Pulmonary Infections

A few items bring back unpleasant memories of COVID-19, such as masks. However, they are among the simplest and most effective ways to prevent the spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). If everyone had worn them correctly, the transmission could have been reduced as much as ninefold, according to a theoretical study published in Physical Review E by Richard P. Sear, PhD, from the University of Surrey, Guildford, England.

Study Overcomes Limitations

This study aimed to address the limitations of epidemiological investigations of masks, which can be complex and error-prone. Sear used data obtained from the UK’s COVID-19 app, totaling 7 million contacts, to create a mathematical model of virus transmission, focusing on the correlation between contact duration and infection. The model estimates that if all UK residents had worn masks during every potential exposure, virus transmission would have been approximately nine times lower.

Although this is a mathematical model, it adds to the growing evidence that supports the benefits of masks. Masks are among the best strategies for treating SARS-CoV-2. This conclusion has been supported by several systematic reviews and additional statistical studies. Conversely, the decision to relax and eliminate mask regulations has had consequences that have received little attention.

As expected, removing the mask mandate leads to increased virus transmission, resulting in more hospitalizations and deaths. A 2024 study estimated that in Japan, where cultural factors lead to much higher mask use in public than in Europe, the decline in mask use from 97% of the population in 2022 to 63% in October 2023 may have caused an additional 3500 deaths.

 

Impact Beyond SARS-CoV-2

One remarkable effect of non-pharmaceutical interventions during the pandemic was the probable extinction of an entire influenza strain (B/Yamagata), which could improve future influenza vaccines and significantly reduce the spread of respiratory syncytial virus. While this was not solely caused by masks, it was also influenced by emergency measures such as lockdowns and social distancing. These behavioral changes can positively alter the landscape of infectious diseases.

Masks play a role in reducing influenza transmission during pandemics. Their effectiveness has been supported by several studies and systematic reviews on a wide range of respiratory viruses. A randomized clinical trial involving 4647 Norwegian participants from February to April 2023, published in May 2024 by the British Medical Journal, suggested that wearing a mask reduces the incidence of respiratory symptoms. Specifically, 8.9% of those who wore masks reported respiratory symptoms during the study period compared with 12.2% of those who did not, representing a relative risk reduction of 27%.

Widespread mask use could also protect against other factors such as fine particulate matter, indirectly reducing the risk for various health conditions. A retrospective study involving 7.8 million residents in the Chinese city of Weifang, published in December 2024 by BMC Public Health, suggested that mask use during the pandemic may have also protected the population from pollution, reducing the number of stroke cases by 38.6% over 33 months of follow-up.

Although there are still voices in bioethics calling for the reintroduction of mask mandates in public places, it is unlikely that, barring emergencies, mask mandates are politically and socially acceptable today. Mask use is also considered a politically polarizing topic in several Western countries. Nevertheless, it is worth considering whether, as we move away from the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, we can more objectively promote the use of masks in public places.

Communicating the importance of public health initiatives and persuading people to support them is a well-known challenge. However, scientific literature offers valuable insights. These include encouraging people to rely on rational thinking rather than emotions and providing information on how masks protect those around them. The fact that East Asian cultures tend to have a more positive relationship with the use of masks shows that, in principle, it is possible to make them acceptable. Data from studies suggest that, as we prepare for potential future pandemics, it may be time to move past polarization and reintroduce masks — not as a universal mandate but as an individual choice for many.

This story was translated from Univadis Italy using several editorial tools, including AI, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication.

A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.

A few items bring back unpleasant memories of COVID-19, such as masks. However, they are among the simplest and most effective ways to prevent the spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). If everyone had worn them correctly, the transmission could have been reduced as much as ninefold, according to a theoretical study published in Physical Review E by Richard P. Sear, PhD, from the University of Surrey, Guildford, England.

Study Overcomes Limitations

This study aimed to address the limitations of epidemiological investigations of masks, which can be complex and error-prone. Sear used data obtained from the UK’s COVID-19 app, totaling 7 million contacts, to create a mathematical model of virus transmission, focusing on the correlation between contact duration and infection. The model estimates that if all UK residents had worn masks during every potential exposure, virus transmission would have been approximately nine times lower.

Although this is a mathematical model, it adds to the growing evidence that supports the benefits of masks. Masks are among the best strategies for treating SARS-CoV-2. This conclusion has been supported by several systematic reviews and additional statistical studies. Conversely, the decision to relax and eliminate mask regulations has had consequences that have received little attention.

As expected, removing the mask mandate leads to increased virus transmission, resulting in more hospitalizations and deaths. A 2024 study estimated that in Japan, where cultural factors lead to much higher mask use in public than in Europe, the decline in mask use from 97% of the population in 2022 to 63% in October 2023 may have caused an additional 3500 deaths.

 

Impact Beyond SARS-CoV-2

One remarkable effect of non-pharmaceutical interventions during the pandemic was the probable extinction of an entire influenza strain (B/Yamagata), which could improve future influenza vaccines and significantly reduce the spread of respiratory syncytial virus. While this was not solely caused by masks, it was also influenced by emergency measures such as lockdowns and social distancing. These behavioral changes can positively alter the landscape of infectious diseases.

Masks play a role in reducing influenza transmission during pandemics. Their effectiveness has been supported by several studies and systematic reviews on a wide range of respiratory viruses. A randomized clinical trial involving 4647 Norwegian participants from February to April 2023, published in May 2024 by the British Medical Journal, suggested that wearing a mask reduces the incidence of respiratory symptoms. Specifically, 8.9% of those who wore masks reported respiratory symptoms during the study period compared with 12.2% of those who did not, representing a relative risk reduction of 27%.

Widespread mask use could also protect against other factors such as fine particulate matter, indirectly reducing the risk for various health conditions. A retrospective study involving 7.8 million residents in the Chinese city of Weifang, published in December 2024 by BMC Public Health, suggested that mask use during the pandemic may have also protected the population from pollution, reducing the number of stroke cases by 38.6% over 33 months of follow-up.

Although there are still voices in bioethics calling for the reintroduction of mask mandates in public places, it is unlikely that, barring emergencies, mask mandates are politically and socially acceptable today. Mask use is also considered a politically polarizing topic in several Western countries. Nevertheless, it is worth considering whether, as we move away from the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, we can more objectively promote the use of masks in public places.

Communicating the importance of public health initiatives and persuading people to support them is a well-known challenge. However, scientific literature offers valuable insights. These include encouraging people to rely on rational thinking rather than emotions and providing information on how masks protect those around them. The fact that East Asian cultures tend to have a more positive relationship with the use of masks shows that, in principle, it is possible to make them acceptable. Data from studies suggest that, as we prepare for potential future pandemics, it may be time to move past polarization and reintroduce masks — not as a universal mandate but as an individual choice for many.

This story was translated from Univadis Italy using several editorial tools, including AI, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication.

A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.

A few items bring back unpleasant memories of COVID-19, such as masks. However, they are among the simplest and most effective ways to prevent the spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). If everyone had worn them correctly, the transmission could have been reduced as much as ninefold, according to a theoretical study published in Physical Review E by Richard P. Sear, PhD, from the University of Surrey, Guildford, England.

Study Overcomes Limitations

This study aimed to address the limitations of epidemiological investigations of masks, which can be complex and error-prone. Sear used data obtained from the UK’s COVID-19 app, totaling 7 million contacts, to create a mathematical model of virus transmission, focusing on the correlation between contact duration and infection. The model estimates that if all UK residents had worn masks during every potential exposure, virus transmission would have been approximately nine times lower.

Although this is a mathematical model, it adds to the growing evidence that supports the benefits of masks. Masks are among the best strategies for treating SARS-CoV-2. This conclusion has been supported by several systematic reviews and additional statistical studies. Conversely, the decision to relax and eliminate mask regulations has had consequences that have received little attention.

As expected, removing the mask mandate leads to increased virus transmission, resulting in more hospitalizations and deaths. A 2024 study estimated that in Japan, where cultural factors lead to much higher mask use in public than in Europe, the decline in mask use from 97% of the population in 2022 to 63% in October 2023 may have caused an additional 3500 deaths.

 

Impact Beyond SARS-CoV-2

One remarkable effect of non-pharmaceutical interventions during the pandemic was the probable extinction of an entire influenza strain (B/Yamagata), which could improve future influenza vaccines and significantly reduce the spread of respiratory syncytial virus. While this was not solely caused by masks, it was also influenced by emergency measures such as lockdowns and social distancing. These behavioral changes can positively alter the landscape of infectious diseases.

Masks play a role in reducing influenza transmission during pandemics. Their effectiveness has been supported by several studies and systematic reviews on a wide range of respiratory viruses. A randomized clinical trial involving 4647 Norwegian participants from February to April 2023, published in May 2024 by the British Medical Journal, suggested that wearing a mask reduces the incidence of respiratory symptoms. Specifically, 8.9% of those who wore masks reported respiratory symptoms during the study period compared with 12.2% of those who did not, representing a relative risk reduction of 27%.

Widespread mask use could also protect against other factors such as fine particulate matter, indirectly reducing the risk for various health conditions. A retrospective study involving 7.8 million residents in the Chinese city of Weifang, published in December 2024 by BMC Public Health, suggested that mask use during the pandemic may have also protected the population from pollution, reducing the number of stroke cases by 38.6% over 33 months of follow-up.

Although there are still voices in bioethics calling for the reintroduction of mask mandates in public places, it is unlikely that, barring emergencies, mask mandates are politically and socially acceptable today. Mask use is also considered a politically polarizing topic in several Western countries. Nevertheless, it is worth considering whether, as we move away from the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, we can more objectively promote the use of masks in public places.

Communicating the importance of public health initiatives and persuading people to support them is a well-known challenge. However, scientific literature offers valuable insights. These include encouraging people to rely on rational thinking rather than emotions and providing information on how masks protect those around them. The fact that East Asian cultures tend to have a more positive relationship with the use of masks shows that, in principle, it is possible to make them acceptable. Data from studies suggest that, as we prepare for potential future pandemics, it may be time to move past polarization and reintroduce masks — not as a universal mandate but as an individual choice for many.

This story was translated from Univadis Italy using several editorial tools, including AI, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication.

A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.

Almost 70 years after the discovery of the respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), vaccines and preventive treatments are giving babies a chance to beat the potentially deadly childhood infection.

As doctors turn to monoclonal antibody therapies and governments plan vaccination programs, clinical researchers are asking whether these measures will reduce the spread of the virus. Will fewer babies die from RSV, and fewer children develop permanent wheezing?

Recent studies offer clues.

Fabio Midulla, an associate professor of pediatrics at Sapienza University of Rome in Rome, Italy, said that the pharmaceutical industry is poised to push governments to use vaccines and monoclonal antibodies for even more children. “Such a push might work,” he said at the European Respiratory Society (ERS) 2024 Congress, “given that several studies have already demonstrated that their use can improve outcomes for children who do become infected and reduce societal costs by reducing hospitalizations.”

But Mariëlle WH Pijnenburg, a pulmonary specialist at Erasmus University Rotterdam in the Netherlands, said at the Congress that greater rollout would require governments to force industry to lower prices. If treatments remain beyond the reach of lower-income countries — where the burden of RSV is the greatest — the death toll from this common childhood infection will remain stubbornly high, and the prospect of global elimination will remain forever out of reach, she said.

New Tools in the Fight Against RSV

Nirsevimab, a long-acting monoclonal antibody given to newborns to prevent severe infection, was approved by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) in October 2022 and the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in July 2023. And Abrysvo, a vaccine given to older adults and pregnant women to stop them from passing the virus to babies from birth through 6 months of age, was approved by the FDA and the EMA in 2023.

RSV is responsible for over 33 million lung infections in children younger than 5 years annually, with more than 4 million hospitalizations and nearly 200,000 deaths. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, every year, 2.1 million children younger than 5 years old visit a healthcare provider because of an RSV infection and between 58,000 and 80,000 children younger than 5 years old are hospitalized in the United States. The burden of severe RSV disease is also high among adults, with an estimated 123,000-193,000 hospitalizations, 24,400-34,900 ICU admissions, and 4680-8620 in-hospital deaths occurring annually among US adults.

While the virus affects all age groups, it is particularly severe in infants, swelling their airways and causing them to struggle for breath. Infection in infancy can lead to later complications, such as the development of wheezing, a condition that causes breathlessness and a feeling of tightening in the chest, and possibly also asthma.

Studies have shown that children and preterm infants infected with RSV who were given monoclonal antibodies experienced less post-infection wheezing, suggesting that RSV prophylaxis could prevent the development of wheezing bronchitis.

A study conducted in Galicia, Spain, showed that only 0.3% of infants who received prophylaxis with Nirsevimab were hospitalized for RSV-related lower respiratory tract infections. “This is very promising,” Yvonne Maldonado, MD, professor of pediatrics and epidemiology and population health at Stanford University in Stanford, California, told Medscape Medical News. “But this virus is ubiquitous. It’s found everywhere. It comes around every winter season. And immunity is not long-lasting.”

Older children who are not receiving monoclonal antibodies still experience RSV-related hospitalizations, suggesting the virus continues to circulate at high enough levels in the community. “The vaccine and monoclonal antibodies can reduce the risk of hospitalization and more severe disease in young kids, but they won’t eliminate the virus,” Maldonado said. “Right now, the goal is to prevent serious infection, not to prevent the spread of the virus completely.”

Expanding Access to RSV Prevention in Low-Income Countries

Currently, the RSV vaccine and monoclonal antibodies are only given in the United States, Europe, United Kingdom, and Canada to newborns, children at risk for severe disease, and pregnant women. However, Midulla said that pharmaceutical companies are pushing to broaden the rollout to a broader population within these countries. Yet, he said, over 99% of RSV infection–related deaths occur in the Global South.

No pharmaceutical company has sought approval in low-income countries such as those in Africa. “Unless they see there being a market in a country, they’re not going to go through the onerous process of getting [a vaccine] licensed,” Shabir Madhi, dean of the faculty of health sciences and a professor of vaccinology at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, told Medscape Medical News.

He highlighted that almost 50% of RSV-related deaths occur in African children younger than 5 years, despite these children comprising just one fifth of the global under-5 population. The high burden of RSV mortality in the Global South is mainly due to poor access to healthcare and supportive treatments, such as supplemental oxygen, which can help children recover from severe RSV infection.

Companies are unlikely to pursue regulatory approval and licensing in low- and middle-income countries until GAVI, the global vaccine alliance, commits to procuring and funding the vaccines for these regions. GAVI’s decision would provide the necessary market incentive for manufacturers to seek approval.

Madhi suggested that GAVI’s decision on RSV vaccine procurement is imminent, likely early next year, following the World Health Organization’s Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization recommendation to vaccinate all pregnant women with the RSV vaccine, regardless of whether they are in high-income or low-income countries.

Nevertheless, even if vaccines become available, many African countries may still struggle to afford them. Madhi said that these countries would likely depend on GAVI and organizations like UNICEF to procure the vaccines at affordable prices. “The unfortunate reality is that many countries — especially in Africa — still wouldn’t be able to afford it, even if the vaccine cost as little as $5,” said Madhi. “But that’s where they would have the greatest impact.”

Midulla, Pijnenburg reported no relevant financial relationships. Madhi’s research unit, the Vaccines and Infectious Disease Analytics Unit, was involved in the clinical trials for the Pfizer RSV vaccine, the GSK RSV vaccine (which was terminated), as well as the MEDLEY trial of palivizumab. All funding for these studies went to his institution, the University of the Witwatersrand. Maldonado was Stanford principal investigator for the Pfizer RSV vaccine.
 

A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.

Almost 70 years after the discovery of the respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), vaccines and preventive treatments are giving babies a chance to beat the potentially deadly childhood infection.

As doctors turn to monoclonal antibody therapies and governments plan vaccination programs, clinical researchers are asking whether these measures will reduce the spread of the virus. Will fewer babies die from RSV, and fewer children develop permanent wheezing?

Recent studies offer clues.

Fabio Midulla, an associate professor of pediatrics at Sapienza University of Rome in Rome, Italy, said that the pharmaceutical industry is poised to push governments to use vaccines and monoclonal antibodies for even more children. “Such a push might work,” he said at the European Respiratory Society (ERS) 2024 Congress, “given that several studies have already demonstrated that their use can improve outcomes for children who do become infected and reduce societal costs by reducing hospitalizations.”

But Mariëlle WH Pijnenburg, a pulmonary specialist at Erasmus University Rotterdam in the Netherlands, said at the Congress that greater rollout would require governments to force industry to lower prices. If treatments remain beyond the reach of lower-income countries — where the burden of RSV is the greatest — the death toll from this common childhood infection will remain stubbornly high, and the prospect of global elimination will remain forever out of reach, she said.

New Tools in the Fight Against RSV

Nirsevimab, a long-acting monoclonal antibody given to newborns to prevent severe infection, was approved by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) in October 2022 and the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in July 2023. And Abrysvo, a vaccine given to older adults and pregnant women to stop them from passing the virus to babies from birth through 6 months of age, was approved by the FDA and the EMA in 2023.

RSV is responsible for over 33 million lung infections in children younger than 5 years annually, with more than 4 million hospitalizations and nearly 200,000 deaths. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, every year, 2.1 million children younger than 5 years old visit a healthcare provider because of an RSV infection and between 58,000 and 80,000 children younger than 5 years old are hospitalized in the United States. The burden of severe RSV disease is also high among adults, with an estimated 123,000-193,000 hospitalizations, 24,400-34,900 ICU admissions, and 4680-8620 in-hospital deaths occurring annually among US adults.

While the virus affects all age groups, it is particularly severe in infants, swelling their airways and causing them to struggle for breath. Infection in infancy can lead to later complications, such as the development of wheezing, a condition that causes breathlessness and a feeling of tightening in the chest, and possibly also asthma.

Studies have shown that children and preterm infants infected with RSV who were given monoclonal antibodies experienced less post-infection wheezing, suggesting that RSV prophylaxis could prevent the development of wheezing bronchitis.

A study conducted in Galicia, Spain, showed that only 0.3% of infants who received prophylaxis with Nirsevimab were hospitalized for RSV-related lower respiratory tract infections. “This is very promising,” Yvonne Maldonado, MD, professor of pediatrics and epidemiology and population health at Stanford University in Stanford, California, told Medscape Medical News. “But this virus is ubiquitous. It’s found everywhere. It comes around every winter season. And immunity is not long-lasting.”

Older children who are not receiving monoclonal antibodies still experience RSV-related hospitalizations, suggesting the virus continues to circulate at high enough levels in the community. “The vaccine and monoclonal antibodies can reduce the risk of hospitalization and more severe disease in young kids, but they won’t eliminate the virus,” Maldonado said. “Right now, the goal is to prevent serious infection, not to prevent the spread of the virus completely.”

Expanding Access to RSV Prevention in Low-Income Countries

Currently, the RSV vaccine and monoclonal antibodies are only given in the United States, Europe, United Kingdom, and Canada to newborns, children at risk for severe disease, and pregnant women. However, Midulla said that pharmaceutical companies are pushing to broaden the rollout to a broader population within these countries. Yet, he said, over 99% of RSV infection–related deaths occur in the Global South.

No pharmaceutical company has sought approval in low-income countries such as those in Africa. “Unless they see there being a market in a country, they’re not going to go through the onerous process of getting [a vaccine] licensed,” Shabir Madhi, dean of the faculty of health sciences and a professor of vaccinology at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, told Medscape Medical News.

He highlighted that almost 50% of RSV-related deaths occur in African children younger than 5 years, despite these children comprising just one fifth of the global under-5 population. The high burden of RSV mortality in the Global South is mainly due to poor access to healthcare and supportive treatments, such as supplemental oxygen, which can help children recover from severe RSV infection.

Companies are unlikely to pursue regulatory approval and licensing in low- and middle-income countries until GAVI, the global vaccine alliance, commits to procuring and funding the vaccines for these regions. GAVI’s decision would provide the necessary market incentive for manufacturers to seek approval.

Madhi suggested that GAVI’s decision on RSV vaccine procurement is imminent, likely early next year, following the World Health Organization’s Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization recommendation to vaccinate all pregnant women with the RSV vaccine, regardless of whether they are in high-income or low-income countries.

Nevertheless, even if vaccines become available, many African countries may still struggle to afford them. Madhi said that these countries would likely depend on GAVI and organizations like UNICEF to procure the vaccines at affordable prices. “The unfortunate reality is that many countries — especially in Africa — still wouldn’t be able to afford it, even if the vaccine cost as little as $5,” said Madhi. “But that’s where they would have the greatest impact.”

Midulla, Pijnenburg reported no relevant financial relationships. Madhi’s research unit, the Vaccines and Infectious Disease Analytics Unit, was involved in the clinical trials for the Pfizer RSV vaccine, the GSK RSV vaccine (which was terminated), as well as the MEDLEY trial of palivizumab. All funding for these studies went to his institution, the University of the Witwatersrand. Maldonado was Stanford principal investigator for the Pfizer RSV vaccine.
 

A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.

Almost 70 years after the discovery of the respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), vaccines and preventive treatments are giving babies a chance to beat the potentially deadly childhood infection.

As doctors turn to monoclonal antibody therapies and governments plan vaccination programs, clinical researchers are asking whether these measures will reduce the spread of the virus. Will fewer babies die from RSV, and fewer children develop permanent wheezing?

Recent studies offer clues.

Fabio Midulla, an associate professor of pediatrics at Sapienza University of Rome in Rome, Italy, said that the pharmaceutical industry is poised to push governments to use vaccines and monoclonal antibodies for even more children. “Such a push might work,” he said at the European Respiratory Society (ERS) 2024 Congress, “given that several studies have already demonstrated that their use can improve outcomes for children who do become infected and reduce societal costs by reducing hospitalizations.”

But Mariëlle WH Pijnenburg, a pulmonary specialist at Erasmus University Rotterdam in the Netherlands, said at the Congress that greater rollout would require governments to force industry to lower prices. If treatments remain beyond the reach of lower-income countries — where the burden of RSV is the greatest — the death toll from this common childhood infection will remain stubbornly high, and the prospect of global elimination will remain forever out of reach, she said.

New Tools in the Fight Against RSV

Nirsevimab, a long-acting monoclonal antibody given to newborns to prevent severe infection, was approved by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) in October 2022 and the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in July 2023. And Abrysvo, a vaccine given to older adults and pregnant women to stop them from passing the virus to babies from birth through 6 months of age, was approved by the FDA and the EMA in 2023.

RSV is responsible for over 33 million lung infections in children younger than 5 years annually, with more than 4 million hospitalizations and nearly 200,000 deaths. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, every year, 2.1 million children younger than 5 years old visit a healthcare provider because of an RSV infection and between 58,000 and 80,000 children younger than 5 years old are hospitalized in the United States. The burden of severe RSV disease is also high among adults, with an estimated 123,000-193,000 hospitalizations, 24,400-34,900 ICU admissions, and 4680-8620 in-hospital deaths occurring annually among US adults.

While the virus affects all age groups, it is particularly severe in infants, swelling their airways and causing them to struggle for breath. Infection in infancy can lead to later complications, such as the development of wheezing, a condition that causes breathlessness and a feeling of tightening in the chest, and possibly also asthma.

Studies have shown that children and preterm infants infected with RSV who were given monoclonal antibodies experienced less post-infection wheezing, suggesting that RSV prophylaxis could prevent the development of wheezing bronchitis.

A study conducted in Galicia, Spain, showed that only 0.3% of infants who received prophylaxis with Nirsevimab were hospitalized for RSV-related lower respiratory tract infections. “This is very promising,” Yvonne Maldonado, MD, professor of pediatrics and epidemiology and population health at Stanford University in Stanford, California, told Medscape Medical News. “But this virus is ubiquitous. It’s found everywhere. It comes around every winter season. And immunity is not long-lasting.”

Older children who are not receiving monoclonal antibodies still experience RSV-related hospitalizations, suggesting the virus continues to circulate at high enough levels in the community. “The vaccine and monoclonal antibodies can reduce the risk of hospitalization and more severe disease in young kids, but they won’t eliminate the virus,” Maldonado said. “Right now, the goal is to prevent serious infection, not to prevent the spread of the virus completely.”

Expanding Access to RSV Prevention in Low-Income Countries

Currently, the RSV vaccine and monoclonal antibodies are only given in the United States, Europe, United Kingdom, and Canada to newborns, children at risk for severe disease, and pregnant women. However, Midulla said that pharmaceutical companies are pushing to broaden the rollout to a broader population within these countries. Yet, he said, over 99% of RSV infection–related deaths occur in the Global South.

No pharmaceutical company has sought approval in low-income countries such as those in Africa. “Unless they see there being a market in a country, they’re not going to go through the onerous process of getting [a vaccine] licensed,” Shabir Madhi, dean of the faculty of health sciences and a professor of vaccinology at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, told Medscape Medical News.

He highlighted that almost 50% of RSV-related deaths occur in African children younger than 5 years, despite these children comprising just one fifth of the global under-5 population. The high burden of RSV mortality in the Global South is mainly due to poor access to healthcare and supportive treatments, such as supplemental oxygen, which can help children recover from severe RSV infection.

Companies are unlikely to pursue regulatory approval and licensing in low- and middle-income countries until GAVI, the global vaccine alliance, commits to procuring and funding the vaccines for these regions. GAVI’s decision would provide the necessary market incentive for manufacturers to seek approval.

Madhi suggested that GAVI’s decision on RSV vaccine procurement is imminent, likely early next year, following the World Health Organization’s Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization recommendation to vaccinate all pregnant women with the RSV vaccine, regardless of whether they are in high-income or low-income countries.

Nevertheless, even if vaccines become available, many African countries may still struggle to afford them. Madhi said that these countries would likely depend on GAVI and organizations like UNICEF to procure the vaccines at affordable prices. “The unfortunate reality is that many countries — especially in Africa — still wouldn’t be able to afford it, even if the vaccine cost as little as $5,” said Madhi. “But that’s where they would have the greatest impact.”

Midulla, Pijnenburg reported no relevant financial relationships. Madhi’s research unit, the Vaccines and Infectious Disease Analytics Unit, was involved in the clinical trials for the Pfizer RSV vaccine, the GSK RSV vaccine (which was terminated), as well as the MEDLEY trial of palivizumab. All funding for these studies went to his institution, the University of the Witwatersrand. Maldonado was Stanford principal investigator for the Pfizer RSV vaccine.
 

A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.

TOPLINE:

Hypermucoviscous Klebsiella pneumoniae (hmKp) strains demonstrate a significantly lower prevalence of extended-spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL) production and slightly lower carbapenem resistance than non-hmKp strains, according to a recent meta-analysis of 2049 clinical isolates.

METHODOLOGY:

• Researchers conducted a meta-analysis to assess the prevalence of ESBL-producing strains and carbapenem-resistant strains among the hmKp and non-hmKp clinical isolates.
• They included 15 studies published between 2014 and 2023, with 2049 clinical isolates of K pneumoniae identified using a string test to distinguish hypermucoviscous from non-hypermucoviscous strains.
• These studies spanned across four continents: Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America.
• The primary outcome was the prevalence of ESBL-producing and carbapenem-resistant strains, determined through antimicrobial susceptibility testing.

TAKEAWAY:

• The hmKp strains were associated with a significantly lower prevalence of ESBL-producing strains than non-hmKp strains (pooled odds ratio [OR], 0.26; P = .003).
• Similarly, hmKp strains were associated with a slightly lower prevalence of carbapenem-resistant strains than non-hmKp strains (pooled OR, 0.63; P = .038).

IN PRACTICE:

“Therapeutic options for CRKP [carbapenem-resistant K pneumoniae] infections are extremely limited due to the scarcity of effective antibacterial drugs. Therefore, it is crucial to consider the risks posed by CRKP strains when administering treatment to patients with hmKp infections and a history of the aforementioned risk factors,” the authors wrote.

SOURCE:

The study was led by Hiroki Namikawa, Department of Medical Education and General Practice, Graduate School of Medicine, Osaka Metropolitan University, Japan. It was published online on December 16, 2024, in Emerging Microbes & Infections.

LIMITATIONS:

Only three databases (PubMed, Scopus, and Cochrane Library) were searched for identifying studies, potentially missing relevant studies from other sources. Furthermore, only articles published in English were included, which may have restricted the scope of analysis. Additionally, geographical distribution was predominantly limited to Asia, limiting the global applicability of the results.

DISCLOSURES:

No funding sources were mentioned, and no conflicts of interest were reported.

This article was created using several editorial tools, including AI, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication. A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

TOPLINE:

Hypermucoviscous Klebsiella pneumoniae (hmKp) strains demonstrate a significantly lower prevalence of extended-spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL) production and slightly lower carbapenem resistance than non-hmKp strains, according to a recent meta-analysis of 2049 clinical isolates.

METHODOLOGY:

• Researchers conducted a meta-analysis to assess the prevalence of ESBL-producing strains and carbapenem-resistant strains among the hmKp and non-hmKp clinical isolates.
• They included 15 studies published between 2014 and 2023, with 2049 clinical isolates of K pneumoniae identified using a string test to distinguish hypermucoviscous from non-hypermucoviscous strains.
• These studies spanned across four continents: Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America.
• The primary outcome was the prevalence of ESBL-producing and carbapenem-resistant strains, determined through antimicrobial susceptibility testing.

TAKEAWAY:

• The hmKp strains were associated with a significantly lower prevalence of ESBL-producing strains than non-hmKp strains (pooled odds ratio [OR], 0.26; P = .003).
• Similarly, hmKp strains were associated with a slightly lower prevalence of carbapenem-resistant strains than non-hmKp strains (pooled OR, 0.63; P = .038).

IN PRACTICE:

“Therapeutic options for CRKP [carbapenem-resistant K pneumoniae] infections are extremely limited due to the scarcity of effective antibacterial drugs. Therefore, it is crucial to consider the risks posed by CRKP strains when administering treatment to patients with hmKp infections and a history of the aforementioned risk factors,” the authors wrote.

SOURCE:

The study was led by Hiroki Namikawa, Department of Medical Education and General Practice, Graduate School of Medicine, Osaka Metropolitan University, Japan. It was published online on December 16, 2024, in Emerging Microbes & Infections.

LIMITATIONS:

Only three databases (PubMed, Scopus, and Cochrane Library) were searched for identifying studies, potentially missing relevant studies from other sources. Furthermore, only articles published in English were included, which may have restricted the scope of analysis. Additionally, geographical distribution was predominantly limited to Asia, limiting the global applicability of the results.

DISCLOSURES:

No funding sources were mentioned, and no conflicts of interest were reported.

This article was created using several editorial tools, including AI, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication. A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

TOPLINE:

Hypermucoviscous Klebsiella pneumoniae (hmKp) strains demonstrate a significantly lower prevalence of extended-spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL) production and slightly lower carbapenem resistance than non-hmKp strains, according to a recent meta-analysis of 2049 clinical isolates.

METHODOLOGY:

• Researchers conducted a meta-analysis to assess the prevalence of ESBL-producing strains and carbapenem-resistant strains among the hmKp and non-hmKp clinical isolates.
• They included 15 studies published between 2014 and 2023, with 2049 clinical isolates of K pneumoniae identified using a string test to distinguish hypermucoviscous from non-hypermucoviscous strains.
• These studies spanned across four continents: Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America.
• The primary outcome was the prevalence of ESBL-producing and carbapenem-resistant strains, determined through antimicrobial susceptibility testing.

TAKEAWAY:

• The hmKp strains were associated with a significantly lower prevalence of ESBL-producing strains than non-hmKp strains (pooled odds ratio [OR], 0.26; P = .003).
• Similarly, hmKp strains were associated with a slightly lower prevalence of carbapenem-resistant strains than non-hmKp strains (pooled OR, 0.63; P = .038).

IN PRACTICE:

“Therapeutic options for CRKP [carbapenem-resistant K pneumoniae] infections are extremely limited due to the scarcity of effective antibacterial drugs. Therefore, it is crucial to consider the risks posed by CRKP strains when administering treatment to patients with hmKp infections and a history of the aforementioned risk factors,” the authors wrote.

SOURCE:

The study was led by Hiroki Namikawa, Department of Medical Education and General Practice, Graduate School of Medicine, Osaka Metropolitan University, Japan. It was published online on December 16, 2024, in Emerging Microbes & Infections.

LIMITATIONS:

Only three databases (PubMed, Scopus, and Cochrane Library) were searched for identifying studies, potentially missing relevant studies from other sources. Furthermore, only articles published in English were included, which may have restricted the scope of analysis. Additionally, geographical distribution was predominantly limited to Asia, limiting the global applicability of the results.

DISCLOSURES:

No funding sources were mentioned, and no conflicts of interest were reported.

This article was created using several editorial tools, including AI, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication. A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

The first human patient in the United States with a confirmed case of avian influenza has died, according to a press release from the Louisiana Department of Health. The individual was older than 65 years and had underlying medical conditions and remains the only known human case in the state.

The patient contracted highly pathogenic avian influenza, also known as H5N1, through exposure to wild birds and a noncommercial backyard flock, according to the release. The Louisiana Department of Health has found no additional H5H1 cases in the state and no evidence of person-to-person transmission.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) conducted genetic sequencing of specimens of the virus collected from the Louisiana patient. The agency compared the sequences with sequences from dairy cows, wild birds, and poultry in various areas of the United States that were infected with the H5N1 virus.

The Louisiana patient was infected with the D1.1 genotype of the H5N1 virus. Although D1.1 is related to other D1.1 viruses found in recent human cases in Washington State and British Columbia, Canada, it is distinct from the widely spreading B3.13 genotype that has caused H5N1 outbreaks in dairy cows, poultry, and other animals and has been linked to sporadic human cases in the United States, according to the CDC.

Despite evidence of some changes in the virus between the Louisiana patient and samples from poultry on the patient’s property, “these changes would be more concerning if found in animal hosts or in early stages of infection,” according to the CDC. The CDC and the Louisiana Department of Health are conducting additional sequencing to facilitate further analysis.

In the meantime, the risk to the general public for H5N1 remains low, but individuals who work with or have recreational exposure to birds, poultry, or cows remain at increased risk.

The CDC and the Louisiana Department of Health advise individuals to reduce the risk for H5N1 exposure by avoiding direct contact with wild birds or other animals infected or possibly infected with the virus, avoiding any contact with dead animals, and keeping pets away from sick or dead animals and their feces. Additional safety measures include avoiding uncooked food products such as unpasteurized raw milk or cheese from animals with suspected or confirmed infections and reporting sick or dead birds or animals to the US Department of Agriculture by calling 1-866-536-7593 or the Louisiana Department of Agriculture and Forestry Diagnostic Lab by calling 318-927-3441.

The CDC advises clinicians to consider H5N1 in patients presenting with conjunctivitis or signs of acute respiratory illness and a history of high-risk exposure, including handling sick or dead animals, notably birds and livestock, within 10 days before the onset of symptoms. Other risk factors include consuming uncooked or undercooked food, direct contact with areas contaminated with feces, direct contact with unpasteurized milk or other dairy products or with parts of potentially infected animals, and prolonged exposure to infected animals in a confined space.

Clinical symptoms also may include gastrointestinal complaints such as diarrhea, as well as fatigue, arthralgia, and headache. Patients with more severe H5N1 may experience shortness of breath, altered mental state, and seizures, and serious complications of the virus include pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome, multiorgan failure, and sepsis, according to the CDC.

Clinicians who suspect H5N1 cases should contact their local public health departments. The CDC offers additional advice on evaluating and managing patients with novel influenza A viruses.

 

A Clinician’s Take

“Some symptoms of avian flu include fever, cough, sore throat, runny nose, fatigue, body aches or eye redness or irritation,” Shirin A. Mazumder, MD, associate professor and infectious disease specialist at The University of Tennessee Health Science Center, Memphis, said in an interview. “The timing to the development of symptoms after exposure is typically within 10 days. Avian influenza should be considered when individuals develop symptoms with a relevant exposure history,” she said. 

Whenever possible, avoidance of sick or dead birds and other animals is ideal, but for those who must have contact with sick or dead birds, poultry, or other animals, personal protective equipment (PPE) including a respirator, goggles, and disposable gloves is recommended, said Mazumder. 

“For those working in high-exposure settings, additional PPE including boots or boot covers, hair cover, and fluid-resistant coveralls are recommended,” she said. “Other protective measures include avoiding touching surfaces or materials contaminated with feces, mucus, and saliva from infected animals and avoid[ing] the consumption of raw milk, raw milk products, and undercooked meat from infected animals,” she added.

Hunters handling wild game should dress birds in the field, practice good hand hygiene, and use a respirator or well-fitting mask and gloves when handling the animals to help prevent disease, said Mazumder. 

In addition, those working with confirmed or suspected H5N1 cases should monitor themselves for symptoms, said Mazumder. “Those who become ill within 10 days of exposure to an infected animal or source should isolate from household members and avoid going to work or school until infection is excluded. It is important to reach out to a healthcare professional if you think you may have been exposed or if you think you are infected,” she said. 

There is no currently available vaccine for H5N1 infection, but oseltamivir can be used for chemoprophylaxis and treatment, said Mazumder. “The seasonal flu vaccine does not protect against avian influenza; however, it is still important to ensure that you are up to date on the latest flu vaccine to prevent the possibility of a coinfection with seasonal flu and avian flu,” she emphasized. 

More research is needed to better understand how the influenza virus is transmitted, said Mazumder. “The potential for the virus to evolve and mutate, and how it affects different hosts, are all factors that can impact public health decisions,” she said. “In addition, further research into finding a vaccine and improving surveillance methods are necessary for disease prevention,” she said. 

Mazumder had no financial conflicts to disclose. 
 

A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.

The first human patient in the United States with a confirmed case of avian influenza has died, according to a press release from the Louisiana Department of Health. The individual was older than 65 years and had underlying medical conditions and remains the only known human case in the state.

The patient contracted highly pathogenic avian influenza, also known as H5N1, through exposure to wild birds and a noncommercial backyard flock, according to the release. The Louisiana Department of Health has found no additional H5H1 cases in the state and no evidence of person-to-person transmission.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) conducted genetic sequencing of specimens of the virus collected from the Louisiana patient. The agency compared the sequences with sequences from dairy cows, wild birds, and poultry in various areas of the United States that were infected with the H5N1 virus.

The Louisiana patient was infected with the D1.1 genotype of the H5N1 virus. Although D1.1 is related to other D1.1 viruses found in recent human cases in Washington State and British Columbia, Canada, it is distinct from the widely spreading B3.13 genotype that has caused H5N1 outbreaks in dairy cows, poultry, and other animals and has been linked to sporadic human cases in the United States, according to the CDC.

Despite evidence of some changes in the virus between the Louisiana patient and samples from poultry on the patient’s property, “these changes would be more concerning if found in animal hosts or in early stages of infection,” according to the CDC. The CDC and the Louisiana Department of Health are conducting additional sequencing to facilitate further analysis.

In the meantime, the risk to the general public for H5N1 remains low, but individuals who work with or have recreational exposure to birds, poultry, or cows remain at increased risk.

The CDC and the Louisiana Department of Health advise individuals to reduce the risk for H5N1 exposure by avoiding direct contact with wild birds or other animals infected or possibly infected with the virus, avoiding any contact with dead animals, and keeping pets away from sick or dead animals and their feces. Additional safety measures include avoiding uncooked food products such as unpasteurized raw milk or cheese from animals with suspected or confirmed infections and reporting sick or dead birds or animals to the US Department of Agriculture by calling 1-866-536-7593 or the Louisiana Department of Agriculture and Forestry Diagnostic Lab by calling 318-927-3441.

The CDC advises clinicians to consider H5N1 in patients presenting with conjunctivitis or signs of acute respiratory illness and a history of high-risk exposure, including handling sick or dead animals, notably birds and livestock, within 10 days before the onset of symptoms. Other risk factors include consuming uncooked or undercooked food, direct contact with areas contaminated with feces, direct contact with unpasteurized milk or other dairy products or with parts of potentially infected animals, and prolonged exposure to infected animals in a confined space.

Clinical symptoms also may include gastrointestinal complaints such as diarrhea, as well as fatigue, arthralgia, and headache. Patients with more severe H5N1 may experience shortness of breath, altered mental state, and seizures, and serious complications of the virus include pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome, multiorgan failure, and sepsis, according to the CDC.

Clinicians who suspect H5N1 cases should contact their local public health departments. The CDC offers additional advice on evaluating and managing patients with novel influenza A viruses.

 

A Clinician’s Take

“Some symptoms of avian flu include fever, cough, sore throat, runny nose, fatigue, body aches or eye redness or irritation,” Shirin A. Mazumder, MD, associate professor and infectious disease specialist at The University of Tennessee Health Science Center, Memphis, said in an interview. “The timing to the development of symptoms after exposure is typically within 10 days. Avian influenza should be considered when individuals develop symptoms with a relevant exposure history,” she said. 

Whenever possible, avoidance of sick or dead birds and other animals is ideal, but for those who must have contact with sick or dead birds, poultry, or other animals, personal protective equipment (PPE) including a respirator, goggles, and disposable gloves is recommended, said Mazumder. 

“For those working in high-exposure settings, additional PPE including boots or boot covers, hair cover, and fluid-resistant coveralls are recommended,” she said. “Other protective measures include avoiding touching surfaces or materials contaminated with feces, mucus, and saliva from infected animals and avoid[ing] the consumption of raw milk, raw milk products, and undercooked meat from infected animals,” she added.

Hunters handling wild game should dress birds in the field, practice good hand hygiene, and use a respirator or well-fitting mask and gloves when handling the animals to help prevent disease, said Mazumder. 

In addition, those working with confirmed or suspected H5N1 cases should monitor themselves for symptoms, said Mazumder. “Those who become ill within 10 days of exposure to an infected animal or source should isolate from household members and avoid going to work or school until infection is excluded. It is important to reach out to a healthcare professional if you think you may have been exposed or if you think you are infected,” she said. 

There is no currently available vaccine for H5N1 infection, but oseltamivir can be used for chemoprophylaxis and treatment, said Mazumder. “The seasonal flu vaccine does not protect against avian influenza; however, it is still important to ensure that you are up to date on the latest flu vaccine to prevent the possibility of a coinfection with seasonal flu and avian flu,” she emphasized. 

More research is needed to better understand how the influenza virus is transmitted, said Mazumder. “The potential for the virus to evolve and mutate, and how it affects different hosts, are all factors that can impact public health decisions,” she said. “In addition, further research into finding a vaccine and improving surveillance methods are necessary for disease prevention,” she said. 

Mazumder had no financial conflicts to disclose. 
 

A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.

The first human patient in the United States with a confirmed case of avian influenza has died, according to a press release from the Louisiana Department of Health. The individual was older than 65 years and had underlying medical conditions and remains the only known human case in the state.

The patient contracted highly pathogenic avian influenza, also known as H5N1, through exposure to wild birds and a noncommercial backyard flock, according to the release. The Louisiana Department of Health has found no additional H5H1 cases in the state and no evidence of person-to-person transmission.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) conducted genetic sequencing of specimens of the virus collected from the Louisiana patient. The agency compared the sequences with sequences from dairy cows, wild birds, and poultry in various areas of the United States that were infected with the H5N1 virus.

The Louisiana patient was infected with the D1.1 genotype of the H5N1 virus. Although D1.1 is related to other D1.1 viruses found in recent human cases in Washington State and British Columbia, Canada, it is distinct from the widely spreading B3.13 genotype that has caused H5N1 outbreaks in dairy cows, poultry, and other animals and has been linked to sporadic human cases in the United States, according to the CDC.

Despite evidence of some changes in the virus between the Louisiana patient and samples from poultry on the patient’s property, “these changes would be more concerning if found in animal hosts or in early stages of infection,” according to the CDC. The CDC and the Louisiana Department of Health are conducting additional sequencing to facilitate further analysis.

In the meantime, the risk to the general public for H5N1 remains low, but individuals who work with or have recreational exposure to birds, poultry, or cows remain at increased risk.

The CDC and the Louisiana Department of Health advise individuals to reduce the risk for H5N1 exposure by avoiding direct contact with wild birds or other animals infected or possibly infected with the virus, avoiding any contact with dead animals, and keeping pets away from sick or dead animals and their feces. Additional safety measures include avoiding uncooked food products such as unpasteurized raw milk or cheese from animals with suspected or confirmed infections and reporting sick or dead birds or animals to the US Department of Agriculture by calling 1-866-536-7593 or the Louisiana Department of Agriculture and Forestry Diagnostic Lab by calling 318-927-3441.

The CDC advises clinicians to consider H5N1 in patients presenting with conjunctivitis or signs of acute respiratory illness and a history of high-risk exposure, including handling sick or dead animals, notably birds and livestock, within 10 days before the onset of symptoms. Other risk factors include consuming uncooked or undercooked food, direct contact with areas contaminated with feces, direct contact with unpasteurized milk or other dairy products or with parts of potentially infected animals, and prolonged exposure to infected animals in a confined space.

Clinical symptoms also may include gastrointestinal complaints such as diarrhea, as well as fatigue, arthralgia, and headache. Patients with more severe H5N1 may experience shortness of breath, altered mental state, and seizures, and serious complications of the virus include pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome, multiorgan failure, and sepsis, according to the CDC.

Clinicians who suspect H5N1 cases should contact their local public health departments. The CDC offers additional advice on evaluating and managing patients with novel influenza A viruses.

 

A Clinician’s Take

“Some symptoms of avian flu include fever, cough, sore throat, runny nose, fatigue, body aches or eye redness or irritation,” Shirin A. Mazumder, MD, associate professor and infectious disease specialist at The University of Tennessee Health Science Center, Memphis, said in an interview. “The timing to the development of symptoms after exposure is typically within 10 days. Avian influenza should be considered when individuals develop symptoms with a relevant exposure history,” she said. 

Whenever possible, avoidance of sick or dead birds and other animals is ideal, but for those who must have contact with sick or dead birds, poultry, or other animals, personal protective equipment (PPE) including a respirator, goggles, and disposable gloves is recommended, said Mazumder. 

“For those working in high-exposure settings, additional PPE including boots or boot covers, hair cover, and fluid-resistant coveralls are recommended,” she said. “Other protective measures include avoiding touching surfaces or materials contaminated with feces, mucus, and saliva from infected animals and avoid[ing] the consumption of raw milk, raw milk products, and undercooked meat from infected animals,” she added.

Hunters handling wild game should dress birds in the field, practice good hand hygiene, and use a respirator or well-fitting mask and gloves when handling the animals to help prevent disease, said Mazumder. 

In addition, those working with confirmed or suspected H5N1 cases should monitor themselves for symptoms, said Mazumder. “Those who become ill within 10 days of exposure to an infected animal or source should isolate from household members and avoid going to work or school until infection is excluded. It is important to reach out to a healthcare professional if you think you may have been exposed or if you think you are infected,” she said. 

There is no currently available vaccine for H5N1 infection, but oseltamivir can be used for chemoprophylaxis and treatment, said Mazumder. “The seasonal flu vaccine does not protect against avian influenza; however, it is still important to ensure that you are up to date on the latest flu vaccine to prevent the possibility of a coinfection with seasonal flu and avian flu,” she emphasized. 

More research is needed to better understand how the influenza virus is transmitted, said Mazumder. “The potential for the virus to evolve and mutate, and how it affects different hosts, are all factors that can impact public health decisions,” she said. “In addition, further research into finding a vaccine and improving surveillance methods are necessary for disease prevention,” she said. 

Mazumder had no financial conflicts to disclose. 
 

A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.

TOPLINE:

In a multinational phase 3 trial, imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam demonstrated noninferiority to piperacillin-tazobactam in treating critically ill patients with hospital-acquired bacterial pneumonia (HABP) or ventilator-associated bacterial pneumonia (VABP), with a comparable safety profile.

METHODOLOGY:

• This multinational phase 3 trial, conducted between September 2018 and July 2022, compared imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam with piperacillin-tazobactam for HABP and VABP to support its use across multiple countries.
• Overall, 270 patients with HABP or VABP (mean age, 57.6 years; 73.3% men) were randomly assigned to receive either intravenous imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam (500 mg/250 mg) or piperacillin-tazobactam (4000 mg/500 mg) every 6 hours over 30 minutes for 7-14 days.
• Both treatment groups included critically ill patients, with 54.5% and 55.1% of patients in the imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam and piperacillin-tazobactam groups, respectively, having an Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation II score ≥ 15.
• The primary outcome was the 28-day all-cause mortality; secondary outcomes included the rates of clinical and microbiological responses, as well as the incidence of adverse events.

TAKEAWAY:

• Imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam was noninferior to piperacillin-tazobactam in terms of 28-day all-cause mortality (adjusted difference, 5.2%; 95% CI, −1.5-12.4; P = .024 for noninferiority).
• At the end of treatment, the rates of a favorable clinical response were comparable between the imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam (71.6%) and piperacillin-tazobactam (68.4%) groups.
• After treatment, microbiological response rates were 48.8% in the imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam group, whereas the rates were 47.9% in the piperacillin-tazobactam group.
• The incidence of drug-related adverse events was similar across the treatment groups, with diarrhea, increased levels of alanine aminotransferase and aspartate aminotransferase, and abnormal hepatic function being the most common events.

IN PRACTICE:

“These results support the use of IMI/REL [imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam] in MDR [multidrug-resistant] infections globally, including to expand the range of available treatments for critically ill patients with HABP/VABP in China, and provide additional data to inform the World Health Organization’s MDR pathogen strategy,” the authors wrote.

SOURCE:

This study was led by Junjie Li, Department of Pulmonary and Critical Care Medicine, Ruijin Hospital, Shanghai Jiao Tong University School of Medicine, Shanghai, China. It was published online on December 12, 2024, in the International Journal of Infectious Diseases.

LIMITATIONS:

This study excluded patients with immunosuppression and those on intermittent hemodialysis, limiting the generalizability of the results to these populations.

DISCLOSURES:

This study was funded by Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC, a subsidiary of Merck & Co. Inc., Rahway, New Jersey. Some authors served as employees of Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC, New Jersey, and MSD, China.

 

This article was created using several editorial tools, including AI, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication. A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.

TOPLINE:

In a multinational phase 3 trial, imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam demonstrated noninferiority to piperacillin-tazobactam in treating critically ill patients with hospital-acquired bacterial pneumonia (HABP) or ventilator-associated bacterial pneumonia (VABP), with a comparable safety profile.

METHODOLOGY:

• This multinational phase 3 trial, conducted between September 2018 and July 2022, compared imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam with piperacillin-tazobactam for HABP and VABP to support its use across multiple countries.
• Overall, 270 patients with HABP or VABP (mean age, 57.6 years; 73.3% men) were randomly assigned to receive either intravenous imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam (500 mg/250 mg) or piperacillin-tazobactam (4000 mg/500 mg) every 6 hours over 30 minutes for 7-14 days.
• Both treatment groups included critically ill patients, with 54.5% and 55.1% of patients in the imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam and piperacillin-tazobactam groups, respectively, having an Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation II score ≥ 15.
• The primary outcome was the 28-day all-cause mortality; secondary outcomes included the rates of clinical and microbiological responses, as well as the incidence of adverse events.

TAKEAWAY:

• Imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam was noninferior to piperacillin-tazobactam in terms of 28-day all-cause mortality (adjusted difference, 5.2%; 95% CI, −1.5-12.4; P = .024 for noninferiority).
• At the end of treatment, the rates of a favorable clinical response were comparable between the imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam (71.6%) and piperacillin-tazobactam (68.4%) groups.
• After treatment, microbiological response rates were 48.8% in the imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam group, whereas the rates were 47.9% in the piperacillin-tazobactam group.
• The incidence of drug-related adverse events was similar across the treatment groups, with diarrhea, increased levels of alanine aminotransferase and aspartate aminotransferase, and abnormal hepatic function being the most common events.

IN PRACTICE:

“These results support the use of IMI/REL [imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam] in MDR [multidrug-resistant] infections globally, including to expand the range of available treatments for critically ill patients with HABP/VABP in China, and provide additional data to inform the World Health Organization’s MDR pathogen strategy,” the authors wrote.

SOURCE:

This study was led by Junjie Li, Department of Pulmonary and Critical Care Medicine, Ruijin Hospital, Shanghai Jiao Tong University School of Medicine, Shanghai, China. It was published online on December 12, 2024, in the International Journal of Infectious Diseases.

LIMITATIONS:

This study excluded patients with immunosuppression and those on intermittent hemodialysis, limiting the generalizability of the results to these populations.

DISCLOSURES:

This study was funded by Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC, a subsidiary of Merck & Co. Inc., Rahway, New Jersey. Some authors served as employees of Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC, New Jersey, and MSD, China.

 

This article was created using several editorial tools, including AI, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication. A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.

TOPLINE:

In a multinational phase 3 trial, imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam demonstrated noninferiority to piperacillin-tazobactam in treating critically ill patients with hospital-acquired bacterial pneumonia (HABP) or ventilator-associated bacterial pneumonia (VABP), with a comparable safety profile.

METHODOLOGY:

• This multinational phase 3 trial, conducted between September 2018 and July 2022, compared imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam with piperacillin-tazobactam for HABP and VABP to support its use across multiple countries.
• Overall, 270 patients with HABP or VABP (mean age, 57.6 years; 73.3% men) were randomly assigned to receive either intravenous imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam (500 mg/250 mg) or piperacillin-tazobactam (4000 mg/500 mg) every 6 hours over 30 minutes for 7-14 days.
• Both treatment groups included critically ill patients, with 54.5% and 55.1% of patients in the imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam and piperacillin-tazobactam groups, respectively, having an Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation II score ≥ 15.
• The primary outcome was the 28-day all-cause mortality; secondary outcomes included the rates of clinical and microbiological responses, as well as the incidence of adverse events.

TAKEAWAY:

• Imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam was noninferior to piperacillin-tazobactam in terms of 28-day all-cause mortality (adjusted difference, 5.2%; 95% CI, −1.5-12.4; P = .024 for noninferiority).
• At the end of treatment, the rates of a favorable clinical response were comparable between the imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam (71.6%) and piperacillin-tazobactam (68.4%) groups.
• After treatment, microbiological response rates were 48.8% in the imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam group, whereas the rates were 47.9% in the piperacillin-tazobactam group.
• The incidence of drug-related adverse events was similar across the treatment groups, with diarrhea, increased levels of alanine aminotransferase and aspartate aminotransferase, and abnormal hepatic function being the most common events.

IN PRACTICE:

“These results support the use of IMI/REL [imipenem-cilastatin-relebactam] in MDR [multidrug-resistant] infections globally, including to expand the range of available treatments for critically ill patients with HABP/VABP in China, and provide additional data to inform the World Health Organization’s MDR pathogen strategy,” the authors wrote.

SOURCE:

This study was led by Junjie Li, Department of Pulmonary and Critical Care Medicine, Ruijin Hospital, Shanghai Jiao Tong University School of Medicine, Shanghai, China. It was published online on December 12, 2024, in the International Journal of Infectious Diseases.

LIMITATIONS:

This study excluded patients with immunosuppression and those on intermittent hemodialysis, limiting the generalizability of the results to these populations.

DISCLOSURES:

This study was funded by Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC, a subsidiary of Merck & Co. Inc., Rahway, New Jersey. Some authors served as employees of Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC, New Jersey, and MSD, China.

 

This article was created using several editorial tools, including AI, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication. A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.

Keith Poulsen’s jaw dropped when farmers showed him images on their cellphones at the World Dairy Expo in Wisconsin in October. A livestock veterinarian at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Poulsen had seen sick cows before, with their noses dripping and udders slack.

But the scale of the farmers’ efforts to treat the sick cows stunned him. They showed videos of systems they built to hydrate hundreds of cattle at once. In 14-hour shifts, dairy workers pumped gallons of electrolyte-rich fluids into ailing cows through metal tubes inserted into the esophagus.

“It was like watching a field hospital on an active battlefront treating hundreds of wounded soldiers,” he said.

Nearly a year into the first outbreak of the bird flu among cattle, the virus shows no sign of slowing. The US government failed to eliminate the virus on dairy farms when it was confined to a handful of states, by quickly identifying infected cows and taking measures to keep their infections from spreading. Now at least 875 herds across 16 states have tested positive.

Experts say they have lost faith in the government’s ability to contain the outbreak.

“We are in a terrible situation and going into a worse situation,” said Angela Rasmussen, a virologist at the University of Saskatchewan in Canada. “I don’t know if the bird flu will become a pandemic, but if it does, we are screwed.”

To understand how the bird flu got out of hand, KFF Health News interviewed nearly 70 government officials, farmers and farmworkers, and researchers with expertise in virology, pandemics, veterinary medicine, and more.

Together with emails obtained from local health departments through public records requests, this investigation revealed key problems, including deference to the farm industry, eroded public health budgets, neglect for the safety of agriculture workers, and the sluggish pace of federal interventions.

Case in point: The US Department of Agriculture this month announced a federal order to test milk nationwide. Researchers welcomed the news but said it should have happened months ago — before the virus was so entrenched.

“It’s disheartening to see so many of the same failures that emerged during the COVID-19 crisis reemerge,” said Tom Bollyky, director of the Global Health Program at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Far more bird flu damage is inevitable, but the extent of it will be left to the Trump administration and Mother Nature. Already, the USDA has funneled more than $1.7 billion into tamping down the bird flu on poultry farms since 2022, which includes reimbursing farmers who’ve had to cull their flocks, and more than $430 million into combating the bird flu on dairy farms. In coming years, the bird flu may cost billions of dollars more in expenses and losses. Dairy industry experts say the virus kills roughly 2%-5% of infected dairy cows and reduces a herd’s milk production by about 20%.

Worse, the outbreak poses the threat of a pandemic. More than 60 people in the US have been infected, mainly by cows or poultry, but cases could skyrocket if the virus evolves to spread efficiently from person to person. And the recent news of a person critically ill in Louisiana with the bird flu shows that the virus can be dangerous.

Just a few mutations could allow the bird flu to spread between people. Because viruses mutate within human and animal bodies, each infection is like a pull of a slot machine lever.

“Even if there’s only a 5% chance of a bird flu pandemic happening, we’re talking about a pandemic that probably looks like 2020 or worse,” said Tom Peacock, a bird flu researcher at the Pirbright Institute in the United Kingdom, referring to COVID. “The US knows the risk but hasn’t done anything to slow this down,” he added.

Beyond the bird flu, the federal government’s handling of the outbreak reveals cracks in the US health security system that would allow other risky new pathogens to take root. “This virus may not be the one that takes off,” said Maria Van Kerkhove, director of the emerging diseases group at the World Health Organization. “But this is a real-fire exercise right now, and it demonstrates what needs to be improved.”

 

A Slow Start

It may have been a grackle, a goose, or some other wild bird that infected a cow in northern Texas. In February, the state’s dairy farmers took note when cows stopped making milk. They worked alongside veterinarians to figure out why. In less than two months, veterinary researchers identified the highly pathogenic H5N1 bird flu virus as the culprit.

Long listed among pathogens with pandemic potential, the bird flu’s unprecedented spread among cows marked a worrying shift. It had evolved to thrive in animals that are more like people biologically than birds.

After the USDA announced the dairy outbreak on March 25, control shifted from farmers, veterinarians, and local officials to state and federal agencies. Collaboration disintegrated almost immediately.

Farmers worried the government might block their milk sales or even demand sick cows be killed, as poultry are, said Kay Russo, a livestock veterinarian in Fort Collins, Colorado.

Instead, Russo and other veterinarians said, they were dismayed by inaction. The USDA didn’t respond to their urgent requests to support studies on dairy farms — and for money and confidentiality policies to protect farmers from financial loss if they agreed to test animals.

The USDA announced that it would conduct studies itself. But researchers grew anxious as weeks passed without results. “Probably the biggest mistake from the USDA was not involving the boots-on-the-ground veterinarians,” Russo said.

Will Clement, a USDA senior adviser for communications, said in an email: “Since first learning of H5N1 in dairy cattle in late March 2024, USDA has worked swiftly and diligently to assess the prevalence of the virus in US dairy herds.” The agency provided research funds to state and national animal health labs beginning in April, he added.

The USDA didn’t require lactating cows to be tested before interstate travel until April 29. By then, the outbreak had spread to eight other states. Farmers often move cattle across great distances, for calving in one place, raising in warm, dry climates, and milking in cooler ones. Analyses of the virus’s genes implied that it spread between cows rather than repeatedly jumping from birds into herds.

Milking equipment was a likely source of infection, and there were hints of other possibilities, such as through the air as cows coughed or in droplets on objects, like work boots. But not enough data had been collected to know how exactly it was happening. Many farmers declined to test their herds, despite an announcement of funds to compensate them for lost milk production in May.

“There is a fear within the dairy farmer community that if they become officially listed as an affected farm, they may lose their milk market,” said Jamie Jonker, chief science officer at the National Milk Producers Federation, an organization that represents dairy farmers. To his knowledge, he added, this hasn’t happened.

Speculation filled knowledge gaps. Zach Riley, head of the Colorado Livestock Association, said he suspected that wild birds may be spreading the virus to herds across the country, despite scientific data suggesting otherwise. Riley said farmers were considering whether to install “floppy inflatable men you see outside of car dealerships” to ward off the birds.

Advisories from agriculture departments to farmers were somewhat speculative, too. Officials recommended biosecurity measures such as disinfecting equipment and limiting visitors. As the virus kept spreading throughout the summer, USDA senior official Eric Deeble said at a press briefing, “The response is adequate.”

The USDA, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Food and Drug Administration presented a united front at these briefings, calling it a “One Health” approach. In reality, agriculture agencies took the lead.

This was explicit in an email from a local health department in Colorado to the county’s commissioners. “The State is treating this primarily as an agriculture issue (rightly so) and the public health part is secondary,” wrote Jason Chessher, public health director in Weld County, Colorado. The state’s leading agriculture county, Weld’s livestock and poultry industry produces about $1.9 billion in sales each year.

 

Patchy Surveillance

In July, the bird flu spread from dairies in Colorado to poultry farms. To contain it, two poultry operations employed about 650 temporary workers — Spanish-speaking immigrants as young as 15 — to cull flocks. Inside hot barns, they caught infected birds, gassed them with carbon dioxide, and disposed of the carcasses. Many did the hazardous job without goggles, face masks, and gloves.

By the time Colorado’s health department asked if workers felt sick, five women and four men had been infected. They all had red, swollen eyes — conjunctivitis — and several had such symptoms as fevers, body aches, and nausea.

State health departments posted online notices offering farms protective gear, but dairy workers in several states told KFF Health News that they had none. They also hadn’t heard about the bird flu, never mind tests for it.

Studies in Colorado, Michigan, and Texas would later show that bird flu cases had gone under the radar. In one analysis, eight dairy workers who hadn’t been tested — 7% of those studied — had antibodies against the virus, a sign that they had been infected.

Missed cases made it impossible to determine how the virus jumped into people and whether it was growing more infectious or dangerous. “I have been distressed and depressed by the lack of epidemiologic data and the lack of surveillance,” said Nicole Lurie, an executive director at the international organization the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, who served as assistant secretary for preparedness and response in the Obama administration.

Citing “insufficient data,” the British government raised its assessment of the risk posed by the US dairy outbreak in July from three to four on a six-tier scale.

Virologists around the world said they were flabbergasted by how poorly the United States was tracking the situation. “You are surrounded by highly pathogenic viruses in the wild and in farm animals,” said Marion Koopmans, head of virology at Erasmus Medical Center in the Netherlands. “If 3 months from now we are at the start of the pandemic, it is nobody’s surprise.”

Although the bird flu is not yet spreading swiftly between people, a shift in that direction could cause immense suffering. The CDC has repeatedly described the cases among farmworkers this year as mild — they weren’t hospitalized. But that doesn’t mean symptoms are a breeze, or that the virus can’t cause worse.

“It does not look pleasant,” wrote Sean Roberts, an emergency services specialist at the Tulare County, California, health department in an email to colleagues in May. He described photographs of an infected dairy worker in another state: “Apparently, the conjunctivitis that this is causing is not a mild one, but rather ruptured blood vessels and bleeding conjunctiva.”

Over the past 30 years, half of around 900 people diagnosed with bird flu around the world have died. Even if the case fatality rate is much lower for this strain of the bird flu, COVID showed how devastating a 1% death rate can be when a virus spreads easily.

Like other cases around the world, the person now hospitalized with the bird flu in Louisiana appears to have gotten the virus directly from birds. After the case was announced, the CDC released a statement saying, “A sporadic case of severe H5N1 bird flu illness in a person is not unexpected.”

 

‘The Cows Are More Valuable Than Us’

Local health officials were trying hard to track infections, according to hundreds of emails from county health departments in five states. But their efforts were stymied. Even if farmers reported infected herds to the USDA and agriculture agencies told health departments where the infected cows were, health officials had to rely on farm owners for access.

“The agriculture community has dictated the rules of engagement from the start,” said Michael Osterholm, director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota. “That was a big mistake.”

Some farmers told health officials not to visit and declined to monitor their employees for signs of sickness. Sending workers to clinics for testing could leave them shorthanded when cattle needed care. “Producer refuses to send workers to Sunrise [clinic] to get tested since they’re too busy. He has pink eye, too,” said an email from the Weld, Colorado, health department.

“We know of 386 persons exposed — but we know this is far from the total,” said an email from a public health specialist to officials at Tulare’s health department recounting a call with state health officials. “Employers do not want to run this through worker’s compensation. Workers are hesitant to get tested due to cost,” she wrote.

Jennifer Morse, medical director of the Mid-Michigan District Health Department, said local health officials have been hesitant to apply pressure after the backlash many faced at the peak of COVID. Describing the 19 rural counties she serves as “very minimal government–minded,” she said, “if you try to work against them, it will not go well.”

Rural health departments are also stretched thin. Organizations that specialize in outreach to farmworkers offered to assist health officials early in the outbreak, but months passed without contracts or funding. During the first years of COVID, lagging government funds for outreach to farmworkers and other historically marginalized groups led to a disproportionate toll of the disease among people of color.

Kevin Griffis, director of communications at the CDC, said the agency worked with the National Center for Farmworker Health throughout the summer “to reach every farmworker impacted by H5N1.” But Bethany Boggess Alcauter, the center’s director of public health programs, said it didn’t receive a CDC grant for bird flu outreach until October, to the tune of $4 million. Before then, she said, the group had very limited funds for the task. “We are certainly not reaching ‘every farmworker,’” she added.

Farmworker advocates also pressed the CDC for money to offset workers’ financial concerns about testing, including paying for medical care, sick leave, and the risk of being fired. This amounted to an offer of $75 each. “Outreach is clearly not a huge priority,” Boggess said. “I hear over and over from workers, ‘The cows are more valuable than us.’ ”

The USDA has so far put more than $2.1 billion into reimbursing poultry and dairy farmers for losses due to the bird flu and other measures to control the spread on farms. Federal agencies have also put $292 million into developing and stockpiling bird flu vaccines for animals and people. In a controversial decision, the CDC has advised against offering the ones on hand to farmworkers.

“If you want to keep this from becoming a human pandemic, you focus on protecting farmworkers, since that’s the most likely way that this will enter the human population,” said Peg Seminario, an occupational health researcher in Bethesda, Maryland. “The fact that this isn’t happening drives me crazy.”

Nirav Shah, principal deputy director of the CDC, said the agency aims to keep workers safe. “Widespread awareness does take time,” he said. “And that’s the work we’re committed to doing.”

As President-elect Donald Trump comes into office in January, farmworkers may be even less protected. Trump’s pledge of mass deportations will have repercussions whether they happen or not, said Tania Pacheco-Werner, director of the Central Valley Health Policy Institute in California.

Many dairy and poultry workers are living in the United States without authorization or on temporary visas linked to their employers. Such precarity made people less willing to see doctors about COVID symptoms or complain about unsafe working conditions in 2020. Pacheco-Werner said, “Mass deportation is an astronomical challenge for public health.”

 

Not ‘Immaculate Conception’

A switch flipped in September among experts who study pandemics as national security threats. A patient in Missouri had the bird flu, and no one knew why. “Evidence points to this being a one-off case,” Shah said at a briefing with journalists. About a month later, the agency revealed it was not.

Antibody tests found that a person who lived with the patient had been infected, too. The CDC didn’t know how the two had gotten the virus, and the possibility of human transmission couldn’t be ruled out.

Nonetheless, at an October briefing, Shah said the public risk remained low and Deeble said he was optimistic that the dairy outbreak could be eliminated.

Experts were perturbed by such confident statements in the face of uncertainty, especially as California’s outbreak spiked and a child was mysteriously infected by the same strain of virus found on dairy farms.

“This wasn’t just immaculate conception,” said Stephen Morrison, director of the Global Health Policy Center at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “It came from somewhere and we don’t know where, but that hasn’t triggered any kind of reset in approach — just the same kind of complacency and low energy.”

Sam Scarpino, a disease surveillance specialist in the Boston area, wondered how many other mysterious infections had gone undetected. Surveillance outside of farms was even patchier than on them, and bird flu tests have been hard to get.

Although pandemic experts had identified the CDC’s singular hold on testing for new viruses as a key explanation for why America was hit so hard by COVID in 2020, the system remained the same. Bird flu tests could be run only by the CDC and public health labs until this month, even though commercial and academic diagnostic laboratories had inquired about running tests since April. The CDC and FDA should have tried to help them along months ago, said Ali Khan, a former top CDC official who now leads the University of Nebraska Medical Center College of Public Health.

As winter sets in, the bird flu becomes harder to spot because patient symptoms may be mistaken for the seasonal flu. Flu season also raises a risk that the two flu viruses could swap genes if they infect a person simultaneously. That could form a hybrid bird flu that spreads swiftly through coughs and sneezes.

A sluggish response to emerging outbreaks may simply be a new, unfortunate norm for America, said Bollyky, at the Council on Foreign Relations. If so, the nation has gotten lucky that the bird flu still can’t spread easily between people. Controlling the virus will be much harder and costlier than it would have been when the outbreak was small. But it’s possible.

Agriculture officials could start testing every silo of bulk milk, in every state, monthly, said Poulsen, the livestock veterinarian. “Not one and done,” he added. If they detect the virus, they’d need to determine the affected farm in time to stop sick cows from spreading infections to the rest of the herd — or at least to other farms. Cows can spread the bird flu before they’re sick, he said, so speed is crucial.

Curtailing the virus on farms is the best way to prevent human infections, said Jennifer Nuzzo, director of the Pandemic Center at Brown University, but human surveillance must be stepped up, too. Every clinic serving communities where farmworkers live should have easy access to bird flu tests — and be encouraged to use them. Funds for farmworker outreach must be boosted. And, she added, the CDC should change its position and offer farmworkers bird flu vaccines to protect them and ward off the chance of a hybrid bird flu that spreads quickly.

The rising number of cases not linked to farms signals a need for more testing in general. When patients are positive on a general flu test — a common diagnostic that indicates human, swine, or bird flu — clinics should probe more deeply, Nuzzo said.

The alternative is a wait-and-see approach in which the nation responds only after enormous damage to lives or businesses. This tack tends to rely on mass vaccination. But an effort analogous to Trump’s Operation Warp Speed is not assured, and neither is rollout like that for the first COVID shots, given a rise in vaccine skepticism among Republican lawmakers.

Change may instead need to start from the bottom up — on dairy farms, still the most common source of human infections, said Poulsen. He noticed a shift in attitudes among farmers at the Dairy Expo: “They’re starting to say, ‘How do I save my dairy for the next generation?’ They recognize how severe this is, and that it’s not just going away.”

KFF Health News is a national newsroom that produces in-depth journalism about health issues and is one of the core operating programs at KFF — the independent source for health policy research, polling, and journalism.

 

Keith Poulsen’s jaw dropped when farmers showed him images on their cellphones at the World Dairy Expo in Wisconsin in October. A livestock veterinarian at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Poulsen had seen sick cows before, with their noses dripping and udders slack.

But the scale of the farmers’ efforts to treat the sick cows stunned him. They showed videos of systems they built to hydrate hundreds of cattle at once. In 14-hour shifts, dairy workers pumped gallons of electrolyte-rich fluids into ailing cows through metal tubes inserted into the esophagus.

“It was like watching a field hospital on an active battlefront treating hundreds of wounded soldiers,” he said.

Nearly a year into the first outbreak of the bird flu among cattle, the virus shows no sign of slowing. The US government failed to eliminate the virus on dairy farms when it was confined to a handful of states, by quickly identifying infected cows and taking measures to keep their infections from spreading. Now at least 875 herds across 16 states have tested positive.

Experts say they have lost faith in the government’s ability to contain the outbreak.

“We are in a terrible situation and going into a worse situation,” said Angela Rasmussen, a virologist at the University of Saskatchewan in Canada. “I don’t know if the bird flu will become a pandemic, but if it does, we are screwed.”

To understand how the bird flu got out of hand, KFF Health News interviewed nearly 70 government officials, farmers and farmworkers, and researchers with expertise in virology, pandemics, veterinary medicine, and more.

Together with emails obtained from local health departments through public records requests, this investigation revealed key problems, including deference to the farm industry, eroded public health budgets, neglect for the safety of agriculture workers, and the sluggish pace of federal interventions.

Case in point: The US Department of Agriculture this month announced a federal order to test milk nationwide. Researchers welcomed the news but said it should have happened months ago — before the virus was so entrenched.

“It’s disheartening to see so many of the same failures that emerged during the COVID-19 crisis reemerge,” said Tom Bollyky, director of the Global Health Program at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Far more bird flu damage is inevitable, but the extent of it will be left to the Trump administration and Mother Nature. Already, the USDA has funneled more than $1.7 billion into tamping down the bird flu on poultry farms since 2022, which includes reimbursing farmers who’ve had to cull their flocks, and more than $430 million into combating the bird flu on dairy farms. In coming years, the bird flu may cost billions of dollars more in expenses and losses. Dairy industry experts say the virus kills roughly 2%-5% of infected dairy cows and reduces a herd’s milk production by about 20%.

Worse, the outbreak poses the threat of a pandemic. More than 60 people in the US have been infected, mainly by cows or poultry, but cases could skyrocket if the virus evolves to spread efficiently from person to person. And the recent news of a person critically ill in Louisiana with the bird flu shows that the virus can be dangerous.

Just a few mutations could allow the bird flu to spread between people. Because viruses mutate within human and animal bodies, each infection is like a pull of a slot machine lever.

“Even if there’s only a 5% chance of a bird flu pandemic happening, we’re talking about a pandemic that probably looks like 2020 or worse,” said Tom Peacock, a bird flu researcher at the Pirbright Institute in the United Kingdom, referring to COVID. “The US knows the risk but hasn’t done anything to slow this down,” he added.

Beyond the bird flu, the federal government’s handling of the outbreak reveals cracks in the US health security system that would allow other risky new pathogens to take root. “This virus may not be the one that takes off,” said Maria Van Kerkhove, director of the emerging diseases group at the World Health Organization. “But this is a real-fire exercise right now, and it demonstrates what needs to be improved.”

 

A Slow Start

It may have been a grackle, a goose, or some other wild bird that infected a cow in northern Texas. In February, the state’s dairy farmers took note when cows stopped making milk. They worked alongside veterinarians to figure out why. In less than two months, veterinary researchers identified the highly pathogenic H5N1 bird flu virus as the culprit.

Long listed among pathogens with pandemic potential, the bird flu’s unprecedented spread among cows marked a worrying shift. It had evolved to thrive in animals that are more like people biologically than birds.

After the USDA announced the dairy outbreak on March 25, control shifted from farmers, veterinarians, and local officials to state and federal agencies. Collaboration disintegrated almost immediately.

Farmers worried the government might block their milk sales or even demand sick cows be killed, as poultry are, said Kay Russo, a livestock veterinarian in Fort Collins, Colorado.

Instead, Russo and other veterinarians said, they were dismayed by inaction. The USDA didn’t respond to their urgent requests to support studies on dairy farms — and for money and confidentiality policies to protect farmers from financial loss if they agreed to test animals.

The USDA announced that it would conduct studies itself. But researchers grew anxious as weeks passed without results. “Probably the biggest mistake from the USDA was not involving the boots-on-the-ground veterinarians,” Russo said.

Will Clement, a USDA senior adviser for communications, said in an email: “Since first learning of H5N1 in dairy cattle in late March 2024, USDA has worked swiftly and diligently to assess the prevalence of the virus in US dairy herds.” The agency provided research funds to state and national animal health labs beginning in April, he added.

The USDA didn’t require lactating cows to be tested before interstate travel until April 29. By then, the outbreak had spread to eight other states. Farmers often move cattle across great distances, for calving in one place, raising in warm, dry climates, and milking in cooler ones. Analyses of the virus’s genes implied that it spread between cows rather than repeatedly jumping from birds into herds.

Milking equipment was a likely source of infection, and there were hints of other possibilities, such as through the air as cows coughed or in droplets on objects, like work boots. But not enough data had been collected to know how exactly it was happening. Many farmers declined to test their herds, despite an announcement of funds to compensate them for lost milk production in May.

“There is a fear within the dairy farmer community that if they become officially listed as an affected farm, they may lose their milk market,” said Jamie Jonker, chief science officer at the National Milk Producers Federation, an organization that represents dairy farmers. To his knowledge, he added, this hasn’t happened.

Speculation filled knowledge gaps. Zach Riley, head of the Colorado Livestock Association, said he suspected that wild birds may be spreading the virus to herds across the country, despite scientific data suggesting otherwise. Riley said farmers were considering whether to install “floppy inflatable men you see outside of car dealerships” to ward off the birds.

Advisories from agriculture departments to farmers were somewhat speculative, too. Officials recommended biosecurity measures such as disinfecting equipment and limiting visitors. As the virus kept spreading throughout the summer, USDA senior official Eric Deeble said at a press briefing, “The response is adequate.”

The USDA, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Food and Drug Administration presented a united front at these briefings, calling it a “One Health” approach. In reality, agriculture agencies took the lead.

This was explicit in an email from a local health department in Colorado to the county’s commissioners. “The State is treating this primarily as an agriculture issue (rightly so) and the public health part is secondary,” wrote Jason Chessher, public health director in Weld County, Colorado. The state’s leading agriculture county, Weld’s livestock and poultry industry produces about $1.9 billion in sales each year.

 

Patchy Surveillance

In July, the bird flu spread from dairies in Colorado to poultry farms. To contain it, two poultry operations employed about 650 temporary workers — Spanish-speaking immigrants as young as 15 — to cull flocks. Inside hot barns, they caught infected birds, gassed them with carbon dioxide, and disposed of the carcasses. Many did the hazardous job without goggles, face masks, and gloves.

By the time Colorado’s health department asked if workers felt sick, five women and four men had been infected. They all had red, swollen eyes — conjunctivitis — and several had such symptoms as fevers, body aches, and nausea.

State health departments posted online notices offering farms protective gear, but dairy workers in several states told KFF Health News that they had none. They also hadn’t heard about the bird flu, never mind tests for it.

Studies in Colorado, Michigan, and Texas would later show that bird flu cases had gone under the radar. In one analysis, eight dairy workers who hadn’t been tested — 7% of those studied — had antibodies against the virus, a sign that they had been infected.

Missed cases made it impossible to determine how the virus jumped into people and whether it was growing more infectious or dangerous. “I have been distressed and depressed by the lack of epidemiologic data and the lack of surveillance,” said Nicole Lurie, an executive director at the international organization the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, who served as assistant secretary for preparedness and response in the Obama administration.

Citing “insufficient data,” the British government raised its assessment of the risk posed by the US dairy outbreak in July from three to four on a six-tier scale.

Virologists around the world said they were flabbergasted by how poorly the United States was tracking the situation. “You are surrounded by highly pathogenic viruses in the wild and in farm animals,” said Marion Koopmans, head of virology at Erasmus Medical Center in the Netherlands. “If 3 months from now we are at the start of the pandemic, it is nobody’s surprise.”

Although the bird flu is not yet spreading swiftly between people, a shift in that direction could cause immense suffering. The CDC has repeatedly described the cases among farmworkers this year as mild — they weren’t hospitalized. But that doesn’t mean symptoms are a breeze, or that the virus can’t cause worse.

“It does not look pleasant,” wrote Sean Roberts, an emergency services specialist at the Tulare County, California, health department in an email to colleagues in May. He described photographs of an infected dairy worker in another state: “Apparently, the conjunctivitis that this is causing is not a mild one, but rather ruptured blood vessels and bleeding conjunctiva.”

Over the past 30 years, half of around 900 people diagnosed with bird flu around the world have died. Even if the case fatality rate is much lower for this strain of the bird flu, COVID showed how devastating a 1% death rate can be when a virus spreads easily.

Like other cases around the world, the person now hospitalized with the bird flu in Louisiana appears to have gotten the virus directly from birds. After the case was announced, the CDC released a statement saying, “A sporadic case of severe H5N1 bird flu illness in a person is not unexpected.”

 

‘The Cows Are More Valuable Than Us’

Local health officials were trying hard to track infections, according to hundreds of emails from county health departments in five states. But their efforts were stymied. Even if farmers reported infected herds to the USDA and agriculture agencies told health departments where the infected cows were, health officials had to rely on farm owners for access.

“The agriculture community has dictated the rules of engagement from the start,” said Michael Osterholm, director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota. “That was a big mistake.”

Some farmers told health officials not to visit and declined to monitor their employees for signs of sickness. Sending workers to clinics for testing could leave them shorthanded when cattle needed care. “Producer refuses to send workers to Sunrise [clinic] to get tested since they’re too busy. He has pink eye, too,” said an email from the Weld, Colorado, health department.

“We know of 386 persons exposed — but we know this is far from the total,” said an email from a public health specialist to officials at Tulare’s health department recounting a call with state health officials. “Employers do not want to run this through worker’s compensation. Workers are hesitant to get tested due to cost,” she wrote.

Jennifer Morse, medical director of the Mid-Michigan District Health Department, said local health officials have been hesitant to apply pressure after the backlash many faced at the peak of COVID. Describing the 19 rural counties she serves as “very minimal government–minded,” she said, “if you try to work against them, it will not go well.”

Rural health departments are also stretched thin. Organizations that specialize in outreach to farmworkers offered to assist health officials early in the outbreak, but months passed without contracts or funding. During the first years of COVID, lagging government funds for outreach to farmworkers and other historically marginalized groups led to a disproportionate toll of the disease among people of color.

Kevin Griffis, director of communications at the CDC, said the agency worked with the National Center for Farmworker Health throughout the summer “to reach every farmworker impacted by H5N1.” But Bethany Boggess Alcauter, the center’s director of public health programs, said it didn’t receive a CDC grant for bird flu outreach until October, to the tune of $4 million. Before then, she said, the group had very limited funds for the task. “We are certainly not reaching ‘every farmworker,’” she added.

Farmworker advocates also pressed the CDC for money to offset workers’ financial concerns about testing, including paying for medical care, sick leave, and the risk of being fired. This amounted to an offer of $75 each. “Outreach is clearly not a huge priority,” Boggess said. “I hear over and over from workers, ‘The cows are more valuable than us.’ ”

The USDA has so far put more than $2.1 billion into reimbursing poultry and dairy farmers for losses due to the bird flu and other measures to control the spread on farms. Federal agencies have also put $292 million into developing and stockpiling bird flu vaccines for animals and people. In a controversial decision, the CDC has advised against offering the ones on hand to farmworkers.

“If you want to keep this from becoming a human pandemic, you focus on protecting farmworkers, since that’s the most likely way that this will enter the human population,” said Peg Seminario, an occupational health researcher in Bethesda, Maryland. “The fact that this isn’t happening drives me crazy.”

Nirav Shah, principal deputy director of the CDC, said the agency aims to keep workers safe. “Widespread awareness does take time,” he said. “And that’s the work we’re committed to doing.”

As President-elect Donald Trump comes into office in January, farmworkers may be even less protected. Trump’s pledge of mass deportations will have repercussions whether they happen or not, said Tania Pacheco-Werner, director of the Central Valley Health Policy Institute in California.

Many dairy and poultry workers are living in the United States without authorization or on temporary visas linked to their employers. Such precarity made people less willing to see doctors about COVID symptoms or complain about unsafe working conditions in 2020. Pacheco-Werner said, “Mass deportation is an astronomical challenge for public health.”

 

Not ‘Immaculate Conception’

A switch flipped in September among experts who study pandemics as national security threats. A patient in Missouri had the bird flu, and no one knew why. “Evidence points to this being a one-off case,” Shah said at a briefing with journalists. About a month later, the agency revealed it was not.

Antibody tests found that a person who lived with the patient had been infected, too. The CDC didn’t know how the two had gotten the virus, and the possibility of human transmission couldn’t be ruled out.

Nonetheless, at an October briefing, Shah said the public risk remained low and Deeble said he was optimistic that the dairy outbreak could be eliminated.

Experts were perturbed by such confident statements in the face of uncertainty, especially as California’s outbreak spiked and a child was mysteriously infected by the same strain of virus found on dairy farms.

“This wasn’t just immaculate conception,” said Stephen Morrison, director of the Global Health Policy Center at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “It came from somewhere and we don’t know where, but that hasn’t triggered any kind of reset in approach — just the same kind of complacency and low energy.”

Sam Scarpino, a disease surveillance specialist in the Boston area, wondered how many other mysterious infections had gone undetected. Surveillance outside of farms was even patchier than on them, and bird flu tests have been hard to get.

Although pandemic experts had identified the CDC’s singular hold on testing for new viruses as a key explanation for why America was hit so hard by COVID in 2020, the system remained the same. Bird flu tests could be run only by the CDC and public health labs until this month, even though commercial and academic diagnostic laboratories had inquired about running tests since April. The CDC and FDA should have tried to help them along months ago, said Ali Khan, a former top CDC official who now leads the University of Nebraska Medical Center College of Public Health.

As winter sets in, the bird flu becomes harder to spot because patient symptoms may be mistaken for the seasonal flu. Flu season also raises a risk that the two flu viruses could swap genes if they infect a person simultaneously. That could form a hybrid bird flu that spreads swiftly through coughs and sneezes.

A sluggish response to emerging outbreaks may simply be a new, unfortunate norm for America, said Bollyky, at the Council on Foreign Relations. If so, the nation has gotten lucky that the bird flu still can’t spread easily between people. Controlling the virus will be much harder and costlier than it would have been when the outbreak was small. But it’s possible.

Agriculture officials could start testing every silo of bulk milk, in every state, monthly, said Poulsen, the livestock veterinarian. “Not one and done,” he added. If they detect the virus, they’d need to determine the affected farm in time to stop sick cows from spreading infections to the rest of the herd — or at least to other farms. Cows can spread the bird flu before they’re sick, he said, so speed is crucial.

Curtailing the virus on farms is the best way to prevent human infections, said Jennifer Nuzzo, director of the Pandemic Center at Brown University, but human surveillance must be stepped up, too. Every clinic serving communities where farmworkers live should have easy access to bird flu tests — and be encouraged to use them. Funds for farmworker outreach must be boosted. And, she added, the CDC should change its position and offer farmworkers bird flu vaccines to protect them and ward off the chance of a hybrid bird flu that spreads quickly.

The rising number of cases not linked to farms signals a need for more testing in general. When patients are positive on a general flu test — a common diagnostic that indicates human, swine, or bird flu — clinics should probe more deeply, Nuzzo said.

The alternative is a wait-and-see approach in which the nation responds only after enormous damage to lives or businesses. This tack tends to rely on mass vaccination. But an effort analogous to Trump’s Operation Warp Speed is not assured, and neither is rollout like that for the first COVID shots, given a rise in vaccine skepticism among Republican lawmakers.

Change may instead need to start from the bottom up — on dairy farms, still the most common source of human infections, said Poulsen. He noticed a shift in attitudes among farmers at the Dairy Expo: “They’re starting to say, ‘How do I save my dairy for the next generation?’ They recognize how severe this is, and that it’s not just going away.”

KFF Health News is a national newsroom that produces in-depth journalism about health issues and is one of the core operating programs at KFF — the independent source for health policy research, polling, and journalism.

 

Keith Poulsen’s jaw dropped when farmers showed him images on their cellphones at the World Dairy Expo in Wisconsin in October. A livestock veterinarian at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Poulsen had seen sick cows before, with their noses dripping and udders slack.

But the scale of the farmers’ efforts to treat the sick cows stunned him. They showed videos of systems they built to hydrate hundreds of cattle at once. In 14-hour shifts, dairy workers pumped gallons of electrolyte-rich fluids into ailing cows through metal tubes inserted into the esophagus.

“It was like watching a field hospital on an active battlefront treating hundreds of wounded soldiers,” he said.

Nearly a year into the first outbreak of the bird flu among cattle, the virus shows no sign of slowing. The US government failed to eliminate the virus on dairy farms when it was confined to a handful of states, by quickly identifying infected cows and taking measures to keep their infections from spreading. Now at least 875 herds across 16 states have tested positive.

Experts say they have lost faith in the government’s ability to contain the outbreak.

“We are in a terrible situation and going into a worse situation,” said Angela Rasmussen, a virologist at the University of Saskatchewan in Canada. “I don’t know if the bird flu will become a pandemic, but if it does, we are screwed.”

To understand how the bird flu got out of hand, KFF Health News interviewed nearly 70 government officials, farmers and farmworkers, and researchers with expertise in virology, pandemics, veterinary medicine, and more.

Together with emails obtained from local health departments through public records requests, this investigation revealed key problems, including deference to the farm industry, eroded public health budgets, neglect for the safety of agriculture workers, and the sluggish pace of federal interventions.

Case in point: The US Department of Agriculture this month announced a federal order to test milk nationwide. Researchers welcomed the news but said it should have happened months ago — before the virus was so entrenched.

“It’s disheartening to see so many of the same failures that emerged during the COVID-19 crisis reemerge,” said Tom Bollyky, director of the Global Health Program at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Far more bird flu damage is inevitable, but the extent of it will be left to the Trump administration and Mother Nature. Already, the USDA has funneled more than $1.7 billion into tamping down the bird flu on poultry farms since 2022, which includes reimbursing farmers who’ve had to cull their flocks, and more than $430 million into combating the bird flu on dairy farms. In coming years, the bird flu may cost billions of dollars more in expenses and losses. Dairy industry experts say the virus kills roughly 2%-5% of infected dairy cows and reduces a herd’s milk production by about 20%.

Worse, the outbreak poses the threat of a pandemic. More than 60 people in the US have been infected, mainly by cows or poultry, but cases could skyrocket if the virus evolves to spread efficiently from person to person. And the recent news of a person critically ill in Louisiana with the bird flu shows that the virus can be dangerous.

Just a few mutations could allow the bird flu to spread between people. Because viruses mutate within human and animal bodies, each infection is like a pull of a slot machine lever.

“Even if there’s only a 5% chance of a bird flu pandemic happening, we’re talking about a pandemic that probably looks like 2020 or worse,” said Tom Peacock, a bird flu researcher at the Pirbright Institute in the United Kingdom, referring to COVID. “The US knows the risk but hasn’t done anything to slow this down,” he added.

Beyond the bird flu, the federal government’s handling of the outbreak reveals cracks in the US health security system that would allow other risky new pathogens to take root. “This virus may not be the one that takes off,” said Maria Van Kerkhove, director of the emerging diseases group at the World Health Organization. “But this is a real-fire exercise right now, and it demonstrates what needs to be improved.”

 

A Slow Start

It may have been a grackle, a goose, or some other wild bird that infected a cow in northern Texas. In February, the state’s dairy farmers took note when cows stopped making milk. They worked alongside veterinarians to figure out why. In less than two months, veterinary researchers identified the highly pathogenic H5N1 bird flu virus as the culprit.

Long listed among pathogens with pandemic potential, the bird flu’s unprecedented spread among cows marked a worrying shift. It had evolved to thrive in animals that are more like people biologically than birds.

After the USDA announced the dairy outbreak on March 25, control shifted from farmers, veterinarians, and local officials to state and federal agencies. Collaboration disintegrated almost immediately.

Farmers worried the government might block their milk sales or even demand sick cows be killed, as poultry are, said Kay Russo, a livestock veterinarian in Fort Collins, Colorado.

Instead, Russo and other veterinarians said, they were dismayed by inaction. The USDA didn’t respond to their urgent requests to support studies on dairy farms — and for money and confidentiality policies to protect farmers from financial loss if they agreed to test animals.

The USDA announced that it would conduct studies itself. But researchers grew anxious as weeks passed without results. “Probably the biggest mistake from the USDA was not involving the boots-on-the-ground veterinarians,” Russo said.

Will Clement, a USDA senior adviser for communications, said in an email: “Since first learning of H5N1 in dairy cattle in late March 2024, USDA has worked swiftly and diligently to assess the prevalence of the virus in US dairy herds.” The agency provided research funds to state and national animal health labs beginning in April, he added.

The USDA didn’t require lactating cows to be tested before interstate travel until April 29. By then, the outbreak had spread to eight other states. Farmers often move cattle across great distances, for calving in one place, raising in warm, dry climates, and milking in cooler ones. Analyses of the virus’s genes implied that it spread between cows rather than repeatedly jumping from birds into herds.

Milking equipment was a likely source of infection, and there were hints of other possibilities, such as through the air as cows coughed or in droplets on objects, like work boots. But not enough data had been collected to know how exactly it was happening. Many farmers declined to test their herds, despite an announcement of funds to compensate them for lost milk production in May.

“There is a fear within the dairy farmer community that if they become officially listed as an affected farm, they may lose their milk market,” said Jamie Jonker, chief science officer at the National Milk Producers Federation, an organization that represents dairy farmers. To his knowledge, he added, this hasn’t happened.

Speculation filled knowledge gaps. Zach Riley, head of the Colorado Livestock Association, said he suspected that wild birds may be spreading the virus to herds across the country, despite scientific data suggesting otherwise. Riley said farmers were considering whether to install “floppy inflatable men you see outside of car dealerships” to ward off the birds.

Advisories from agriculture departments to farmers were somewhat speculative, too. Officials recommended biosecurity measures such as disinfecting equipment and limiting visitors. As the virus kept spreading throughout the summer, USDA senior official Eric Deeble said at a press briefing, “The response is adequate.”

The USDA, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Food and Drug Administration presented a united front at these briefings, calling it a “One Health” approach. In reality, agriculture agencies took the lead.

This was explicit in an email from a local health department in Colorado to the county’s commissioners. “The State is treating this primarily as an agriculture issue (rightly so) and the public health part is secondary,” wrote Jason Chessher, public health director in Weld County, Colorado. The state’s leading agriculture county, Weld’s livestock and poultry industry produces about $1.9 billion in sales each year.

 

Patchy Surveillance

In July, the bird flu spread from dairies in Colorado to poultry farms. To contain it, two poultry operations employed about 650 temporary workers — Spanish-speaking immigrants as young as 15 — to cull flocks. Inside hot barns, they caught infected birds, gassed them with carbon dioxide, and disposed of the carcasses. Many did the hazardous job without goggles, face masks, and gloves.

By the time Colorado’s health department asked if workers felt sick, five women and four men had been infected. They all had red, swollen eyes — conjunctivitis — and several had such symptoms as fevers, body aches, and nausea.

State health departments posted online notices offering farms protective gear, but dairy workers in several states told KFF Health News that they had none. They also hadn’t heard about the bird flu, never mind tests for it.

Studies in Colorado, Michigan, and Texas would later show that bird flu cases had gone under the radar. In one analysis, eight dairy workers who hadn’t been tested — 7% of those studied — had antibodies against the virus, a sign that they had been infected.

Missed cases made it impossible to determine how the virus jumped into people and whether it was growing more infectious or dangerous. “I have been distressed and depressed by the lack of epidemiologic data and the lack of surveillance,” said Nicole Lurie, an executive director at the international organization the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, who served as assistant secretary for preparedness and response in the Obama administration.

Citing “insufficient data,” the British government raised its assessment of the risk posed by the US dairy outbreak in July from three to four on a six-tier scale.

Virologists around the world said they were flabbergasted by how poorly the United States was tracking the situation. “You are surrounded by highly pathogenic viruses in the wild and in farm animals,” said Marion Koopmans, head of virology at Erasmus Medical Center in the Netherlands. “If 3 months from now we are at the start of the pandemic, it is nobody’s surprise.”

Although the bird flu is not yet spreading swiftly between people, a shift in that direction could cause immense suffering. The CDC has repeatedly described the cases among farmworkers this year as mild — they weren’t hospitalized. But that doesn’t mean symptoms are a breeze, or that the virus can’t cause worse.

“It does not look pleasant,” wrote Sean Roberts, an emergency services specialist at the Tulare County, California, health department in an email to colleagues in May. He described photographs of an infected dairy worker in another state: “Apparently, the conjunctivitis that this is causing is not a mild one, but rather ruptured blood vessels and bleeding conjunctiva.”

Over the past 30 years, half of around 900 people diagnosed with bird flu around the world have died. Even if the case fatality rate is much lower for this strain of the bird flu, COVID showed how devastating a 1% death rate can be when a virus spreads easily.

Like other cases around the world, the person now hospitalized with the bird flu in Louisiana appears to have gotten the virus directly from birds. After the case was announced, the CDC released a statement saying, “A sporadic case of severe H5N1 bird flu illness in a person is not unexpected.”

 

‘The Cows Are More Valuable Than Us’

Local health officials were trying hard to track infections, according to hundreds of emails from county health departments in five states. But their efforts were stymied. Even if farmers reported infected herds to the USDA and agriculture agencies told health departments where the infected cows were, health officials had to rely on farm owners for access.

“The agriculture community has dictated the rules of engagement from the start,” said Michael Osterholm, director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota. “That was a big mistake.”

Some farmers told health officials not to visit and declined to monitor their employees for signs of sickness. Sending workers to clinics for testing could leave them shorthanded when cattle needed care. “Producer refuses to send workers to Sunrise [clinic] to get tested since they’re too busy. He has pink eye, too,” said an email from the Weld, Colorado, health department.

“We know of 386 persons exposed — but we know this is far from the total,” said an email from a public health specialist to officials at Tulare’s health department recounting a call with state health officials. “Employers do not want to run this through worker’s compensation. Workers are hesitant to get tested due to cost,” she wrote.

Jennifer Morse, medical director of the Mid-Michigan District Health Department, said local health officials have been hesitant to apply pressure after the backlash many faced at the peak of COVID. Describing the 19 rural counties she serves as “very minimal government–minded,” she said, “if you try to work against them, it will not go well.”

Rural health departments are also stretched thin. Organizations that specialize in outreach to farmworkers offered to assist health officials early in the outbreak, but months passed without contracts or funding. During the first years of COVID, lagging government funds for outreach to farmworkers and other historically marginalized groups led to a disproportionate toll of the disease among people of color.

Kevin Griffis, director of communications at the CDC, said the agency worked with the National Center for Farmworker Health throughout the summer “to reach every farmworker impacted by H5N1.” But Bethany Boggess Alcauter, the center’s director of public health programs, said it didn’t receive a CDC grant for bird flu outreach until October, to the tune of $4 million. Before then, she said, the group had very limited funds for the task. “We are certainly not reaching ‘every farmworker,’” she added.

Farmworker advocates also pressed the CDC for money to offset workers’ financial concerns about testing, including paying for medical care, sick leave, and the risk of being fired. This amounted to an offer of $75 each. “Outreach is clearly not a huge priority,” Boggess said. “I hear over and over from workers, ‘The cows are more valuable than us.’ ”

The USDA has so far put more than $2.1 billion into reimbursing poultry and dairy farmers for losses due to the bird flu and other measures to control the spread on farms. Federal agencies have also put $292 million into developing and stockpiling bird flu vaccines for animals and people. In a controversial decision, the CDC has advised against offering the ones on hand to farmworkers.

“If you want to keep this from becoming a human pandemic, you focus on protecting farmworkers, since that’s the most likely way that this will enter the human population,” said Peg Seminario, an occupational health researcher in Bethesda, Maryland. “The fact that this isn’t happening drives me crazy.”

Nirav Shah, principal deputy director of the CDC, said the agency aims to keep workers safe. “Widespread awareness does take time,” he said. “And that’s the work we’re committed to doing.”

As President-elect Donald Trump comes into office in January, farmworkers may be even less protected. Trump’s pledge of mass deportations will have repercussions whether they happen or not, said Tania Pacheco-Werner, director of the Central Valley Health Policy Institute in California.

Many dairy and poultry workers are living in the United States without authorization or on temporary visas linked to their employers. Such precarity made people less willing to see doctors about COVID symptoms or complain about unsafe working conditions in 2020. Pacheco-Werner said, “Mass deportation is an astronomical challenge for public health.”

 

Not ‘Immaculate Conception’

A switch flipped in September among experts who study pandemics as national security threats. A patient in Missouri had the bird flu, and no one knew why. “Evidence points to this being a one-off case,” Shah said at a briefing with journalists. About a month later, the agency revealed it was not.

Antibody tests found that a person who lived with the patient had been infected, too. The CDC didn’t know how the two had gotten the virus, and the possibility of human transmission couldn’t be ruled out.

Nonetheless, at an October briefing, Shah said the public risk remained low and Deeble said he was optimistic that the dairy outbreak could be eliminated.

Experts were perturbed by such confident statements in the face of uncertainty, especially as California’s outbreak spiked and a child was mysteriously infected by the same strain of virus found on dairy farms.

“This wasn’t just immaculate conception,” said Stephen Morrison, director of the Global Health Policy Center at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “It came from somewhere and we don’t know where, but that hasn’t triggered any kind of reset in approach — just the same kind of complacency and low energy.”

Sam Scarpino, a disease surveillance specialist in the Boston area, wondered how many other mysterious infections had gone undetected. Surveillance outside of farms was even patchier than on them, and bird flu tests have been hard to get.

Although pandemic experts had identified the CDC’s singular hold on testing for new viruses as a key explanation for why America was hit so hard by COVID in 2020, the system remained the same. Bird flu tests could be run only by the CDC and public health labs until this month, even though commercial and academic diagnostic laboratories had inquired about running tests since April. The CDC and FDA should have tried to help them along months ago, said Ali Khan, a former top CDC official who now leads the University of Nebraska Medical Center College of Public Health.

As winter sets in, the bird flu becomes harder to spot because patient symptoms may be mistaken for the seasonal flu. Flu season also raises a risk that the two flu viruses could swap genes if they infect a person simultaneously. That could form a hybrid bird flu that spreads swiftly through coughs and sneezes.

A sluggish response to emerging outbreaks may simply be a new, unfortunate norm for America, said Bollyky, at the Council on Foreign Relations. If so, the nation has gotten lucky that the bird flu still can’t spread easily between people. Controlling the virus will be much harder and costlier than it would have been when the outbreak was small. But it’s possible.

Agriculture officials could start testing every silo of bulk milk, in every state, monthly, said Poulsen, the livestock veterinarian. “Not one and done,” he added. If they detect the virus, they’d need to determine the affected farm in time to stop sick cows from spreading infections to the rest of the herd — or at least to other farms. Cows can spread the bird flu before they’re sick, he said, so speed is crucial.

Curtailing the virus on farms is the best way to prevent human infections, said Jennifer Nuzzo, director of the Pandemic Center at Brown University, but human surveillance must be stepped up, too. Every clinic serving communities where farmworkers live should have easy access to bird flu tests — and be encouraged to use them. Funds for farmworker outreach must be boosted. And, she added, the CDC should change its position and offer farmworkers bird flu vaccines to protect them and ward off the chance of a hybrid bird flu that spreads quickly.

The rising number of cases not linked to farms signals a need for more testing in general. When patients are positive on a general flu test — a common diagnostic that indicates human, swine, or bird flu — clinics should probe more deeply, Nuzzo said.

The alternative is a wait-and-see approach in which the nation responds only after enormous damage to lives or businesses. This tack tends to rely on mass vaccination. But an effort analogous to Trump’s Operation Warp Speed is not assured, and neither is rollout like that for the first COVID shots, given a rise in vaccine skepticism among Republican lawmakers.

Change may instead need to start from the bottom up — on dairy farms, still the most common source of human infections, said Poulsen. He noticed a shift in attitudes among farmers at the Dairy Expo: “They’re starting to say, ‘How do I save my dairy for the next generation?’ They recognize how severe this is, and that it’s not just going away.”

KFF Health News is a national newsroom that produces in-depth journalism about health issues and is one of the core operating programs at KFF — the independent source for health policy research, polling, and journalism.

 

It’s been a while since I’ve discussed the H5N1 avian influenza clade 2.3.4.4b and its rapid spread in North America. I hope the facts prove me wrong, but many experts have been warning for some time that ideal conditions are forming for this virus, which for now only causes zoonoses, to pose a pandemic threat.

Let me recap for anyone who may have missed some of the developments, either because they work in other medical fields or think that the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic was a worst-case scenario that is unlikely to be repeated in the short term.

 

The Virus Has Flown to Hawaii

According to data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia, the infection has now affected more than 500 cattle herds in 15 states. There are about 30 outbreaks reported in poultry, equally distributed between backyard and farm-raised birds, primarily located in California. Here alone, over 3 million birds have been affected. 

Wild birds are believed to have transported the highly pathogenic virus via migration routes across the Pacific, introducing it to Hawaii for the first time. Just days after wastewater analysis detected the presence of H5N1 on the island of Oahu, home to the capital Honolulu, the first outbreak was promptly reported, killing at least a dozen ducks and geese in a backyard coop. Some of these birds had been taken in early November to the Mililani Pet Fair, a sort of domestic animal festival. Local authorities recommended that anyone who attended the fair, touched a duck or goose at the event, and developed symptoms including fever, cough, sore throat, and conjunctivitis, should isolate and seek medical advice.

Meanwhile, more than 50 farmers, animal handlers, or workers involved in the slaughter of cattle or poultry across seven states have been confirmed infected, presumably contracted at their workplace. The latest case, diagnosed recently in Oregon, presented with severe conjunctivitis and mild respiratory symptoms. More than half of these patients have been identified in recent weeks in California, where active surveillance measures have been implemented. However, there is strong suspicion that the actual number of people infected with mild symptoms in the rest of the country is much, much higher.

 

The Red Alert Lights Up in Canada

The level of concern was raised further with news of the first severe — indeed very severe — case of H5N1 avian influenza originating from the western edge of Canada. A teenager (gender not disclosed), previously healthy and without risk factors, was hospitalized with severe respiratory failure in the intensive care unit at British Columbia Children’s Hospital in Vancouver. The source of the infection is unknown, similar to only one other case in Missouri involving an adult already hospitalized for other reasons, which was identified by chance through influenza surveillance programs. We also know that the Canadian adolescent does not live on a farm and had no known contact with potentially infected animals. The only suspicions focus on the family dog, euthanized owing to unspecified health problems in the early days of the epidemiologic investigation. Although the dog tested negative for avian influenza, a necropsy will be conducted to rule out its involvement in the transmission chain.

An initial characterization of the virus has linked it to genotype D1.1, which is circulating among wild birds and poultry farms in Canada’s westernmost province, rather than the strain typical of dairy cows in the United States. The publication of the complete viral sequence over the past weekend has, for the first time, highlighted mutations that could enhance the virus’s ability to infect human cells.

How do we know this? From the highly contested “gain-of-function” studies, which artificially modify viruses to understand which genomic points require the most surveillance — those mutations that can make the infectious agent more virulent or more transmissible between people.

 

Under Special Surveillance for 20 Years

The influenza A (H5N1) avian virus is not new or previously unknown, like SARS-CoV-2, and this could (in theory) give us a slight advantage. We have known about it for decades, and it began infecting humans about 20 years ago, causing pneumonia with respiratory failure. It proved lethal in about half of the cases, but only in people who had close contact with infected poultry, primarily in Southeast Asia.

Hundreds of other human cases occurred worldwide, but always in low-income countries with poor hygiene conditions and where families lived in close contact with animals. This contributed to a false sense of security in Europe and North America, where the threat has been consistently underestimated. Despite an estimated fatality rate of around 50%, the media often labeled scientists’ warnings and health authorities’ efforts to remain prepared as false alarms, tainted by suspicions of catering to the interests of pharmaceutical companies.

Some people may recall the scandal involving Tamiflu, the Roche antiviral oseltamivir, that governments stockpiled when there were fears that the avian virus might acquire the ability to spread among humans. It was dubbed “a false antidote for a false pandemic,” referring to the potential avian pandemic and the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, improperly called “swine flu,” and which turned out to be less severe than expected. There was talk of €2.64 billion being “wasted” to “please” the manufacturer. Although the Cochrane Collaboration made legitimate demands for rigor and transparency in conducting and publishing clinical trials, much of the public, and the journalists who wrote the stories, cared little about these technical aspects. The prevailing message was that stockpiling drugs (or vaccines) for a disease we don’t even know will occur is a waste of taxpayers’ money rather than a prudent preventive measure.

 

More Vulnerable Than Ever

If we were to ascribe strategic thinking to the virus, which it is not capable of, we might argue that it chose the ideal moment to conquer the world. It began circulating in the new clade in 2020, when experts and authorities were focused on the coronavirus. It spread from birds to marine mammals and finally to cattle, exploiting the public’s post-pandemic fatigue, as people no longer wanted to hear about infectious diseases and containment measures. It ultimately rode the wave of political polarization that irrationally equates prevention with supposed cowardice on the left, and recklessness with courageous freedom on the right.

The coincidence between the future appointments announced by the incoming Trump administration and the virus’s accelerated spread deserves attention from decision-makers and health professionals worldwide. The COVID-19 pandemic experience should have taught us that ignoring a threat doesn’t make it go away, if not in our health, then at least in our wallet. The economic repercussions of a virus circulating among animals crucial to our food chain and national economies should concern everyone, well before the threat crosses the ocean, because only then can we defend ourselves.

The proposed Secretary of Health and Human Services, Robert F. Kennedy, is a proponent of the supposed benefits of raw milk, which could serve as a potent vector for the virus. He is ideologically opposed to vaccinations. It’s hard to imagine he would utilize the H5N1 vaccine stockpiles held by the US government for a campaign starting at least with farmers, as was done prophylactically in Finland with products jointly procured by 15 European countries — a group the Italian government decided not to join.

If Kennedy indeed becomes responsible for US public health, it’s reasonable to fear that, in the name of freedom, he will try to delay as much as possible — even if necessary — the obligation to undergo testing and wear masks, not to mention more restrictive infection containment measures. It’s also unlikely he would support and promote the development of new mRNA products already under study, which would become indispensable if the disease begins to spread more easily among people, as well as animals. In such a case, traditional influenza vaccine cultivation methods using chicken eggs would prove too slow and quantitatively insufficient, especially if the virus continues to circulate among poultry.

In short, let’s keep our fingers crossed, but recognize that crossing our fingers might not be enough.

This story was translated from Univadis Italy using several editorial tools, including artificial intelligence, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication. A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.

It’s been a while since I’ve discussed the H5N1 avian influenza clade 2.3.4.4b and its rapid spread in North America. I hope the facts prove me wrong, but many experts have been warning for some time that ideal conditions are forming for this virus, which for now only causes zoonoses, to pose a pandemic threat.

Let me recap for anyone who may have missed some of the developments, either because they work in other medical fields or think that the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic was a worst-case scenario that is unlikely to be repeated in the short term.

 

The Virus Has Flown to Hawaii

According to data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia, the infection has now affected more than 500 cattle herds in 15 states. There are about 30 outbreaks reported in poultry, equally distributed between backyard and farm-raised birds, primarily located in California. Here alone, over 3 million birds have been affected. 

Wild birds are believed to have transported the highly pathogenic virus via migration routes across the Pacific, introducing it to Hawaii for the first time. Just days after wastewater analysis detected the presence of H5N1 on the island of Oahu, home to the capital Honolulu, the first outbreak was promptly reported, killing at least a dozen ducks and geese in a backyard coop. Some of these birds had been taken in early November to the Mililani Pet Fair, a sort of domestic animal festival. Local authorities recommended that anyone who attended the fair, touched a duck or goose at the event, and developed symptoms including fever, cough, sore throat, and conjunctivitis, should isolate and seek medical advice.

Meanwhile, more than 50 farmers, animal handlers, or workers involved in the slaughter of cattle or poultry across seven states have been confirmed infected, presumably contracted at their workplace. The latest case, diagnosed recently in Oregon, presented with severe conjunctivitis and mild respiratory symptoms. More than half of these patients have been identified in recent weeks in California, where active surveillance measures have been implemented. However, there is strong suspicion that the actual number of people infected with mild symptoms in the rest of the country is much, much higher.

 

The Red Alert Lights Up in Canada

The level of concern was raised further with news of the first severe — indeed very severe — case of H5N1 avian influenza originating from the western edge of Canada. A teenager (gender not disclosed), previously healthy and without risk factors, was hospitalized with severe respiratory failure in the intensive care unit at British Columbia Children’s Hospital in Vancouver. The source of the infection is unknown, similar to only one other case in Missouri involving an adult already hospitalized for other reasons, which was identified by chance through influenza surveillance programs. We also know that the Canadian adolescent does not live on a farm and had no known contact with potentially infected animals. The only suspicions focus on the family dog, euthanized owing to unspecified health problems in the early days of the epidemiologic investigation. Although the dog tested negative for avian influenza, a necropsy will be conducted to rule out its involvement in the transmission chain.

An initial characterization of the virus has linked it to genotype D1.1, which is circulating among wild birds and poultry farms in Canada’s westernmost province, rather than the strain typical of dairy cows in the United States. The publication of the complete viral sequence over the past weekend has, for the first time, highlighted mutations that could enhance the virus’s ability to infect human cells.

How do we know this? From the highly contested “gain-of-function” studies, which artificially modify viruses to understand which genomic points require the most surveillance — those mutations that can make the infectious agent more virulent or more transmissible between people.

 

Under Special Surveillance for 20 Years

The influenza A (H5N1) avian virus is not new or previously unknown, like SARS-CoV-2, and this could (in theory) give us a slight advantage. We have known about it for decades, and it began infecting humans about 20 years ago, causing pneumonia with respiratory failure. It proved lethal in about half of the cases, but only in people who had close contact with infected poultry, primarily in Southeast Asia.

Hundreds of other human cases occurred worldwide, but always in low-income countries with poor hygiene conditions and where families lived in close contact with animals. This contributed to a false sense of security in Europe and North America, where the threat has been consistently underestimated. Despite an estimated fatality rate of around 50%, the media often labeled scientists’ warnings and health authorities’ efforts to remain prepared as false alarms, tainted by suspicions of catering to the interests of pharmaceutical companies.

Some people may recall the scandal involving Tamiflu, the Roche antiviral oseltamivir, that governments stockpiled when there were fears that the avian virus might acquire the ability to spread among humans. It was dubbed “a false antidote for a false pandemic,” referring to the potential avian pandemic and the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, improperly called “swine flu,” and which turned out to be less severe than expected. There was talk of €2.64 billion being “wasted” to “please” the manufacturer. Although the Cochrane Collaboration made legitimate demands for rigor and transparency in conducting and publishing clinical trials, much of the public, and the journalists who wrote the stories, cared little about these technical aspects. The prevailing message was that stockpiling drugs (or vaccines) for a disease we don’t even know will occur is a waste of taxpayers’ money rather than a prudent preventive measure.

 

More Vulnerable Than Ever

If we were to ascribe strategic thinking to the virus, which it is not capable of, we might argue that it chose the ideal moment to conquer the world. It began circulating in the new clade in 2020, when experts and authorities were focused on the coronavirus. It spread from birds to marine mammals and finally to cattle, exploiting the public’s post-pandemic fatigue, as people no longer wanted to hear about infectious diseases and containment measures. It ultimately rode the wave of political polarization that irrationally equates prevention with supposed cowardice on the left, and recklessness with courageous freedom on the right.

The coincidence between the future appointments announced by the incoming Trump administration and the virus’s accelerated spread deserves attention from decision-makers and health professionals worldwide. The COVID-19 pandemic experience should have taught us that ignoring a threat doesn’t make it go away, if not in our health, then at least in our wallet. The economic repercussions of a virus circulating among animals crucial to our food chain and national economies should concern everyone, well before the threat crosses the ocean, because only then can we defend ourselves.

The proposed Secretary of Health and Human Services, Robert F. Kennedy, is a proponent of the supposed benefits of raw milk, which could serve as a potent vector for the virus. He is ideologically opposed to vaccinations. It’s hard to imagine he would utilize the H5N1 vaccine stockpiles held by the US government for a campaign starting at least with farmers, as was done prophylactically in Finland with products jointly procured by 15 European countries — a group the Italian government decided not to join.

If Kennedy indeed becomes responsible for US public health, it’s reasonable to fear that, in the name of freedom, he will try to delay as much as possible — even if necessary — the obligation to undergo testing and wear masks, not to mention more restrictive infection containment measures. It’s also unlikely he would support and promote the development of new mRNA products already under study, which would become indispensable if the disease begins to spread more easily among people, as well as animals. In such a case, traditional influenza vaccine cultivation methods using chicken eggs would prove too slow and quantitatively insufficient, especially if the virus continues to circulate among poultry.

In short, let’s keep our fingers crossed, but recognize that crossing our fingers might not be enough.

This story was translated from Univadis Italy using several editorial tools, including artificial intelligence, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication. A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.

It’s been a while since I’ve discussed the H5N1 avian influenza clade 2.3.4.4b and its rapid spread in North America. I hope the facts prove me wrong, but many experts have been warning for some time that ideal conditions are forming for this virus, which for now only causes zoonoses, to pose a pandemic threat.

Let me recap for anyone who may have missed some of the developments, either because they work in other medical fields or think that the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic was a worst-case scenario that is unlikely to be repeated in the short term.

 

The Virus Has Flown to Hawaii

According to data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia, the infection has now affected more than 500 cattle herds in 15 states. There are about 30 outbreaks reported in poultry, equally distributed between backyard and farm-raised birds, primarily located in California. Here alone, over 3 million birds have been affected. 

Wild birds are believed to have transported the highly pathogenic virus via migration routes across the Pacific, introducing it to Hawaii for the first time. Just days after wastewater analysis detected the presence of H5N1 on the island of Oahu, home to the capital Honolulu, the first outbreak was promptly reported, killing at least a dozen ducks and geese in a backyard coop. Some of these birds had been taken in early November to the Mililani Pet Fair, a sort of domestic animal festival. Local authorities recommended that anyone who attended the fair, touched a duck or goose at the event, and developed symptoms including fever, cough, sore throat, and conjunctivitis, should isolate and seek medical advice.

Meanwhile, more than 50 farmers, animal handlers, or workers involved in the slaughter of cattle or poultry across seven states have been confirmed infected, presumably contracted at their workplace. The latest case, diagnosed recently in Oregon, presented with severe conjunctivitis and mild respiratory symptoms. More than half of these patients have been identified in recent weeks in California, where active surveillance measures have been implemented. However, there is strong suspicion that the actual number of people infected with mild symptoms in the rest of the country is much, much higher.

 

The Red Alert Lights Up in Canada

The level of concern was raised further with news of the first severe — indeed very severe — case of H5N1 avian influenza originating from the western edge of Canada. A teenager (gender not disclosed), previously healthy and without risk factors, was hospitalized with severe respiratory failure in the intensive care unit at British Columbia Children’s Hospital in Vancouver. The source of the infection is unknown, similar to only one other case in Missouri involving an adult already hospitalized for other reasons, which was identified by chance through influenza surveillance programs. We also know that the Canadian adolescent does not live on a farm and had no known contact with potentially infected animals. The only suspicions focus on the family dog, euthanized owing to unspecified health problems in the early days of the epidemiologic investigation. Although the dog tested negative for avian influenza, a necropsy will be conducted to rule out its involvement in the transmission chain.

An initial characterization of the virus has linked it to genotype D1.1, which is circulating among wild birds and poultry farms in Canada’s westernmost province, rather than the strain typical of dairy cows in the United States. The publication of the complete viral sequence over the past weekend has, for the first time, highlighted mutations that could enhance the virus’s ability to infect human cells.

How do we know this? From the highly contested “gain-of-function” studies, which artificially modify viruses to understand which genomic points require the most surveillance — those mutations that can make the infectious agent more virulent or more transmissible between people.

 

Under Special Surveillance for 20 Years

The influenza A (H5N1) avian virus is not new or previously unknown, like SARS-CoV-2, and this could (in theory) give us a slight advantage. We have known about it for decades, and it began infecting humans about 20 years ago, causing pneumonia with respiratory failure. It proved lethal in about half of the cases, but only in people who had close contact with infected poultry, primarily in Southeast Asia.

Hundreds of other human cases occurred worldwide, but always in low-income countries with poor hygiene conditions and where families lived in close contact with animals. This contributed to a false sense of security in Europe and North America, where the threat has been consistently underestimated. Despite an estimated fatality rate of around 50%, the media often labeled scientists’ warnings and health authorities’ efforts to remain prepared as false alarms, tainted by suspicions of catering to the interests of pharmaceutical companies.

Some people may recall the scandal involving Tamiflu, the Roche antiviral oseltamivir, that governments stockpiled when there were fears that the avian virus might acquire the ability to spread among humans. It was dubbed “a false antidote for a false pandemic,” referring to the potential avian pandemic and the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, improperly called “swine flu,” and which turned out to be less severe than expected. There was talk of €2.64 billion being “wasted” to “please” the manufacturer. Although the Cochrane Collaboration made legitimate demands for rigor and transparency in conducting and publishing clinical trials, much of the public, and the journalists who wrote the stories, cared little about these technical aspects. The prevailing message was that stockpiling drugs (or vaccines) for a disease we don’t even know will occur is a waste of taxpayers’ money rather than a prudent preventive measure.

 

More Vulnerable Than Ever

If we were to ascribe strategic thinking to the virus, which it is not capable of, we might argue that it chose the ideal moment to conquer the world. It began circulating in the new clade in 2020, when experts and authorities were focused on the coronavirus. It spread from birds to marine mammals and finally to cattle, exploiting the public’s post-pandemic fatigue, as people no longer wanted to hear about infectious diseases and containment measures. It ultimately rode the wave of political polarization that irrationally equates prevention with supposed cowardice on the left, and recklessness with courageous freedom on the right.

The coincidence between the future appointments announced by the incoming Trump administration and the virus’s accelerated spread deserves attention from decision-makers and health professionals worldwide. The COVID-19 pandemic experience should have taught us that ignoring a threat doesn’t make it go away, if not in our health, then at least in our wallet. The economic repercussions of a virus circulating among animals crucial to our food chain and national economies should concern everyone, well before the threat crosses the ocean, because only then can we defend ourselves.

The proposed Secretary of Health and Human Services, Robert F. Kennedy, is a proponent of the supposed benefits of raw milk, which could serve as a potent vector for the virus. He is ideologically opposed to vaccinations. It’s hard to imagine he would utilize the H5N1 vaccine stockpiles held by the US government for a campaign starting at least with farmers, as was done prophylactically in Finland with products jointly procured by 15 European countries — a group the Italian government decided not to join.

If Kennedy indeed becomes responsible for US public health, it’s reasonable to fear that, in the name of freedom, he will try to delay as much as possible — even if necessary — the obligation to undergo testing and wear masks, not to mention more restrictive infection containment measures. It’s also unlikely he would support and promote the development of new mRNA products already under study, which would become indispensable if the disease begins to spread more easily among people, as well as animals. In such a case, traditional influenza vaccine cultivation methods using chicken eggs would prove too slow and quantitatively insufficient, especially if the virus continues to circulate among poultry.

In short, let’s keep our fingers crossed, but recognize that crossing our fingers might not be enough.

This story was translated from Univadis Italy using several editorial tools, including artificial intelligence, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication. A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.

Six times as many cases of pertussis were reported in the United States for the week ending November 16, 2024, as the same week in 2023, according to new data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

The numbers reflect a return to prepandemic trends, but overall, pertussis cases for 2024 so far have surpassed those seen prior to the pandemic in 2019, according to the CDC.

Of the 434 cases reported for the week ending November 16, 2024, a majority (109) occurred in the East North Central region, mostly in Ohio (93). Another 70 cases occurred in the West North Central region, with 32 cases and 37 cases in Missouri and Nebraska, respectively.

None of the 75 cases in the Middle Atlantic region occurred in New Jersey or New York City; 38 were reported elsewhere in New York, and 37 in Pennsylvania. The South Atlantic region reported 55 cases, including 29 in Florida. The East South Central and West South Central regions reported 11 and 20 cases, respectively. The Mountain and Pacific regions reported 31 (20 in Arizona) and 47 (20 in Washington State) cases, respectively.

The CDC tracks pertussis cases through a national surveillance system, but many cases are likely unrecognized and unreported, according to the CDC.

Although vaccines for pertussis (whooping cough) provide protection, their effectiveness decreases over time, and the CDC expects rates to increase in vaccinated and unvaccinated populations as case levels rebound with the lifting of pandemic mitigation strategies such as masking and remote learning.

Recent CDC data reported by Medscape Medical News showed an association between lower vaccination rates and 2024’s uptick in pertussis cases.

 

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

Six times as many cases of pertussis were reported in the United States for the week ending November 16, 2024, as the same week in 2023, according to new data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

The numbers reflect a return to prepandemic trends, but overall, pertussis cases for 2024 so far have surpassed those seen prior to the pandemic in 2019, according to the CDC.

Of the 434 cases reported for the week ending November 16, 2024, a majority (109) occurred in the East North Central region, mostly in Ohio (93). Another 70 cases occurred in the West North Central region, with 32 cases and 37 cases in Missouri and Nebraska, respectively.

None of the 75 cases in the Middle Atlantic region occurred in New Jersey or New York City; 38 were reported elsewhere in New York, and 37 in Pennsylvania. The South Atlantic region reported 55 cases, including 29 in Florida. The East South Central and West South Central regions reported 11 and 20 cases, respectively. The Mountain and Pacific regions reported 31 (20 in Arizona) and 47 (20 in Washington State) cases, respectively.

The CDC tracks pertussis cases through a national surveillance system, but many cases are likely unrecognized and unreported, according to the CDC.

Although vaccines for pertussis (whooping cough) provide protection, their effectiveness decreases over time, and the CDC expects rates to increase in vaccinated and unvaccinated populations as case levels rebound with the lifting of pandemic mitigation strategies such as masking and remote learning.

Recent CDC data reported by Medscape Medical News showed an association between lower vaccination rates and 2024’s uptick in pertussis cases.

 

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

Six times as many cases of pertussis were reported in the United States for the week ending November 16, 2024, as the same week in 2023, according to new data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

The numbers reflect a return to prepandemic trends, but overall, pertussis cases for 2024 so far have surpassed those seen prior to the pandemic in 2019, according to the CDC.

Of the 434 cases reported for the week ending November 16, 2024, a majority (109) occurred in the East North Central region, mostly in Ohio (93). Another 70 cases occurred in the West North Central region, with 32 cases and 37 cases in Missouri and Nebraska, respectively.

None of the 75 cases in the Middle Atlantic region occurred in New Jersey or New York City; 38 were reported elsewhere in New York, and 37 in Pennsylvania. The South Atlantic region reported 55 cases, including 29 in Florida. The East South Central and West South Central regions reported 11 and 20 cases, respectively. The Mountain and Pacific regions reported 31 (20 in Arizona) and 47 (20 in Washington State) cases, respectively.

The CDC tracks pertussis cases through a national surveillance system, but many cases are likely unrecognized and unreported, according to the CDC.

Although vaccines for pertussis (whooping cough) provide protection, their effectiveness decreases over time, and the CDC expects rates to increase in vaccinated and unvaccinated populations as case levels rebound with the lifting of pandemic mitigation strategies such as masking and remote learning.

Recent CDC data reported by Medscape Medical News showed an association between lower vaccination rates and 2024’s uptick in pertussis cases.

 

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

TOPLINE:

Administering the Bacillus Calmette-Guérin (BCG) vaccine during the active phase of COVID-19 may help protect against the development of long COVID.

METHODOLOGY:

• A phase 3 clinical trial initiated in early 2020 investigated the effect of the BCG vaccine injected during active infection on COVID-19 progression in adults with mild or moderate COVID-19. The current study summarizes the 6- and 12-month follow-up data with a focus on long-COVID symptoms.
• Patients who tested positive for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 were randomly assigned to receive either 0.1 mL of intradermal BCG (n = 191) or 0.9% saline placebo (n = 202) within 14 days of symptom onset and were followed up at 7, 14, 21, and 45 days and at 6 and 12 months postinjection.
• Overall, 157 BCG (median age, 40 years; 54.1% women) and 142 placebo (median age, 41 years; 65.5% women) recipients completed the 6-month follow-up, and 97 BCG (median age, 37 years; 49.5% women) and 95 placebo (median age, 40 years; 67.4% women) recipients completed the 12-month follow-up.
• The researchers primarily assessed the effect of the BCG vaccine on the development of the symptoms of long COVID at 6 and 12 months.

TAKEAWAY:

• Hearing problems were less frequent among BCG recipients at 6 months compared with those who received placebo (odds ratio [OR], 0.26; 95% CI, 0.045-1.0; P = .044).
• At 12 months, participants who received the BCG vaccine exhibited fewer issues with sleeping (P = .027), concentration (P = .009), memory (P = .009), and vision (P = .022) along with a lower long-COVID score (one-sided Wilcoxon test, P = .002) than those who received placebo.
• At 6 months, BCG demonstrated a sex-specific paradoxical effect on hair loss, decreasing it in men (P = .031), while causing a slight, though statistically nonsignificant, increase in women.
• Male sex was the strongest predictive factor for long COVID, cognitive dysfunction, and cardiopulmonary scores at both follow-up assessments.

IN PRACTICE:

“[The study] findings suggest that BCG immunotherapy for an existing ailment may be superior to prophylaxis in healthy individuals,” the authors wrote.

SOURCE:

The study was led by Mehrsa Jalalizadeh and Keini Buosi, UroScience, State University of Campinas, Unicamp, São Paulo, Brazil. It was published online on November 19, 2024, in the Journal of Internal Medicine.

LIMITATIONS:

Previous mycobacterial exposure was not tested among the study participants. A notable loss to follow-up, particularly at 12 months, may have introduced bias into the results.

DISCLOSURES:

The study was supported by the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel, Federal Government of Brazil, the General Coordination of the National Immunization Program, Ministry of Health (Brazil), and the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development-Research Productivity. The authors declared no conflicts of interest.

This article was created using several editorial tools, including AI, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication. A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.

TOPLINE:

Administering the Bacillus Calmette-Guérin (BCG) vaccine during the active phase of COVID-19 may help protect against the development of long COVID.

METHODOLOGY:

• A phase 3 clinical trial initiated in early 2020 investigated the effect of the BCG vaccine injected during active infection on COVID-19 progression in adults with mild or moderate COVID-19. The current study summarizes the 6- and 12-month follow-up data with a focus on long-COVID symptoms.
• Patients who tested positive for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 were randomly assigned to receive either 0.1 mL of intradermal BCG (n = 191) or 0.9% saline placebo (n = 202) within 14 days of symptom onset and were followed up at 7, 14, 21, and 45 days and at 6 and 12 months postinjection.
• Overall, 157 BCG (median age, 40 years; 54.1% women) and 142 placebo (median age, 41 years; 65.5% women) recipients completed the 6-month follow-up, and 97 BCG (median age, 37 years; 49.5% women) and 95 placebo (median age, 40 years; 67.4% women) recipients completed the 12-month follow-up.
• The researchers primarily assessed the effect of the BCG vaccine on the development of the symptoms of long COVID at 6 and 12 months.

TAKEAWAY:

• Hearing problems were less frequent among BCG recipients at 6 months compared with those who received placebo (odds ratio [OR], 0.26; 95% CI, 0.045-1.0; P = .044).
• At 12 months, participants who received the BCG vaccine exhibited fewer issues with sleeping (P = .027), concentration (P = .009), memory (P = .009), and vision (P = .022) along with a lower long-COVID score (one-sided Wilcoxon test, P = .002) than those who received placebo.
• At 6 months, BCG demonstrated a sex-specific paradoxical effect on hair loss, decreasing it in men (P = .031), while causing a slight, though statistically nonsignificant, increase in women.
• Male sex was the strongest predictive factor for long COVID, cognitive dysfunction, and cardiopulmonary scores at both follow-up assessments.

IN PRACTICE:

“[The study] findings suggest that BCG immunotherapy for an existing ailment may be superior to prophylaxis in healthy individuals,” the authors wrote.

SOURCE:

The study was led by Mehrsa Jalalizadeh and Keini Buosi, UroScience, State University of Campinas, Unicamp, São Paulo, Brazil. It was published online on November 19, 2024, in the Journal of Internal Medicine.

LIMITATIONS:

Previous mycobacterial exposure was not tested among the study participants. A notable loss to follow-up, particularly at 12 months, may have introduced bias into the results.

DISCLOSURES:

The study was supported by the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel, Federal Government of Brazil, the General Coordination of the National Immunization Program, Ministry of Health (Brazil), and the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development-Research Productivity. The authors declared no conflicts of interest.

This article was created using several editorial tools, including AI, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication. A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.

TOPLINE:

Administering the Bacillus Calmette-Guérin (BCG) vaccine during the active phase of COVID-19 may help protect against the development of long COVID.

METHODOLOGY:

• A phase 3 clinical trial initiated in early 2020 investigated the effect of the BCG vaccine injected during active infection on COVID-19 progression in adults with mild or moderate COVID-19. The current study summarizes the 6- and 12-month follow-up data with a focus on long-COVID symptoms.
• Patients who tested positive for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 were randomly assigned to receive either 0.1 mL of intradermal BCG (n = 191) or 0.9% saline placebo (n = 202) within 14 days of symptom onset and were followed up at 7, 14, 21, and 45 days and at 6 and 12 months postinjection.
• Overall, 157 BCG (median age, 40 years; 54.1% women) and 142 placebo (median age, 41 years; 65.5% women) recipients completed the 6-month follow-up, and 97 BCG (median age, 37 years; 49.5% women) and 95 placebo (median age, 40 years; 67.4% women) recipients completed the 12-month follow-up.
• The researchers primarily assessed the effect of the BCG vaccine on the development of the symptoms of long COVID at 6 and 12 months.

TAKEAWAY:

• Hearing problems were less frequent among BCG recipients at 6 months compared with those who received placebo (odds ratio [OR], 0.26; 95% CI, 0.045-1.0; P = .044).
• At 12 months, participants who received the BCG vaccine exhibited fewer issues with sleeping (P = .027), concentration (P = .009), memory (P = .009), and vision (P = .022) along with a lower long-COVID score (one-sided Wilcoxon test, P = .002) than those who received placebo.
• At 6 months, BCG demonstrated a sex-specific paradoxical effect on hair loss, decreasing it in men (P = .031), while causing a slight, though statistically nonsignificant, increase in women.
• Male sex was the strongest predictive factor for long COVID, cognitive dysfunction, and cardiopulmonary scores at both follow-up assessments.

IN PRACTICE:

“[The study] findings suggest that BCG immunotherapy for an existing ailment may be superior to prophylaxis in healthy individuals,” the authors wrote.

SOURCE:

The study was led by Mehrsa Jalalizadeh and Keini Buosi, UroScience, State University of Campinas, Unicamp, São Paulo, Brazil. It was published online on November 19, 2024, in the Journal of Internal Medicine.

LIMITATIONS:

Previous mycobacterial exposure was not tested among the study participants. A notable loss to follow-up, particularly at 12 months, may have introduced bias into the results.

DISCLOSURES:

The study was supported by the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel, Federal Government of Brazil, the General Coordination of the National Immunization Program, Ministry of Health (Brazil), and the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development-Research Productivity. The authors declared no conflicts of interest.

This article was created using several editorial tools, including AI, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication. A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.

This news organization recently spoke with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Lisa Grohskopf, MD, MPH, Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, about what providers need to know regarding recommendations for influenza vaccination in the United States.

Text has been edited for length. 

 

Are there any updates to this season’s influenza vaccine or vaccine recommendations?

Yes, we have updates to both the vaccine and the vaccine recommendations this year. Typically we have some changes each year, and this year there are two main changes in the recommendations. One relates to the composition of the vaccine for this season, and the other is a new recommendation for adult solid organ transplant recipients. 

We typically have changes in the vaccine composition each season. For most seasons, one or more parts of the vaccine will change, but this year is a little different in that all of the vaccines available in the US for the 2024-2025 season are going to be three-virus, or trivalent, vaccines. They are going to be formulated to protect against three viruses: an influenza A(H1N1) virus, an influenza A(H3N2) virus, and an influenza B/Victoria lineage virus. 

The reason for this change is that since the 2013-2014 season through the 2023-2024 season, we had quadrivalent vaccines that were available in the US that contained four viruses. Those vaccines contained a second influenza B virus from the Yamagata lineage (B viruses come from two main lineages).

The reason for the change to trivalent vaccines this season is that influenza B/Yamagata viruses have not been detected in global surveillance since March 2020, and so their inclusion is no longer warranted. So this season, all of the vaccines available in the US are going to be trivalent.

In addition to that change, we have an update in the influenza A(H3N2) component of the vaccine compared with last season.

The second change concerning adult solid organ transplant recipients is that Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) now recommends that solid organ transplant recipients aged 18-64 years can receive as acceptable options either the high-dose inactivated vaccine or the adjuvanted inactivated vaccine without a preference over other age appropriate, inactivated, or recombinant vaccines.

Those vaccines are both formulated with features intended to make them more immunogenic — ie, promote a stronger immune response — and there are data for immunogenicity that suggest they could be more immunogenic in that population.

 

Who needs an influenza vaccine this season?

That recommendation is the same as it’s been for a number of years, which is that everybody aged 6 months or older is recommended to get a flu vaccine, with some rare exceptions, mainly concerning contraindications to vaccination. 

Contraindications are detailed in the ACIP flu statement each year, and they’re relatively uncommon conditions overall, so most people are recommended, if they’re in that age group 6 months and up, to get an annual flu vaccine.

Are there groups for whom influenza vaccination is especially important?

Yes. While influenza vaccination is recommended for everybody in that age group 6 months and up — and in truth, we can never really predict who’s going to get severely ill — some people are more likely to be at risk of having serious illness or hospitalization. Those people include adults aged 65 years or older; young children; people with certain chronic health conditions such as heart disease, lung disease, and diabetes; and people from some racial and ethnic groups.

 

Are there any specific influenza vaccination recommendations for these groups or others? 

Not for most people. In general, we have a number of different influenza vaccines each season; this year we have a total of nine brands. In general, there’s no preferential recommendation for one vaccine or type of vaccine for specific groups of people, with one exception: For people aged 65 years or older, there’s a preferential recommendation for three specific vaccines — the high-dose inactivated vaccine, Fluzone High-Dose; the recombinant vaccine, Flublok; and the adjuvanted inactivated vaccine, FLUAD. 

Among those three, there’s no preference for any one of them over the other two; they’re all preferred vaccines for this age group, if available. If none of those three vaccines are available at the time that somebody aged 65 or older is there to get vaccinated, people in this age group should get any other age-appropriate influenza vaccine that is available.

 

When should people get vaccinated if they haven’t already?

CDC and ACIP recommend vaccination for most people, ideally by the end of October. But for those who missed the end of October, it is absolutely not too late. Providers should continue to encourage vaccination and people should get their vaccines as long as flu viruses are circulating. 

The timing of the onset and the peak and the end of the flu season vary a bit from year to year. We often start to see generally activity begin to increase in the US in the fall, which is the reason for the end of October recommendation; however, flu activity doesn’t tend to peak in the US until after October. We’re talking December, January, or later, so getting vaccinated after October can still provide important protection during the peak of the season.

There does seem to be a tendency for people to think, OK, I haven’t gotten the vaccine yet, and there probably isn’t a lot of reason to do it now. But really, it’s definitely not too late, and that’s something we like to encourage people to think about, particularly as we move into December and January — it’s not too late if you missed October. 

Influenza vaccination is also available in so many places. You don’t necessarily have to go to a healthcare provider’s office; there are many retail chains which offer influenza vaccines.

 

Is influenza spreading right now? Are activity levels increasing?

Overall influenza activity currently is low nationally, although there’s starting to be some slight increases in the pediatric age groups and, of course, we do anticipate that it will increase in the coming weeks and months.

When we get vaccinated, the protection isn’t instantaneous. The immune system needs a bit of time to react to the vaccine and to develop antibodies. That can take about 2 weeks. Even with that, now is still absolutely not too late to get a vaccine. Neither is December, for that matter. As long as the flu viruses are circulating where you are, it is still worth getting vaccinated.

 

What was influenza vaccination coverage like last season?

It’s a little bit early to tell for the current season, but one of the things that we do know is that since the COVID-19 pandemic, coverage has dropped compared with before the COVID-19 pandemic. Before COVID-19, influenza vaccination coverage had been slowly increasing in most groups, but it has decreased since then, and those downturns in coverage haven’t recovered to prepandemic levels. For example, during 2023-2024, about half of children and adults received a flu vaccine. 

What can providers do to encourage influenza vaccination in their patients?

We know that a healthcare provider’s strong recommendation for flu vaccination is a really major factor in whether or not patients get a flu vaccine, and is more effective in increasing acceptance of vaccination than just about any other factor. 

There’s a method from CDC called SHARE, which is a helpful way to help make a strong recommendation and provide information to help patients make an informed decision about whether or not they want to be vaccinated.

To implement SHARE, it’s an acronym with five parts. S is for Share the reasons why the flu vaccine is right for that patient. H is for Highlight positive experiences with flu vaccination, either personal or in practice. A is for Address patient concerns and questions about the flu vaccine, including things such as side effects, safety, and effectiveness. R is Remind patients that vaccination protects them and their loved ones from serious illness and related complications. E is Explain the potential complications and consequences of getting influenza, including serious health effects, time lost from family, work, and school, and potential financial costs.

Additional resources are accessible on CDC’s influenza resources page, including brochures, posters, and fact sheets that can help providers in encouraging and reminding people to get vaccinated.

A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.

This news organization recently spoke with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Lisa Grohskopf, MD, MPH, Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, about what providers need to know regarding recommendations for influenza vaccination in the United States.

Text has been edited for length. 

 

Are there any updates to this season’s influenza vaccine or vaccine recommendations?

Yes, we have updates to both the vaccine and the vaccine recommendations this year. Typically we have some changes each year, and this year there are two main changes in the recommendations. One relates to the composition of the vaccine for this season, and the other is a new recommendation for adult solid organ transplant recipients. 

We typically have changes in the vaccine composition each season. For most seasons, one or more parts of the vaccine will change, but this year is a little different in that all of the vaccines available in the US for the 2024-2025 season are going to be three-virus, or trivalent, vaccines. They are going to be formulated to protect against three viruses: an influenza A(H1N1) virus, an influenza A(H3N2) virus, and an influenza B/Victoria lineage virus. 

The reason for this change is that since the 2013-2014 season through the 2023-2024 season, we had quadrivalent vaccines that were available in the US that contained four viruses. Those vaccines contained a second influenza B virus from the Yamagata lineage (B viruses come from two main lineages).

The reason for the change to trivalent vaccines this season is that influenza B/Yamagata viruses have not been detected in global surveillance since March 2020, and so their inclusion is no longer warranted. So this season, all of the vaccines available in the US are going to be trivalent.

In addition to that change, we have an update in the influenza A(H3N2) component of the vaccine compared with last season.

The second change concerning adult solid organ transplant recipients is that Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) now recommends that solid organ transplant recipients aged 18-64 years can receive as acceptable options either the high-dose inactivated vaccine or the adjuvanted inactivated vaccine without a preference over other age appropriate, inactivated, or recombinant vaccines.

Those vaccines are both formulated with features intended to make them more immunogenic — ie, promote a stronger immune response — and there are data for immunogenicity that suggest they could be more immunogenic in that population.

 

Who needs an influenza vaccine this season?

That recommendation is the same as it’s been for a number of years, which is that everybody aged 6 months or older is recommended to get a flu vaccine, with some rare exceptions, mainly concerning contraindications to vaccination. 

Contraindications are detailed in the ACIP flu statement each year, and they’re relatively uncommon conditions overall, so most people are recommended, if they’re in that age group 6 months and up, to get an annual flu vaccine.

Are there groups for whom influenza vaccination is especially important?

Yes. While influenza vaccination is recommended for everybody in that age group 6 months and up — and in truth, we can never really predict who’s going to get severely ill — some people are more likely to be at risk of having serious illness or hospitalization. Those people include adults aged 65 years or older; young children; people with certain chronic health conditions such as heart disease, lung disease, and diabetes; and people from some racial and ethnic groups.

 

Are there any specific influenza vaccination recommendations for these groups or others? 

Not for most people. In general, we have a number of different influenza vaccines each season; this year we have a total of nine brands. In general, there’s no preferential recommendation for one vaccine or type of vaccine for specific groups of people, with one exception: For people aged 65 years or older, there’s a preferential recommendation for three specific vaccines — the high-dose inactivated vaccine, Fluzone High-Dose; the recombinant vaccine, Flublok; and the adjuvanted inactivated vaccine, FLUAD. 

Among those three, there’s no preference for any one of them over the other two; they’re all preferred vaccines for this age group, if available. If none of those three vaccines are available at the time that somebody aged 65 or older is there to get vaccinated, people in this age group should get any other age-appropriate influenza vaccine that is available.

 

When should people get vaccinated if they haven’t already?

CDC and ACIP recommend vaccination for most people, ideally by the end of October. But for those who missed the end of October, it is absolutely not too late. Providers should continue to encourage vaccination and people should get their vaccines as long as flu viruses are circulating. 

The timing of the onset and the peak and the end of the flu season vary a bit from year to year. We often start to see generally activity begin to increase in the US in the fall, which is the reason for the end of October recommendation; however, flu activity doesn’t tend to peak in the US until after October. We’re talking December, January, or later, so getting vaccinated after October can still provide important protection during the peak of the season.

There does seem to be a tendency for people to think, OK, I haven’t gotten the vaccine yet, and there probably isn’t a lot of reason to do it now. But really, it’s definitely not too late, and that’s something we like to encourage people to think about, particularly as we move into December and January — it’s not too late if you missed October. 

Influenza vaccination is also available in so many places. You don’t necessarily have to go to a healthcare provider’s office; there are many retail chains which offer influenza vaccines.

 

Is influenza spreading right now? Are activity levels increasing?

Overall influenza activity currently is low nationally, although there’s starting to be some slight increases in the pediatric age groups and, of course, we do anticipate that it will increase in the coming weeks and months.

When we get vaccinated, the protection isn’t instantaneous. The immune system needs a bit of time to react to the vaccine and to develop antibodies. That can take about 2 weeks. Even with that, now is still absolutely not too late to get a vaccine. Neither is December, for that matter. As long as the flu viruses are circulating where you are, it is still worth getting vaccinated.

 

What was influenza vaccination coverage like last season?

It’s a little bit early to tell for the current season, but one of the things that we do know is that since the COVID-19 pandemic, coverage has dropped compared with before the COVID-19 pandemic. Before COVID-19, influenza vaccination coverage had been slowly increasing in most groups, but it has decreased since then, and those downturns in coverage haven’t recovered to prepandemic levels. For example, during 2023-2024, about half of children and adults received a flu vaccine. 

What can providers do to encourage influenza vaccination in their patients?

We know that a healthcare provider’s strong recommendation for flu vaccination is a really major factor in whether or not patients get a flu vaccine, and is more effective in increasing acceptance of vaccination than just about any other factor. 

There’s a method from CDC called SHARE, which is a helpful way to help make a strong recommendation and provide information to help patients make an informed decision about whether or not they want to be vaccinated.

To implement SHARE, it’s an acronym with five parts. S is for Share the reasons why the flu vaccine is right for that patient. H is for Highlight positive experiences with flu vaccination, either personal or in practice. A is for Address patient concerns and questions about the flu vaccine, including things such as side effects, safety, and effectiveness. R is Remind patients that vaccination protects them and their loved ones from serious illness and related complications. E is Explain the potential complications and consequences of getting influenza, including serious health effects, time lost from family, work, and school, and potential financial costs.

Additional resources are accessible on CDC’s influenza resources page, including brochures, posters, and fact sheets that can help providers in encouraging and reminding people to get vaccinated.

A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.

This news organization recently spoke with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Lisa Grohskopf, MD, MPH, Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, about what providers need to know regarding recommendations for influenza vaccination in the United States.

Text has been edited for length. 

 

Are there any updates to this season’s influenza vaccine or vaccine recommendations?

Yes, we have updates to both the vaccine and the vaccine recommendations this year. Typically we have some changes each year, and this year there are two main changes in the recommendations. One relates to the composition of the vaccine for this season, and the other is a new recommendation for adult solid organ transplant recipients. 

We typically have changes in the vaccine composition each season. For most seasons, one or more parts of the vaccine will change, but this year is a little different in that all of the vaccines available in the US for the 2024-2025 season are going to be three-virus, or trivalent, vaccines. They are going to be formulated to protect against three viruses: an influenza A(H1N1) virus, an influenza A(H3N2) virus, and an influenza B/Victoria lineage virus. 

The reason for this change is that since the 2013-2014 season through the 2023-2024 season, we had quadrivalent vaccines that were available in the US that contained four viruses. Those vaccines contained a second influenza B virus from the Yamagata lineage (B viruses come from two main lineages).

The reason for the change to trivalent vaccines this season is that influenza B/Yamagata viruses have not been detected in global surveillance since March 2020, and so their inclusion is no longer warranted. So this season, all of the vaccines available in the US are going to be trivalent.

In addition to that change, we have an update in the influenza A(H3N2) component of the vaccine compared with last season.

The second change concerning adult solid organ transplant recipients is that Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) now recommends that solid organ transplant recipients aged 18-64 years can receive as acceptable options either the high-dose inactivated vaccine or the adjuvanted inactivated vaccine without a preference over other age appropriate, inactivated, or recombinant vaccines.

Those vaccines are both formulated with features intended to make them more immunogenic — ie, promote a stronger immune response — and there are data for immunogenicity that suggest they could be more immunogenic in that population.

 

Who needs an influenza vaccine this season?

That recommendation is the same as it’s been for a number of years, which is that everybody aged 6 months or older is recommended to get a flu vaccine, with some rare exceptions, mainly concerning contraindications to vaccination. 

Contraindications are detailed in the ACIP flu statement each year, and they’re relatively uncommon conditions overall, so most people are recommended, if they’re in that age group 6 months and up, to get an annual flu vaccine.

Are there groups for whom influenza vaccination is especially important?

Yes. While influenza vaccination is recommended for everybody in that age group 6 months and up — and in truth, we can never really predict who’s going to get severely ill — some people are more likely to be at risk of having serious illness or hospitalization. Those people include adults aged 65 years or older; young children; people with certain chronic health conditions such as heart disease, lung disease, and diabetes; and people from some racial and ethnic groups.

 

Are there any specific influenza vaccination recommendations for these groups or others? 

Not for most people. In general, we have a number of different influenza vaccines each season; this year we have a total of nine brands. In general, there’s no preferential recommendation for one vaccine or type of vaccine for specific groups of people, with one exception: For people aged 65 years or older, there’s a preferential recommendation for three specific vaccines — the high-dose inactivated vaccine, Fluzone High-Dose; the recombinant vaccine, Flublok; and the adjuvanted inactivated vaccine, FLUAD. 

Among those three, there’s no preference for any one of them over the other two; they’re all preferred vaccines for this age group, if available. If none of those three vaccines are available at the time that somebody aged 65 or older is there to get vaccinated, people in this age group should get any other age-appropriate influenza vaccine that is available.

 

When should people get vaccinated if they haven’t already?

CDC and ACIP recommend vaccination for most people, ideally by the end of October. But for those who missed the end of October, it is absolutely not too late. Providers should continue to encourage vaccination and people should get their vaccines as long as flu viruses are circulating. 

The timing of the onset and the peak and the end of the flu season vary a bit from year to year. We often start to see generally activity begin to increase in the US in the fall, which is the reason for the end of October recommendation; however, flu activity doesn’t tend to peak in the US until after October. We’re talking December, January, or later, so getting vaccinated after October can still provide important protection during the peak of the season.

There does seem to be a tendency for people to think, OK, I haven’t gotten the vaccine yet, and there probably isn’t a lot of reason to do it now. But really, it’s definitely not too late, and that’s something we like to encourage people to think about, particularly as we move into December and January — it’s not too late if you missed October. 

Influenza vaccination is also available in so many places. You don’t necessarily have to go to a healthcare provider’s office; there are many retail chains which offer influenza vaccines.

 

Is influenza spreading right now? Are activity levels increasing?

Overall influenza activity currently is low nationally, although there’s starting to be some slight increases in the pediatric age groups and, of course, we do anticipate that it will increase in the coming weeks and months.

When we get vaccinated, the protection isn’t instantaneous. The immune system needs a bit of time to react to the vaccine and to develop antibodies. That can take about 2 weeks. Even with that, now is still absolutely not too late to get a vaccine. Neither is December, for that matter. As long as the flu viruses are circulating where you are, it is still worth getting vaccinated.

 

What was influenza vaccination coverage like last season?

It’s a little bit early to tell for the current season, but one of the things that we do know is that since the COVID-19 pandemic, coverage has dropped compared with before the COVID-19 pandemic. Before COVID-19, influenza vaccination coverage had been slowly increasing in most groups, but it has decreased since then, and those downturns in coverage haven’t recovered to prepandemic levels. For example, during 2023-2024, about half of children and adults received a flu vaccine. 

What can providers do to encourage influenza vaccination in their patients?

We know that a healthcare provider’s strong recommendation for flu vaccination is a really major factor in whether or not patients get a flu vaccine, and is more effective in increasing acceptance of vaccination than just about any other factor. 

There’s a method from CDC called SHARE, which is a helpful way to help make a strong recommendation and provide information to help patients make an informed decision about whether or not they want to be vaccinated.

To implement SHARE, it’s an acronym with five parts. S is for Share the reasons why the flu vaccine is right for that patient. H is for Highlight positive experiences with flu vaccination, either personal or in practice. A is for Address patient concerns and questions about the flu vaccine, including things such as side effects, safety, and effectiveness. R is Remind patients that vaccination protects them and their loved ones from serious illness and related complications. E is Explain the potential complications and consequences of getting influenza, including serious health effects, time lost from family, work, and school, and potential financial costs.

Additional resources are accessible on CDC’s influenza resources page, including brochures, posters, and fact sheets that can help providers in encouraging and reminding people to get vaccinated.

A version of this article appeared on Medscape.com.