Holzman PS. Comparative studies of thought disorders. I. Mania and schizophrenia. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1987;44:13-20.
11. Duke P, Hochman G. A brilliant madness: living with manic-depressive illness. New York, NY: Bantam Books; 1997.
12. Coryell W, Scheftner W, Keller M, et al. The enduring psychosocial consequences of mania and depression. Am J Psychiatry. 1993;150:720-727.
13. Kennedy N, Boydell J, van Os J, et al. Ethnic differences in first clinical presentation of bipolar disorder: results from an epidemiological study. J Affect Dis. 2004;83:161-168.
14. Mikowitz DJ, Goldstein MJ. Bipolar disorder: a family-focused approach. New York, NY: Guilford Press; 2006.
1. Ware JE, Jr, Kosinski M, Bayliss MS, et al. Comparison of methods for the scoring and statistical analysis of SF-36 health profile and summary measures: summary of results from the Medical Outcomes Study. Med Care. 1995;33(suppl 4):AS264-AS279.
2. Glahn D, Bearden CE, Barguil M, et al. The neurocognitive signature of psychotic bipolar disorder. Biol Psychiatry. 2007;62:910-916.
3. Goodwin G, Martinez-Aran A, Glahn DC, et al. Cognitive impairment in bipolar disorder: neurodevelopment or neurodegeneration? An ECNP expert meeting report. Eur Neuropsychopharm. 2008;18:787-793.
4. Goldberg JF, Perlis RH, Bowden CL, et al. Manic symptoms during depressive episodes in 1,380 patients with bipolar disorder: findings from the STEP-BD. Am J Psychiatry. 2009;166(2):173-181.
5. Mansour HA, Wood J, Chowdari KV, et al. Circadian phase variation in bipolar I disorder. Chronobiol Int. 2005;22(3):571-584.
6. Feske U, Frank E, Mallinger AG, et al. Anxiety as a correlate of response to the acute treatment of bipolar I disorder. Am J Psychiatry. 2000;57:956-962.
7. Mantere O, Melartin TK, Suominen K, et al. Difference in axis I and II comorbidities between bipolar I and II disorder and major depressive disorder. J Clin Psychiatry. 2006;67:584-593.
8. Bowden CL. Bipolar disorder and creativity. In: Shaw MP, Runco MA, eds. Creativity and affect. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp; 1994:73-86.
9. Andreasen N, Powers S. Overinclusive thinking in mania and schizophrenia. Br J Psychiatry. 1974;125:452-456.
10. Solovay MR, Shenton ME, Holzman PS. Comparative studies of thought disorders. I. Mania and schizophrenia. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1987;44:13-20.
11. Duke P, Hochman G. A brilliant madness: living with manic-depressive illness. New York, NY: Bantam Books; 1997.
12. Coryell W, Scheftner W, Keller M, et al. The enduring psychosocial consequences of mania and depression. Am J Psychiatry. 1993;150:720-727.
13. Kennedy N, Boydell J, van Os J, et al. Ethnic differences in first clinical presentation of bipolar disorder: results from an epidemiological study. J Affect Dis. 2004;83:161-168.
14. Mikowitz DJ, Goldstein MJ. Bipolar disorder: a family-focused approach. New York, NY: Guilford Press; 2006.
Transcend dread: 8 ways to transform your care of ‘difficult’ patients
In a psychiatric clinic, Dr. B treats Ms. D, a single 28-year-old, for depression. She has multiple pain and gastrointestinal complaints that have responded poorly to treatment, morbid obesity, chronic tiredness, irritability, and Cluster B personality traits. Ms. D is lonely, unemployed, and seems to be in perpetual crisis. She states “unless someone does something to make this better, I just might kill myself.” She blames Dr. B for failing to adequately treat her depression; he has tried many medications to no avail. In psychotherapy sessions, Ms. D complains instead of examining methods for improvement, and she does not complete psychotherapy homework. She is extremely passive in her approach to getting better.
Ms. D asks Dr. B fill out the necessary paperwork so she can qualify for disability. Dr. B informs her that he will not do so because he believes she is capable of employment and that receiving disability would make her less likely to improve. Ms. D and her parents file letters of complaint about Dr. B to the supervisor of the psychiatric clinic for lack of treatment efficacy and for not supporting her disability claim. Dr. B dreads seeing Ms. D on his appointment list, and realizes she repulses him.
Although “the difficult patient” is not a diagnosis or specific clinical entity, clinicians universally struggle with such patients and have an immediate sense of shared experience when describing the phenomenon. In primary care, O’Dowd1 aptly described this type of patient as the “heartsink” patient, meaning the practitioner often feels exasperation, defeat, or dislike when he or she sees the patient’s name on the schedule.
This article discusses the literature on this topic and provides strategies for dealing with difficult patients in psychiatric practice.
Patient characteristics
Most published reports of difficult patients involve descriptive case series or physician accounts, most often describing patients presenting in nonpsychiatric specialties, including family practice, emergency medicine, rheumatology, gastroenterology, plastic surgery, and dentistry, among others.2-7
In a survey of physicians in 4 primary care clinics, subjects rated 96 (15%) of 627 adult patients as “difficult.”8 Difficult patients were significantly more likely than others to have a mental disorder ( Table 1 ).8 They also had more functional impairment, higher health care utilization, and lower satisfaction with care.
A separate primary care clinic study found uncannily similar results—physicians rated 74 (15%) of 500 new walk-in patients as “difficult.”9 Compared with other patients, the difficult patients had:
- higher rates of psychiatric illness, somatization (>5 somatic complaints), and more severe symptoms
- poorer functional status, more unmet expectations, less satisfaction with care, and higher use of health services.
Fewer articles on difficult patients have been published in psychiatric literature, although some commonalities have emerged ( Box ).10-12 Often suffering from chronic conditions without well-defined treatment endpoints, difficult patients do worse clinically, have higher use of health services, and are less happy with their care than other patients.
Difficult patients challenge our competence as physicians and evoke personal distress. Physicians with less job satisfaction, less clinical experience, less training in counseling, and a poor attitude toward psychosocial problems are more likely to perceive a patient as difficult.13,14
Table 1
Common psychiatric disorders in difficult patients
| Multisomatoform disorder |
| Panic disorder |
| Dysthymia |
| Generalized anxiety disorder |
| Major depressive disorder |
| Alcohol abuse or dependence* |
| *Researchers categorized patients as having “probable” alcohol abuse or dependence but did not determine if they met DSM-IV-TR criteria for these disorders |
| Source: Reference 8 |
An Ovid Medline search of psychiatric literature for “difficult patients” found only 9 articles published from 1996 to 2008, and most were editorials or essays.10
Groves11 grouped difficult patients into 4 categories:
- dependent clingers
- entitled demanders
- manipulative help-rejecters
- self-destructive deniers.
For a description of the behaviors and personality traits associated with each of these 4 categories and strategies to address them, see “The nurse who worked the system,” Current Psychiatry, July 2009. Groves emphasized that a physician’s negative reactions evoked by such patients—once understood through introspection—may facilitate better understanding and psychological management in their care.
Hinshelwood12 wrote about the cognitive dissonance psychiatrists encounter when trying to balance the different responses evoked by patients with schizophrenia and severe personality disorders.
When confronted with a psychotic patient’s severely damaged reality testing, psychiatrists often depersonalize the patient in an effort to be “scientific.” Conversely, patients with severe personality disorders threaten the psychiatrist with their emotional instability. The psychiatrist loses the role of objective observer and instead becomes a “moral evaluator,” seeing the patient as “good” or “bad” instead of as a person in need of help.
Hinshelwood cautioned that patients such as this are difficult not because their treatment is complicated but because they challenge our identity as scientists and put us in personal difficulty.
Survival strategies for clinicians
Eight strategies can help improve your care of difficult patients ( Table 2 ).
Table 2
8 strategies for managing difficult patients
| 1. Acknowledge that the patient is difficult |
| 2. Develop empathy |
| 3. Seek out supervision/consultation |
| 4. Utilize a team approach |
| 5. Lower treatment goals |
| 6. Decompress the treatment timeline |
| 7. Use ‘plussing’ (positive comments and acknowledgements) |
| 8. Use imagery (visualize the patient as a character in an unfinished novel) |
2. Develop empathy. Empathy is identification with and understanding of why a person feels, thinks, and acts as he or she does. The best way to develop empathy for a difficult patient is to learn about him or her firsthand—directly from the patient, not from reading chart notes or from information passed among colleagues.
Learning about the patient firsthand means shifting from sign-and-symptom gathering to performing a genuine inquiry about how the person thinks or feels, including interests, loves, or background. Challenging clinical circumstances—such as seeing a patient in a busy emergency department or during a 15-minute medication check—can make this difficult. In some cases, however, the time needed to establish empathy can be surprisingly brief.
The more patients feel that the psychiatrist is “on their level,” the less likely they are to project internalized anguish or impulsively act on conflicted feelings.
3. Seek out supervision or consultation. You can gain new perspectives by taking a “step back” and looking at the case with a colleague. Seeking out consultation also allows you to decompress by “getting it off your chest.” Supervision often allows clinicians to develop:
- empathy toward a difficult patient
- increased energy and creativity in subsequent sessions.
If you cannot utilize a team to carry out treatment, this approach still may help you develop a treatment plan.
5. Lower treatment goals. The nature of difficult patients makes complete “cures” a rarity. A psychiatrist whose goal is to substantially help a patient may become chronically frustrated and feel inadequate in the face of a patient’s perpetual suffering. The clinician sometimes reacts by developing therapeutic nihilism and withdrawing energy from the case. The patient, of course, senses this and increases his or her general distress level, which intensifies the negative interaction.
By lowering goals—for example, aiming for stabilization rather than improvement—you can feel less like a failure and be more relaxed. A relaxed clinician is more tolerant and in a better position to help the patient. Other lowered goals might be to reduce harm from impulsive or dangerous behaviors instead of eliminating them or better coping with symptoms rather than symptom remission.
7. Use ‘plussing.’ Because we experience dread with difficult patients, clinicians often avoid, refrain from, or simply don’t see opportunities to use positive comments and acknowledgements (“plussing”) when they arise. Most patients (as well as clinicians) want to be liked, and small compliments—when genuinely and appropriately placed—sometimes can make a huge difference in patients’ willingness to cope or try new things.
This technique might allow you to see the humorous side of yourself as the hardworking, well-intentioned yet ineffectual psychiatrist. You don’t know how the story will unfold, but you can accept this as you would in any other unfinished novel.
CASE CONTINUED: A more effective approach
Dr. B realizes Ms. D is a difficult patient for him and takes the case into supervision. He is stunned when he is unable to answer several of his supervisor’s questions about Ms. D, including “What was her upbringing like?” and “What are her strengths or interests?” He realizes he knows little about Ms. D and becomes aware that he has focused most of their sessions on either fixing her immediate and never-ending crises or defending himself.
The supervisor points out that Dr. B’s lack of empathy for Ms. D keeps him from helping her—being anxious and defensive makes him less likely to be supportive or creative. Dr. B feels better after the supervision session. He experiences some catharsis and develops a plan to improve the situation.
Dr. B structures the next session to get to know Ms. D better. He mentally decompresses the treatment timeline and refocuses on the need to develop empathy instead of attempting to ameliorate symptoms. Dr. B begins by letting Ms. D know he wants to help her but doesn’t know much about her. She initially rejects his attempts at empathic communication, but with gentle persistence he learns about her upbringing and interests. Dr. B is able to genuinely compliment her on coping with previous traumas and begins to better understand her strengths. Over the next several weeks, Ms. D seems more able to accept supportive interventions and eventually begins a part-time job.
Related resources
- Colson DB. Difficult patients in extended psychiatric hospitalization: a research perspective on the patient, staff, and team. Psychiatry. 1990;53(4):369-382.
- Koekkoek B, van Meijel B, Hutschemaekers G. “Difficult patients” in mental health care: a review. Psychiatr Serv. 2006;57:795-802.
Dr. Battaglia reports no financial relationship with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
1. O’Dowd TC. Five years of heartsink patients in general practice. BMJ. 1988;297:528-530.
2. Smith HW. The difficult patient and doctor: origins and suggestions. Facial Plast Surg Clin North Am. 2008;16(2):177-178, vi.
3. Woods CD. The difficult patient: a psychodynamic perspective. J Calif Dent Assoc. 2007;35(3):186-191.
4. Müller-Lissner S. The difficult patient with constipation. Best Pract Res Clin Gastroenterol. 2007;21(3):473-484.
5. King K, Moss AH. The frequency and significance of the “difficult” patient: the nephrology community’s perceptions. Adv Chronic Kidney Dis. 2004;11(2):234-239.
6. Potter M, Gordon S, Hamer P. The difficult patient in private practice physiotherapy: a qualitative study. Aust J Physiother. 2003;49(1):53-61.
7. Fee C. Death of a difficult patient. Ann Emerg Med. 2001;37(3):354-355.
8. Hahn SR, Kroenke K, Spitzer RL, et al. The difficult patient: prevalence, psychopathology, and functional impairment. J Gen Intern Med. 1996;11(1):1-8.
9. Jackson JL, Kroenke K. Difficult patient encounters in the ambulatory clinic: clinical predictors and outcomes. Arch Intern Med. 1999;159(10):1069-1075.
10. Ovid Medline [database online]. New York, NY: Ovid Technologies, Inc; 2009.
11. Groves JE. Taking care of the hateful patient. N Engl J Med. 1978;298(16):883-887.
12. Hinshelwood RD. The difficult patient. The role of ‘scientific psychiatry’ in understanding patients with chronic schizophrenia or severe personality disorders. Br J Psychiatry. 1999;174:187-190.
13. Mathers N, Jones N, Hannay D. Heartsink patients: a study of their general practitioners. Br J Gen Pract. 1995;45(395):293-296.
14. Steinmetz D, Tabenkin H. The ‘difficult’ patient as perceived by family physicians. Fam Pract. 2001;18(5):495-500.
15. Maltsberger JT, Buie DH. Countertransference hate in the treatment of suicidal patients. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1974;30(5):625-633.
In a psychiatric clinic, Dr. B treats Ms. D, a single 28-year-old, for depression. She has multiple pain and gastrointestinal complaints that have responded poorly to treatment, morbid obesity, chronic tiredness, irritability, and Cluster B personality traits. Ms. D is lonely, unemployed, and seems to be in perpetual crisis. She states “unless someone does something to make this better, I just might kill myself.” She blames Dr. B for failing to adequately treat her depression; he has tried many medications to no avail. In psychotherapy sessions, Ms. D complains instead of examining methods for improvement, and she does not complete psychotherapy homework. She is extremely passive in her approach to getting better.
Ms. D asks Dr. B fill out the necessary paperwork so she can qualify for disability. Dr. B informs her that he will not do so because he believes she is capable of employment and that receiving disability would make her less likely to improve. Ms. D and her parents file letters of complaint about Dr. B to the supervisor of the psychiatric clinic for lack of treatment efficacy and for not supporting her disability claim. Dr. B dreads seeing Ms. D on his appointment list, and realizes she repulses him.
Although “the difficult patient” is not a diagnosis or specific clinical entity, clinicians universally struggle with such patients and have an immediate sense of shared experience when describing the phenomenon. In primary care, O’Dowd1 aptly described this type of patient as the “heartsink” patient, meaning the practitioner often feels exasperation, defeat, or dislike when he or she sees the patient’s name on the schedule.
This article discusses the literature on this topic and provides strategies for dealing with difficult patients in psychiatric practice.
Patient characteristics
Most published reports of difficult patients involve descriptive case series or physician accounts, most often describing patients presenting in nonpsychiatric specialties, including family practice, emergency medicine, rheumatology, gastroenterology, plastic surgery, and dentistry, among others.2-7
In a survey of physicians in 4 primary care clinics, subjects rated 96 (15%) of 627 adult patients as “difficult.”8 Difficult patients were significantly more likely than others to have a mental disorder ( Table 1 ).8 They also had more functional impairment, higher health care utilization, and lower satisfaction with care.
A separate primary care clinic study found uncannily similar results—physicians rated 74 (15%) of 500 new walk-in patients as “difficult.”9 Compared with other patients, the difficult patients had:
- higher rates of psychiatric illness, somatization (>5 somatic complaints), and more severe symptoms
- poorer functional status, more unmet expectations, less satisfaction with care, and higher use of health services.
Fewer articles on difficult patients have been published in psychiatric literature, although some commonalities have emerged ( Box ).10-12 Often suffering from chronic conditions without well-defined treatment endpoints, difficult patients do worse clinically, have higher use of health services, and are less happy with their care than other patients.
Difficult patients challenge our competence as physicians and evoke personal distress. Physicians with less job satisfaction, less clinical experience, less training in counseling, and a poor attitude toward psychosocial problems are more likely to perceive a patient as difficult.13,14
Table 1
Common psychiatric disorders in difficult patients
| Multisomatoform disorder |
| Panic disorder |
| Dysthymia |
| Generalized anxiety disorder |
| Major depressive disorder |
| Alcohol abuse or dependence* |
| *Researchers categorized patients as having “probable” alcohol abuse or dependence but did not determine if they met DSM-IV-TR criteria for these disorders |
| Source: Reference 8 |
An Ovid Medline search of psychiatric literature for “difficult patients” found only 9 articles published from 1996 to 2008, and most were editorials or essays.10
Groves11 grouped difficult patients into 4 categories:
- dependent clingers
- entitled demanders
- manipulative help-rejecters
- self-destructive deniers.
For a description of the behaviors and personality traits associated with each of these 4 categories and strategies to address them, see “The nurse who worked the system,” Current Psychiatry, July 2009. Groves emphasized that a physician’s negative reactions evoked by such patients—once understood through introspection—may facilitate better understanding and psychological management in their care.
Hinshelwood12 wrote about the cognitive dissonance psychiatrists encounter when trying to balance the different responses evoked by patients with schizophrenia and severe personality disorders.
When confronted with a psychotic patient’s severely damaged reality testing, psychiatrists often depersonalize the patient in an effort to be “scientific.” Conversely, patients with severe personality disorders threaten the psychiatrist with their emotional instability. The psychiatrist loses the role of objective observer and instead becomes a “moral evaluator,” seeing the patient as “good” or “bad” instead of as a person in need of help.
Hinshelwood cautioned that patients such as this are difficult not because their treatment is complicated but because they challenge our identity as scientists and put us in personal difficulty.
Survival strategies for clinicians
Eight strategies can help improve your care of difficult patients ( Table 2 ).
Table 2
8 strategies for managing difficult patients
| 1. Acknowledge that the patient is difficult |
| 2. Develop empathy |
| 3. Seek out supervision/consultation |
| 4. Utilize a team approach |
| 5. Lower treatment goals |
| 6. Decompress the treatment timeline |
| 7. Use ‘plussing’ (positive comments and acknowledgements) |
| 8. Use imagery (visualize the patient as a character in an unfinished novel) |
2. Develop empathy. Empathy is identification with and understanding of why a person feels, thinks, and acts as he or she does. The best way to develop empathy for a difficult patient is to learn about him or her firsthand—directly from the patient, not from reading chart notes or from information passed among colleagues.
Learning about the patient firsthand means shifting from sign-and-symptom gathering to performing a genuine inquiry about how the person thinks or feels, including interests, loves, or background. Challenging clinical circumstances—such as seeing a patient in a busy emergency department or during a 15-minute medication check—can make this difficult. In some cases, however, the time needed to establish empathy can be surprisingly brief.
The more patients feel that the psychiatrist is “on their level,” the less likely they are to project internalized anguish or impulsively act on conflicted feelings.
3. Seek out supervision or consultation. You can gain new perspectives by taking a “step back” and looking at the case with a colleague. Seeking out consultation also allows you to decompress by “getting it off your chest.” Supervision often allows clinicians to develop:
- empathy toward a difficult patient
- increased energy and creativity in subsequent sessions.
If you cannot utilize a team to carry out treatment, this approach still may help you develop a treatment plan.
5. Lower treatment goals. The nature of difficult patients makes complete “cures” a rarity. A psychiatrist whose goal is to substantially help a patient may become chronically frustrated and feel inadequate in the face of a patient’s perpetual suffering. The clinician sometimes reacts by developing therapeutic nihilism and withdrawing energy from the case. The patient, of course, senses this and increases his or her general distress level, which intensifies the negative interaction.
By lowering goals—for example, aiming for stabilization rather than improvement—you can feel less like a failure and be more relaxed. A relaxed clinician is more tolerant and in a better position to help the patient. Other lowered goals might be to reduce harm from impulsive or dangerous behaviors instead of eliminating them or better coping with symptoms rather than symptom remission.
7. Use ‘plussing.’ Because we experience dread with difficult patients, clinicians often avoid, refrain from, or simply don’t see opportunities to use positive comments and acknowledgements (“plussing”) when they arise. Most patients (as well as clinicians) want to be liked, and small compliments—when genuinely and appropriately placed—sometimes can make a huge difference in patients’ willingness to cope or try new things.
This technique might allow you to see the humorous side of yourself as the hardworking, well-intentioned yet ineffectual psychiatrist. You don’t know how the story will unfold, but you can accept this as you would in any other unfinished novel.
CASE CONTINUED: A more effective approach
Dr. B realizes Ms. D is a difficult patient for him and takes the case into supervision. He is stunned when he is unable to answer several of his supervisor’s questions about Ms. D, including “What was her upbringing like?” and “What are her strengths or interests?” He realizes he knows little about Ms. D and becomes aware that he has focused most of their sessions on either fixing her immediate and never-ending crises or defending himself.
The supervisor points out that Dr. B’s lack of empathy for Ms. D keeps him from helping her—being anxious and defensive makes him less likely to be supportive or creative. Dr. B feels better after the supervision session. He experiences some catharsis and develops a plan to improve the situation.
Dr. B structures the next session to get to know Ms. D better. He mentally decompresses the treatment timeline and refocuses on the need to develop empathy instead of attempting to ameliorate symptoms. Dr. B begins by letting Ms. D know he wants to help her but doesn’t know much about her. She initially rejects his attempts at empathic communication, but with gentle persistence he learns about her upbringing and interests. Dr. B is able to genuinely compliment her on coping with previous traumas and begins to better understand her strengths. Over the next several weeks, Ms. D seems more able to accept supportive interventions and eventually begins a part-time job.
Related resources
- Colson DB. Difficult patients in extended psychiatric hospitalization: a research perspective on the patient, staff, and team. Psychiatry. 1990;53(4):369-382.
- Koekkoek B, van Meijel B, Hutschemaekers G. “Difficult patients” in mental health care: a review. Psychiatr Serv. 2006;57:795-802.
Dr. Battaglia reports no financial relationship with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
In a psychiatric clinic, Dr. B treats Ms. D, a single 28-year-old, for depression. She has multiple pain and gastrointestinal complaints that have responded poorly to treatment, morbid obesity, chronic tiredness, irritability, and Cluster B personality traits. Ms. D is lonely, unemployed, and seems to be in perpetual crisis. She states “unless someone does something to make this better, I just might kill myself.” She blames Dr. B for failing to adequately treat her depression; he has tried many medications to no avail. In psychotherapy sessions, Ms. D complains instead of examining methods for improvement, and she does not complete psychotherapy homework. She is extremely passive in her approach to getting better.
Ms. D asks Dr. B fill out the necessary paperwork so she can qualify for disability. Dr. B informs her that he will not do so because he believes she is capable of employment and that receiving disability would make her less likely to improve. Ms. D and her parents file letters of complaint about Dr. B to the supervisor of the psychiatric clinic for lack of treatment efficacy and for not supporting her disability claim. Dr. B dreads seeing Ms. D on his appointment list, and realizes she repulses him.
Although “the difficult patient” is not a diagnosis or specific clinical entity, clinicians universally struggle with such patients and have an immediate sense of shared experience when describing the phenomenon. In primary care, O’Dowd1 aptly described this type of patient as the “heartsink” patient, meaning the practitioner often feels exasperation, defeat, or dislike when he or she sees the patient’s name on the schedule.
This article discusses the literature on this topic and provides strategies for dealing with difficult patients in psychiatric practice.
Patient characteristics
Most published reports of difficult patients involve descriptive case series or physician accounts, most often describing patients presenting in nonpsychiatric specialties, including family practice, emergency medicine, rheumatology, gastroenterology, plastic surgery, and dentistry, among others.2-7
In a survey of physicians in 4 primary care clinics, subjects rated 96 (15%) of 627 adult patients as “difficult.”8 Difficult patients were significantly more likely than others to have a mental disorder ( Table 1 ).8 They also had more functional impairment, higher health care utilization, and lower satisfaction with care.
A separate primary care clinic study found uncannily similar results—physicians rated 74 (15%) of 500 new walk-in patients as “difficult.”9 Compared with other patients, the difficult patients had:
- higher rates of psychiatric illness, somatization (>5 somatic complaints), and more severe symptoms
- poorer functional status, more unmet expectations, less satisfaction with care, and higher use of health services.
Fewer articles on difficult patients have been published in psychiatric literature, although some commonalities have emerged ( Box ).10-12 Often suffering from chronic conditions without well-defined treatment endpoints, difficult patients do worse clinically, have higher use of health services, and are less happy with their care than other patients.
Difficult patients challenge our competence as physicians and evoke personal distress. Physicians with less job satisfaction, less clinical experience, less training in counseling, and a poor attitude toward psychosocial problems are more likely to perceive a patient as difficult.13,14
Table 1
Common psychiatric disorders in difficult patients
| Multisomatoform disorder |
| Panic disorder |
| Dysthymia |
| Generalized anxiety disorder |
| Major depressive disorder |
| Alcohol abuse or dependence* |
| *Researchers categorized patients as having “probable” alcohol abuse or dependence but did not determine if they met DSM-IV-TR criteria for these disorders |
| Source: Reference 8 |
An Ovid Medline search of psychiatric literature for “difficult patients” found only 9 articles published from 1996 to 2008, and most were editorials or essays.10
Groves11 grouped difficult patients into 4 categories:
- dependent clingers
- entitled demanders
- manipulative help-rejecters
- self-destructive deniers.
For a description of the behaviors and personality traits associated with each of these 4 categories and strategies to address them, see “The nurse who worked the system,” Current Psychiatry, July 2009. Groves emphasized that a physician’s negative reactions evoked by such patients—once understood through introspection—may facilitate better understanding and psychological management in their care.
Hinshelwood12 wrote about the cognitive dissonance psychiatrists encounter when trying to balance the different responses evoked by patients with schizophrenia and severe personality disorders.
When confronted with a psychotic patient’s severely damaged reality testing, psychiatrists often depersonalize the patient in an effort to be “scientific.” Conversely, patients with severe personality disorders threaten the psychiatrist with their emotional instability. The psychiatrist loses the role of objective observer and instead becomes a “moral evaluator,” seeing the patient as “good” or “bad” instead of as a person in need of help.
Hinshelwood cautioned that patients such as this are difficult not because their treatment is complicated but because they challenge our identity as scientists and put us in personal difficulty.
Survival strategies for clinicians
Eight strategies can help improve your care of difficult patients ( Table 2 ).
Table 2
8 strategies for managing difficult patients
| 1. Acknowledge that the patient is difficult |
| 2. Develop empathy |
| 3. Seek out supervision/consultation |
| 4. Utilize a team approach |
| 5. Lower treatment goals |
| 6. Decompress the treatment timeline |
| 7. Use ‘plussing’ (positive comments and acknowledgements) |
| 8. Use imagery (visualize the patient as a character in an unfinished novel) |
2. Develop empathy. Empathy is identification with and understanding of why a person feels, thinks, and acts as he or she does. The best way to develop empathy for a difficult patient is to learn about him or her firsthand—directly from the patient, not from reading chart notes or from information passed among colleagues.
Learning about the patient firsthand means shifting from sign-and-symptom gathering to performing a genuine inquiry about how the person thinks or feels, including interests, loves, or background. Challenging clinical circumstances—such as seeing a patient in a busy emergency department or during a 15-minute medication check—can make this difficult. In some cases, however, the time needed to establish empathy can be surprisingly brief.
The more patients feel that the psychiatrist is “on their level,” the less likely they are to project internalized anguish or impulsively act on conflicted feelings.
3. Seek out supervision or consultation. You can gain new perspectives by taking a “step back” and looking at the case with a colleague. Seeking out consultation also allows you to decompress by “getting it off your chest.” Supervision often allows clinicians to develop:
- empathy toward a difficult patient
- increased energy and creativity in subsequent sessions.
If you cannot utilize a team to carry out treatment, this approach still may help you develop a treatment plan.
5. Lower treatment goals. The nature of difficult patients makes complete “cures” a rarity. A psychiatrist whose goal is to substantially help a patient may become chronically frustrated and feel inadequate in the face of a patient’s perpetual suffering. The clinician sometimes reacts by developing therapeutic nihilism and withdrawing energy from the case. The patient, of course, senses this and increases his or her general distress level, which intensifies the negative interaction.
By lowering goals—for example, aiming for stabilization rather than improvement—you can feel less like a failure and be more relaxed. A relaxed clinician is more tolerant and in a better position to help the patient. Other lowered goals might be to reduce harm from impulsive or dangerous behaviors instead of eliminating them or better coping with symptoms rather than symptom remission.
7. Use ‘plussing.’ Because we experience dread with difficult patients, clinicians often avoid, refrain from, or simply don’t see opportunities to use positive comments and acknowledgements (“plussing”) when they arise. Most patients (as well as clinicians) want to be liked, and small compliments—when genuinely and appropriately placed—sometimes can make a huge difference in patients’ willingness to cope or try new things.
This technique might allow you to see the humorous side of yourself as the hardworking, well-intentioned yet ineffectual psychiatrist. You don’t know how the story will unfold, but you can accept this as you would in any other unfinished novel.
CASE CONTINUED: A more effective approach
Dr. B realizes Ms. D is a difficult patient for him and takes the case into supervision. He is stunned when he is unable to answer several of his supervisor’s questions about Ms. D, including “What was her upbringing like?” and “What are her strengths or interests?” He realizes he knows little about Ms. D and becomes aware that he has focused most of their sessions on either fixing her immediate and never-ending crises or defending himself.
The supervisor points out that Dr. B’s lack of empathy for Ms. D keeps him from helping her—being anxious and defensive makes him less likely to be supportive or creative. Dr. B feels better after the supervision session. He experiences some catharsis and develops a plan to improve the situation.
Dr. B structures the next session to get to know Ms. D better. He mentally decompresses the treatment timeline and refocuses on the need to develop empathy instead of attempting to ameliorate symptoms. Dr. B begins by letting Ms. D know he wants to help her but doesn’t know much about her. She initially rejects his attempts at empathic communication, but with gentle persistence he learns about her upbringing and interests. Dr. B is able to genuinely compliment her on coping with previous traumas and begins to better understand her strengths. Over the next several weeks, Ms. D seems more able to accept supportive interventions and eventually begins a part-time job.
Related resources
- Colson DB. Difficult patients in extended psychiatric hospitalization: a research perspective on the patient, staff, and team. Psychiatry. 1990;53(4):369-382.
- Koekkoek B, van Meijel B, Hutschemaekers G. “Difficult patients” in mental health care: a review. Psychiatr Serv. 2006;57:795-802.
Dr. Battaglia reports no financial relationship with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
1. O’Dowd TC. Five years of heartsink patients in general practice. BMJ. 1988;297:528-530.
2. Smith HW. The difficult patient and doctor: origins and suggestions. Facial Plast Surg Clin North Am. 2008;16(2):177-178, vi.
3. Woods CD. The difficult patient: a psychodynamic perspective. J Calif Dent Assoc. 2007;35(3):186-191.
4. Müller-Lissner S. The difficult patient with constipation. Best Pract Res Clin Gastroenterol. 2007;21(3):473-484.
5. King K, Moss AH. The frequency and significance of the “difficult” patient: the nephrology community’s perceptions. Adv Chronic Kidney Dis. 2004;11(2):234-239.
6. Potter M, Gordon S, Hamer P. The difficult patient in private practice physiotherapy: a qualitative study. Aust J Physiother. 2003;49(1):53-61.
7. Fee C. Death of a difficult patient. Ann Emerg Med. 2001;37(3):354-355.
8. Hahn SR, Kroenke K, Spitzer RL, et al. The difficult patient: prevalence, psychopathology, and functional impairment. J Gen Intern Med. 1996;11(1):1-8.
9. Jackson JL, Kroenke K. Difficult patient encounters in the ambulatory clinic: clinical predictors and outcomes. Arch Intern Med. 1999;159(10):1069-1075.
10. Ovid Medline [database online]. New York, NY: Ovid Technologies, Inc; 2009.
11. Groves JE. Taking care of the hateful patient. N Engl J Med. 1978;298(16):883-887.
12. Hinshelwood RD. The difficult patient. The role of ‘scientific psychiatry’ in understanding patients with chronic schizophrenia or severe personality disorders. Br J Psychiatry. 1999;174:187-190.
13. Mathers N, Jones N, Hannay D. Heartsink patients: a study of their general practitioners. Br J Gen Pract. 1995;45(395):293-296.
14. Steinmetz D, Tabenkin H. The ‘difficult’ patient as perceived by family physicians. Fam Pract. 2001;18(5):495-500.
15. Maltsberger JT, Buie DH. Countertransference hate in the treatment of suicidal patients. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1974;30(5):625-633.
1. O’Dowd TC. Five years of heartsink patients in general practice. BMJ. 1988;297:528-530.
2. Smith HW. The difficult patient and doctor: origins and suggestions. Facial Plast Surg Clin North Am. 2008;16(2):177-178, vi.
3. Woods CD. The difficult patient: a psychodynamic perspective. J Calif Dent Assoc. 2007;35(3):186-191.
4. Müller-Lissner S. The difficult patient with constipation. Best Pract Res Clin Gastroenterol. 2007;21(3):473-484.
5. King K, Moss AH. The frequency and significance of the “difficult” patient: the nephrology community’s perceptions. Adv Chronic Kidney Dis. 2004;11(2):234-239.
6. Potter M, Gordon S, Hamer P. The difficult patient in private practice physiotherapy: a qualitative study. Aust J Physiother. 2003;49(1):53-61.
7. Fee C. Death of a difficult patient. Ann Emerg Med. 2001;37(3):354-355.
8. Hahn SR, Kroenke K, Spitzer RL, et al. The difficult patient: prevalence, psychopathology, and functional impairment. J Gen Intern Med. 1996;11(1):1-8.
9. Jackson JL, Kroenke K. Difficult patient encounters in the ambulatory clinic: clinical predictors and outcomes. Arch Intern Med. 1999;159(10):1069-1075.
10. Ovid Medline [database online]. New York, NY: Ovid Technologies, Inc; 2009.
11. Groves JE. Taking care of the hateful patient. N Engl J Med. 1978;298(16):883-887.
12. Hinshelwood RD. The difficult patient. The role of ‘scientific psychiatry’ in understanding patients with chronic schizophrenia or severe personality disorders. Br J Psychiatry. 1999;174:187-190.
13. Mathers N, Jones N, Hannay D. Heartsink patients: a study of their general practitioners. Br J Gen Pract. 1995;45(395):293-296.
14. Steinmetz D, Tabenkin H. The ‘difficult’ patient as perceived by family physicians. Fam Pract. 2001;18(5):495-500.
15. Maltsberger JT, Buie DH. Countertransference hate in the treatment of suicidal patients. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1974;30(5):625-633.
Let the "script" of your patient's suicide attempt help you plan effective treatment
2 quick questions for dementia screening
The Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) is widely used in psychiatry and throughout the medical community to evaluate a patient’s cognitive status. The MMSE score is the common language for communicating a patient’s cognitive level among psychiatrists, primary care physicians, social workers, nursing staff, psychologists, long-term care and assisted living facility staff, and insurance companies.
Although the MMSE is highly useful and should continue to be used as a cognitive screening instrument, in some clinical situations time is too limited to allow a full assessment, which could take up to 30 minutes. In my clinical experience, I’ve discovered I can estimate the MMSE score range for a patient I suspect has dementia by asking 2 simple questions.
What is your date of birth (DOB)? When a patient cannot accurately state his or her complete DOB, usually the MMSE is ≤10, indicating severe dementia. Often this observation has been confirmed when another clinician later would do a complete MMSE and return a score close to one I predicted. DOB is a highly personal piece of information that an individual should be able to provide quickly and directly. If a patient is unable to give this information, consider the rest of the patient’s history to be inaccurate and check with collateral sources such as family or close friends.
Can you name 10 vegetables? If a patient is unable to list 10 vegetables—for example, if he or she cannot name 10 vegetables within a minute, repeats them, or mixes them up with fruits or other foods—the MMSE range usually is between 10 to 20, indicating moderate dementia. Instead of vegetables, you can ask your patient to name animals, fruits, or familiar items in other categories.
Clinical value. These 2 bedside questions do not take the place of performing a full MMSE or another established cognitive screen, such as the Montreal Cognitive Assessment1 or the Mini-Cog.2 My quick assessment—which has not been validated by research—is merely a tip that in certain situations may help you get a rough estimate of a patient’s cognitive status.
1. Nasreddine ZS, Phillips NA, Bédirian V, et al. The Montreal Cognitive Assessment, MoCA: a brief screening tool for mild cognitive impairment. J Am Geriatr Soc. 2005;53:695-699.
2. Borson S, Scanlan J, Brush M, et al. The Mini-Cog: a cognitive “vital signs” measure for dementia screening in multi-lingual elderly. Int J Geriatr Psychiatry. 2000;15:1021-1027.
The Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) is widely used in psychiatry and throughout the medical community to evaluate a patient’s cognitive status. The MMSE score is the common language for communicating a patient’s cognitive level among psychiatrists, primary care physicians, social workers, nursing staff, psychologists, long-term care and assisted living facility staff, and insurance companies.
Although the MMSE is highly useful and should continue to be used as a cognitive screening instrument, in some clinical situations time is too limited to allow a full assessment, which could take up to 30 minutes. In my clinical experience, I’ve discovered I can estimate the MMSE score range for a patient I suspect has dementia by asking 2 simple questions.
What is your date of birth (DOB)? When a patient cannot accurately state his or her complete DOB, usually the MMSE is ≤10, indicating severe dementia. Often this observation has been confirmed when another clinician later would do a complete MMSE and return a score close to one I predicted. DOB is a highly personal piece of information that an individual should be able to provide quickly and directly. If a patient is unable to give this information, consider the rest of the patient’s history to be inaccurate and check with collateral sources such as family or close friends.
Can you name 10 vegetables? If a patient is unable to list 10 vegetables—for example, if he or she cannot name 10 vegetables within a minute, repeats them, or mixes them up with fruits or other foods—the MMSE range usually is between 10 to 20, indicating moderate dementia. Instead of vegetables, you can ask your patient to name animals, fruits, or familiar items in other categories.
Clinical value. These 2 bedside questions do not take the place of performing a full MMSE or another established cognitive screen, such as the Montreal Cognitive Assessment1 or the Mini-Cog.2 My quick assessment—which has not been validated by research—is merely a tip that in certain situations may help you get a rough estimate of a patient’s cognitive status.
The Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) is widely used in psychiatry and throughout the medical community to evaluate a patient’s cognitive status. The MMSE score is the common language for communicating a patient’s cognitive level among psychiatrists, primary care physicians, social workers, nursing staff, psychologists, long-term care and assisted living facility staff, and insurance companies.
Although the MMSE is highly useful and should continue to be used as a cognitive screening instrument, in some clinical situations time is too limited to allow a full assessment, which could take up to 30 minutes. In my clinical experience, I’ve discovered I can estimate the MMSE score range for a patient I suspect has dementia by asking 2 simple questions.
What is your date of birth (DOB)? When a patient cannot accurately state his or her complete DOB, usually the MMSE is ≤10, indicating severe dementia. Often this observation has been confirmed when another clinician later would do a complete MMSE and return a score close to one I predicted. DOB is a highly personal piece of information that an individual should be able to provide quickly and directly. If a patient is unable to give this information, consider the rest of the patient’s history to be inaccurate and check with collateral sources such as family or close friends.
Can you name 10 vegetables? If a patient is unable to list 10 vegetables—for example, if he or she cannot name 10 vegetables within a minute, repeats them, or mixes them up with fruits or other foods—the MMSE range usually is between 10 to 20, indicating moderate dementia. Instead of vegetables, you can ask your patient to name animals, fruits, or familiar items in other categories.
Clinical value. These 2 bedside questions do not take the place of performing a full MMSE or another established cognitive screen, such as the Montreal Cognitive Assessment1 or the Mini-Cog.2 My quick assessment—which has not been validated by research—is merely a tip that in certain situations may help you get a rough estimate of a patient’s cognitive status.
1. Nasreddine ZS, Phillips NA, Bédirian V, et al. The Montreal Cognitive Assessment, MoCA: a brief screening tool for mild cognitive impairment. J Am Geriatr Soc. 2005;53:695-699.
2. Borson S, Scanlan J, Brush M, et al. The Mini-Cog: a cognitive “vital signs” measure for dementia screening in multi-lingual elderly. Int J Geriatr Psychiatry. 2000;15:1021-1027.
1. Nasreddine ZS, Phillips NA, Bédirian V, et al. The Montreal Cognitive Assessment, MoCA: a brief screening tool for mild cognitive impairment. J Am Geriatr Soc. 2005;53:695-699.
2. Borson S, Scanlan J, Brush M, et al. The Mini-Cog: a cognitive “vital signs” measure for dementia screening in multi-lingual elderly. Int J Geriatr Psychiatry. 2000;15:1021-1027.
Is a medical illness causing your patient’s depression?
Ms. G, age 56, presents with the chief complaint of “depression.” Review of symptoms reveals 6 months of depressed mood, anhedonia, tearfulness, 30-pound weight gain, low energy, and bilateral ankle edema. Her psychiatrist orders a thyroid stimulating hormone (TSH) level, which shows 9.51 mU/L (normal range 0.35 to 4.94 mU/L), indicating hypothyroidism. After 1 month of treatment with levothyroxine, Ms. G’s mood symptoms and edema resolve and her weight stabilizes.
A patient who comes to you for treatment of depression might also present with physical symptoms (such as, fatigue, nausea, balance problems, etc.) that could point to a medical illness. Endocrine, neurologic, infectious, and malignant processes (Table 1) and vitamin deficiencies (Table 2) could be causing your patient’s depression. To help differentiate various etiologies of depressive symptoms, we review common medical causes of depression, their distinguishing characteristics, and pertinent treatment issues.
DSM-IV-TR considers major depression secondary to a general medical condition to be diagnostically separate from a major depressive episode. When considering nonpsychiatric causes of depression, begin with a thorough medical history including current and past medications (Table 3),1-7 illicit substance use, review of systems, and a detailed neurologic exam.
Table 1
Medical conditions with evidence of causing depression
| Endocrine Hypothyroidism Hyperparathyroidism Cushing’s syndrome Addison’s disease |
| Neurologic Stroke Seizures Huntington’s disease Wilson’s disease Multiple sclerosis Parkinson’s disease Traumatic brain injury |
| Infectious Human immunodeficiency virus West Nile virus Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease Lyme disease Neurosyphilis Hepatitis C |
| Malignancy Paraneoplastic syndromes Pancreatic cancer |
Table 2
Vitamin deficiencies that can lead to depression
| Vitamin | Symptom |
|---|---|
| B12 | Megaloblastic anemia Decreased appetite Unexplained pancytopenia Paresthesias Dementia Glossitis Depressed mood Ataxia Irritability |
| Folate | Ataxia Depressed mood Dementia Impaired vibratory sensation Hyper- or hyporeflexia Macrocytic anemia |
Table 3
Medications that may be linked to depressive symptoms
| Antiepileptic drugs Primidone, tiagabine, vigabatrin, felbamate, levetiracetam, topiramate, and phenytoin may cause depression,1 and phenobarbital may cause depression associated with suicidal ideation2 |
| Beta-blockers Recent randomized studies indicate these drugs do not carry a higher risk of depression, contrary to earlier accepted wisdom |
| Corticosteroids Depressive symptoms may occur after initial corticosteroid administration, with long-term use, or with drug discontinuation3 |
| Interferon alfa Depression rates of nearly 50% have been reported.4 Depressive symptoms seem to be related to dose and duration of treatment and may take several weeks to develop |
| Interferon beta Initial studies raised concern about an increased risk of depression and suicide, but a review of 16 studies did not detect an increased risk of depression5 |
| Isotretinoin Although initial studies did not show an association between isotretinoin and depression and suicide, 24 reports of depression and more than 170 cases of isotretinoin-associated suicide have been reported.6 In many patients, depressive symptoms resolved when the medication was discontinued, and several case studies reported depression recurrence with medication rechallenge |
| Varenicline and bupropion Postmarketing cases have described neuropsychiatric symptoms including depression and suicidal ideation with these antismoking agents, prompting changes in the drugs’ prescribing information. Many of the cases reflect new-onset depressed mood, suicidal ideation, and changes in emotion and behavior within days to weeks of initiating treatment. Patients with pre-existing psychiatric illness may experience worsening of symptoms7 |
Endocrine disorders
Hypothyroidism increases a patient’s risk of a mood disorder 7-fold, compared with the general population.8
Signs and symptoms. Patients with hypothyroidism may complain of constipation, thinning hair, dry skin, edema, sensitivity to cold, goiter, thyroid nodule, or hoarse voice. Symptoms such as fatigue, weight gain, and sleep disturbance overlap with depressive symptoms. A TSH value >4.94 mU/L indicates hypothyroidism and warrants referral to a primary care provider or endocrinologist.
Although the pathophysiology is unclear, 1 study found elevated thyroid peroxide antibodies in depressed postmenopausal women who had abnormal thyroid function tests, suggesting an autoimmune link between depression and hypothyroidism.9 In another study, 2.5% of depressed patients had abnormal serum TSH or thyroxine levels indicating hypothyroidism.10 Thyroid hormones have been used to augment treatment of refractory depression.11
Hyperparathyroidism. “Moans, groans, stones, and psychiatric overtones” describes the constellation of hyperparathyroidism symptoms. As serum calcium levels rise, mood and physical symptoms worsen (Table 4).
Signs and symptoms. Elevated serum calcium (normal range 8.7 to 10.7 mg/dL) and parathyroid hormone (PTH) levels support the diagnosis. Depressive symptoms may diminish or even resolve when calcium levels return to normal after parathyroidectomy.12
Cushing’s syndrome (CS). As many as 80% of patients exhibit depressive symptoms when CS is active.13
Signs and symptoms. Distinguishing CS symptoms include:
- hirsutism
- truncal obesity
- acne
- hypertension
- facial flushing
- purple striae.
Elevated serum cortisol, the condition’s hallmark, may be caused by pituitary adenomas, adrenal tumors or hyperplasia, or ectopic adrenocorticotropic hormone secretion. The most common cause is exogenous administration of glucocorticoids. A dexamethasone suppression test or 24-hour urine cortisol confirms CS diagnosis.
Depressed CS patients often experience poor concentration, early morning waking, and decreased libido. Compared with nondepressed individuals with CS, those with depression tend to be older (average age 37.5) and more likely to be female, have more severe CS-related symptoms, and exhibit higher urine cortisol levels at diagnosis (average 1.694 pmol/L).14,15
Antidepressants typically will not resolve depression in patients with CS unless you also correct the hypercorticalism.16
Addison’s disease (AD). Major depressive disorder is >2 times more prevalent in AD patients compared with matched controls.17
Signs and symptoms. Hyperpigmentation, salt cravings, low blood pressure, nausea, and vomiting are AD hallmarks. AD patients present with fatigue, vegetative symptoms, weight loss, and weakness that mimics a major depressive episode.
AD is caused by damage to the adrenal cortex. These patients do not have enough of the mineralocorticoid aldosterone, which maintains sodium and potassium balance and regulates blood pressure via the renin-angiotensin-aldosterone pathway. Decreased morning serum cortisol level, hyponatremia, and hyperkalemia confirm the diagnosis. AD can be serious—possibly fatal—so prompt referral to an endocrinologist is warranted.
Table 4
Clinical symptoms of hyperparathyroidism
| Physical | Psychiatric |
|---|---|
| Kidney stones | Poor sleep |
| Headache | Anhedonia |
| Gastroesophageal reflux disease | Decreased concentration |
| Palpitations | Irritability |
| Aching bones | Decreased libido |
| Increased blood pressure |
Neurologic disorders
Stroke. Post-stroke depressive symptoms generally do not differ from endogenous depression. Apathy, catastrophic reactions, hyper emotionalism, and diurnal mood variations are more prevalent in stroke patients,18 although some of these features have been noted in other neurologic conditions.
Signs and symptoms. Look for depression onset or a change in existing depression symptoms that occurs in the context of a clinically apparent stroke.19 Antidepressants such as serotonin reuptake inhibitors may relieve post-stroke depression.
Seizures. Depressive symptoms could appear before or after a seizure or may be the clinical presentation of a simple or complex partial seizure.1
Signs and symptoms. Episodic, short-lived depression that resolves rapidly may warrant a seizure evaluation. Prodromal depressive symptoms such as irritability, depression, fear, or anger20 may precede a seizure by 1 to 3 days and could improve after the seizure.
Caused by a simple partial seizure, ictal depression is characterized by guilt, anhedonia, or sudden-onset suicidal ideation without an environmental trigger. Symptoms are fairly short-lived, lasting from a few hours to a few days.5
Depressive symptoms also may develop minutes before a complex partial seizure or a secondarily generalized seizure.2 Mood changes typically are brief, stereotypical, and associated with other ictal phenomena. Interictal depression involves mild chronic symptoms similar to dysthymia. Postictal depression may last for several days.
Prodromal and ictal depression often improve when antiepileptic therapy reduces seizure frequency.
Huntington’s disease (HD) is a hereditary chorea caused by expanded trinucleotide repeats and characterized by abnormal movements, cognitive impairment, and neuropsychiatric symptoms. The suicide rate among HD patients is 4 times higher than in the general population.21
Signs and symptoms. Depression concurrent with neurologic symptoms such as chorea or dystonia may warrant an HD evaluation. Patients may present with psychiatric complaints such as depression, apathy, insomnia, or anxiety that may coincide with or precede other neurologic symptoms.22 Mood-congruent delusions and auditory hallucinations also have been reported.23 In one study, 98% of HD patients exhibited psychiatric symptoms—including dysphoria, agitation, irritability, apathy, and anxiety—that occurred irrespective of cognitive or motor symptoms.24
Research into the cause of HD’s neuropsychiatric symptoms has focused on abnormalities in frontostriatal brain circuitry.25 Depressive symptoms might respond to any class of antidepressant.
Wilson’s disease—caused by copper accumulation in the liver and basal ganglia—is characterized by degenerative changes in the brain, liver disease, and golden-brown or green Kayser-Fleischer rings in the cornea.
Signs and symptoms. Hepatic symptoms include hepatomegaly, hepatitis, and cirrhosis. Psychiatric symptoms—which include personality changes, depression, irritability, and psychosis—may occur alone or concurrent with neurologic symptoms such as tremor or dystonia.26 Neuropsychiatric symptoms—the initial presentation in up to one-third of Wilson’s disease patients—may respond to anticopper therapies.26
Multiple sclerosis (MS). Up to 50% of MS patients experience depression, although it is unclear if symptoms are caused by the disease or the impact of having a progressive chronic illness.
Signs and symptoms. MS may cause weakness, visual loss, incontinence, paresthesias, and speech disturbances. MS symptoms such as fatigue, insomnia, and poor concentration overlap with DSM-IV-TR criteria for major depression. Depressive symptoms may worsen during disease flare-ups and with advanced neurologic disease.
27 Irritability, discouragement, and a sense of frustration are more common than low self-esteem and guilt.28
Depression may be more prevalent in MS patients with brain lesions compared with those with spinal cord lesions.29 Imaging studies indicate that depressed MS patients are more likely to have hyperintense lesions in the left inferior frontal regions of the brain and greater atrophy of the left anterior temporal region,30 indicating that the disease may play a role in depressive symptoms.
Parkinson’s disease (PD). Nearly one-half of PD patients experience depression, which recent research suggests is related to neuroanatomic degeneration and not a reaction to having the illness.31
Signs and symptoms. Because PD can present with sleep disturbances, bradykinesia, restricted range of facial expression, and apathy, it initially might be mistaken for a depressive disorder.
Other neurologic disorders. Depression in Alzheimer’s disease typically involves prominent anhedonia, irritability, apathy, and anxiety, rather than suicidal ideation and guilt.32 In traumatic brain injury, the most common psychiatric disturbance is a depressive syndrome resembling endogenous depression.32 Progressive supranuclear palsy—a degenerative disorder of the basal ganglia, brainstem, and cerebellar nuclei—is associated with cognitive impairments and personality changes and may present as depression.33
Infectious disease
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Depression affects 22% to 45% of HIV patients, particularly women, homosexual men, intravenous drug users, and patients with a history of depression.34 The cause of depression in HIV infection is unclear because studies are complicated by factors such as:
- social stigma and isolation associated with HIV
- side effects (such as fatigue) of antiretroviral medications
- comorbid opportunistic CNS infections, such as tuberculosis or cryptococcal meningitis
- the virus itself, which is known to affect the brain.35
Certain sociodemographic factors are associated with depression in HIV patients, but Gibbie et al36 found that CD4 count and viral load are not. This suggests that HIV does not directly cause depression, although research is ongoing. Comorbid substance dependence and AIDS-related dementia can complicate the clinical picture.
The depressive syndrome in patients with HIV typically does not precede the diagnosis of HIV. Diagnosing depression in HIV patients—regardless of the cause—is crucial because of its effect on quality of life, productivity, medication adherence, and mortality.37
West Nile virus. Among the one-third of patients who report new-onset depression after West Nile infection, 75% experience mild-to-severe depression as measured on a depression scale.38 Studies of depression in West Nile virus infection are complicated by recall bias, illness-related disability, and fatigue that interferes with psychiatric assessment. Similar to HIV, a depression diagnosis typically is made following a known West Nile virus infection.
Lyme disease. More than one-third of patients diagnosed with post-Lyme syndrome—chronic symptoms that persist after antibiotic treatment—will have depression during their lifetime.39 One report that attempted to determine a causal relationship between Lyme disease and depression found a similar lifetime incidence of depression in those with Lyme disease and in the general population. Even so, the incidence of depression doubled in this sample after the onset of Lyme disease. Studies of this relationship are confounded by other effects of Lyme disease, small numbers of subjects, and recall bias.
Signs and symptoms. Exposure to ticks, cranial nerve involvement, arthralgias, memory deficits, and psychotic depression may suggest Lyme disease.
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease is a rare prion disease that can be genetic, spontaneous, or acquired via contaminated beef, corneal transplants, or dural transplants. Patients may present with cognitive impairment, fatigue, emotional lability, and depression.
Signs and symptoms include changes in the brain seen on an MRI, rapid physical and mental decline, and myoclonus and ataxia signs that occur late in the disease. Depression caused by this incurable disease often fails to respond to treatment.
Neurosyphilis patients may experience personality changes, irritability, psychosis, and decreased self-care, which may be interpreted as anhedonia or depressed mood.
Signs and symptoms. Common physical signs include dysarthria, hyperreflexia, cognitive decline, hallucinations, tremor, tabes dorsalis, and Argyll Robertson pupils. Neurosyphilis is confirmed by positive venereal disease research laboratory test of cerebrospinal fluid and treated with high-dose penicillin. Consensus is lacking on the role of psychotropic medications for the management of psychiatric symptoms.40
Hepatitis C patients have a higher lifetime prevalence of major depression compared with controls.41 Although evidence does not support a causal link between hepatitis C infection and depression, anecdotal reports persist.42 Studies of comorbid depression and hepatitis C are complicated by hepatic encephalopathy, fatigue, medication side effects, and social and economic factors associated with hepatitis C. Physical symptoms include decreased appetite, fatigue, fever, nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, clay-colored stool, joint pain, and jaundice.
Interferon (IFN) treatment for chronic, active hepatitis C has been associated with increased depressive symptoms and suicidal behavior. In a study of 31 hepatitis C patients, 23% experienced depressive episodes concurrent with IFN alfa treatment.43 Depressive symptoms seem to be related to dose and treatment duration and may take several weeks to develop.
Malignancy
Cancer patients often report depressive symptoms, although a causal relationship between malignancy and depression remains unclear. Some evidence suggests that pancreatic cancer and paraneoplastic syndromes can cause depression. In a retrospective study, depression preceded a pancreatic cancer diagnosis more often than with other gastrointestinal or non-gastrointestinal cancers.44 Typically, depression starts >1 year before the cancer is discovered. It is unclear, however, if the cancer leads to depression or depression predisposes a person to pancreatic cancer.
Signs and symptoms. New-onset depression, dramatic unintended weight loss, and predominant sleep disturbance warrant further evaluation for malignancy. In patients diagnosed with cancer, depressive symptoms may be caused by reactive depression, an acute stress reaction, or adjustment disorder with depressed mood.
Paraneoplastic syndromes can cause depression, behavior and personality changes, and memory deficits.45 These syndromes are commonly found in breast, lung, and testicular cancer, all of which might not be discovered when psychiatric symptoms develop.46
The immune system’s reaction to cancer produces antibodies that attack the nervous system. Diagnosis of the resulting limbic encephalitis thought to underlie psychiatric symptoms is by CSF-positive antibodies (anti-Yo antibodies, anti-Ma2 antibodies, or anti-Hu) and abnormalities in brain MRI. Psychiatric symptoms often improve when the underlying malignancy is treated.
Related resources
- Blumenfield M, Strain JJ. Psychosomatic medicine. Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, Williams, & Wilkins; 2006.
- Ferrando SJ, Freyberg Z. Neuropsychiatric aspects of infectious diseases. Crit Care Clin. 2008;24:889-919.
Drug brand names
- Bupropion • Wellbutrin, Zyban
- Felbamate • Felbatol
- Interferon alfa • Intron, Roferon
- Interferon beta • Avonex, Rebif
- Isotretinoin • Accutane
- Levetiracetam • Keppra
- Phenytoin • Dilantin
- Primidone • Mysoline
- Propranolol • Inderal
- Tiagabine • Gabitril Roferon
- Topiramate • Topamax
- Verapamil • Isoptin
- Vigabatrin • Sabril
- Varenicline • Chantix
Disclosures
Dr. Carroll reports no financial relationship with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
Dr. Rado receives research support from Eli Lilly and Company, Neuronetics, and Otsuka, and is a speaker for Eli Lilly and Company.
1. Kanner AM. Depression in epilepsy: prevalence, clinical semiology, pathogenic mechanisms, and treatment. Biol Psychiatry. 2003;54(3):388-398.
2. Lambert MV, Robertson MM. Depression in epilepsy: etiology, phenomenology, and treatment. Epilepsia. 1999;40(suppl 10):S21-S47.
3. Patten SB, Neutel CI. Corticosteroid-induced adverse psychiatric effects: incidence, diagnosis and management. Drug Saf. 2000;22(2):111-122.
4. Asnis GM, De La Garza R, 2nd. Interferon-induced depression in chronic hepatitis C: a review of its prevalence, risk factors, biology and treatment approaches. J Clin Gastroenterol. 2006;40(4):322-335.
5. Goeb JL, Even C, Nicolas G, et al. Psychiatric side effects of interferon-beta in multiple sclerosis. Eur Psychiatry. 2006;21(3):186-193.
6. Hull PR, D’Arcy C. Isotretinoin use and subsequent depression and suicide: presenting the evidence. Am J Clin Dermatol. 2003;4(7):493-505.
7. U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Information for Healthcare Professionals: Varenicline (marketed as Chantix) and Bupropion (marketed as Zyban, Wellbutrin, and generics). Available at: http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders
/DrugSafetyInformationforHeathcareProfessionals/ucm169986.htm. Accessed July 7, 2009.
8. Larisch R, Kley K, Nikolaus S, et al. Depression and anxiety in different thyroid function states. Horm Metab Res. 2004;36(9):650-653.
9. Pop VJ, Maartens LH, Leusink G, et al. Are autoimmune thyroid dysfunction and depression related? J Clin Endocrinol Metab. 1998;83(9):3194-3197.
10. Gold MS, Pottash AL, Extein I. Hypothyroidism and depression. Evidence from complete thyroid function evaluation. JAMA. 1981;245(19):1919-1922.
11. Joffe RT, Singer W, Levitt AJ, et al. A placebo-controlled comparison of lithium and triiodothyronine augmentation of tricyclic antidepressants in unipolar refractory depression. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1993;50(5):387-393.
12. Wilhelm SM, Lee J, Prinz RA. Major depression due to primary hyperparathyroidism: a frequent and correctable disorder. Am Surg. 2004;70(2):175-179.
13. Sonino N, Fava GA. Psychiatric disorders associated with Cushing’s syndrome. Epidemiology, pathophysiology, and treatment. CNS Drugs. 2001;15(5):361-373.
14. Sonino N, Fava GA, Raffi AR, et al. Clinical correlates of major depression in Cushing’s disease. Psychopathology. 1998;31(6):302-306.
15. Dorn LD, Burgess ES, Dubbert B, et al. Psychopathology in patients with endogenous Cushing’s syndrome: ‘atypical’ or melancholic features. Clin Endocrinol (Oxf). 1995;43(4):433-442.
16. Zeiger MA, Fraker DL, Pass HI, et al. Effective reversibility of the signs and symptoms of hypercortisolemia by bilateral adrenalectomy. Surgery. 1993;114(6):1138-1143.
17. Thomsen AF, Kvist TK, Andersen PK, et al. The risk of affective disorders in patients with adrenocortical insufficiency. Psychoneuroendocrinology. 2006;31(5):614-622.
18. Gainotti G, Azzoni A, Marra C. Frequency, phenomenology and anatomical-clinical correlates of major post-stroke depression. Br J Psychiatry. 1999;175:163-167.
19. Newberg AR, Davydow DS, Lee HB. Cerebrovascular disease basis of depression: post-stroke depression and vascular depression. Int Rev Psychiatry. 2006;18(5):433-441.
20. Hughes J, Devinsky O, Flemann E, et al. Premonitory symptoms in epilepsy. Seizure. 1993;2(3):201-203.
21. Shoenfeld M, Myers RH, Cupples RA, et al. Increased rate of suicide among patients with Huntington’s disease. J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry. 1984;47(12):1283-1287.
22. Tost H, Wendt CS, Schmitt A, et al. Huntington’s disease: phenomenological diversity of a neuropsychiatric condition that challenges traditional concepts in neurology and psychiatry. Am J Psychiatry. 2004;161(1):28-34.
23. Rosenblatt A. Neuropsychiatry of Huntington’s disease. Dialogues Clin Neurosci. 2007;9(2):191-197.
24. Paulsen JS, Ready RE, Hamilton JM, et al. Neuropsychiatric aspects of Huntington’s disease. J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry. 2001;71(3):310-314.
25. Anderson KE. Huntington’s disease and related disorders. Psychiatry Clin North Am. 2005;28(1):275-290.
26. Loudianos G, Gitlin JD. Wilson’s disease. Semin Liver Dis. 2000;20(3):353-364.
27. Chwastiak L, Ehde DM, Gibbons LE, et al. Depressive symptoms and severity of illness in multiple sclerosis: epidemiologic study of a large community sample. Am J Psychiatry. 2002;159(11):1862-1868.
28. Feinstein A. The neuropsychiatry of multiple sclerosis. Can J Psychiatry. 2004;49(3):157-163.
29. Siegert RJ, Abernethy DA. Depression in multiple sclerosis: a review. J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry. 2005;76(4):469-475.
30. Feinstein A, Roy P, Lobaugh N, et al. Structural brain abnormalities in multiple sclerosis patients with major depression. Neurology. 2004;62(4):586-590.
31. McDonald WM, Richard IH, DeLong MR. Prevalence, etiology and treatment of depression in Parkinson’s disease. Biol Psychiatry. 2003;54(3):363-375.
32. Lyketsos CG, Kozauer N, Rabins PV. Psychiatric manifestations of neurologic disease: where are we headed? Dialogues Clin Neurosci. 2007;9(2):111-124.
33. Rosenblatt A, Leroi I. Neuropsychiatry of Huntington’s disease and other basal ganglia disorders. Psychosomatics. 2000;41(1):24-30.
34. Penzak SR, Reddy YS, Grimsley SR. Depression in patients with HIV infection. Am J Health Syst Pharm. 2000;57(4):376-386.
35. Basu S, Chwastiak LA, Bruce RD. Clinical management of depression and anxiety in HIV-infected adults. AIDS. 2005;19(18):2057-2067.
36. Gibbie T, Mijch A, Ellen S, et al. Depression and neurocognitive performance in individuals with HIV/AIDS: 2-year follow-up. HIV Med. 2006;7(2):112-121.
37. Ammassari A, Antinori A, Aloisi MS, et al. Depressive symptoms, neurocognitive impairment, and adherence to highly active antiretroviral therapy among HIV-infected persons. Psychosomatics. 2004;45(5):394-402.
38. Murray KO, Resnick M, Miller V. Depression after infection with West Nile virus. Emerg Infect Dis. 2007;13(3):479-481.
39. Elkins LE, Pollina DA, Scheffer SR, et al. Psychological states and neuropsychological performances in chronic Lyme disease. Appl Neuropsychol. 1999;6(1):19-26.
40. Sanchez FM, Zisselman MH. Treatment of psychiatric symptoms associated with neurosyphilis. Psychosomatics. 2007;48(5):440-445.
41. Carta MG, Hardoy MC, Garofalo A, et al. Association of chronic hepatitis C with major depressive disorders: irrespective of interferon-alpha therapy. Clin Pract Epidemol Ment Health. 2007;3:22.-
42. Wessely S, Pariante C. Fatigue, depression and chronic hepatitis C infection. Psychol Med. 2002;32(1):1-10.
43. Dieperink E, Ho SB, Thuras P. A prospective study of neuropsychiatry symptoms associated with interferon-alpha-2b and ribavirin therapy for patients with chronic hepatitis C. Psychosomatics. 2003;44(2):104-112.
44. Carney CP, Jones L, Woolson RF, et al. Relationship between depression and pancreatic cancer in the general population. Psychosom Med. 2003;65(5):884-888.
45. Farrugia ME, Conway R, Simpson DJ, et al. Paraneoplastic limbic encephalitis. Clin Neurol Neurosurg. 2005;107(2):128-131.
46. Gultekin SH, Rosenfeld MR, Voltz R, et al. Paraneoplastic limbic encephalitis: neurological symptoms, immunological findings, and tumor association in 50 patients. Brain. 2000;123(pt 7):1481-1494.
Ms. G, age 56, presents with the chief complaint of “depression.” Review of symptoms reveals 6 months of depressed mood, anhedonia, tearfulness, 30-pound weight gain, low energy, and bilateral ankle edema. Her psychiatrist orders a thyroid stimulating hormone (TSH) level, which shows 9.51 mU/L (normal range 0.35 to 4.94 mU/L), indicating hypothyroidism. After 1 month of treatment with levothyroxine, Ms. G’s mood symptoms and edema resolve and her weight stabilizes.
A patient who comes to you for treatment of depression might also present with physical symptoms (such as, fatigue, nausea, balance problems, etc.) that could point to a medical illness. Endocrine, neurologic, infectious, and malignant processes (Table 1) and vitamin deficiencies (Table 2) could be causing your patient’s depression. To help differentiate various etiologies of depressive symptoms, we review common medical causes of depression, their distinguishing characteristics, and pertinent treatment issues.
DSM-IV-TR considers major depression secondary to a general medical condition to be diagnostically separate from a major depressive episode. When considering nonpsychiatric causes of depression, begin with a thorough medical history including current and past medications (Table 3),1-7 illicit substance use, review of systems, and a detailed neurologic exam.
Table 1
Medical conditions with evidence of causing depression
| Endocrine Hypothyroidism Hyperparathyroidism Cushing’s syndrome Addison’s disease |
| Neurologic Stroke Seizures Huntington’s disease Wilson’s disease Multiple sclerosis Parkinson’s disease Traumatic brain injury |
| Infectious Human immunodeficiency virus West Nile virus Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease Lyme disease Neurosyphilis Hepatitis C |
| Malignancy Paraneoplastic syndromes Pancreatic cancer |
Table 2
Vitamin deficiencies that can lead to depression
| Vitamin | Symptom |
|---|---|
| B12 | Megaloblastic anemia Decreased appetite Unexplained pancytopenia Paresthesias Dementia Glossitis Depressed mood Ataxia Irritability |
| Folate | Ataxia Depressed mood Dementia Impaired vibratory sensation Hyper- or hyporeflexia Macrocytic anemia |
Table 3
Medications that may be linked to depressive symptoms
| Antiepileptic drugs Primidone, tiagabine, vigabatrin, felbamate, levetiracetam, topiramate, and phenytoin may cause depression,1 and phenobarbital may cause depression associated with suicidal ideation2 |
| Beta-blockers Recent randomized studies indicate these drugs do not carry a higher risk of depression, contrary to earlier accepted wisdom |
| Corticosteroids Depressive symptoms may occur after initial corticosteroid administration, with long-term use, or with drug discontinuation3 |
| Interferon alfa Depression rates of nearly 50% have been reported.4 Depressive symptoms seem to be related to dose and duration of treatment and may take several weeks to develop |
| Interferon beta Initial studies raised concern about an increased risk of depression and suicide, but a review of 16 studies did not detect an increased risk of depression5 |
| Isotretinoin Although initial studies did not show an association between isotretinoin and depression and suicide, 24 reports of depression and more than 170 cases of isotretinoin-associated suicide have been reported.6 In many patients, depressive symptoms resolved when the medication was discontinued, and several case studies reported depression recurrence with medication rechallenge |
| Varenicline and bupropion Postmarketing cases have described neuropsychiatric symptoms including depression and suicidal ideation with these antismoking agents, prompting changes in the drugs’ prescribing information. Many of the cases reflect new-onset depressed mood, suicidal ideation, and changes in emotion and behavior within days to weeks of initiating treatment. Patients with pre-existing psychiatric illness may experience worsening of symptoms7 |
Endocrine disorders
Hypothyroidism increases a patient’s risk of a mood disorder 7-fold, compared with the general population.8
Signs and symptoms. Patients with hypothyroidism may complain of constipation, thinning hair, dry skin, edema, sensitivity to cold, goiter, thyroid nodule, or hoarse voice. Symptoms such as fatigue, weight gain, and sleep disturbance overlap with depressive symptoms. A TSH value >4.94 mU/L indicates hypothyroidism and warrants referral to a primary care provider or endocrinologist.
Although the pathophysiology is unclear, 1 study found elevated thyroid peroxide antibodies in depressed postmenopausal women who had abnormal thyroid function tests, suggesting an autoimmune link between depression and hypothyroidism.9 In another study, 2.5% of depressed patients had abnormal serum TSH or thyroxine levels indicating hypothyroidism.10 Thyroid hormones have been used to augment treatment of refractory depression.11
Hyperparathyroidism. “Moans, groans, stones, and psychiatric overtones” describes the constellation of hyperparathyroidism symptoms. As serum calcium levels rise, mood and physical symptoms worsen (Table 4).
Signs and symptoms. Elevated serum calcium (normal range 8.7 to 10.7 mg/dL) and parathyroid hormone (PTH) levels support the diagnosis. Depressive symptoms may diminish or even resolve when calcium levels return to normal after parathyroidectomy.12
Cushing’s syndrome (CS). As many as 80% of patients exhibit depressive symptoms when CS is active.13
Signs and symptoms. Distinguishing CS symptoms include:
- hirsutism
- truncal obesity
- acne
- hypertension
- facial flushing
- purple striae.
Elevated serum cortisol, the condition’s hallmark, may be caused by pituitary adenomas, adrenal tumors or hyperplasia, or ectopic adrenocorticotropic hormone secretion. The most common cause is exogenous administration of glucocorticoids. A dexamethasone suppression test or 24-hour urine cortisol confirms CS diagnosis.
Depressed CS patients often experience poor concentration, early morning waking, and decreased libido. Compared with nondepressed individuals with CS, those with depression tend to be older (average age 37.5) and more likely to be female, have more severe CS-related symptoms, and exhibit higher urine cortisol levels at diagnosis (average 1.694 pmol/L).14,15
Antidepressants typically will not resolve depression in patients with CS unless you also correct the hypercorticalism.16
Addison’s disease (AD). Major depressive disorder is >2 times more prevalent in AD patients compared with matched controls.17
Signs and symptoms. Hyperpigmentation, salt cravings, low blood pressure, nausea, and vomiting are AD hallmarks. AD patients present with fatigue, vegetative symptoms, weight loss, and weakness that mimics a major depressive episode.
AD is caused by damage to the adrenal cortex. These patients do not have enough of the mineralocorticoid aldosterone, which maintains sodium and potassium balance and regulates blood pressure via the renin-angiotensin-aldosterone pathway. Decreased morning serum cortisol level, hyponatremia, and hyperkalemia confirm the diagnosis. AD can be serious—possibly fatal—so prompt referral to an endocrinologist is warranted.
Table 4
Clinical symptoms of hyperparathyroidism
| Physical | Psychiatric |
|---|---|
| Kidney stones | Poor sleep |
| Headache | Anhedonia |
| Gastroesophageal reflux disease | Decreased concentration |
| Palpitations | Irritability |
| Aching bones | Decreased libido |
| Increased blood pressure |
Neurologic disorders
Stroke. Post-stroke depressive symptoms generally do not differ from endogenous depression. Apathy, catastrophic reactions, hyper emotionalism, and diurnal mood variations are more prevalent in stroke patients,18 although some of these features have been noted in other neurologic conditions.
Signs and symptoms. Look for depression onset or a change in existing depression symptoms that occurs in the context of a clinically apparent stroke.19 Antidepressants such as serotonin reuptake inhibitors may relieve post-stroke depression.
Seizures. Depressive symptoms could appear before or after a seizure or may be the clinical presentation of a simple or complex partial seizure.1
Signs and symptoms. Episodic, short-lived depression that resolves rapidly may warrant a seizure evaluation. Prodromal depressive symptoms such as irritability, depression, fear, or anger20 may precede a seizure by 1 to 3 days and could improve after the seizure.
Caused by a simple partial seizure, ictal depression is characterized by guilt, anhedonia, or sudden-onset suicidal ideation without an environmental trigger. Symptoms are fairly short-lived, lasting from a few hours to a few days.5
Depressive symptoms also may develop minutes before a complex partial seizure or a secondarily generalized seizure.2 Mood changes typically are brief, stereotypical, and associated with other ictal phenomena. Interictal depression involves mild chronic symptoms similar to dysthymia. Postictal depression may last for several days.
Prodromal and ictal depression often improve when antiepileptic therapy reduces seizure frequency.
Huntington’s disease (HD) is a hereditary chorea caused by expanded trinucleotide repeats and characterized by abnormal movements, cognitive impairment, and neuropsychiatric symptoms. The suicide rate among HD patients is 4 times higher than in the general population.21
Signs and symptoms. Depression concurrent with neurologic symptoms such as chorea or dystonia may warrant an HD evaluation. Patients may present with psychiatric complaints such as depression, apathy, insomnia, or anxiety that may coincide with or precede other neurologic symptoms.22 Mood-congruent delusions and auditory hallucinations also have been reported.23 In one study, 98% of HD patients exhibited psychiatric symptoms—including dysphoria, agitation, irritability, apathy, and anxiety—that occurred irrespective of cognitive or motor symptoms.24
Research into the cause of HD’s neuropsychiatric symptoms has focused on abnormalities in frontostriatal brain circuitry.25 Depressive symptoms might respond to any class of antidepressant.
Wilson’s disease—caused by copper accumulation in the liver and basal ganglia—is characterized by degenerative changes in the brain, liver disease, and golden-brown or green Kayser-Fleischer rings in the cornea.
Signs and symptoms. Hepatic symptoms include hepatomegaly, hepatitis, and cirrhosis. Psychiatric symptoms—which include personality changes, depression, irritability, and psychosis—may occur alone or concurrent with neurologic symptoms such as tremor or dystonia.26 Neuropsychiatric symptoms—the initial presentation in up to one-third of Wilson’s disease patients—may respond to anticopper therapies.26
Multiple sclerosis (MS). Up to 50% of MS patients experience depression, although it is unclear if symptoms are caused by the disease or the impact of having a progressive chronic illness.
Signs and symptoms. MS may cause weakness, visual loss, incontinence, paresthesias, and speech disturbances. MS symptoms such as fatigue, insomnia, and poor concentration overlap with DSM-IV-TR criteria for major depression. Depressive symptoms may worsen during disease flare-ups and with advanced neurologic disease.
27 Irritability, discouragement, and a sense of frustration are more common than low self-esteem and guilt.28
Depression may be more prevalent in MS patients with brain lesions compared with those with spinal cord lesions.29 Imaging studies indicate that depressed MS patients are more likely to have hyperintense lesions in the left inferior frontal regions of the brain and greater atrophy of the left anterior temporal region,30 indicating that the disease may play a role in depressive symptoms.
Parkinson’s disease (PD). Nearly one-half of PD patients experience depression, which recent research suggests is related to neuroanatomic degeneration and not a reaction to having the illness.31
Signs and symptoms. Because PD can present with sleep disturbances, bradykinesia, restricted range of facial expression, and apathy, it initially might be mistaken for a depressive disorder.
Other neurologic disorders. Depression in Alzheimer’s disease typically involves prominent anhedonia, irritability, apathy, and anxiety, rather than suicidal ideation and guilt.32 In traumatic brain injury, the most common psychiatric disturbance is a depressive syndrome resembling endogenous depression.32 Progressive supranuclear palsy—a degenerative disorder of the basal ganglia, brainstem, and cerebellar nuclei—is associated with cognitive impairments and personality changes and may present as depression.33
Infectious disease
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Depression affects 22% to 45% of HIV patients, particularly women, homosexual men, intravenous drug users, and patients with a history of depression.34 The cause of depression in HIV infection is unclear because studies are complicated by factors such as:
- social stigma and isolation associated with HIV
- side effects (such as fatigue) of antiretroviral medications
- comorbid opportunistic CNS infections, such as tuberculosis or cryptococcal meningitis
- the virus itself, which is known to affect the brain.35
Certain sociodemographic factors are associated with depression in HIV patients, but Gibbie et al36 found that CD4 count and viral load are not. This suggests that HIV does not directly cause depression, although research is ongoing. Comorbid substance dependence and AIDS-related dementia can complicate the clinical picture.
The depressive syndrome in patients with HIV typically does not precede the diagnosis of HIV. Diagnosing depression in HIV patients—regardless of the cause—is crucial because of its effect on quality of life, productivity, medication adherence, and mortality.37
West Nile virus. Among the one-third of patients who report new-onset depression after West Nile infection, 75% experience mild-to-severe depression as measured on a depression scale.38 Studies of depression in West Nile virus infection are complicated by recall bias, illness-related disability, and fatigue that interferes with psychiatric assessment. Similar to HIV, a depression diagnosis typically is made following a known West Nile virus infection.
Lyme disease. More than one-third of patients diagnosed with post-Lyme syndrome—chronic symptoms that persist after antibiotic treatment—will have depression during their lifetime.39 One report that attempted to determine a causal relationship between Lyme disease and depression found a similar lifetime incidence of depression in those with Lyme disease and in the general population. Even so, the incidence of depression doubled in this sample after the onset of Lyme disease. Studies of this relationship are confounded by other effects of Lyme disease, small numbers of subjects, and recall bias.
Signs and symptoms. Exposure to ticks, cranial nerve involvement, arthralgias, memory deficits, and psychotic depression may suggest Lyme disease.
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease is a rare prion disease that can be genetic, spontaneous, or acquired via contaminated beef, corneal transplants, or dural transplants. Patients may present with cognitive impairment, fatigue, emotional lability, and depression.
Signs and symptoms include changes in the brain seen on an MRI, rapid physical and mental decline, and myoclonus and ataxia signs that occur late in the disease. Depression caused by this incurable disease often fails to respond to treatment.
Neurosyphilis patients may experience personality changes, irritability, psychosis, and decreased self-care, which may be interpreted as anhedonia or depressed mood.
Signs and symptoms. Common physical signs include dysarthria, hyperreflexia, cognitive decline, hallucinations, tremor, tabes dorsalis, and Argyll Robertson pupils. Neurosyphilis is confirmed by positive venereal disease research laboratory test of cerebrospinal fluid and treated with high-dose penicillin. Consensus is lacking on the role of psychotropic medications for the management of psychiatric symptoms.40
Hepatitis C patients have a higher lifetime prevalence of major depression compared with controls.41 Although evidence does not support a causal link between hepatitis C infection and depression, anecdotal reports persist.42 Studies of comorbid depression and hepatitis C are complicated by hepatic encephalopathy, fatigue, medication side effects, and social and economic factors associated with hepatitis C. Physical symptoms include decreased appetite, fatigue, fever, nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, clay-colored stool, joint pain, and jaundice.
Interferon (IFN) treatment for chronic, active hepatitis C has been associated with increased depressive symptoms and suicidal behavior. In a study of 31 hepatitis C patients, 23% experienced depressive episodes concurrent with IFN alfa treatment.43 Depressive symptoms seem to be related to dose and treatment duration and may take several weeks to develop.
Malignancy
Cancer patients often report depressive symptoms, although a causal relationship between malignancy and depression remains unclear. Some evidence suggests that pancreatic cancer and paraneoplastic syndromes can cause depression. In a retrospective study, depression preceded a pancreatic cancer diagnosis more often than with other gastrointestinal or non-gastrointestinal cancers.44 Typically, depression starts >1 year before the cancer is discovered. It is unclear, however, if the cancer leads to depression or depression predisposes a person to pancreatic cancer.
Signs and symptoms. New-onset depression, dramatic unintended weight loss, and predominant sleep disturbance warrant further evaluation for malignancy. In patients diagnosed with cancer, depressive symptoms may be caused by reactive depression, an acute stress reaction, or adjustment disorder with depressed mood.
Paraneoplastic syndromes can cause depression, behavior and personality changes, and memory deficits.45 These syndromes are commonly found in breast, lung, and testicular cancer, all of which might not be discovered when psychiatric symptoms develop.46
The immune system’s reaction to cancer produces antibodies that attack the nervous system. Diagnosis of the resulting limbic encephalitis thought to underlie psychiatric symptoms is by CSF-positive antibodies (anti-Yo antibodies, anti-Ma2 antibodies, or anti-Hu) and abnormalities in brain MRI. Psychiatric symptoms often improve when the underlying malignancy is treated.
Related resources
- Blumenfield M, Strain JJ. Psychosomatic medicine. Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, Williams, & Wilkins; 2006.
- Ferrando SJ, Freyberg Z. Neuropsychiatric aspects of infectious diseases. Crit Care Clin. 2008;24:889-919.
Drug brand names
- Bupropion • Wellbutrin, Zyban
- Felbamate • Felbatol
- Interferon alfa • Intron, Roferon
- Interferon beta • Avonex, Rebif
- Isotretinoin • Accutane
- Levetiracetam • Keppra
- Phenytoin • Dilantin
- Primidone • Mysoline
- Propranolol • Inderal
- Tiagabine • Gabitril Roferon
- Topiramate • Topamax
- Verapamil • Isoptin
- Vigabatrin • Sabril
- Varenicline • Chantix
Disclosures
Dr. Carroll reports no financial relationship with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
Dr. Rado receives research support from Eli Lilly and Company, Neuronetics, and Otsuka, and is a speaker for Eli Lilly and Company.
Ms. G, age 56, presents with the chief complaint of “depression.” Review of symptoms reveals 6 months of depressed mood, anhedonia, tearfulness, 30-pound weight gain, low energy, and bilateral ankle edema. Her psychiatrist orders a thyroid stimulating hormone (TSH) level, which shows 9.51 mU/L (normal range 0.35 to 4.94 mU/L), indicating hypothyroidism. After 1 month of treatment with levothyroxine, Ms. G’s mood symptoms and edema resolve and her weight stabilizes.
A patient who comes to you for treatment of depression might also present with physical symptoms (such as, fatigue, nausea, balance problems, etc.) that could point to a medical illness. Endocrine, neurologic, infectious, and malignant processes (Table 1) and vitamin deficiencies (Table 2) could be causing your patient’s depression. To help differentiate various etiologies of depressive symptoms, we review common medical causes of depression, their distinguishing characteristics, and pertinent treatment issues.
DSM-IV-TR considers major depression secondary to a general medical condition to be diagnostically separate from a major depressive episode. When considering nonpsychiatric causes of depression, begin with a thorough medical history including current and past medications (Table 3),1-7 illicit substance use, review of systems, and a detailed neurologic exam.
Table 1
Medical conditions with evidence of causing depression
| Endocrine Hypothyroidism Hyperparathyroidism Cushing’s syndrome Addison’s disease |
| Neurologic Stroke Seizures Huntington’s disease Wilson’s disease Multiple sclerosis Parkinson’s disease Traumatic brain injury |
| Infectious Human immunodeficiency virus West Nile virus Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease Lyme disease Neurosyphilis Hepatitis C |
| Malignancy Paraneoplastic syndromes Pancreatic cancer |
Table 2
Vitamin deficiencies that can lead to depression
| Vitamin | Symptom |
|---|---|
| B12 | Megaloblastic anemia Decreased appetite Unexplained pancytopenia Paresthesias Dementia Glossitis Depressed mood Ataxia Irritability |
| Folate | Ataxia Depressed mood Dementia Impaired vibratory sensation Hyper- or hyporeflexia Macrocytic anemia |
Table 3
Medications that may be linked to depressive symptoms
| Antiepileptic drugs Primidone, tiagabine, vigabatrin, felbamate, levetiracetam, topiramate, and phenytoin may cause depression,1 and phenobarbital may cause depression associated with suicidal ideation2 |
| Beta-blockers Recent randomized studies indicate these drugs do not carry a higher risk of depression, contrary to earlier accepted wisdom |
| Corticosteroids Depressive symptoms may occur after initial corticosteroid administration, with long-term use, or with drug discontinuation3 |
| Interferon alfa Depression rates of nearly 50% have been reported.4 Depressive symptoms seem to be related to dose and duration of treatment and may take several weeks to develop |
| Interferon beta Initial studies raised concern about an increased risk of depression and suicide, but a review of 16 studies did not detect an increased risk of depression5 |
| Isotretinoin Although initial studies did not show an association between isotretinoin and depression and suicide, 24 reports of depression and more than 170 cases of isotretinoin-associated suicide have been reported.6 In many patients, depressive symptoms resolved when the medication was discontinued, and several case studies reported depression recurrence with medication rechallenge |
| Varenicline and bupropion Postmarketing cases have described neuropsychiatric symptoms including depression and suicidal ideation with these antismoking agents, prompting changes in the drugs’ prescribing information. Many of the cases reflect new-onset depressed mood, suicidal ideation, and changes in emotion and behavior within days to weeks of initiating treatment. Patients with pre-existing psychiatric illness may experience worsening of symptoms7 |
Endocrine disorders
Hypothyroidism increases a patient’s risk of a mood disorder 7-fold, compared with the general population.8
Signs and symptoms. Patients with hypothyroidism may complain of constipation, thinning hair, dry skin, edema, sensitivity to cold, goiter, thyroid nodule, or hoarse voice. Symptoms such as fatigue, weight gain, and sleep disturbance overlap with depressive symptoms. A TSH value >4.94 mU/L indicates hypothyroidism and warrants referral to a primary care provider or endocrinologist.
Although the pathophysiology is unclear, 1 study found elevated thyroid peroxide antibodies in depressed postmenopausal women who had abnormal thyroid function tests, suggesting an autoimmune link between depression and hypothyroidism.9 In another study, 2.5% of depressed patients had abnormal serum TSH or thyroxine levels indicating hypothyroidism.10 Thyroid hormones have been used to augment treatment of refractory depression.11
Hyperparathyroidism. “Moans, groans, stones, and psychiatric overtones” describes the constellation of hyperparathyroidism symptoms. As serum calcium levels rise, mood and physical symptoms worsen (Table 4).
Signs and symptoms. Elevated serum calcium (normal range 8.7 to 10.7 mg/dL) and parathyroid hormone (PTH) levels support the diagnosis. Depressive symptoms may diminish or even resolve when calcium levels return to normal after parathyroidectomy.12
Cushing’s syndrome (CS). As many as 80% of patients exhibit depressive symptoms when CS is active.13
Signs and symptoms. Distinguishing CS symptoms include:
- hirsutism
- truncal obesity
- acne
- hypertension
- facial flushing
- purple striae.
Elevated serum cortisol, the condition’s hallmark, may be caused by pituitary adenomas, adrenal tumors or hyperplasia, or ectopic adrenocorticotropic hormone secretion. The most common cause is exogenous administration of glucocorticoids. A dexamethasone suppression test or 24-hour urine cortisol confirms CS diagnosis.
Depressed CS patients often experience poor concentration, early morning waking, and decreased libido. Compared with nondepressed individuals with CS, those with depression tend to be older (average age 37.5) and more likely to be female, have more severe CS-related symptoms, and exhibit higher urine cortisol levels at diagnosis (average 1.694 pmol/L).14,15
Antidepressants typically will not resolve depression in patients with CS unless you also correct the hypercorticalism.16
Addison’s disease (AD). Major depressive disorder is >2 times more prevalent in AD patients compared with matched controls.17
Signs and symptoms. Hyperpigmentation, salt cravings, low blood pressure, nausea, and vomiting are AD hallmarks. AD patients present with fatigue, vegetative symptoms, weight loss, and weakness that mimics a major depressive episode.
AD is caused by damage to the adrenal cortex. These patients do not have enough of the mineralocorticoid aldosterone, which maintains sodium and potassium balance and regulates blood pressure via the renin-angiotensin-aldosterone pathway. Decreased morning serum cortisol level, hyponatremia, and hyperkalemia confirm the diagnosis. AD can be serious—possibly fatal—so prompt referral to an endocrinologist is warranted.
Table 4
Clinical symptoms of hyperparathyroidism
| Physical | Psychiatric |
|---|---|
| Kidney stones | Poor sleep |
| Headache | Anhedonia |
| Gastroesophageal reflux disease | Decreased concentration |
| Palpitations | Irritability |
| Aching bones | Decreased libido |
| Increased blood pressure |
Neurologic disorders
Stroke. Post-stroke depressive symptoms generally do not differ from endogenous depression. Apathy, catastrophic reactions, hyper emotionalism, and diurnal mood variations are more prevalent in stroke patients,18 although some of these features have been noted in other neurologic conditions.
Signs and symptoms. Look for depression onset or a change in existing depression symptoms that occurs in the context of a clinically apparent stroke.19 Antidepressants such as serotonin reuptake inhibitors may relieve post-stroke depression.
Seizures. Depressive symptoms could appear before or after a seizure or may be the clinical presentation of a simple or complex partial seizure.1
Signs and symptoms. Episodic, short-lived depression that resolves rapidly may warrant a seizure evaluation. Prodromal depressive symptoms such as irritability, depression, fear, or anger20 may precede a seizure by 1 to 3 days and could improve after the seizure.
Caused by a simple partial seizure, ictal depression is characterized by guilt, anhedonia, or sudden-onset suicidal ideation without an environmental trigger. Symptoms are fairly short-lived, lasting from a few hours to a few days.5
Depressive symptoms also may develop minutes before a complex partial seizure or a secondarily generalized seizure.2 Mood changes typically are brief, stereotypical, and associated with other ictal phenomena. Interictal depression involves mild chronic symptoms similar to dysthymia. Postictal depression may last for several days.
Prodromal and ictal depression often improve when antiepileptic therapy reduces seizure frequency.
Huntington’s disease (HD) is a hereditary chorea caused by expanded trinucleotide repeats and characterized by abnormal movements, cognitive impairment, and neuropsychiatric symptoms. The suicide rate among HD patients is 4 times higher than in the general population.21
Signs and symptoms. Depression concurrent with neurologic symptoms such as chorea or dystonia may warrant an HD evaluation. Patients may present with psychiatric complaints such as depression, apathy, insomnia, or anxiety that may coincide with or precede other neurologic symptoms.22 Mood-congruent delusions and auditory hallucinations also have been reported.23 In one study, 98% of HD patients exhibited psychiatric symptoms—including dysphoria, agitation, irritability, apathy, and anxiety—that occurred irrespective of cognitive or motor symptoms.24
Research into the cause of HD’s neuropsychiatric symptoms has focused on abnormalities in frontostriatal brain circuitry.25 Depressive symptoms might respond to any class of antidepressant.
Wilson’s disease—caused by copper accumulation in the liver and basal ganglia—is characterized by degenerative changes in the brain, liver disease, and golden-brown or green Kayser-Fleischer rings in the cornea.
Signs and symptoms. Hepatic symptoms include hepatomegaly, hepatitis, and cirrhosis. Psychiatric symptoms—which include personality changes, depression, irritability, and psychosis—may occur alone or concurrent with neurologic symptoms such as tremor or dystonia.26 Neuropsychiatric symptoms—the initial presentation in up to one-third of Wilson’s disease patients—may respond to anticopper therapies.26
Multiple sclerosis (MS). Up to 50% of MS patients experience depression, although it is unclear if symptoms are caused by the disease or the impact of having a progressive chronic illness.
Signs and symptoms. MS may cause weakness, visual loss, incontinence, paresthesias, and speech disturbances. MS symptoms such as fatigue, insomnia, and poor concentration overlap with DSM-IV-TR criteria for major depression. Depressive symptoms may worsen during disease flare-ups and with advanced neurologic disease.
27 Irritability, discouragement, and a sense of frustration are more common than low self-esteem and guilt.28
Depression may be more prevalent in MS patients with brain lesions compared with those with spinal cord lesions.29 Imaging studies indicate that depressed MS patients are more likely to have hyperintense lesions in the left inferior frontal regions of the brain and greater atrophy of the left anterior temporal region,30 indicating that the disease may play a role in depressive symptoms.
Parkinson’s disease (PD). Nearly one-half of PD patients experience depression, which recent research suggests is related to neuroanatomic degeneration and not a reaction to having the illness.31
Signs and symptoms. Because PD can present with sleep disturbances, bradykinesia, restricted range of facial expression, and apathy, it initially might be mistaken for a depressive disorder.
Other neurologic disorders. Depression in Alzheimer’s disease typically involves prominent anhedonia, irritability, apathy, and anxiety, rather than suicidal ideation and guilt.32 In traumatic brain injury, the most common psychiatric disturbance is a depressive syndrome resembling endogenous depression.32 Progressive supranuclear palsy—a degenerative disorder of the basal ganglia, brainstem, and cerebellar nuclei—is associated with cognitive impairments and personality changes and may present as depression.33
Infectious disease
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Depression affects 22% to 45% of HIV patients, particularly women, homosexual men, intravenous drug users, and patients with a history of depression.34 The cause of depression in HIV infection is unclear because studies are complicated by factors such as:
- social stigma and isolation associated with HIV
- side effects (such as fatigue) of antiretroviral medications
- comorbid opportunistic CNS infections, such as tuberculosis or cryptococcal meningitis
- the virus itself, which is known to affect the brain.35
Certain sociodemographic factors are associated with depression in HIV patients, but Gibbie et al36 found that CD4 count and viral load are not. This suggests that HIV does not directly cause depression, although research is ongoing. Comorbid substance dependence and AIDS-related dementia can complicate the clinical picture.
The depressive syndrome in patients with HIV typically does not precede the diagnosis of HIV. Diagnosing depression in HIV patients—regardless of the cause—is crucial because of its effect on quality of life, productivity, medication adherence, and mortality.37
West Nile virus. Among the one-third of patients who report new-onset depression after West Nile infection, 75% experience mild-to-severe depression as measured on a depression scale.38 Studies of depression in West Nile virus infection are complicated by recall bias, illness-related disability, and fatigue that interferes with psychiatric assessment. Similar to HIV, a depression diagnosis typically is made following a known West Nile virus infection.
Lyme disease. More than one-third of patients diagnosed with post-Lyme syndrome—chronic symptoms that persist after antibiotic treatment—will have depression during their lifetime.39 One report that attempted to determine a causal relationship between Lyme disease and depression found a similar lifetime incidence of depression in those with Lyme disease and in the general population. Even so, the incidence of depression doubled in this sample after the onset of Lyme disease. Studies of this relationship are confounded by other effects of Lyme disease, small numbers of subjects, and recall bias.
Signs and symptoms. Exposure to ticks, cranial nerve involvement, arthralgias, memory deficits, and psychotic depression may suggest Lyme disease.
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease is a rare prion disease that can be genetic, spontaneous, or acquired via contaminated beef, corneal transplants, or dural transplants. Patients may present with cognitive impairment, fatigue, emotional lability, and depression.
Signs and symptoms include changes in the brain seen on an MRI, rapid physical and mental decline, and myoclonus and ataxia signs that occur late in the disease. Depression caused by this incurable disease often fails to respond to treatment.
Neurosyphilis patients may experience personality changes, irritability, psychosis, and decreased self-care, which may be interpreted as anhedonia or depressed mood.
Signs and symptoms. Common physical signs include dysarthria, hyperreflexia, cognitive decline, hallucinations, tremor, tabes dorsalis, and Argyll Robertson pupils. Neurosyphilis is confirmed by positive venereal disease research laboratory test of cerebrospinal fluid and treated with high-dose penicillin. Consensus is lacking on the role of psychotropic medications for the management of psychiatric symptoms.40
Hepatitis C patients have a higher lifetime prevalence of major depression compared with controls.41 Although evidence does not support a causal link between hepatitis C infection and depression, anecdotal reports persist.42 Studies of comorbid depression and hepatitis C are complicated by hepatic encephalopathy, fatigue, medication side effects, and social and economic factors associated with hepatitis C. Physical symptoms include decreased appetite, fatigue, fever, nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, clay-colored stool, joint pain, and jaundice.
Interferon (IFN) treatment for chronic, active hepatitis C has been associated with increased depressive symptoms and suicidal behavior. In a study of 31 hepatitis C patients, 23% experienced depressive episodes concurrent with IFN alfa treatment.43 Depressive symptoms seem to be related to dose and treatment duration and may take several weeks to develop.
Malignancy
Cancer patients often report depressive symptoms, although a causal relationship between malignancy and depression remains unclear. Some evidence suggests that pancreatic cancer and paraneoplastic syndromes can cause depression. In a retrospective study, depression preceded a pancreatic cancer diagnosis more often than with other gastrointestinal or non-gastrointestinal cancers.44 Typically, depression starts >1 year before the cancer is discovered. It is unclear, however, if the cancer leads to depression or depression predisposes a person to pancreatic cancer.
Signs and symptoms. New-onset depression, dramatic unintended weight loss, and predominant sleep disturbance warrant further evaluation for malignancy. In patients diagnosed with cancer, depressive symptoms may be caused by reactive depression, an acute stress reaction, or adjustment disorder with depressed mood.
Paraneoplastic syndromes can cause depression, behavior and personality changes, and memory deficits.45 These syndromes are commonly found in breast, lung, and testicular cancer, all of which might not be discovered when psychiatric symptoms develop.46
The immune system’s reaction to cancer produces antibodies that attack the nervous system. Diagnosis of the resulting limbic encephalitis thought to underlie psychiatric symptoms is by CSF-positive antibodies (anti-Yo antibodies, anti-Ma2 antibodies, or anti-Hu) and abnormalities in brain MRI. Psychiatric symptoms often improve when the underlying malignancy is treated.
Related resources
- Blumenfield M, Strain JJ. Psychosomatic medicine. Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, Williams, & Wilkins; 2006.
- Ferrando SJ, Freyberg Z. Neuropsychiatric aspects of infectious diseases. Crit Care Clin. 2008;24:889-919.
Drug brand names
- Bupropion • Wellbutrin, Zyban
- Felbamate • Felbatol
- Interferon alfa • Intron, Roferon
- Interferon beta • Avonex, Rebif
- Isotretinoin • Accutane
- Levetiracetam • Keppra
- Phenytoin • Dilantin
- Primidone • Mysoline
- Propranolol • Inderal
- Tiagabine • Gabitril Roferon
- Topiramate • Topamax
- Verapamil • Isoptin
- Vigabatrin • Sabril
- Varenicline • Chantix
Disclosures
Dr. Carroll reports no financial relationship with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
Dr. Rado receives research support from Eli Lilly and Company, Neuronetics, and Otsuka, and is a speaker for Eli Lilly and Company.
1. Kanner AM. Depression in epilepsy: prevalence, clinical semiology, pathogenic mechanisms, and treatment. Biol Psychiatry. 2003;54(3):388-398.
2. Lambert MV, Robertson MM. Depression in epilepsy: etiology, phenomenology, and treatment. Epilepsia. 1999;40(suppl 10):S21-S47.
3. Patten SB, Neutel CI. Corticosteroid-induced adverse psychiatric effects: incidence, diagnosis and management. Drug Saf. 2000;22(2):111-122.
4. Asnis GM, De La Garza R, 2nd. Interferon-induced depression in chronic hepatitis C: a review of its prevalence, risk factors, biology and treatment approaches. J Clin Gastroenterol. 2006;40(4):322-335.
5. Goeb JL, Even C, Nicolas G, et al. Psychiatric side effects of interferon-beta in multiple sclerosis. Eur Psychiatry. 2006;21(3):186-193.
6. Hull PR, D’Arcy C. Isotretinoin use and subsequent depression and suicide: presenting the evidence. Am J Clin Dermatol. 2003;4(7):493-505.
7. U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Information for Healthcare Professionals: Varenicline (marketed as Chantix) and Bupropion (marketed as Zyban, Wellbutrin, and generics). Available at: http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders
/DrugSafetyInformationforHeathcareProfessionals/ucm169986.htm. Accessed July 7, 2009.
8. Larisch R, Kley K, Nikolaus S, et al. Depression and anxiety in different thyroid function states. Horm Metab Res. 2004;36(9):650-653.
9. Pop VJ, Maartens LH, Leusink G, et al. Are autoimmune thyroid dysfunction and depression related? J Clin Endocrinol Metab. 1998;83(9):3194-3197.
10. Gold MS, Pottash AL, Extein I. Hypothyroidism and depression. Evidence from complete thyroid function evaluation. JAMA. 1981;245(19):1919-1922.
11. Joffe RT, Singer W, Levitt AJ, et al. A placebo-controlled comparison of lithium and triiodothyronine augmentation of tricyclic antidepressants in unipolar refractory depression. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1993;50(5):387-393.
12. Wilhelm SM, Lee J, Prinz RA. Major depression due to primary hyperparathyroidism: a frequent and correctable disorder. Am Surg. 2004;70(2):175-179.
13. Sonino N, Fava GA. Psychiatric disorders associated with Cushing’s syndrome. Epidemiology, pathophysiology, and treatment. CNS Drugs. 2001;15(5):361-373.
14. Sonino N, Fava GA, Raffi AR, et al. Clinical correlates of major depression in Cushing’s disease. Psychopathology. 1998;31(6):302-306.
15. Dorn LD, Burgess ES, Dubbert B, et al. Psychopathology in patients with endogenous Cushing’s syndrome: ‘atypical’ or melancholic features. Clin Endocrinol (Oxf). 1995;43(4):433-442.
16. Zeiger MA, Fraker DL, Pass HI, et al. Effective reversibility of the signs and symptoms of hypercortisolemia by bilateral adrenalectomy. Surgery. 1993;114(6):1138-1143.
17. Thomsen AF, Kvist TK, Andersen PK, et al. The risk of affective disorders in patients with adrenocortical insufficiency. Psychoneuroendocrinology. 2006;31(5):614-622.
18. Gainotti G, Azzoni A, Marra C. Frequency, phenomenology and anatomical-clinical correlates of major post-stroke depression. Br J Psychiatry. 1999;175:163-167.
19. Newberg AR, Davydow DS, Lee HB. Cerebrovascular disease basis of depression: post-stroke depression and vascular depression. Int Rev Psychiatry. 2006;18(5):433-441.
20. Hughes J, Devinsky O, Flemann E, et al. Premonitory symptoms in epilepsy. Seizure. 1993;2(3):201-203.
21. Shoenfeld M, Myers RH, Cupples RA, et al. Increased rate of suicide among patients with Huntington’s disease. J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry. 1984;47(12):1283-1287.
22. Tost H, Wendt CS, Schmitt A, et al. Huntington’s disease: phenomenological diversity of a neuropsychiatric condition that challenges traditional concepts in neurology and psychiatry. Am J Psychiatry. 2004;161(1):28-34.
23. Rosenblatt A. Neuropsychiatry of Huntington’s disease. Dialogues Clin Neurosci. 2007;9(2):191-197.
24. Paulsen JS, Ready RE, Hamilton JM, et al. Neuropsychiatric aspects of Huntington’s disease. J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry. 2001;71(3):310-314.
25. Anderson KE. Huntington’s disease and related disorders. Psychiatry Clin North Am. 2005;28(1):275-290.
26. Loudianos G, Gitlin JD. Wilson’s disease. Semin Liver Dis. 2000;20(3):353-364.
27. Chwastiak L, Ehde DM, Gibbons LE, et al. Depressive symptoms and severity of illness in multiple sclerosis: epidemiologic study of a large community sample. Am J Psychiatry. 2002;159(11):1862-1868.
28. Feinstein A. The neuropsychiatry of multiple sclerosis. Can J Psychiatry. 2004;49(3):157-163.
29. Siegert RJ, Abernethy DA. Depression in multiple sclerosis: a review. J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry. 2005;76(4):469-475.
30. Feinstein A, Roy P, Lobaugh N, et al. Structural brain abnormalities in multiple sclerosis patients with major depression. Neurology. 2004;62(4):586-590.
31. McDonald WM, Richard IH, DeLong MR. Prevalence, etiology and treatment of depression in Parkinson’s disease. Biol Psychiatry. 2003;54(3):363-375.
32. Lyketsos CG, Kozauer N, Rabins PV. Psychiatric manifestations of neurologic disease: where are we headed? Dialogues Clin Neurosci. 2007;9(2):111-124.
33. Rosenblatt A, Leroi I. Neuropsychiatry of Huntington’s disease and other basal ganglia disorders. Psychosomatics. 2000;41(1):24-30.
34. Penzak SR, Reddy YS, Grimsley SR. Depression in patients with HIV infection. Am J Health Syst Pharm. 2000;57(4):376-386.
35. Basu S, Chwastiak LA, Bruce RD. Clinical management of depression and anxiety in HIV-infected adults. AIDS. 2005;19(18):2057-2067.
36. Gibbie T, Mijch A, Ellen S, et al. Depression and neurocognitive performance in individuals with HIV/AIDS: 2-year follow-up. HIV Med. 2006;7(2):112-121.
37. Ammassari A, Antinori A, Aloisi MS, et al. Depressive symptoms, neurocognitive impairment, and adherence to highly active antiretroviral therapy among HIV-infected persons. Psychosomatics. 2004;45(5):394-402.
38. Murray KO, Resnick M, Miller V. Depression after infection with West Nile virus. Emerg Infect Dis. 2007;13(3):479-481.
39. Elkins LE, Pollina DA, Scheffer SR, et al. Psychological states and neuropsychological performances in chronic Lyme disease. Appl Neuropsychol. 1999;6(1):19-26.
40. Sanchez FM, Zisselman MH. Treatment of psychiatric symptoms associated with neurosyphilis. Psychosomatics. 2007;48(5):440-445.
41. Carta MG, Hardoy MC, Garofalo A, et al. Association of chronic hepatitis C with major depressive disorders: irrespective of interferon-alpha therapy. Clin Pract Epidemol Ment Health. 2007;3:22.-
42. Wessely S, Pariante C. Fatigue, depression and chronic hepatitis C infection. Psychol Med. 2002;32(1):1-10.
43. Dieperink E, Ho SB, Thuras P. A prospective study of neuropsychiatry symptoms associated with interferon-alpha-2b and ribavirin therapy for patients with chronic hepatitis C. Psychosomatics. 2003;44(2):104-112.
44. Carney CP, Jones L, Woolson RF, et al. Relationship between depression and pancreatic cancer in the general population. Psychosom Med. 2003;65(5):884-888.
45. Farrugia ME, Conway R, Simpson DJ, et al. Paraneoplastic limbic encephalitis. Clin Neurol Neurosurg. 2005;107(2):128-131.
46. Gultekin SH, Rosenfeld MR, Voltz R, et al. Paraneoplastic limbic encephalitis: neurological symptoms, immunological findings, and tumor association in 50 patients. Brain. 2000;123(pt 7):1481-1494.
1. Kanner AM. Depression in epilepsy: prevalence, clinical semiology, pathogenic mechanisms, and treatment. Biol Psychiatry. 2003;54(3):388-398.
2. Lambert MV, Robertson MM. Depression in epilepsy: etiology, phenomenology, and treatment. Epilepsia. 1999;40(suppl 10):S21-S47.
3. Patten SB, Neutel CI. Corticosteroid-induced adverse psychiatric effects: incidence, diagnosis and management. Drug Saf. 2000;22(2):111-122.
4. Asnis GM, De La Garza R, 2nd. Interferon-induced depression in chronic hepatitis C: a review of its prevalence, risk factors, biology and treatment approaches. J Clin Gastroenterol. 2006;40(4):322-335.
5. Goeb JL, Even C, Nicolas G, et al. Psychiatric side effects of interferon-beta in multiple sclerosis. Eur Psychiatry. 2006;21(3):186-193.
6. Hull PR, D’Arcy C. Isotretinoin use and subsequent depression and suicide: presenting the evidence. Am J Clin Dermatol. 2003;4(7):493-505.
7. U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Information for Healthcare Professionals: Varenicline (marketed as Chantix) and Bupropion (marketed as Zyban, Wellbutrin, and generics). Available at: http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders
/DrugSafetyInformationforHeathcareProfessionals/ucm169986.htm. Accessed July 7, 2009.
8. Larisch R, Kley K, Nikolaus S, et al. Depression and anxiety in different thyroid function states. Horm Metab Res. 2004;36(9):650-653.
9. Pop VJ, Maartens LH, Leusink G, et al. Are autoimmune thyroid dysfunction and depression related? J Clin Endocrinol Metab. 1998;83(9):3194-3197.
10. Gold MS, Pottash AL, Extein I. Hypothyroidism and depression. Evidence from complete thyroid function evaluation. JAMA. 1981;245(19):1919-1922.
11. Joffe RT, Singer W, Levitt AJ, et al. A placebo-controlled comparison of lithium and triiodothyronine augmentation of tricyclic antidepressants in unipolar refractory depression. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1993;50(5):387-393.
12. Wilhelm SM, Lee J, Prinz RA. Major depression due to primary hyperparathyroidism: a frequent and correctable disorder. Am Surg. 2004;70(2):175-179.
13. Sonino N, Fava GA. Psychiatric disorders associated with Cushing’s syndrome. Epidemiology, pathophysiology, and treatment. CNS Drugs. 2001;15(5):361-373.
14. Sonino N, Fava GA, Raffi AR, et al. Clinical correlates of major depression in Cushing’s disease. Psychopathology. 1998;31(6):302-306.
15. Dorn LD, Burgess ES, Dubbert B, et al. Psychopathology in patients with endogenous Cushing’s syndrome: ‘atypical’ or melancholic features. Clin Endocrinol (Oxf). 1995;43(4):433-442.
16. Zeiger MA, Fraker DL, Pass HI, et al. Effective reversibility of the signs and symptoms of hypercortisolemia by bilateral adrenalectomy. Surgery. 1993;114(6):1138-1143.
17. Thomsen AF, Kvist TK, Andersen PK, et al. The risk of affective disorders in patients with adrenocortical insufficiency. Psychoneuroendocrinology. 2006;31(5):614-622.
18. Gainotti G, Azzoni A, Marra C. Frequency, phenomenology and anatomical-clinical correlates of major post-stroke depression. Br J Psychiatry. 1999;175:163-167.
19. Newberg AR, Davydow DS, Lee HB. Cerebrovascular disease basis of depression: post-stroke depression and vascular depression. Int Rev Psychiatry. 2006;18(5):433-441.
20. Hughes J, Devinsky O, Flemann E, et al. Premonitory symptoms in epilepsy. Seizure. 1993;2(3):201-203.
21. Shoenfeld M, Myers RH, Cupples RA, et al. Increased rate of suicide among patients with Huntington’s disease. J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry. 1984;47(12):1283-1287.
22. Tost H, Wendt CS, Schmitt A, et al. Huntington’s disease: phenomenological diversity of a neuropsychiatric condition that challenges traditional concepts in neurology and psychiatry. Am J Psychiatry. 2004;161(1):28-34.
23. Rosenblatt A. Neuropsychiatry of Huntington’s disease. Dialogues Clin Neurosci. 2007;9(2):191-197.
24. Paulsen JS, Ready RE, Hamilton JM, et al. Neuropsychiatric aspects of Huntington’s disease. J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry. 2001;71(3):310-314.
25. Anderson KE. Huntington’s disease and related disorders. Psychiatry Clin North Am. 2005;28(1):275-290.
26. Loudianos G, Gitlin JD. Wilson’s disease. Semin Liver Dis. 2000;20(3):353-364.
27. Chwastiak L, Ehde DM, Gibbons LE, et al. Depressive symptoms and severity of illness in multiple sclerosis: epidemiologic study of a large community sample. Am J Psychiatry. 2002;159(11):1862-1868.
28. Feinstein A. The neuropsychiatry of multiple sclerosis. Can J Psychiatry. 2004;49(3):157-163.
29. Siegert RJ, Abernethy DA. Depression in multiple sclerosis: a review. J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry. 2005;76(4):469-475.
30. Feinstein A, Roy P, Lobaugh N, et al. Structural brain abnormalities in multiple sclerosis patients with major depression. Neurology. 2004;62(4):586-590.
31. McDonald WM, Richard IH, DeLong MR. Prevalence, etiology and treatment of depression in Parkinson’s disease. Biol Psychiatry. 2003;54(3):363-375.
32. Lyketsos CG, Kozauer N, Rabins PV. Psychiatric manifestations of neurologic disease: where are we headed? Dialogues Clin Neurosci. 2007;9(2):111-124.
33. Rosenblatt A, Leroi I. Neuropsychiatry of Huntington’s disease and other basal ganglia disorders. Psychosomatics. 2000;41(1):24-30.
34. Penzak SR, Reddy YS, Grimsley SR. Depression in patients with HIV infection. Am J Health Syst Pharm. 2000;57(4):376-386.
35. Basu S, Chwastiak LA, Bruce RD. Clinical management of depression and anxiety in HIV-infected adults. AIDS. 2005;19(18):2057-2067.
36. Gibbie T, Mijch A, Ellen S, et al. Depression and neurocognitive performance in individuals with HIV/AIDS: 2-year follow-up. HIV Med. 2006;7(2):112-121.
37. Ammassari A, Antinori A, Aloisi MS, et al. Depressive symptoms, neurocognitive impairment, and adherence to highly active antiretroviral therapy among HIV-infected persons. Psychosomatics. 2004;45(5):394-402.
38. Murray KO, Resnick M, Miller V. Depression after infection with West Nile virus. Emerg Infect Dis. 2007;13(3):479-481.
39. Elkins LE, Pollina DA, Scheffer SR, et al. Psychological states and neuropsychological performances in chronic Lyme disease. Appl Neuropsychol. 1999;6(1):19-26.
40. Sanchez FM, Zisselman MH. Treatment of psychiatric symptoms associated with neurosyphilis. Psychosomatics. 2007;48(5):440-445.
41. Carta MG, Hardoy MC, Garofalo A, et al. Association of chronic hepatitis C with major depressive disorders: irrespective of interferon-alpha therapy. Clin Pract Epidemol Ment Health. 2007;3:22.-
42. Wessely S, Pariante C. Fatigue, depression and chronic hepatitis C infection. Psychol Med. 2002;32(1):1-10.
43. Dieperink E, Ho SB, Thuras P. A prospective study of neuropsychiatry symptoms associated with interferon-alpha-2b and ribavirin therapy for patients with chronic hepatitis C. Psychosomatics. 2003;44(2):104-112.
44. Carney CP, Jones L, Woolson RF, et al. Relationship between depression and pancreatic cancer in the general population. Psychosom Med. 2003;65(5):884-888.
45. Farrugia ME, Conway R, Simpson DJ, et al. Paraneoplastic limbic encephalitis. Clin Neurol Neurosurg. 2005;107(2):128-131.
46. Gultekin SH, Rosenfeld MR, Voltz R, et al. Paraneoplastic limbic encephalitis: neurological symptoms, immunological findings, and tumor association in 50 patients. Brain. 2000;123(pt 7):1481-1494.
Sex with former patients: OK after retirement?
Dear Dr. Mossman,
A psychiatrist retires from practice and goes into some other line of work—perhaps managing a restaurant. He then has an “affair” with a former patient whom he had not treated for several years. Could the retired psychiatrist’s conduct be the basis of a successful lawsuit?—Submitted by “Dr. D”
Evidence tells us that the retired psychiatrist’s behavior likely could do emotional harm to his former patient. If the former patient suffers some injury, a successful suit could follow—if not on grounds of malpractice, then on other grounds. In this article we’ll see why by looking at:
- rates of doctor-patient sex
- potential harm from doctor-patient sex
- ethical bans on sex with former patients
- possible legal actions.
Sex with patients: Rates and risk
Doctors and patients often develop erotic thoughts about each other.1,2 But as Sigmund Freud noted almost a century ago, an actual love relationship between a doctor and a psychotherapy patient can cause a “complete defeat for the treatment” and destroy the patient’s chance for recovery.3
More than 5 decades later, surveys of medical professionals supplemented Freud’s observations with data about the frequency and impact of doctor-patient sex. In a 1973 survey, 11% of physicians said they had erotic contact with patients, and 5% reported intercourse.4 In a 1986 survey of psychiatrists, 3% of women and 7% of men acknowledged having sexual contact with patients.5 In a 1992 study of 10,000 nonpsychiatric physicians, 9% of respondents reported having sex with patients.6 Actual rates of doctor-patient sex probably are much higher than reported because physicians may be reluctant to admit to having erotic contact with patients, even in anonymous surveys.7 The typical therapist-patient sex scenario involves a male doctor and an adult female patient, but same-sex encounters and sexual contact with minors occur, too.8
Sex between a therapist and a patient is likely to cause emotional injury. For example, a 1991 study found that 90% of psychotherapy patients who had sexual involvement with a prior therapist had been harmed by the experience.9 Books, articles, and Web sites offer vivid individual accounts of harm patients have suffered ( Table ). Doctors who have sex with patients could face public opprobrium, civil lawsuits, actions against their medical licenses, and prosecution in states that make sex with psychiatric patients a criminal offense.10
Table
How sexual relationships can harm patients
| Type of harm | Explanation |
|---|---|
| Ambivalence | Psychological paralysis regarding whether to protect or take action against the abusive therapist |
| Cognitive dysfunction | Impaired memory and concentration, intrusive thoughts, flashbacks |
| Emotional lability | Unpredictable emotional responses, abrupt changes in mood, severe disruption of the patient’s typical way of feeling |
| Emptiness, isolation | Lost sense of self, feeling cut off from others |
| Guilt | Irrational self-blame for causing the sexual contact |
| Impaired trust | Fear of being taken advantage of, used, or abused in future therapy |
| Suicide | 14% of patients who had sex with a therapist attempt suicide; approximately 1% commit suicide |
| Role confusion | Treatment sessions and the therapeutic relationship serve the therapist’s needs rather than the patient’s; this perception may generalize to later therapies and other relationships |
| Sexual confusion | Examples include disgust with sexual feelings, uncertainty about sexual orientation, belief that self-worth comes from gratifying others’ sexual desires |
| Confusion about anger | Rage at self, self-loathing, need to suppress angry feelings, mistaken beliefs that others are angry at you |
| Source: Adapted from reference 8 | |
What about former patients?
Sex between providers and current patients is opposed by all major healthcare organizations, including the American Psychiatric Association (APA),11 American Medical Association,12 and American Psychological Association.13 The last 2 groups strongly discourage sex with former patients, but the APA’s ethics code states that such activity is always unethical.
The APA’s position reflects 2 general truths of psychiatric practice:
- Psychiatric patients often return for care years after initial treatment has ended. “Former patients” are really “possible future patients.” Improper relationships with former patients disrupt the doctor’s obligation to remain available for future care.
- Even if a patient never returns to treatment, intense feelings about a doctor can last for years. A psychiatrist who engages in sex with a former patient may evoke and manipulate feelings “left over” from therapy.
Psychiatrists therefore “have only one kind of relationship with a patient—that is, a doctor-patient relationship.”14 Moreover, as Simon and Shuman observe, “[N]o patient [is] strong enough, no pause is long enough, and no love is true enough to justify compromising this boundary.”15
Legal actions
If a physician no longer practices medicine, can any of his activities—including with a former patient—be malpractice? In fact, sex between practicing doctors and current patients might not always be malpractice. If a psychiatrist gains sexual access to a patient by saying that the sex will be therapeutic, the psychiatrist has perpetrated fraud and this intentional action might not be covered by malpractice insurance.16
In several cases involving nonpsychiatric physicians,17 courts have held that consensual doctor-patient sex is not malpractice, though it might represent some other form of wrongdoing. The argument is that sex with a patient is an intentional act that is never a professional service, whereas malpractice by definition arises unintentionally from negligence while rendering professional services. Other courts, however, have held that doctor-patient sex can be malpractice because it breaches the physician’s fiduciary relationship and can constitute an abuse of power.18
After retirement, physicians still have responsibilities to former patients: to protect records, to respect confidentiality, and to release information upon proper requests. Some fiduciary duties to patients survive the conclusion of treatment, and behavior that breaches those responsibilities can bring legal action.
Psychiatrists should realize that many former patients remain vulnerable because of feelings “left over” from therapy. Therefore, potential civil actions against a retired psychiatrist might include:
A suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress. This tort action requires proving more than mere insults or indignities; it occurs only when someone “by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another.”19 Initiating sex with a former patient is strongly disapproved and meets the legal criterion of having a high probability of causing mental distress.20
A suit for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Modern law permits recourse for negligently inflicted emotional distress when harm occurs in “the course of specified categories of activities, undertakings, or relationships in which the negligent conduct is especially likely to cause emotional disturbance.”21
Suits for exploitation. Some jurisdictions allow suits against therapists who have sex with former patients, irrespective of therapists’ license status. For example, Minnesota allows lawsuits for “sexual exploitation” if the former patient’s capacity to consent was impaired by emotional dependence on the psychotherapist.22
Actions by licensing boards. Many retired practitioners maintain their medical licenses. Retired-but-still-licensed psychiatrists can be subject to professional disciplinary actions.
- Submit your malpractice-related questions to Dr. Mossman at [email protected].
- Include your name, address, and practice location. If your question is chosen for publication, your name can be withheld by request.
- All readers who submit questions will be included in quarterly drawings for a $50 gift certificate for Professional Risk Management Services, Inc’s online marketplace of risk management publications and resources (www.prms.com).
1. Pope KS, Keith-Spiegel P, Tabachnick BG. Sexual attraction to clients. The human therapist and the (sometimes) inhuman training system. Am Psychol. 1986;4:147-158.
2. Golden GA, Brennan M. Managing erotic feelings in the physician-patient relationship. CMAJ. 1995;153:1241-1245.
3. Freud S. Observations on transference-love. In: Strachey J, ed. Complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, standard edition, vol 12. London, UK: Hogarth Press; 1958:157-173.
4. Kardener SH, Fuller M, Mensh IN. A survey of physicians’ attitudes and practice regarding erotic and non-erotic contact with patients. Am J Psychiatry. 1973;130:1077-1081.
5. Gartrell N, Herman J, Olarte S, et al. Psychiatrist-patient sexual contact: results of a national survey, 1: prevalence. Am J Psychiatry. 1986;143:1126-1131.
6. Gartrell N, Milliken N, Goodson WH, et al. Physician-patient sexual contact—prevalence and problems. West J Med. 1992;157:139-143.
7. Roman B, Kay J. Residency education on the prevention of physician-patient sexual misconduct. Acad Psychiatry. 1997;21:26-34.
8. Pope KS. Sex between therapists and clients. In: Worrell J, ed. Encyclopedia of women and gender: sex similarities and differences and the impact of society on gender. New York, NY: Academic Press; 2001;955-962.
9. Pope KS, Vetter VA. Prior therapist-patient sexual involvement among patients seen by psychologists. Psychotherapy. 1991;28:429-438.
10. Simon RI. Clinical psychiatry and the law, 2nd edition. Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing, Inc.; 2003.
11. American Psychiatric Association. The principles of medical ethics with annotations especially applicable to psychiatry. Available at: http://www.psych.org/MainMenu/PsychiatricPractice/Ethics/
ResourcesStandards/PrinciplesofMedicalEthics.aspx. Accessed May 4, 2009.
12. American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs. Sexual misconduct in the practice of medicine. JAMA. 1991;266:2741-2745.
13. American Psychological Association. Ethical principles of psychologists and code of conduct. Available at: http://www.apa.org/ethics/code2002.html. Accessed May 4, 2009.
14. Gruenberg PB. Boundary violations. In: Ethics primer of the American Psychiatric Association. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association; 2001;1-9.
15. Simon RI, Shuman DW. Clinical manual of psychiatry and the law. Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing, Inc.; 2007.
16. Sadock BJ, Sadock VA. Kaplan and Sadock’s synopsis of psychiatry, 10th ed. Baltimore, MD: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins; 2007.
17. Clemente v Roth, 171 Fed. Appx. 999 (4th Cir. Md. 2006).
18. Hoopes v Hammargren, 102 Nev. 425, 725 P.2d 238 (1986).
19. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm, ch 8, §45 (2007 draft).
20. Prosser WL, Keeton WP, Dobbs DB, et al. Prosser and Keeton on torts, 5th ed. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co.; 1984.
21. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm, ch 8, §46 (2007 draft).
22. Minnesota Statutes §148A (2008).
Dear Dr. Mossman,
A psychiatrist retires from practice and goes into some other line of work—perhaps managing a restaurant. He then has an “affair” with a former patient whom he had not treated for several years. Could the retired psychiatrist’s conduct be the basis of a successful lawsuit?—Submitted by “Dr. D”
Evidence tells us that the retired psychiatrist’s behavior likely could do emotional harm to his former patient. If the former patient suffers some injury, a successful suit could follow—if not on grounds of malpractice, then on other grounds. In this article we’ll see why by looking at:
- rates of doctor-patient sex
- potential harm from doctor-patient sex
- ethical bans on sex with former patients
- possible legal actions.
Sex with patients: Rates and risk
Doctors and patients often develop erotic thoughts about each other.1,2 But as Sigmund Freud noted almost a century ago, an actual love relationship between a doctor and a psychotherapy patient can cause a “complete defeat for the treatment” and destroy the patient’s chance for recovery.3
More than 5 decades later, surveys of medical professionals supplemented Freud’s observations with data about the frequency and impact of doctor-patient sex. In a 1973 survey, 11% of physicians said they had erotic contact with patients, and 5% reported intercourse.4 In a 1986 survey of psychiatrists, 3% of women and 7% of men acknowledged having sexual contact with patients.5 In a 1992 study of 10,000 nonpsychiatric physicians, 9% of respondents reported having sex with patients.6 Actual rates of doctor-patient sex probably are much higher than reported because physicians may be reluctant to admit to having erotic contact with patients, even in anonymous surveys.7 The typical therapist-patient sex scenario involves a male doctor and an adult female patient, but same-sex encounters and sexual contact with minors occur, too.8
Sex between a therapist and a patient is likely to cause emotional injury. For example, a 1991 study found that 90% of psychotherapy patients who had sexual involvement with a prior therapist had been harmed by the experience.9 Books, articles, and Web sites offer vivid individual accounts of harm patients have suffered ( Table ). Doctors who have sex with patients could face public opprobrium, civil lawsuits, actions against their medical licenses, and prosecution in states that make sex with psychiatric patients a criminal offense.10
Table
How sexual relationships can harm patients
| Type of harm | Explanation |
|---|---|
| Ambivalence | Psychological paralysis regarding whether to protect or take action against the abusive therapist |
| Cognitive dysfunction | Impaired memory and concentration, intrusive thoughts, flashbacks |
| Emotional lability | Unpredictable emotional responses, abrupt changes in mood, severe disruption of the patient’s typical way of feeling |
| Emptiness, isolation | Lost sense of self, feeling cut off from others |
| Guilt | Irrational self-blame for causing the sexual contact |
| Impaired trust | Fear of being taken advantage of, used, or abused in future therapy |
| Suicide | 14% of patients who had sex with a therapist attempt suicide; approximately 1% commit suicide |
| Role confusion | Treatment sessions and the therapeutic relationship serve the therapist’s needs rather than the patient’s; this perception may generalize to later therapies and other relationships |
| Sexual confusion | Examples include disgust with sexual feelings, uncertainty about sexual orientation, belief that self-worth comes from gratifying others’ sexual desires |
| Confusion about anger | Rage at self, self-loathing, need to suppress angry feelings, mistaken beliefs that others are angry at you |
| Source: Adapted from reference 8 | |
What about former patients?
Sex between providers and current patients is opposed by all major healthcare organizations, including the American Psychiatric Association (APA),11 American Medical Association,12 and American Psychological Association.13 The last 2 groups strongly discourage sex with former patients, but the APA’s ethics code states that such activity is always unethical.
The APA’s position reflects 2 general truths of psychiatric practice:
- Psychiatric patients often return for care years after initial treatment has ended. “Former patients” are really “possible future patients.” Improper relationships with former patients disrupt the doctor’s obligation to remain available for future care.
- Even if a patient never returns to treatment, intense feelings about a doctor can last for years. A psychiatrist who engages in sex with a former patient may evoke and manipulate feelings “left over” from therapy.
Psychiatrists therefore “have only one kind of relationship with a patient—that is, a doctor-patient relationship.”14 Moreover, as Simon and Shuman observe, “[N]o patient [is] strong enough, no pause is long enough, and no love is true enough to justify compromising this boundary.”15
Legal actions
If a physician no longer practices medicine, can any of his activities—including with a former patient—be malpractice? In fact, sex between practicing doctors and current patients might not always be malpractice. If a psychiatrist gains sexual access to a patient by saying that the sex will be therapeutic, the psychiatrist has perpetrated fraud and this intentional action might not be covered by malpractice insurance.16
In several cases involving nonpsychiatric physicians,17 courts have held that consensual doctor-patient sex is not malpractice, though it might represent some other form of wrongdoing. The argument is that sex with a patient is an intentional act that is never a professional service, whereas malpractice by definition arises unintentionally from negligence while rendering professional services. Other courts, however, have held that doctor-patient sex can be malpractice because it breaches the physician’s fiduciary relationship and can constitute an abuse of power.18
After retirement, physicians still have responsibilities to former patients: to protect records, to respect confidentiality, and to release information upon proper requests. Some fiduciary duties to patients survive the conclusion of treatment, and behavior that breaches those responsibilities can bring legal action.
Psychiatrists should realize that many former patients remain vulnerable because of feelings “left over” from therapy. Therefore, potential civil actions against a retired psychiatrist might include:
A suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress. This tort action requires proving more than mere insults or indignities; it occurs only when someone “by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another.”19 Initiating sex with a former patient is strongly disapproved and meets the legal criterion of having a high probability of causing mental distress.20
A suit for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Modern law permits recourse for negligently inflicted emotional distress when harm occurs in “the course of specified categories of activities, undertakings, or relationships in which the negligent conduct is especially likely to cause emotional disturbance.”21
Suits for exploitation. Some jurisdictions allow suits against therapists who have sex with former patients, irrespective of therapists’ license status. For example, Minnesota allows lawsuits for “sexual exploitation” if the former patient’s capacity to consent was impaired by emotional dependence on the psychotherapist.22
Actions by licensing boards. Many retired practitioners maintain their medical licenses. Retired-but-still-licensed psychiatrists can be subject to professional disciplinary actions.
- Submit your malpractice-related questions to Dr. Mossman at [email protected].
- Include your name, address, and practice location. If your question is chosen for publication, your name can be withheld by request.
- All readers who submit questions will be included in quarterly drawings for a $50 gift certificate for Professional Risk Management Services, Inc’s online marketplace of risk management publications and resources (www.prms.com).
Dear Dr. Mossman,
A psychiatrist retires from practice and goes into some other line of work—perhaps managing a restaurant. He then has an “affair” with a former patient whom he had not treated for several years. Could the retired psychiatrist’s conduct be the basis of a successful lawsuit?—Submitted by “Dr. D”
Evidence tells us that the retired psychiatrist’s behavior likely could do emotional harm to his former patient. If the former patient suffers some injury, a successful suit could follow—if not on grounds of malpractice, then on other grounds. In this article we’ll see why by looking at:
- rates of doctor-patient sex
- potential harm from doctor-patient sex
- ethical bans on sex with former patients
- possible legal actions.
Sex with patients: Rates and risk
Doctors and patients often develop erotic thoughts about each other.1,2 But as Sigmund Freud noted almost a century ago, an actual love relationship between a doctor and a psychotherapy patient can cause a “complete defeat for the treatment” and destroy the patient’s chance for recovery.3
More than 5 decades later, surveys of medical professionals supplemented Freud’s observations with data about the frequency and impact of doctor-patient sex. In a 1973 survey, 11% of physicians said they had erotic contact with patients, and 5% reported intercourse.4 In a 1986 survey of psychiatrists, 3% of women and 7% of men acknowledged having sexual contact with patients.5 In a 1992 study of 10,000 nonpsychiatric physicians, 9% of respondents reported having sex with patients.6 Actual rates of doctor-patient sex probably are much higher than reported because physicians may be reluctant to admit to having erotic contact with patients, even in anonymous surveys.7 The typical therapist-patient sex scenario involves a male doctor and an adult female patient, but same-sex encounters and sexual contact with minors occur, too.8
Sex between a therapist and a patient is likely to cause emotional injury. For example, a 1991 study found that 90% of psychotherapy patients who had sexual involvement with a prior therapist had been harmed by the experience.9 Books, articles, and Web sites offer vivid individual accounts of harm patients have suffered ( Table ). Doctors who have sex with patients could face public opprobrium, civil lawsuits, actions against their medical licenses, and prosecution in states that make sex with psychiatric patients a criminal offense.10
Table
How sexual relationships can harm patients
| Type of harm | Explanation |
|---|---|
| Ambivalence | Psychological paralysis regarding whether to protect or take action against the abusive therapist |
| Cognitive dysfunction | Impaired memory and concentration, intrusive thoughts, flashbacks |
| Emotional lability | Unpredictable emotional responses, abrupt changes in mood, severe disruption of the patient’s typical way of feeling |
| Emptiness, isolation | Lost sense of self, feeling cut off from others |
| Guilt | Irrational self-blame for causing the sexual contact |
| Impaired trust | Fear of being taken advantage of, used, or abused in future therapy |
| Suicide | 14% of patients who had sex with a therapist attempt suicide; approximately 1% commit suicide |
| Role confusion | Treatment sessions and the therapeutic relationship serve the therapist’s needs rather than the patient’s; this perception may generalize to later therapies and other relationships |
| Sexual confusion | Examples include disgust with sexual feelings, uncertainty about sexual orientation, belief that self-worth comes from gratifying others’ sexual desires |
| Confusion about anger | Rage at self, self-loathing, need to suppress angry feelings, mistaken beliefs that others are angry at you |
| Source: Adapted from reference 8 | |
What about former patients?
Sex between providers and current patients is opposed by all major healthcare organizations, including the American Psychiatric Association (APA),11 American Medical Association,12 and American Psychological Association.13 The last 2 groups strongly discourage sex with former patients, but the APA’s ethics code states that such activity is always unethical.
The APA’s position reflects 2 general truths of psychiatric practice:
- Psychiatric patients often return for care years after initial treatment has ended. “Former patients” are really “possible future patients.” Improper relationships with former patients disrupt the doctor’s obligation to remain available for future care.
- Even if a patient never returns to treatment, intense feelings about a doctor can last for years. A psychiatrist who engages in sex with a former patient may evoke and manipulate feelings “left over” from therapy.
Psychiatrists therefore “have only one kind of relationship with a patient—that is, a doctor-patient relationship.”14 Moreover, as Simon and Shuman observe, “[N]o patient [is] strong enough, no pause is long enough, and no love is true enough to justify compromising this boundary.”15
Legal actions
If a physician no longer practices medicine, can any of his activities—including with a former patient—be malpractice? In fact, sex between practicing doctors and current patients might not always be malpractice. If a psychiatrist gains sexual access to a patient by saying that the sex will be therapeutic, the psychiatrist has perpetrated fraud and this intentional action might not be covered by malpractice insurance.16
In several cases involving nonpsychiatric physicians,17 courts have held that consensual doctor-patient sex is not malpractice, though it might represent some other form of wrongdoing. The argument is that sex with a patient is an intentional act that is never a professional service, whereas malpractice by definition arises unintentionally from negligence while rendering professional services. Other courts, however, have held that doctor-patient sex can be malpractice because it breaches the physician’s fiduciary relationship and can constitute an abuse of power.18
After retirement, physicians still have responsibilities to former patients: to protect records, to respect confidentiality, and to release information upon proper requests. Some fiduciary duties to patients survive the conclusion of treatment, and behavior that breaches those responsibilities can bring legal action.
Psychiatrists should realize that many former patients remain vulnerable because of feelings “left over” from therapy. Therefore, potential civil actions against a retired psychiatrist might include:
A suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress. This tort action requires proving more than mere insults or indignities; it occurs only when someone “by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another.”19 Initiating sex with a former patient is strongly disapproved and meets the legal criterion of having a high probability of causing mental distress.20
A suit for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Modern law permits recourse for negligently inflicted emotional distress when harm occurs in “the course of specified categories of activities, undertakings, or relationships in which the negligent conduct is especially likely to cause emotional disturbance.”21
Suits for exploitation. Some jurisdictions allow suits against therapists who have sex with former patients, irrespective of therapists’ license status. For example, Minnesota allows lawsuits for “sexual exploitation” if the former patient’s capacity to consent was impaired by emotional dependence on the psychotherapist.22
Actions by licensing boards. Many retired practitioners maintain their medical licenses. Retired-but-still-licensed psychiatrists can be subject to professional disciplinary actions.
- Submit your malpractice-related questions to Dr. Mossman at [email protected].
- Include your name, address, and practice location. If your question is chosen for publication, your name can be withheld by request.
- All readers who submit questions will be included in quarterly drawings for a $50 gift certificate for Professional Risk Management Services, Inc’s online marketplace of risk management publications and resources (www.prms.com).
1. Pope KS, Keith-Spiegel P, Tabachnick BG. Sexual attraction to clients. The human therapist and the (sometimes) inhuman training system. Am Psychol. 1986;4:147-158.
2. Golden GA, Brennan M. Managing erotic feelings in the physician-patient relationship. CMAJ. 1995;153:1241-1245.
3. Freud S. Observations on transference-love. In: Strachey J, ed. Complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, standard edition, vol 12. London, UK: Hogarth Press; 1958:157-173.
4. Kardener SH, Fuller M, Mensh IN. A survey of physicians’ attitudes and practice regarding erotic and non-erotic contact with patients. Am J Psychiatry. 1973;130:1077-1081.
5. Gartrell N, Herman J, Olarte S, et al. Psychiatrist-patient sexual contact: results of a national survey, 1: prevalence. Am J Psychiatry. 1986;143:1126-1131.
6. Gartrell N, Milliken N, Goodson WH, et al. Physician-patient sexual contact—prevalence and problems. West J Med. 1992;157:139-143.
7. Roman B, Kay J. Residency education on the prevention of physician-patient sexual misconduct. Acad Psychiatry. 1997;21:26-34.
8. Pope KS. Sex between therapists and clients. In: Worrell J, ed. Encyclopedia of women and gender: sex similarities and differences and the impact of society on gender. New York, NY: Academic Press; 2001;955-962.
9. Pope KS, Vetter VA. Prior therapist-patient sexual involvement among patients seen by psychologists. Psychotherapy. 1991;28:429-438.
10. Simon RI. Clinical psychiatry and the law, 2nd edition. Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing, Inc.; 2003.
11. American Psychiatric Association. The principles of medical ethics with annotations especially applicable to psychiatry. Available at: http://www.psych.org/MainMenu/PsychiatricPractice/Ethics/
ResourcesStandards/PrinciplesofMedicalEthics.aspx. Accessed May 4, 2009.
12. American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs. Sexual misconduct in the practice of medicine. JAMA. 1991;266:2741-2745.
13. American Psychological Association. Ethical principles of psychologists and code of conduct. Available at: http://www.apa.org/ethics/code2002.html. Accessed May 4, 2009.
14. Gruenberg PB. Boundary violations. In: Ethics primer of the American Psychiatric Association. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association; 2001;1-9.
15. Simon RI, Shuman DW. Clinical manual of psychiatry and the law. Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing, Inc.; 2007.
16. Sadock BJ, Sadock VA. Kaplan and Sadock’s synopsis of psychiatry, 10th ed. Baltimore, MD: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins; 2007.
17. Clemente v Roth, 171 Fed. Appx. 999 (4th Cir. Md. 2006).
18. Hoopes v Hammargren, 102 Nev. 425, 725 P.2d 238 (1986).
19. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm, ch 8, §45 (2007 draft).
20. Prosser WL, Keeton WP, Dobbs DB, et al. Prosser and Keeton on torts, 5th ed. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co.; 1984.
21. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm, ch 8, §46 (2007 draft).
22. Minnesota Statutes §148A (2008).
1. Pope KS, Keith-Spiegel P, Tabachnick BG. Sexual attraction to clients. The human therapist and the (sometimes) inhuman training system. Am Psychol. 1986;4:147-158.
2. Golden GA, Brennan M. Managing erotic feelings in the physician-patient relationship. CMAJ. 1995;153:1241-1245.
3. Freud S. Observations on transference-love. In: Strachey J, ed. Complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, standard edition, vol 12. London, UK: Hogarth Press; 1958:157-173.
4. Kardener SH, Fuller M, Mensh IN. A survey of physicians’ attitudes and practice regarding erotic and non-erotic contact with patients. Am J Psychiatry. 1973;130:1077-1081.
5. Gartrell N, Herman J, Olarte S, et al. Psychiatrist-patient sexual contact: results of a national survey, 1: prevalence. Am J Psychiatry. 1986;143:1126-1131.
6. Gartrell N, Milliken N, Goodson WH, et al. Physician-patient sexual contact—prevalence and problems. West J Med. 1992;157:139-143.
7. Roman B, Kay J. Residency education on the prevention of physician-patient sexual misconduct. Acad Psychiatry. 1997;21:26-34.
8. Pope KS. Sex between therapists and clients. In: Worrell J, ed. Encyclopedia of women and gender: sex similarities and differences and the impact of society on gender. New York, NY: Academic Press; 2001;955-962.
9. Pope KS, Vetter VA. Prior therapist-patient sexual involvement among patients seen by psychologists. Psychotherapy. 1991;28:429-438.
10. Simon RI. Clinical psychiatry and the law, 2nd edition. Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing, Inc.; 2003.
11. American Psychiatric Association. The principles of medical ethics with annotations especially applicable to psychiatry. Available at: http://www.psych.org/MainMenu/PsychiatricPractice/Ethics/
ResourcesStandards/PrinciplesofMedicalEthics.aspx. Accessed May 4, 2009.
12. American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs. Sexual misconduct in the practice of medicine. JAMA. 1991;266:2741-2745.
13. American Psychological Association. Ethical principles of psychologists and code of conduct. Available at: http://www.apa.org/ethics/code2002.html. Accessed May 4, 2009.
14. Gruenberg PB. Boundary violations. In: Ethics primer of the American Psychiatric Association. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association; 2001;1-9.
15. Simon RI, Shuman DW. Clinical manual of psychiatry and the law. Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing, Inc.; 2007.
16. Sadock BJ, Sadock VA. Kaplan and Sadock’s synopsis of psychiatry, 10th ed. Baltimore, MD: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins; 2007.
17. Clemente v Roth, 171 Fed. Appx. 999 (4th Cir. Md. 2006).
18. Hoopes v Hammargren, 102 Nev. 425, 725 P.2d 238 (1986).
19. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm, ch 8, §45 (2007 draft).
20. Prosser WL, Keeton WP, Dobbs DB, et al. Prosser and Keeton on torts, 5th ed. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co.; 1984.
21. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm, ch 8, §46 (2007 draft).
22. Minnesota Statutes §148A (2008).
Correction
A staff-written summary of a presentation by Marlene P. Freeman, MD, (Current Psychiatry, May 2009, p. 56) paraphrased her as saying “atypical antipsychotics may pose a lower risk of fetal malformations compared with lithium or anticonvulsants.” Dr. Freeman did not make this statement and states that available data are insufficient to support this comparison. She wishes to clarify what the scientific evidence supports when treating bipolar disorder in pregnant patients:
“Because relapse rates for bipolar women who discontinue medication during pregnancy are high, it is recommended that patients consider the serious risks of untreated bipolar disorder as well as medication exposure. Valproate appears to be the mood stabilizer associated with the greatest teratogenic potential. Among the anticonvulsants, lamotrigine appears to have the most favorable reproductive safety profile, and lithium appears to have a much lower risk of teratogenicity than was thought years ago, with a very low absolute risk of malformations with first-trimester exposure. More data are needed to inform the use of atypical antipsychotics across pregnancy and breast-feeding.”
A staff-written summary of a presentation by Marlene P. Freeman, MD, (Current Psychiatry, May 2009, p. 56) paraphrased her as saying “atypical antipsychotics may pose a lower risk of fetal malformations compared with lithium or anticonvulsants.” Dr. Freeman did not make this statement and states that available data are insufficient to support this comparison. She wishes to clarify what the scientific evidence supports when treating bipolar disorder in pregnant patients:
“Because relapse rates for bipolar women who discontinue medication during pregnancy are high, it is recommended that patients consider the serious risks of untreated bipolar disorder as well as medication exposure. Valproate appears to be the mood stabilizer associated with the greatest teratogenic potential. Among the anticonvulsants, lamotrigine appears to have the most favorable reproductive safety profile, and lithium appears to have a much lower risk of teratogenicity than was thought years ago, with a very low absolute risk of malformations with first-trimester exposure. More data are needed to inform the use of atypical antipsychotics across pregnancy and breast-feeding.”
A staff-written summary of a presentation by Marlene P. Freeman, MD, (Current Psychiatry, May 2009, p. 56) paraphrased her as saying “atypical antipsychotics may pose a lower risk of fetal malformations compared with lithium or anticonvulsants.” Dr. Freeman did not make this statement and states that available data are insufficient to support this comparison. She wishes to clarify what the scientific evidence supports when treating bipolar disorder in pregnant patients:
“Because relapse rates for bipolar women who discontinue medication during pregnancy are high, it is recommended that patients consider the serious risks of untreated bipolar disorder as well as medication exposure. Valproate appears to be the mood stabilizer associated with the greatest teratogenic potential. Among the anticonvulsants, lamotrigine appears to have the most favorable reproductive safety profile, and lithium appears to have a much lower risk of teratogenicity than was thought years ago, with a very low absolute risk of malformations with first-trimester exposure. More data are needed to inform the use of atypical antipsychotics across pregnancy and breast-feeding.”