'An Organization in Turmoil': Ken Kizer on the Challenges Facing the VA

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'An Organization in Turmoil': Ken Kizer on the Challenges Facing the VA

Kenneth W. Kizer, MD, MPH, knows a thing or two about transition at the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). He served as VA Under Secretary of Health from 1994 to 1999, stepping in during an era of crisis with a mandate for transformation.

Kizer, a Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of California, Davis School of Medicine, is among the top thinkers about the VA and its future. He recently spoke with Federal Practitioner about community care, the electronic health record transition, and other challenges facing the Veterans Health Administration (VHA).

At stake, Kizer explained, is an invaluable service for veterans—and much more. “VA is the largest provider of training for... multiple types of health professionals that people use every day,” he said. “There’s also the research, the direct care provided to veterans, and the contingency support the VA provides, which was very well demonstrated during the COVID pandemic. These are things that benefit all Americans, not just veterans.”

When you look at the VA, what do you see?

I see an organization in turmoil, a great health care system struggling with multiple major challenges simultaneously. The VHA is becoming a very large health insurance program without the necessary infrastructure, and costs are rising rapidly. And it is trying to roll out a new EHR and implement new third-party administrator contracts while suffering from significant staffing reductions and very depressed morale.

There are a host of other high-visibility and high-impact issues, including a major reorganization. There’s been a paucity of details about exactly what is going to change, who is going to be doing what, and how the changes will affect staffing and workflow.

How will the loss of 35,000 health care positions affect veterans' care?

If you don’t have enough people, then you’re not going to be able to provide the care that is needed. Years ago, I led a project assessing the Roseburg VA Medical Center in Central Oregon. Among other things, there were a lot of problems with cardiology care. The biggest complaint the cardiologists had, and why the hospital couldn’t keep cardiologists on staff, was that there weren’t enough support staff to do the electrocardiograms. The cardiologists had to do the electrocardiograms themselves, which meant they weren’t doing other things they should be doing. You can amplify that example in a hundred different ways in VA today. If physicians don’t have adequate support, they get frustrated and disenfranchised. And they leave.

One of the fallacies I’ve heard mentioned in some congressional hearings is that it’s mainly a matter of lower pay in the VA. Pay may be an issue somewhere on the list of recruiting challenges, but more important issues higher up are things like the support clinicians receive, the work environment, whether they feel valued, and how easy it is for them to do their work. Case in point: If you put in a new EHR that doesn’t work as well as the existing one, then some doctors are going to leave.

Is VA being pushed toward privatization?

At some point it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. If you don’t have the staff to provide the services, then you refer more veterans to the community, and you get in a downward spiral. Patients are going to the community, you lose more staff, you continue to be unable to provide services, and more care goes to the community.

A part of this equation that hasn’t been given adequate attention is VA’s teaching mission. If care is increasingly going to the community, those patients won’t be available for the trainees in teaching programs. That in turn impacts the pipeline of clinicians who will be available to serve the population at large. The negative effects will be seen far beyond the VA.

Why have you expressed concern over VA care fragmentation?1

Greater than 80% of VA ICU [intensive care unit] care is now being provided in community hospitals. When patients are discharged from those hospitals, they often continue getting follow-up care in the community because VA doesn’t have good mechanisms to reconnect those patients back to VA care.2

[Other researchers] found that the majority of emergency department care for enrolled veterans in New York State was being paid for by entities other than the VA, most commonly Medicare but also Medicaid and private insurance. Where follow-up care occurred often depended on who paid for the emergency department visit, not necessarily what was best for the patient.3

The core problem is that the VA has very little insight into what’s happening when its enrollees get care that is paid for by another payer. VA doesn’t know when their patients are in a private hospital emergency department, so they can’t reach out in real time, and they can’t reconnect with them afterward.

That is very different than for commercial health plans. They know when one of their enrollees is admitted to an out-of-network hospital, and when they are discharged, and they follow up immediately. VA doesn’t have the infrastructure in place to do that.

Why did the VA spend $44 billion on Medicare Advantage double-payments from 2018 to 2021?4

That number is much larger now—$87 billion from 2019 to 2023. Here’s the problem: When VA enrollees are also enrolled in a Medicare Advantage plan, the Medicare plan gets paid to provide the care for those veterans. But when those enrollees come to the VA, the VA provides and pays for the care but cannot bill Medicare for the costs. So the federal government ends up paying twice for care of the same person.

In a paper I coauthored last December we showed that in 2023 alone VA spent $23 billion for care of veterans enrolled in Medicare Advantage plan. Those duplicative payments accounted for almost 20% of VA's entire medical care budget.5

How can fragmented care be reduced?

Two things really stand out. First, real-time health insurance data sharing across payers is foundational. VA has to know when its patients get care by non-VA providers if it is going to coordinate and provide follow-up care. As a first step, VA and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services need to create a data sharing platform for veterans dually enrolled in VA and Medicare or Medicaid.

This is not a new idea. I tried to do it when I was Under Secretary for Health in the late 1990s, but it never happened for various political reasons. Others have tried since. Maybe now, given how much money is at stake, it will finally get done.

Second, the VA needs to implement rigorous case management for high utilizers. The costs are not evenly distributed across enrollees. Approximately 10% of community care users account for almost 90% of community care expenditures. Common sense says you should intensely manage the care of those high-need patients who account for so much of the costs, try to avoid out-of-network ICU and emergency department care as much as possible, and build relationships with other providers so there are clear mechanisms to reconnect those patients back to VA care after an acute episode is treated outside the VA health system.

Is community care itself the problem?

No. Community care is a good thing for many veterans. It has increased access and made it easier for enrolled veterans to get care in some situations. The problem is that the VA hasn’t built in the mechanisms and processes to share information, manage complex patients, provide follow-up care, or oversee quality in community care.

Historically, VA has been an integrated delivery system that provided the overwhelming majority of care within its own facilities. However, over the last decade it has become a hybrid purchaser-provider system. It has become a very large purchaser of non-VA care, going from about $7 billion to $50 billion in community care spending over the past decade. But the VA hasn’t built the infrastructure—information exchange, case management, utilization review, quality oversight—that a hybrid purchaser-provider system needs to be a prudent purchaser.

What is your perspective on VHA's EHR transition?

The many problems with the rollout of the Oracle/Cerner EHR have been well-documented by the Inspector General, frontline clinicians, and others. The problems have been so bad that implementation has been halted a couple times. They’re now moving forward again, but it remains to be seen whether the problems truly have been fixed.

Still unaddressed is the more fundamental question of whether VistA could have been upgraded and modernized at far less cost and disruption of care. No thorough, deliberative analysis of that was ever done. And some of the ostensible problems with upgrading VistA in years past are no longer an issue.

Given the challenges VA faces, are you optimistic about its future?

While there definitely are problems, they are all solvable. Every challenge the VA is facing can be addressed. The question is when and how, and whether the VA is going to be given a fair chance to work through its challenges.

As for those who look to the private sector and think that’s the solution: They haven’t looked closely enough. The private sector is also struggling with staffing and financing issues, many of the same issues VA is dealing with, just in a somewhat different way. The problems in the private sector will be an increasing challenge for community care going forward.

Overall, my life experience is that dark times are always followed by daylight, so I am confident there are brighter days ahead for VA.

References

1. Kizer KW. Curbing the growing fragmentation of veterans’ health care. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e254148. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.4148

2. Hahn Z, Naiditch H, Talisa V, et al. Intensive care unit admissions purchased or delivered by veterans in the VA health care system. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e255605. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.5605

3. Vashi AA, Urech T, Wu S, Asch S. Fragmented financing in emergency department use among US veterans. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e255635. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.5635

4. Maremont M, Weaver C, McGinty T. Insurers collected billions from medicare for veterans who cost them almost nothing. The Wall Street Journal. December 2, 2024. Accessed March 17, 2026. https://www.wsj.com/health/healthcare /veterans-medicare-insurers-collect-billions-bfd47d27

5. Trivedi AN, Jiang L, Meyers DJ, et al. Spending by the Veterans Affairs health care system for Medicare Advantage Enrollees. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e255653. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.5653

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Kenneth W. Kizer, MD, MPH, knows a thing or two about transition at the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). He served as VA Under Secretary of Health from 1994 to 1999, stepping in during an era of crisis with a mandate for transformation.

Kizer, a Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of California, Davis School of Medicine, is among the top thinkers about the VA and its future. He recently spoke with Federal Practitioner about community care, the electronic health record transition, and other challenges facing the Veterans Health Administration (VHA).

At stake, Kizer explained, is an invaluable service for veterans—and much more. “VA is the largest provider of training for... multiple types of health professionals that people use every day,” he said. “There’s also the research, the direct care provided to veterans, and the contingency support the VA provides, which was very well demonstrated during the COVID pandemic. These are things that benefit all Americans, not just veterans.”

When you look at the VA, what do you see?

I see an organization in turmoil, a great health care system struggling with multiple major challenges simultaneously. The VHA is becoming a very large health insurance program without the necessary infrastructure, and costs are rising rapidly. And it is trying to roll out a new EHR and implement new third-party administrator contracts while suffering from significant staffing reductions and very depressed morale.

There are a host of other high-visibility and high-impact issues, including a major reorganization. There’s been a paucity of details about exactly what is going to change, who is going to be doing what, and how the changes will affect staffing and workflow.

How will the loss of 35,000 health care positions affect veterans' care?

If you don’t have enough people, then you’re not going to be able to provide the care that is needed. Years ago, I led a project assessing the Roseburg VA Medical Center in Central Oregon. Among other things, there were a lot of problems with cardiology care. The biggest complaint the cardiologists had, and why the hospital couldn’t keep cardiologists on staff, was that there weren’t enough support staff to do the electrocardiograms. The cardiologists had to do the electrocardiograms themselves, which meant they weren’t doing other things they should be doing. You can amplify that example in a hundred different ways in VA today. If physicians don’t have adequate support, they get frustrated and disenfranchised. And they leave.

One of the fallacies I’ve heard mentioned in some congressional hearings is that it’s mainly a matter of lower pay in the VA. Pay may be an issue somewhere on the list of recruiting challenges, but more important issues higher up are things like the support clinicians receive, the work environment, whether they feel valued, and how easy it is for them to do their work. Case in point: If you put in a new EHR that doesn’t work as well as the existing one, then some doctors are going to leave.

Is VA being pushed toward privatization?

At some point it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. If you don’t have the staff to provide the services, then you refer more veterans to the community, and you get in a downward spiral. Patients are going to the community, you lose more staff, you continue to be unable to provide services, and more care goes to the community.

A part of this equation that hasn’t been given adequate attention is VA’s teaching mission. If care is increasingly going to the community, those patients won’t be available for the trainees in teaching programs. That in turn impacts the pipeline of clinicians who will be available to serve the population at large. The negative effects will be seen far beyond the VA.

Why have you expressed concern over VA care fragmentation?1

Greater than 80% of VA ICU [intensive care unit] care is now being provided in community hospitals. When patients are discharged from those hospitals, they often continue getting follow-up care in the community because VA doesn’t have good mechanisms to reconnect those patients back to VA care.2

[Other researchers] found that the majority of emergency department care for enrolled veterans in New York State was being paid for by entities other than the VA, most commonly Medicare but also Medicaid and private insurance. Where follow-up care occurred often depended on who paid for the emergency department visit, not necessarily what was best for the patient.3

The core problem is that the VA has very little insight into what’s happening when its enrollees get care that is paid for by another payer. VA doesn’t know when their patients are in a private hospital emergency department, so they can’t reach out in real time, and they can’t reconnect with them afterward.

That is very different than for commercial health plans. They know when one of their enrollees is admitted to an out-of-network hospital, and when they are discharged, and they follow up immediately. VA doesn’t have the infrastructure in place to do that.

Why did the VA spend $44 billion on Medicare Advantage double-payments from 2018 to 2021?4

That number is much larger now—$87 billion from 2019 to 2023. Here’s the problem: When VA enrollees are also enrolled in a Medicare Advantage plan, the Medicare plan gets paid to provide the care for those veterans. But when those enrollees come to the VA, the VA provides and pays for the care but cannot bill Medicare for the costs. So the federal government ends up paying twice for care of the same person.

In a paper I coauthored last December we showed that in 2023 alone VA spent $23 billion for care of veterans enrolled in Medicare Advantage plan. Those duplicative payments accounted for almost 20% of VA's entire medical care budget.5

How can fragmented care be reduced?

Two things really stand out. First, real-time health insurance data sharing across payers is foundational. VA has to know when its patients get care by non-VA providers if it is going to coordinate and provide follow-up care. As a first step, VA and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services need to create a data sharing platform for veterans dually enrolled in VA and Medicare or Medicaid.

This is not a new idea. I tried to do it when I was Under Secretary for Health in the late 1990s, but it never happened for various political reasons. Others have tried since. Maybe now, given how much money is at stake, it will finally get done.

Second, the VA needs to implement rigorous case management for high utilizers. The costs are not evenly distributed across enrollees. Approximately 10% of community care users account for almost 90% of community care expenditures. Common sense says you should intensely manage the care of those high-need patients who account for so much of the costs, try to avoid out-of-network ICU and emergency department care as much as possible, and build relationships with other providers so there are clear mechanisms to reconnect those patients back to VA care after an acute episode is treated outside the VA health system.

Is community care itself the problem?

No. Community care is a good thing for many veterans. It has increased access and made it easier for enrolled veterans to get care in some situations. The problem is that the VA hasn’t built in the mechanisms and processes to share information, manage complex patients, provide follow-up care, or oversee quality in community care.

Historically, VA has been an integrated delivery system that provided the overwhelming majority of care within its own facilities. However, over the last decade it has become a hybrid purchaser-provider system. It has become a very large purchaser of non-VA care, going from about $7 billion to $50 billion in community care spending over the past decade. But the VA hasn’t built the infrastructure—information exchange, case management, utilization review, quality oversight—that a hybrid purchaser-provider system needs to be a prudent purchaser.

What is your perspective on VHA's EHR transition?

The many problems with the rollout of the Oracle/Cerner EHR have been well-documented by the Inspector General, frontline clinicians, and others. The problems have been so bad that implementation has been halted a couple times. They’re now moving forward again, but it remains to be seen whether the problems truly have been fixed.

Still unaddressed is the more fundamental question of whether VistA could have been upgraded and modernized at far less cost and disruption of care. No thorough, deliberative analysis of that was ever done. And some of the ostensible problems with upgrading VistA in years past are no longer an issue.

Given the challenges VA faces, are you optimistic about its future?

While there definitely are problems, they are all solvable. Every challenge the VA is facing can be addressed. The question is when and how, and whether the VA is going to be given a fair chance to work through its challenges.

As for those who look to the private sector and think that’s the solution: They haven’t looked closely enough. The private sector is also struggling with staffing and financing issues, many of the same issues VA is dealing with, just in a somewhat different way. The problems in the private sector will be an increasing challenge for community care going forward.

Overall, my life experience is that dark times are always followed by daylight, so I am confident there are brighter days ahead for VA.

Kenneth W. Kizer, MD, MPH, knows a thing or two about transition at the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). He served as VA Under Secretary of Health from 1994 to 1999, stepping in during an era of crisis with a mandate for transformation.

Kizer, a Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of California, Davis School of Medicine, is among the top thinkers about the VA and its future. He recently spoke with Federal Practitioner about community care, the electronic health record transition, and other challenges facing the Veterans Health Administration (VHA).

At stake, Kizer explained, is an invaluable service for veterans—and much more. “VA is the largest provider of training for... multiple types of health professionals that people use every day,” he said. “There’s also the research, the direct care provided to veterans, and the contingency support the VA provides, which was very well demonstrated during the COVID pandemic. These are things that benefit all Americans, not just veterans.”

When you look at the VA, what do you see?

I see an organization in turmoil, a great health care system struggling with multiple major challenges simultaneously. The VHA is becoming a very large health insurance program without the necessary infrastructure, and costs are rising rapidly. And it is trying to roll out a new EHR and implement new third-party administrator contracts while suffering from significant staffing reductions and very depressed morale.

There are a host of other high-visibility and high-impact issues, including a major reorganization. There’s been a paucity of details about exactly what is going to change, who is going to be doing what, and how the changes will affect staffing and workflow.

How will the loss of 35,000 health care positions affect veterans' care?

If you don’t have enough people, then you’re not going to be able to provide the care that is needed. Years ago, I led a project assessing the Roseburg VA Medical Center in Central Oregon. Among other things, there were a lot of problems with cardiology care. The biggest complaint the cardiologists had, and why the hospital couldn’t keep cardiologists on staff, was that there weren’t enough support staff to do the electrocardiograms. The cardiologists had to do the electrocardiograms themselves, which meant they weren’t doing other things they should be doing. You can amplify that example in a hundred different ways in VA today. If physicians don’t have adequate support, they get frustrated and disenfranchised. And they leave.

One of the fallacies I’ve heard mentioned in some congressional hearings is that it’s mainly a matter of lower pay in the VA. Pay may be an issue somewhere on the list of recruiting challenges, but more important issues higher up are things like the support clinicians receive, the work environment, whether they feel valued, and how easy it is for them to do their work. Case in point: If you put in a new EHR that doesn’t work as well as the existing one, then some doctors are going to leave.

Is VA being pushed toward privatization?

At some point it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. If you don’t have the staff to provide the services, then you refer more veterans to the community, and you get in a downward spiral. Patients are going to the community, you lose more staff, you continue to be unable to provide services, and more care goes to the community.

A part of this equation that hasn’t been given adequate attention is VA’s teaching mission. If care is increasingly going to the community, those patients won’t be available for the trainees in teaching programs. That in turn impacts the pipeline of clinicians who will be available to serve the population at large. The negative effects will be seen far beyond the VA.

Why have you expressed concern over VA care fragmentation?1

Greater than 80% of VA ICU [intensive care unit] care is now being provided in community hospitals. When patients are discharged from those hospitals, they often continue getting follow-up care in the community because VA doesn’t have good mechanisms to reconnect those patients back to VA care.2

[Other researchers] found that the majority of emergency department care for enrolled veterans in New York State was being paid for by entities other than the VA, most commonly Medicare but also Medicaid and private insurance. Where follow-up care occurred often depended on who paid for the emergency department visit, not necessarily what was best for the patient.3

The core problem is that the VA has very little insight into what’s happening when its enrollees get care that is paid for by another payer. VA doesn’t know when their patients are in a private hospital emergency department, so they can’t reach out in real time, and they can’t reconnect with them afterward.

That is very different than for commercial health plans. They know when one of their enrollees is admitted to an out-of-network hospital, and when they are discharged, and they follow up immediately. VA doesn’t have the infrastructure in place to do that.

Why did the VA spend $44 billion on Medicare Advantage double-payments from 2018 to 2021?4

That number is much larger now—$87 billion from 2019 to 2023. Here’s the problem: When VA enrollees are also enrolled in a Medicare Advantage plan, the Medicare plan gets paid to provide the care for those veterans. But when those enrollees come to the VA, the VA provides and pays for the care but cannot bill Medicare for the costs. So the federal government ends up paying twice for care of the same person.

In a paper I coauthored last December we showed that in 2023 alone VA spent $23 billion for care of veterans enrolled in Medicare Advantage plan. Those duplicative payments accounted for almost 20% of VA's entire medical care budget.5

How can fragmented care be reduced?

Two things really stand out. First, real-time health insurance data sharing across payers is foundational. VA has to know when its patients get care by non-VA providers if it is going to coordinate and provide follow-up care. As a first step, VA and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services need to create a data sharing platform for veterans dually enrolled in VA and Medicare or Medicaid.

This is not a new idea. I tried to do it when I was Under Secretary for Health in the late 1990s, but it never happened for various political reasons. Others have tried since. Maybe now, given how much money is at stake, it will finally get done.

Second, the VA needs to implement rigorous case management for high utilizers. The costs are not evenly distributed across enrollees. Approximately 10% of community care users account for almost 90% of community care expenditures. Common sense says you should intensely manage the care of those high-need patients who account for so much of the costs, try to avoid out-of-network ICU and emergency department care as much as possible, and build relationships with other providers so there are clear mechanisms to reconnect those patients back to VA care after an acute episode is treated outside the VA health system.

Is community care itself the problem?

No. Community care is a good thing for many veterans. It has increased access and made it easier for enrolled veterans to get care in some situations. The problem is that the VA hasn’t built in the mechanisms and processes to share information, manage complex patients, provide follow-up care, or oversee quality in community care.

Historically, VA has been an integrated delivery system that provided the overwhelming majority of care within its own facilities. However, over the last decade it has become a hybrid purchaser-provider system. It has become a very large purchaser of non-VA care, going from about $7 billion to $50 billion in community care spending over the past decade. But the VA hasn’t built the infrastructure—information exchange, case management, utilization review, quality oversight—that a hybrid purchaser-provider system needs to be a prudent purchaser.

What is your perspective on VHA's EHR transition?

The many problems with the rollout of the Oracle/Cerner EHR have been well-documented by the Inspector General, frontline clinicians, and others. The problems have been so bad that implementation has been halted a couple times. They’re now moving forward again, but it remains to be seen whether the problems truly have been fixed.

Still unaddressed is the more fundamental question of whether VistA could have been upgraded and modernized at far less cost and disruption of care. No thorough, deliberative analysis of that was ever done. And some of the ostensible problems with upgrading VistA in years past are no longer an issue.

Given the challenges VA faces, are you optimistic about its future?

While there definitely are problems, they are all solvable. Every challenge the VA is facing can be addressed. The question is when and how, and whether the VA is going to be given a fair chance to work through its challenges.

As for those who look to the private sector and think that’s the solution: They haven’t looked closely enough. The private sector is also struggling with staffing and financing issues, many of the same issues VA is dealing with, just in a somewhat different way. The problems in the private sector will be an increasing challenge for community care going forward.

Overall, my life experience is that dark times are always followed by daylight, so I am confident there are brighter days ahead for VA.

References

1. Kizer KW. Curbing the growing fragmentation of veterans’ health care. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e254148. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.4148

2. Hahn Z, Naiditch H, Talisa V, et al. Intensive care unit admissions purchased or delivered by veterans in the VA health care system. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e255605. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.5605

3. Vashi AA, Urech T, Wu S, Asch S. Fragmented financing in emergency department use among US veterans. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e255635. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.5635

4. Maremont M, Weaver C, McGinty T. Insurers collected billions from medicare for veterans who cost them almost nothing. The Wall Street Journal. December 2, 2024. Accessed March 17, 2026. https://www.wsj.com/health/healthcare /veterans-medicare-insurers-collect-billions-bfd47d27

5. Trivedi AN, Jiang L, Meyers DJ, et al. Spending by the Veterans Affairs health care system for Medicare Advantage Enrollees. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e255653. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.5653

References

1. Kizer KW. Curbing the growing fragmentation of veterans’ health care. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e254148. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.4148

2. Hahn Z, Naiditch H, Talisa V, et al. Intensive care unit admissions purchased or delivered by veterans in the VA health care system. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e255605. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.5605

3. Vashi AA, Urech T, Wu S, Asch S. Fragmented financing in emergency department use among US veterans. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e255635. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.5635

4. Maremont M, Weaver C, McGinty T. Insurers collected billions from medicare for veterans who cost them almost nothing. The Wall Street Journal. December 2, 2024. Accessed March 17, 2026. https://www.wsj.com/health/healthcare /veterans-medicare-insurers-collect-billions-bfd47d27

5. Trivedi AN, Jiang L, Meyers DJ, et al. Spending by the Veterans Affairs health care system for Medicare Advantage Enrollees. JAMA Health Forum. 2025;6:e255653. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2025.5653

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Codes, Contracts, and Commitments: Who Defines What is a Profession?

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Codes, Contracts, and Commitments: Who Defines What is a Profession?

A professional is someone who can do his best work when he doesn’t feel like it. 
Alistair Cooke

When I was a young person with no idea about growing up to be something, my father used to tell me there were 4 learned professions: medicine to heal the body, law to protect the body politic, teaching to nurture the mind, and the clergy to care for the soul.1 That adage, or some version of it, is attributed to a variety of sources, likely because it captures something essential and timeless about the learned professions. I write this as a much older person, and it has been my privilege to have worked in some capacity in all 4 of these venerable vocations.

There are many more recognized professions now than in my father’s time with new ones still emerging as the world becomes more complicated and specialized. In November 2025, however, the growth of the professions was dealt a serious blow when the US Department of Education (DOE) redefined what constitutes a profession for the purpose of federal funding of graduate degrees.2 The internet is understandably abuzz with opinions across the political spectrum. What is missing from many of these discussions is an understanding of the criteria for a profession and, even more importantly, who has the authority to decide when an individual or a group has met that standard.

But first, what and why did the DOE make this change? The One Big Beautiful Bill Act charged the DOE with reducing what it claims is massive overspending on graduate education by limiting the programs that meet the definition of a “professional degree” eligible for higher funding. Of my father’s 4, medicine (including dentistry) and law made the cut with students in those professions able to borrow up to $200,000 in direct unsubsidized student loans while those in other programs would be limited to $100,000.2

As one of the oldest and most respected professions in America, nursing has received the most media attention, yet there are also other important and valued professions that are missing from the DOE list.3 The excluded professions also include: physician assistants, physical therapists, audiologists, architects, accountants, educators, and social workers. The proposed regulatory changes are not yet finalized and Congressional representatives, health care experts, and a myriad of professional associations have rightly objected the reclassification will only worsen the critical shortage of nurses, teachers, and other helping professions the country is already facing.4

There are thousands of federal health care professionals who worked long and hard to achieve their goals whom this Act undervalues. Moreover, the regulatory change leaves many students enrolled in education and training programs under federal practice auspices confused and overwhelmed. Perhaps they can take some hope and inspiration from the recognition that historically and philosophically, no agency or administration can unilaterally define what is a profession.

The literature on professionalism is voluminous, in large part because it has been surprisingly difficult to reach a consensus definition. A proposed definition from scholars captures most of the key aspects of a profession. While it is drawn from the medical literature, it applies to most of the caring professions the DOE disqualified. For pedagogic purposes, the definition is parsed into discrete criteria in the Table.5

FDP04301008_T1

Even this simple summary makes it obvious that a government agency alone could not possibly have the competence to determine who meets these complex technical and moral criteria. The members of the profession must assume a primary role in that determination. The complicated history of the professions shows that the locus of these decisions has resided in various combinations of educational institutions, such as nursing schools,6 professional societies (eg, National Association of Social Workers),7 and certifying boards (eg, National Commission on Certification of Physician Assistants).8 States, not the federal government, have long played a key part in defining professions in the US, through their authority to grant licenses to practice.9

In response to criticism, the DOE has stated that “the definition of a ‘professional degree’ is an internal definition used by the Department of Education to distinguish among programs that qualify for higher loan limits, not a value judgment about the importance of programs. It has no bearing on whether a program is professional in nature or not.”2 Given the ancient compact between society and the professions in which the government subsidizes the training of professionals dedicated to public service, it is hard to see how these changes can be dismissed as merely semantic and not a promissory breach.10

I recognize that this abstract editorial is little comfort to beleaguered and demoralized professionals and students. Still, it offers a voice of support for each federal practitioner or trainee who fulfills the epigraph’s description of a professional day after day. The nurse who works the extra shift without complaint or resentment so that veterans receive the care they deserve, the social worker who responds on a weekend night to an active duty family without food so they do not spend another night hungry, and the physician assistant who makes it into the isolated public health clinic despite the terrible weather so there is someone ready to take care for patients in need. The proposed policy shift cannot in any meaningful sense rob them of their identity as individuals committed to a code of caring. However, without an intact social compact, it may well remove their practical ability to remain and enter the helping professions to the detriment of us all.

References
  1. Wade JW. Public responsibilities of the learned professions. Louisiana Law Rev. 1960;21:130-148
  2. US Department of Education. Myth vs. fact: the definition of professional degrees. Press Release. November 24, 2025. Accessed December 22, 2025. https://www.ed.gov/about/news/press-release/myth-vs-fact-definition-of-professional-degrees
  3. Laws J. Full list of degrees not classed as “professional” by Trump admin. Newsweek. Updated November 26, 2025. Accessed December 22, 2025. https://www.newsweek.com/full-list-degrees-professional-trump-administration-11085695
  4. New York Academy of Medicine. Response to stripping “professional status” as proposed by the Department of Education. New York Academy of Medicine. November 24, 2025. Accessed December 22, 2025. https://nyam.org/article/response-to-stripping-professional-status-as-proposed-by-the-department-of-education
  5. Cruess SR, Johnston S, Cruess RL. “Profession”: a working definition for medical educators. Teach Learn Med. 2004;16:74-76. doi:10.1207/s15328015tlm1601_15
  6. American Association of Colleges of Nursing. Nursing is a professional degree. American Association of Colleges of Nursing. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.aacnnursing.org/policy-advocacy/take-action/nursing-is-a-professional-degree
  7. National Association of Social Workers. Social work is a profession. Social Workers. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.socialworkers.org
  8. National Commission on Certification of Physician Assistants. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.nccpa.net/about-nccpa/#who-we-are
  9. The Federation of State Boards of Physical Therapy. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.fsbpt.org/About-Us/Staff-Home
  10. Cruess SR, Cruess RL. Professionalism and medicine’s contract with social contract with society. Virtual Mentor. 2004;6:185-188. doi:10.1001/virtualmentor.2004.6.4.msoc1-040
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A professional is someone who can do his best work when he doesn’t feel like it. 
Alistair Cooke

When I was a young person with no idea about growing up to be something, my father used to tell me there were 4 learned professions: medicine to heal the body, law to protect the body politic, teaching to nurture the mind, and the clergy to care for the soul.1 That adage, or some version of it, is attributed to a variety of sources, likely because it captures something essential and timeless about the learned professions. I write this as a much older person, and it has been my privilege to have worked in some capacity in all 4 of these venerable vocations.

There are many more recognized professions now than in my father’s time with new ones still emerging as the world becomes more complicated and specialized. In November 2025, however, the growth of the professions was dealt a serious blow when the US Department of Education (DOE) redefined what constitutes a profession for the purpose of federal funding of graduate degrees.2 The internet is understandably abuzz with opinions across the political spectrum. What is missing from many of these discussions is an understanding of the criteria for a profession and, even more importantly, who has the authority to decide when an individual or a group has met that standard.

But first, what and why did the DOE make this change? The One Big Beautiful Bill Act charged the DOE with reducing what it claims is massive overspending on graduate education by limiting the programs that meet the definition of a “professional degree” eligible for higher funding. Of my father’s 4, medicine (including dentistry) and law made the cut with students in those professions able to borrow up to $200,000 in direct unsubsidized student loans while those in other programs would be limited to $100,000.2

As one of the oldest and most respected professions in America, nursing has received the most media attention, yet there are also other important and valued professions that are missing from the DOE list.3 The excluded professions also include: physician assistants, physical therapists, audiologists, architects, accountants, educators, and social workers. The proposed regulatory changes are not yet finalized and Congressional representatives, health care experts, and a myriad of professional associations have rightly objected the reclassification will only worsen the critical shortage of nurses, teachers, and other helping professions the country is already facing.4

There are thousands of federal health care professionals who worked long and hard to achieve their goals whom this Act undervalues. Moreover, the regulatory change leaves many students enrolled in education and training programs under federal practice auspices confused and overwhelmed. Perhaps they can take some hope and inspiration from the recognition that historically and philosophically, no agency or administration can unilaterally define what is a profession.

The literature on professionalism is voluminous, in large part because it has been surprisingly difficult to reach a consensus definition. A proposed definition from scholars captures most of the key aspects of a profession. While it is drawn from the medical literature, it applies to most of the caring professions the DOE disqualified. For pedagogic purposes, the definition is parsed into discrete criteria in the Table.5

FDP04301008_T1

Even this simple summary makes it obvious that a government agency alone could not possibly have the competence to determine who meets these complex technical and moral criteria. The members of the profession must assume a primary role in that determination. The complicated history of the professions shows that the locus of these decisions has resided in various combinations of educational institutions, such as nursing schools,6 professional societies (eg, National Association of Social Workers),7 and certifying boards (eg, National Commission on Certification of Physician Assistants).8 States, not the federal government, have long played a key part in defining professions in the US, through their authority to grant licenses to practice.9

In response to criticism, the DOE has stated that “the definition of a ‘professional degree’ is an internal definition used by the Department of Education to distinguish among programs that qualify for higher loan limits, not a value judgment about the importance of programs. It has no bearing on whether a program is professional in nature or not.”2 Given the ancient compact between society and the professions in which the government subsidizes the training of professionals dedicated to public service, it is hard to see how these changes can be dismissed as merely semantic and not a promissory breach.10

I recognize that this abstract editorial is little comfort to beleaguered and demoralized professionals and students. Still, it offers a voice of support for each federal practitioner or trainee who fulfills the epigraph’s description of a professional day after day. The nurse who works the extra shift without complaint or resentment so that veterans receive the care they deserve, the social worker who responds on a weekend night to an active duty family without food so they do not spend another night hungry, and the physician assistant who makes it into the isolated public health clinic despite the terrible weather so there is someone ready to take care for patients in need. The proposed policy shift cannot in any meaningful sense rob them of their identity as individuals committed to a code of caring. However, without an intact social compact, it may well remove their practical ability to remain and enter the helping professions to the detriment of us all.

A professional is someone who can do his best work when he doesn’t feel like it. 
Alistair Cooke

When I was a young person with no idea about growing up to be something, my father used to tell me there were 4 learned professions: medicine to heal the body, law to protect the body politic, teaching to nurture the mind, and the clergy to care for the soul.1 That adage, or some version of it, is attributed to a variety of sources, likely because it captures something essential and timeless about the learned professions. I write this as a much older person, and it has been my privilege to have worked in some capacity in all 4 of these venerable vocations.

There are many more recognized professions now than in my father’s time with new ones still emerging as the world becomes more complicated and specialized. In November 2025, however, the growth of the professions was dealt a serious blow when the US Department of Education (DOE) redefined what constitutes a profession for the purpose of federal funding of graduate degrees.2 The internet is understandably abuzz with opinions across the political spectrum. What is missing from many of these discussions is an understanding of the criteria for a profession and, even more importantly, who has the authority to decide when an individual or a group has met that standard.

But first, what and why did the DOE make this change? The One Big Beautiful Bill Act charged the DOE with reducing what it claims is massive overspending on graduate education by limiting the programs that meet the definition of a “professional degree” eligible for higher funding. Of my father’s 4, medicine (including dentistry) and law made the cut with students in those professions able to borrow up to $200,000 in direct unsubsidized student loans while those in other programs would be limited to $100,000.2

As one of the oldest and most respected professions in America, nursing has received the most media attention, yet there are also other important and valued professions that are missing from the DOE list.3 The excluded professions also include: physician assistants, physical therapists, audiologists, architects, accountants, educators, and social workers. The proposed regulatory changes are not yet finalized and Congressional representatives, health care experts, and a myriad of professional associations have rightly objected the reclassification will only worsen the critical shortage of nurses, teachers, and other helping professions the country is already facing.4

There are thousands of federal health care professionals who worked long and hard to achieve their goals whom this Act undervalues. Moreover, the regulatory change leaves many students enrolled in education and training programs under federal practice auspices confused and overwhelmed. Perhaps they can take some hope and inspiration from the recognition that historically and philosophically, no agency or administration can unilaterally define what is a profession.

The literature on professionalism is voluminous, in large part because it has been surprisingly difficult to reach a consensus definition. A proposed definition from scholars captures most of the key aspects of a profession. While it is drawn from the medical literature, it applies to most of the caring professions the DOE disqualified. For pedagogic purposes, the definition is parsed into discrete criteria in the Table.5

FDP04301008_T1

Even this simple summary makes it obvious that a government agency alone could not possibly have the competence to determine who meets these complex technical and moral criteria. The members of the profession must assume a primary role in that determination. The complicated history of the professions shows that the locus of these decisions has resided in various combinations of educational institutions, such as nursing schools,6 professional societies (eg, National Association of Social Workers),7 and certifying boards (eg, National Commission on Certification of Physician Assistants).8 States, not the federal government, have long played a key part in defining professions in the US, through their authority to grant licenses to practice.9

In response to criticism, the DOE has stated that “the definition of a ‘professional degree’ is an internal definition used by the Department of Education to distinguish among programs that qualify for higher loan limits, not a value judgment about the importance of programs. It has no bearing on whether a program is professional in nature or not.”2 Given the ancient compact between society and the professions in which the government subsidizes the training of professionals dedicated to public service, it is hard to see how these changes can be dismissed as merely semantic and not a promissory breach.10

I recognize that this abstract editorial is little comfort to beleaguered and demoralized professionals and students. Still, it offers a voice of support for each federal practitioner or trainee who fulfills the epigraph’s description of a professional day after day. The nurse who works the extra shift without complaint or resentment so that veterans receive the care they deserve, the social worker who responds on a weekend night to an active duty family without food so they do not spend another night hungry, and the physician assistant who makes it into the isolated public health clinic despite the terrible weather so there is someone ready to take care for patients in need. The proposed policy shift cannot in any meaningful sense rob them of their identity as individuals committed to a code of caring. However, without an intact social compact, it may well remove their practical ability to remain and enter the helping professions to the detriment of us all.

References
  1. Wade JW. Public responsibilities of the learned professions. Louisiana Law Rev. 1960;21:130-148
  2. US Department of Education. Myth vs. fact: the definition of professional degrees. Press Release. November 24, 2025. Accessed December 22, 2025. https://www.ed.gov/about/news/press-release/myth-vs-fact-definition-of-professional-degrees
  3. Laws J. Full list of degrees not classed as “professional” by Trump admin. Newsweek. Updated November 26, 2025. Accessed December 22, 2025. https://www.newsweek.com/full-list-degrees-professional-trump-administration-11085695
  4. New York Academy of Medicine. Response to stripping “professional status” as proposed by the Department of Education. New York Academy of Medicine. November 24, 2025. Accessed December 22, 2025. https://nyam.org/article/response-to-stripping-professional-status-as-proposed-by-the-department-of-education
  5. Cruess SR, Johnston S, Cruess RL. “Profession”: a working definition for medical educators. Teach Learn Med. 2004;16:74-76. doi:10.1207/s15328015tlm1601_15
  6. American Association of Colleges of Nursing. Nursing is a professional degree. American Association of Colleges of Nursing. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.aacnnursing.org/policy-advocacy/take-action/nursing-is-a-professional-degree
  7. National Association of Social Workers. Social work is a profession. Social Workers. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.socialworkers.org
  8. National Commission on Certification of Physician Assistants. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.nccpa.net/about-nccpa/#who-we-are
  9. The Federation of State Boards of Physical Therapy. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.fsbpt.org/About-Us/Staff-Home
  10. Cruess SR, Cruess RL. Professionalism and medicine’s contract with social contract with society. Virtual Mentor. 2004;6:185-188. doi:10.1001/virtualmentor.2004.6.4.msoc1-040
References
  1. Wade JW. Public responsibilities of the learned professions. Louisiana Law Rev. 1960;21:130-148
  2. US Department of Education. Myth vs. fact: the definition of professional degrees. Press Release. November 24, 2025. Accessed December 22, 2025. https://www.ed.gov/about/news/press-release/myth-vs-fact-definition-of-professional-degrees
  3. Laws J. Full list of degrees not classed as “professional” by Trump admin. Newsweek. Updated November 26, 2025. Accessed December 22, 2025. https://www.newsweek.com/full-list-degrees-professional-trump-administration-11085695
  4. New York Academy of Medicine. Response to stripping “professional status” as proposed by the Department of Education. New York Academy of Medicine. November 24, 2025. Accessed December 22, 2025. https://nyam.org/article/response-to-stripping-professional-status-as-proposed-by-the-department-of-education
  5. Cruess SR, Johnston S, Cruess RL. “Profession”: a working definition for medical educators. Teach Learn Med. 2004;16:74-76. doi:10.1207/s15328015tlm1601_15
  6. American Association of Colleges of Nursing. Nursing is a professional degree. American Association of Colleges of Nursing. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.aacnnursing.org/policy-advocacy/take-action/nursing-is-a-professional-degree
  7. National Association of Social Workers. Social work is a profession. Social Workers. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.socialworkers.org
  8. National Commission on Certification of Physician Assistants. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.nccpa.net/about-nccpa/#who-we-are
  9. The Federation of State Boards of Physical Therapy. Accessed December 20, 2025. https://www.fsbpt.org/About-Us/Staff-Home
  10. Cruess SR, Cruess RL. Professionalism and medicine’s contract with social contract with society. Virtual Mentor. 2004;6:185-188. doi:10.1001/virtualmentor.2004.6.4.msoc1-040
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The Once and Future Veterans Health Administration

He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin ... will obtain the clearest view of them. Politics, Book I, Part II by Aristotle

Many seasoned observers of federal practice have signaled that the future of US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care is threatened as never before. Political forces and economic interests are siphoning Veterans Health Administration (VHA) capital and human resources into the community with an ineluctable push toward privatization.1

This Veterans Day, the vitality, if not the very viability of veteran health care, is in serious jeopardy, so it seems fitting to review the rationale for having institutions dedicated to the specialized medical treatment of veterans. Aristotle advises us on how to undertake this intellectual exercise in the epigraph. This column will revisit the historical origins of VA medicine to better appreciate the justification of an agency committed to this unique purpose and what may be sacrificed if it is decimated. 

The provision of medical care focused on the injuries and illnesses of warriors is as old as war. The ancient Romans had among the first veterans’ hospital, named a valetudinarium. Sick and injured members of the Roman legions received state-of-the-art medical and surgical care from military doctors inside these facilities.2

In the United States, federal practice emerged almost simultaneously with the birth of a nation. Wounded troops and families of slain soldiers required rehabilitation and support from the fledgling federal government. This began a pattern of development in which each war generated novel injuries and disorders that required the VA to evolve (Table).3

FDP04211402_T1

Many arguments can be marshalled to demonstrate the importance of not just ensuring VA health care survives but also has the resources needed to thrive. I will highlight what I argue are the most important justifications for its existence.

The ethical argument: President Abraham Lincoln and a long line of government officials for more than 2 centuries have called the provision of high-quality health care focused on veterans a sacred trust. Failing to fulfill that promise is a violation of the deepest principles of veracity and fidelity that those who govern owe to the citizens who selflessly sacrificed time, health, and even in some cases life, for the safety and well-being of their country.4

The quality argument: Dozens of studies have found that compared to the community, many areas of veteran medical care are just plain better. Two surveys particularly salient in the aging veteran population illustrate this growing body of positive research. The most recent and largest survey of Medicare patients found that VHA hospitals surpassed community-based hospitals on all 10 metrics.5 A retrospective cohort study of mortality compared veterans transported by ambulance to VHA or community-based hospitals. The researchers found that those taken to VHA facilities had a 30-day all cause adjustment mortality 20 times lower than those taken to civilian hospitals, especially among minoritized populations who generally have higher mortality.6

The cultural argument: Glance at almost any form of communication from veterans or about their health care and you will apprehend common cultural themes. Even when frustrated that the system has not lived up to their expectations, and perhaps because of their sense of belonging, they voice ownership of VHA as their medical home. Surveys of veteran experiences have shown many feel more comfortable receiving care in the company of comrades in arms and from health care professionals with expertise and experience with veterans’ distinctive medical problems and the military values that inform their preferences for care.7

The complexity argument: Anyone who has worked even a short time in a VHA hospital or clinic knows the patients are in general more complicated than similar patients in the community. Multiple medical, geriatric, neuropsychiatric, substance use, and social comorbidities are the expectation, not the exception, as in some civilian systems. Many of the conditions common in the VHA such as traumatic brain injury, service-connected cancers, suicidal ideation, environmental exposures, and posttraumatic stress disorder would be encountered in community health care settings. The differences between VHA and community care led the RAND Corporation to caution that “Community care providers might not be equipped to handle the needs of veterans.”8

Let me bring this 1000-foot view of the crisis facing federal practice down to the literal level of my own home. For many years I have had a wonderful mechanic who has a mobile bike service. I was talking to him as he fixed my trike. I never knew he was a Vietnam era veteran, and he didn’t realize that I was a career VA health care professional at the very VHA hospital where he received care. He spontaneously told me that, “when I first got out, the VA was awful, but now it is wonderful and they are so good to me. I would not go anywhere else.” For the many veterans of that era who would echo his sentiments, we must not allow the VA to lose all it has gained since that painful time

Another philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard, wrote that “life must be understood backwards but lived forwards.”9 Our own brief back to the future journey in this editorial has, I hope, shown that VHA medical institutions and health professionals cannot be replaced with or replicated by civilian systems and clinicians. Continued attempts to do so betray the trust and risks the health and well-being of veterans. It also would deprive the country of research, innovation, and education that make unparalleled contributions to public health. Ultimately, these efforts to diminish VHA compromise the solidarity of service members with each other and with their federal practitioners. If this trend to dismantle an organization that originated with the sole purpose of caring for veterans continues, then the public expressions of respect and gratitude will sound shallower and more tentative with each passing Veterans Day.

References
  1. Quil L. Hundreds of VA clinicians warn that cuts threaten vet’s health care. National Public Radio. October 1, 2025. Accessed October 27, 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/10/01/nx-s1-5554394/hundreds-of-va-clinicians-warn-that-cuts-threaten-vets-health-care
  2. Nutton V. Ancient Medicine. 2nd ed. Routledge; 2012.
  3. US Department of Veterans Affairs. VA History Summary. Updated June 13, 2025. Accessed October 27, 2025. https://department.va.gov/history/history-overview/
  4. Geppert CMA. Learning from history: the ethical foundation of VA health care. Fed Pract. 2016;33:6-7.
  5. US Department of Veterans Affairs. Nationwide patient survey shows VA hospitals outperform non-VA hospitals. News release. June 14, 2023. Accessed October 27, 2025. https://news.va.gov/press-room/nationwide-patient-survey-shows-va-hospitals-outperform-non-va-hospitals
  6. Chan DC, Danesh K, Costantini S, Card D, Taylor L, Studdert DM. Mortality among US veterans after emergency visits to Veterans Affairs and other hospitals: retrospective cohort study. BMJ. 2022;376:e068099. doi:10.1136/bmj-2021-068099
  7. Vigilante K, Batten SV, Shang Q, et al. Camaraderie among US veterans and their preferences for health care systems and practitioners. JAMA Netw Open. 2025;8(4):e255253. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2025.5253
  8. Rasmussen P, Farmer CM. The promise and challenges of VA community care: veterans’ issues in focus. Rand Health Q. 2023;10:9.
  9. Kierkegaard S. Journalen JJ:167 (1843) in: Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter. Vol 18. Copenhagen; 1997:306.
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He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin ... will obtain the clearest view of them. Politics, Book I, Part II by Aristotle

Many seasoned observers of federal practice have signaled that the future of US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care is threatened as never before. Political forces and economic interests are siphoning Veterans Health Administration (VHA) capital and human resources into the community with an ineluctable push toward privatization.1

This Veterans Day, the vitality, if not the very viability of veteran health care, is in serious jeopardy, so it seems fitting to review the rationale for having institutions dedicated to the specialized medical treatment of veterans. Aristotle advises us on how to undertake this intellectual exercise in the epigraph. This column will revisit the historical origins of VA medicine to better appreciate the justification of an agency committed to this unique purpose and what may be sacrificed if it is decimated. 

The provision of medical care focused on the injuries and illnesses of warriors is as old as war. The ancient Romans had among the first veterans’ hospital, named a valetudinarium. Sick and injured members of the Roman legions received state-of-the-art medical and surgical care from military doctors inside these facilities.2

In the United States, federal practice emerged almost simultaneously with the birth of a nation. Wounded troops and families of slain soldiers required rehabilitation and support from the fledgling federal government. This began a pattern of development in which each war generated novel injuries and disorders that required the VA to evolve (Table).3

FDP04211402_T1

Many arguments can be marshalled to demonstrate the importance of not just ensuring VA health care survives but also has the resources needed to thrive. I will highlight what I argue are the most important justifications for its existence.

The ethical argument: President Abraham Lincoln and a long line of government officials for more than 2 centuries have called the provision of high-quality health care focused on veterans a sacred trust. Failing to fulfill that promise is a violation of the deepest principles of veracity and fidelity that those who govern owe to the citizens who selflessly sacrificed time, health, and even in some cases life, for the safety and well-being of their country.4

The quality argument: Dozens of studies have found that compared to the community, many areas of veteran medical care are just plain better. Two surveys particularly salient in the aging veteran population illustrate this growing body of positive research. The most recent and largest survey of Medicare patients found that VHA hospitals surpassed community-based hospitals on all 10 metrics.5 A retrospective cohort study of mortality compared veterans transported by ambulance to VHA or community-based hospitals. The researchers found that those taken to VHA facilities had a 30-day all cause adjustment mortality 20 times lower than those taken to civilian hospitals, especially among minoritized populations who generally have higher mortality.6

The cultural argument: Glance at almost any form of communication from veterans or about their health care and you will apprehend common cultural themes. Even when frustrated that the system has not lived up to their expectations, and perhaps because of their sense of belonging, they voice ownership of VHA as their medical home. Surveys of veteran experiences have shown many feel more comfortable receiving care in the company of comrades in arms and from health care professionals with expertise and experience with veterans’ distinctive medical problems and the military values that inform their preferences for care.7

The complexity argument: Anyone who has worked even a short time in a VHA hospital or clinic knows the patients are in general more complicated than similar patients in the community. Multiple medical, geriatric, neuropsychiatric, substance use, and social comorbidities are the expectation, not the exception, as in some civilian systems. Many of the conditions common in the VHA such as traumatic brain injury, service-connected cancers, suicidal ideation, environmental exposures, and posttraumatic stress disorder would be encountered in community health care settings. The differences between VHA and community care led the RAND Corporation to caution that “Community care providers might not be equipped to handle the needs of veterans.”8

Let me bring this 1000-foot view of the crisis facing federal practice down to the literal level of my own home. For many years I have had a wonderful mechanic who has a mobile bike service. I was talking to him as he fixed my trike. I never knew he was a Vietnam era veteran, and he didn’t realize that I was a career VA health care professional at the very VHA hospital where he received care. He spontaneously told me that, “when I first got out, the VA was awful, but now it is wonderful and they are so good to me. I would not go anywhere else.” For the many veterans of that era who would echo his sentiments, we must not allow the VA to lose all it has gained since that painful time

Another philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard, wrote that “life must be understood backwards but lived forwards.”9 Our own brief back to the future journey in this editorial has, I hope, shown that VHA medical institutions and health professionals cannot be replaced with or replicated by civilian systems and clinicians. Continued attempts to do so betray the trust and risks the health and well-being of veterans. It also would deprive the country of research, innovation, and education that make unparalleled contributions to public health. Ultimately, these efforts to diminish VHA compromise the solidarity of service members with each other and with their federal practitioners. If this trend to dismantle an organization that originated with the sole purpose of caring for veterans continues, then the public expressions of respect and gratitude will sound shallower and more tentative with each passing Veterans Day.

He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin ... will obtain the clearest view of them. Politics, Book I, Part II by Aristotle

Many seasoned observers of federal practice have signaled that the future of US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care is threatened as never before. Political forces and economic interests are siphoning Veterans Health Administration (VHA) capital and human resources into the community with an ineluctable push toward privatization.1

This Veterans Day, the vitality, if not the very viability of veteran health care, is in serious jeopardy, so it seems fitting to review the rationale for having institutions dedicated to the specialized medical treatment of veterans. Aristotle advises us on how to undertake this intellectual exercise in the epigraph. This column will revisit the historical origins of VA medicine to better appreciate the justification of an agency committed to this unique purpose and what may be sacrificed if it is decimated. 

The provision of medical care focused on the injuries and illnesses of warriors is as old as war. The ancient Romans had among the first veterans’ hospital, named a valetudinarium. Sick and injured members of the Roman legions received state-of-the-art medical and surgical care from military doctors inside these facilities.2

In the United States, federal practice emerged almost simultaneously with the birth of a nation. Wounded troops and families of slain soldiers required rehabilitation and support from the fledgling federal government. This began a pattern of development in which each war generated novel injuries and disorders that required the VA to evolve (Table).3

FDP04211402_T1

Many arguments can be marshalled to demonstrate the importance of not just ensuring VA health care survives but also has the resources needed to thrive. I will highlight what I argue are the most important justifications for its existence.

The ethical argument: President Abraham Lincoln and a long line of government officials for more than 2 centuries have called the provision of high-quality health care focused on veterans a sacred trust. Failing to fulfill that promise is a violation of the deepest principles of veracity and fidelity that those who govern owe to the citizens who selflessly sacrificed time, health, and even in some cases life, for the safety and well-being of their country.4

The quality argument: Dozens of studies have found that compared to the community, many areas of veteran medical care are just plain better. Two surveys particularly salient in the aging veteran population illustrate this growing body of positive research. The most recent and largest survey of Medicare patients found that VHA hospitals surpassed community-based hospitals on all 10 metrics.5 A retrospective cohort study of mortality compared veterans transported by ambulance to VHA or community-based hospitals. The researchers found that those taken to VHA facilities had a 30-day all cause adjustment mortality 20 times lower than those taken to civilian hospitals, especially among minoritized populations who generally have higher mortality.6

The cultural argument: Glance at almost any form of communication from veterans or about their health care and you will apprehend common cultural themes. Even when frustrated that the system has not lived up to their expectations, and perhaps because of their sense of belonging, they voice ownership of VHA as their medical home. Surveys of veteran experiences have shown many feel more comfortable receiving care in the company of comrades in arms and from health care professionals with expertise and experience with veterans’ distinctive medical problems and the military values that inform their preferences for care.7

The complexity argument: Anyone who has worked even a short time in a VHA hospital or clinic knows the patients are in general more complicated than similar patients in the community. Multiple medical, geriatric, neuropsychiatric, substance use, and social comorbidities are the expectation, not the exception, as in some civilian systems. Many of the conditions common in the VHA such as traumatic brain injury, service-connected cancers, suicidal ideation, environmental exposures, and posttraumatic stress disorder would be encountered in community health care settings. The differences between VHA and community care led the RAND Corporation to caution that “Community care providers might not be equipped to handle the needs of veterans.”8

Let me bring this 1000-foot view of the crisis facing federal practice down to the literal level of my own home. For many years I have had a wonderful mechanic who has a mobile bike service. I was talking to him as he fixed my trike. I never knew he was a Vietnam era veteran, and he didn’t realize that I was a career VA health care professional at the very VHA hospital where he received care. He spontaneously told me that, “when I first got out, the VA was awful, but now it is wonderful and they are so good to me. I would not go anywhere else.” For the many veterans of that era who would echo his sentiments, we must not allow the VA to lose all it has gained since that painful time

Another philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard, wrote that “life must be understood backwards but lived forwards.”9 Our own brief back to the future journey in this editorial has, I hope, shown that VHA medical institutions and health professionals cannot be replaced with or replicated by civilian systems and clinicians. Continued attempts to do so betray the trust and risks the health and well-being of veterans. It also would deprive the country of research, innovation, and education that make unparalleled contributions to public health. Ultimately, these efforts to diminish VHA compromise the solidarity of service members with each other and with their federal practitioners. If this trend to dismantle an organization that originated with the sole purpose of caring for veterans continues, then the public expressions of respect and gratitude will sound shallower and more tentative with each passing Veterans Day.

References
  1. Quil L. Hundreds of VA clinicians warn that cuts threaten vet’s health care. National Public Radio. October 1, 2025. Accessed October 27, 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/10/01/nx-s1-5554394/hundreds-of-va-clinicians-warn-that-cuts-threaten-vets-health-care
  2. Nutton V. Ancient Medicine. 2nd ed. Routledge; 2012.
  3. US Department of Veterans Affairs. VA History Summary. Updated June 13, 2025. Accessed October 27, 2025. https://department.va.gov/history/history-overview/
  4. Geppert CMA. Learning from history: the ethical foundation of VA health care. Fed Pract. 2016;33:6-7.
  5. US Department of Veterans Affairs. Nationwide patient survey shows VA hospitals outperform non-VA hospitals. News release. June 14, 2023. Accessed October 27, 2025. https://news.va.gov/press-room/nationwide-patient-survey-shows-va-hospitals-outperform-non-va-hospitals
  6. Chan DC, Danesh K, Costantini S, Card D, Taylor L, Studdert DM. Mortality among US veterans after emergency visits to Veterans Affairs and other hospitals: retrospective cohort study. BMJ. 2022;376:e068099. doi:10.1136/bmj-2021-068099
  7. Vigilante K, Batten SV, Shang Q, et al. Camaraderie among US veterans and their preferences for health care systems and practitioners. JAMA Netw Open. 2025;8(4):e255253. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2025.5253
  8. Rasmussen P, Farmer CM. The promise and challenges of VA community care: veterans’ issues in focus. Rand Health Q. 2023;10:9.
  9. Kierkegaard S. Journalen JJ:167 (1843) in: Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter. Vol 18. Copenhagen; 1997:306.
References
  1. Quil L. Hundreds of VA clinicians warn that cuts threaten vet’s health care. National Public Radio. October 1, 2025. Accessed October 27, 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/10/01/nx-s1-5554394/hundreds-of-va-clinicians-warn-that-cuts-threaten-vets-health-care
  2. Nutton V. Ancient Medicine. 2nd ed. Routledge; 2012.
  3. US Department of Veterans Affairs. VA History Summary. Updated June 13, 2025. Accessed October 27, 2025. https://department.va.gov/history/history-overview/
  4. Geppert CMA. Learning from history: the ethical foundation of VA health care. Fed Pract. 2016;33:6-7.
  5. US Department of Veterans Affairs. Nationwide patient survey shows VA hospitals outperform non-VA hospitals. News release. June 14, 2023. Accessed October 27, 2025. https://news.va.gov/press-room/nationwide-patient-survey-shows-va-hospitals-outperform-non-va-hospitals
  6. Chan DC, Danesh K, Costantini S, Card D, Taylor L, Studdert DM. Mortality among US veterans after emergency visits to Veterans Affairs and other hospitals: retrospective cohort study. BMJ. 2022;376:e068099. doi:10.1136/bmj-2021-068099
  7. Vigilante K, Batten SV, Shang Q, et al. Camaraderie among US veterans and their preferences for health care systems and practitioners. JAMA Netw Open. 2025;8(4):e255253. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2025.5253
  8. Rasmussen P, Farmer CM. The promise and challenges of VA community care: veterans’ issues in focus. Rand Health Q. 2023;10:9.
  9. Kierkegaard S. Journalen JJ:167 (1843) in: Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter. Vol 18. Copenhagen; 1997:306.
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VHA Facilities Report Severe Staffing Shortages

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VHA Facilities Report Severe Staffing Shortages

For > 10 years, the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) has annually surveyed Veterans Health Administration (VHA) facilities about staffing. Its recently released report is the 8th to find severe shortagesin this case, across the board. There were 4434 severe staffing shortages reported across all 139 VHA facilities in fiscal year (FY) 2025, a 50% increase from FY 2024.

In the OIG report lexicon, a severe shortage refers to "particular occupations that are difficult to fill," and is not necessarily an indication of vacancies. Vacancy refers to a "specific unoccupied position and is distinct from the designation of a severe shortage." For example, a facility could identify an occupation as a severe occupational shortage, which could have no vacant positions or 100 vacant positions.

Nearly all facilities (94%) had severe shortages for medical officers, and 79% had severe shortages for nurses even with VHA's ability to make noncompetitive appointments for those occupations. Psychology was the most frequently reported severe clinical occupational staffing shortage, reported by 79 facilities (57%), down slightly from FY 2024 (61%). One facility reported 116 clinical occupational shortages.

The report notes that the OIG does not verify or otherwise confirm the questionnaire responses, but it appears to support other data. In the first 9 months of FY 2024, the VA added 223 physicians and 3196 nurses compared with a deficit of 781 physicians and 2129 nurses over the same period in FY 2025.

VHA facilities are finding it hard to reverse the trend. According to internal documents examined by ProPublica, nearly 4 in 10 of the roughly 2000 doctors offered jobs from January through March 2025 turned them down, 4 times the rate in the same time period in 2024. VHA also lost twice as many nurses as it hired between January and June. Many potential candidates reportedly were worried about the stability of VA employment.

VA spokesperson Peter Kasperowicz did not dispute the ProPublica findings but accused the news outlet of bias and "cherry-picking issues that are mostly routine." A nationwide shortage of health care workers has made hiring and retention difficult, he said.

Kasperowicz said the VA is "working to address" the number of doctors declining job offers by speeding up the hiring process and that the agency "has several strategies to navigate shortages." Those include referring veterans to telehealth and private clinicians.

In a statement released Aug. 12, Sen Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), ranking member of the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, said, "This report confirms what we've warned for monthsthis Administration is driving dedicated VA employees to the private sector at untenable rates."

The OIG survey did not ask about facilities' rationales for identifying shortages. Moreover, the OIG says the responses don't reflect the possible impacts of "workforce reshaping efforts," such as the Deferred Resignation Program announced on January 28, 2025.

In response to the OIG report, Kasperowicz said it is "not based on actual VA health care facility vacancies and therefore is not a reliable indicator of staffing shortages." In a statement to CBS News, he added, "The report simply lists occupations facilities feel are difficult for which to recruit and retain, so the results are completely subjective, not standardized, and unreliable." According to Kasperowicz, the system-wide vacancy rates for doctors and nurses are 14% and 10%, respectively, which are in line with historical averages.

The OIG made no recommendations but "encourages VA leaders to use these review results to inform staffing initiatives and organizational change."

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For > 10 years, the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) has annually surveyed Veterans Health Administration (VHA) facilities about staffing. Its recently released report is the 8th to find severe shortagesin this case, across the board. There were 4434 severe staffing shortages reported across all 139 VHA facilities in fiscal year (FY) 2025, a 50% increase from FY 2024.

In the OIG report lexicon, a severe shortage refers to "particular occupations that are difficult to fill," and is not necessarily an indication of vacancies. Vacancy refers to a "specific unoccupied position and is distinct from the designation of a severe shortage." For example, a facility could identify an occupation as a severe occupational shortage, which could have no vacant positions or 100 vacant positions.

Nearly all facilities (94%) had severe shortages for medical officers, and 79% had severe shortages for nurses even with VHA's ability to make noncompetitive appointments for those occupations. Psychology was the most frequently reported severe clinical occupational staffing shortage, reported by 79 facilities (57%), down slightly from FY 2024 (61%). One facility reported 116 clinical occupational shortages.

The report notes that the OIG does not verify or otherwise confirm the questionnaire responses, but it appears to support other data. In the first 9 months of FY 2024, the VA added 223 physicians and 3196 nurses compared with a deficit of 781 physicians and 2129 nurses over the same period in FY 2025.

VHA facilities are finding it hard to reverse the trend. According to internal documents examined by ProPublica, nearly 4 in 10 of the roughly 2000 doctors offered jobs from January through March 2025 turned them down, 4 times the rate in the same time period in 2024. VHA also lost twice as many nurses as it hired between January and June. Many potential candidates reportedly were worried about the stability of VA employment.

VA spokesperson Peter Kasperowicz did not dispute the ProPublica findings but accused the news outlet of bias and "cherry-picking issues that are mostly routine." A nationwide shortage of health care workers has made hiring and retention difficult, he said.

Kasperowicz said the VA is "working to address" the number of doctors declining job offers by speeding up the hiring process and that the agency "has several strategies to navigate shortages." Those include referring veterans to telehealth and private clinicians.

In a statement released Aug. 12, Sen Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), ranking member of the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, said, "This report confirms what we've warned for monthsthis Administration is driving dedicated VA employees to the private sector at untenable rates."

The OIG survey did not ask about facilities' rationales for identifying shortages. Moreover, the OIG says the responses don't reflect the possible impacts of "workforce reshaping efforts," such as the Deferred Resignation Program announced on January 28, 2025.

In response to the OIG report, Kasperowicz said it is "not based on actual VA health care facility vacancies and therefore is not a reliable indicator of staffing shortages." In a statement to CBS News, he added, "The report simply lists occupations facilities feel are difficult for which to recruit and retain, so the results are completely subjective, not standardized, and unreliable." According to Kasperowicz, the system-wide vacancy rates for doctors and nurses are 14% and 10%, respectively, which are in line with historical averages.

The OIG made no recommendations but "encourages VA leaders to use these review results to inform staffing initiatives and organizational change."

For > 10 years, the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) has annually surveyed Veterans Health Administration (VHA) facilities about staffing. Its recently released report is the 8th to find severe shortagesin this case, across the board. There were 4434 severe staffing shortages reported across all 139 VHA facilities in fiscal year (FY) 2025, a 50% increase from FY 2024.

In the OIG report lexicon, a severe shortage refers to "particular occupations that are difficult to fill," and is not necessarily an indication of vacancies. Vacancy refers to a "specific unoccupied position and is distinct from the designation of a severe shortage." For example, a facility could identify an occupation as a severe occupational shortage, which could have no vacant positions or 100 vacant positions.

Nearly all facilities (94%) had severe shortages for medical officers, and 79% had severe shortages for nurses even with VHA's ability to make noncompetitive appointments for those occupations. Psychology was the most frequently reported severe clinical occupational staffing shortage, reported by 79 facilities (57%), down slightly from FY 2024 (61%). One facility reported 116 clinical occupational shortages.

The report notes that the OIG does not verify or otherwise confirm the questionnaire responses, but it appears to support other data. In the first 9 months of FY 2024, the VA added 223 physicians and 3196 nurses compared with a deficit of 781 physicians and 2129 nurses over the same period in FY 2025.

VHA facilities are finding it hard to reverse the trend. According to internal documents examined by ProPublica, nearly 4 in 10 of the roughly 2000 doctors offered jobs from January through March 2025 turned them down, 4 times the rate in the same time period in 2024. VHA also lost twice as many nurses as it hired between January and June. Many potential candidates reportedly were worried about the stability of VA employment.

VA spokesperson Peter Kasperowicz did not dispute the ProPublica findings but accused the news outlet of bias and "cherry-picking issues that are mostly routine." A nationwide shortage of health care workers has made hiring and retention difficult, he said.

Kasperowicz said the VA is "working to address" the number of doctors declining job offers by speeding up the hiring process and that the agency "has several strategies to navigate shortages." Those include referring veterans to telehealth and private clinicians.

In a statement released Aug. 12, Sen Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), ranking member of the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, said, "This report confirms what we've warned for monthsthis Administration is driving dedicated VA employees to the private sector at untenable rates."

The OIG survey did not ask about facilities' rationales for identifying shortages. Moreover, the OIG says the responses don't reflect the possible impacts of "workforce reshaping efforts," such as the Deferred Resignation Program announced on January 28, 2025.

In response to the OIG report, Kasperowicz said it is "not based on actual VA health care facility vacancies and therefore is not a reliable indicator of staffing shortages." In a statement to CBS News, he added, "The report simply lists occupations facilities feel are difficult for which to recruit and retain, so the results are completely subjective, not standardized, and unreliable." According to Kasperowicz, the system-wide vacancy rates for doctors and nurses are 14% and 10%, respectively, which are in line with historical averages.

The OIG made no recommendations but "encourages VA leaders to use these review results to inform staffing initiatives and organizational change."

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VA Workforce Shrinking as it Loses Collective Bargaining Rights

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The US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is on pace to cut nearly 30,000 positions by the end of fiscal year 2025, an initiative driven by a federal hiring freeze, deferred resignations, retirements, and normal attrition. According to the VA Workforce Dashboard, health care experienced the most significant net change through the first 9 months of fiscal year 2025. That included 2129 fewer registered nurses, 751 fewer physicians, and drops of 565 licensed practical nurses, 564 nurse assistants, and 1294 medical support assistants. In total, nearly 17,000 VA employees have left their jobs and 12,000 more are expected to leave by the end of September 2025.

According to VA Secretary Doug Collins, the departures have eliminated the need for the "large-scale" reduction-in-force that he proposed earlier in 2025.

The VA also announced that in accordance with an Executive Order issued by President Donald Trump, it is terminating collective bargaining rights for most of its employees, including most clinical staff not in leadership positions. The order includes the National Nurses Organizing Committee/National Nurses United, which represents 16,000 VA nurses, and the American Federation of Government Employees, which represents 320,000 VA employees. The order exempted police officers, firefighters, and security guards. The Unions have indicated they will continue to fight the changes.

VA staffing has undergone significant reversals over the past year. The VA added 223 physicians and 3196 nurses in the first 9 months of fiscal year 2024 before reversing course this year. According to the Workforce Dashboard, the VA and Veterans Health Administration combined to hire 26,984 employees in fiscal year 2025. Cumulative losses, however, totaled 54,308.

During exit interviews, VA employees noted a variety of reasons for their departure. "Personal/family matters" and "geographic relocation" were cited by many job categories. In addition, medical and dental workers also noted "poor working relationship with supervisor or coworker(s)," "desired work schedule not offered," and "job stress/pressure" among the causes. The VA has lost 148 psychologists in fiscal year 2025 who cited "lack of trust/confidence in senior leaders," as well as "policy or technology barriers to getting the work done," and "job stress/pressure" among their reasons for departure.

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The US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is on pace to cut nearly 30,000 positions by the end of fiscal year 2025, an initiative driven by a federal hiring freeze, deferred resignations, retirements, and normal attrition. According to the VA Workforce Dashboard, health care experienced the most significant net change through the first 9 months of fiscal year 2025. That included 2129 fewer registered nurses, 751 fewer physicians, and drops of 565 licensed practical nurses, 564 nurse assistants, and 1294 medical support assistants. In total, nearly 17,000 VA employees have left their jobs and 12,000 more are expected to leave by the end of September 2025.

According to VA Secretary Doug Collins, the departures have eliminated the need for the "large-scale" reduction-in-force that he proposed earlier in 2025.

The VA also announced that in accordance with an Executive Order issued by President Donald Trump, it is terminating collective bargaining rights for most of its employees, including most clinical staff not in leadership positions. The order includes the National Nurses Organizing Committee/National Nurses United, which represents 16,000 VA nurses, and the American Federation of Government Employees, which represents 320,000 VA employees. The order exempted police officers, firefighters, and security guards. The Unions have indicated they will continue to fight the changes.

VA staffing has undergone significant reversals over the past year. The VA added 223 physicians and 3196 nurses in the first 9 months of fiscal year 2024 before reversing course this year. According to the Workforce Dashboard, the VA and Veterans Health Administration combined to hire 26,984 employees in fiscal year 2025. Cumulative losses, however, totaled 54,308.

During exit interviews, VA employees noted a variety of reasons for their departure. "Personal/family matters" and "geographic relocation" were cited by many job categories. In addition, medical and dental workers also noted "poor working relationship with supervisor or coworker(s)," "desired work schedule not offered," and "job stress/pressure" among the causes. The VA has lost 148 psychologists in fiscal year 2025 who cited "lack of trust/confidence in senior leaders," as well as "policy or technology barriers to getting the work done," and "job stress/pressure" among their reasons for departure.

The US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is on pace to cut nearly 30,000 positions by the end of fiscal year 2025, an initiative driven by a federal hiring freeze, deferred resignations, retirements, and normal attrition. According to the VA Workforce Dashboard, health care experienced the most significant net change through the first 9 months of fiscal year 2025. That included 2129 fewer registered nurses, 751 fewer physicians, and drops of 565 licensed practical nurses, 564 nurse assistants, and 1294 medical support assistants. In total, nearly 17,000 VA employees have left their jobs and 12,000 more are expected to leave by the end of September 2025.

According to VA Secretary Doug Collins, the departures have eliminated the need for the "large-scale" reduction-in-force that he proposed earlier in 2025.

The VA also announced that in accordance with an Executive Order issued by President Donald Trump, it is terminating collective bargaining rights for most of its employees, including most clinical staff not in leadership positions. The order includes the National Nurses Organizing Committee/National Nurses United, which represents 16,000 VA nurses, and the American Federation of Government Employees, which represents 320,000 VA employees. The order exempted police officers, firefighters, and security guards. The Unions have indicated they will continue to fight the changes.

VA staffing has undergone significant reversals over the past year. The VA added 223 physicians and 3196 nurses in the first 9 months of fiscal year 2024 before reversing course this year. According to the Workforce Dashboard, the VA and Veterans Health Administration combined to hire 26,984 employees in fiscal year 2025. Cumulative losses, however, totaled 54,308.

During exit interviews, VA employees noted a variety of reasons for their departure. "Personal/family matters" and "geographic relocation" were cited by many job categories. In addition, medical and dental workers also noted "poor working relationship with supervisor or coworker(s)," "desired work schedule not offered," and "job stress/pressure" among the causes. The VA has lost 148 psychologists in fiscal year 2025 who cited "lack of trust/confidence in senior leaders," as well as "policy or technology barriers to getting the work done," and "job stress/pressure" among their reasons for departure.

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AVAHO Encourages Members to Make Voices Heard

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Advocacy for veterans with cancer has always been a central part of the Association for VA Hematology/Oncology (AVAHO) mission, but that advocacy has now taken on a new focus: the fate of US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) employees. The advocacy portal provides templated letters, a search function to find local Senators and Members of Congress, a search function to find regional media outlets, updates on voting and elections, and information on key legislation relevant to VA health care.

To ensure its members’ concerns are heard, AVAHO is encouraging members, in their own time and as private citizens, to contact their local representatives to inform them about the real impact of recent policy changes on VA employees and the veterans they care for. Members can select any of 4 letters focused on reductions in force, cancellation of VA contracts, the return to office mandate, and the National Institutes of Health’s proposed cap on indirect cost for research grants: “AVAHO recognizes the power of the individual voice. Our members have an important role in shaping the health care services provided to veterans across our nation.”

"The contracts that have been canceled and continue to be canceled included critical services related to cancer care," AVAHO notes on its Advocacy page. "We know these impacted contracts have hindered the VA’s ability to implement research protocols, process and report pharmacogenomic results, manage Electronic Health Record Modernization workgroups responsible for safety improvements, and execute new oncology services through the Close to Me initiative, just to name a few."

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Advocacy for veterans with cancer has always been a central part of the Association for VA Hematology/Oncology (AVAHO) mission, but that advocacy has now taken on a new focus: the fate of US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) employees. The advocacy portal provides templated letters, a search function to find local Senators and Members of Congress, a search function to find regional media outlets, updates on voting and elections, and information on key legislation relevant to VA health care.

To ensure its members’ concerns are heard, AVAHO is encouraging members, in their own time and as private citizens, to contact their local representatives to inform them about the real impact of recent policy changes on VA employees and the veterans they care for. Members can select any of 4 letters focused on reductions in force, cancellation of VA contracts, the return to office mandate, and the National Institutes of Health’s proposed cap on indirect cost for research grants: “AVAHO recognizes the power of the individual voice. Our members have an important role in shaping the health care services provided to veterans across our nation.”

"The contracts that have been canceled and continue to be canceled included critical services related to cancer care," AVAHO notes on its Advocacy page. "We know these impacted contracts have hindered the VA’s ability to implement research protocols, process and report pharmacogenomic results, manage Electronic Health Record Modernization workgroups responsible for safety improvements, and execute new oncology services through the Close to Me initiative, just to name a few."

Advocacy for veterans with cancer has always been a central part of the Association for VA Hematology/Oncology (AVAHO) mission, but that advocacy has now taken on a new focus: the fate of US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) employees. The advocacy portal provides templated letters, a search function to find local Senators and Members of Congress, a search function to find regional media outlets, updates on voting and elections, and information on key legislation relevant to VA health care.

To ensure its members’ concerns are heard, AVAHO is encouraging members, in their own time and as private citizens, to contact their local representatives to inform them about the real impact of recent policy changes on VA employees and the veterans they care for. Members can select any of 4 letters focused on reductions in force, cancellation of VA contracts, the return to office mandate, and the National Institutes of Health’s proposed cap on indirect cost for research grants: “AVAHO recognizes the power of the individual voice. Our members have an important role in shaping the health care services provided to veterans across our nation.”

"The contracts that have been canceled and continue to be canceled included critical services related to cancer care," AVAHO notes on its Advocacy page. "We know these impacted contracts have hindered the VA’s ability to implement research protocols, process and report pharmacogenomic results, manage Electronic Health Record Modernization workgroups responsible for safety improvements, and execute new oncology services through the Close to Me initiative, just to name a few."

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VA Choice Bill Defeated in the House

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While most attention was focused on the dramatic return of Senator John McCain to the Senate, the VA bill went down to an embarrassing defeat.

A U.S. House of Representatives appropriation to fund the Veterans Choice Program surprisingly went down to defeat on Monday. The VA Choice Program is set to run out of money in September, and VA officials have been calling for Congress to provide additional funding for the program. Republican leaders, hoping to expedite the bill’s passage and thinking that it was not controversial, submitted the bill in a process that required the votes of two-thirds of the representatives. The 219-186 vote fell well short of the necessary two-thirds, and voting fell largely along party lines.

Many veterans service organizations (VSOs) were critical of the bill and called on the House to make substantial changes to it. Seven VSOs signed a joint statement calling for the bill’s defeat. “As organizations who represent and support the interests of America’s 21 million veterans, and in fulfillment of our mandate to ensure that the men and women who served are able to receive the health care and benefits they need and deserve, we are calling on Members of Congress to defeat the House vote on unacceptable choice funding legislation (S. 114, with amendments),” the statement read.

AMVETS, Disabled American Veterans , Military Officers Association of America, Military Order of the Purple Heart, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Vietnam Veterans of America, and Wounded Warrior Project all signed on to the statement. The chief complaint was that the legislation “includes funding only for the ‘choice’ program which provides additional community care options, but makes no investment in VA and uses ‘savings’ from other veterans benefits or services to ‘pay’ for the ‘choice’ program.”

The bill would have allocated $2 billion for the Veterans Choice Program, taken funding for veteran  housing loan fees, and would reduce the pensions for some veterans living in nursing facilities that also could be paid for under the Medicaid program.

The fate of the bill and funding for the Veterans Choice Program remains unclear. Senate and House veterans committees seem to be far apart on how to fund the program and for efforts to make more substantive changes to the program. Although House Republicans eventually may be able to pass a bill without Democrats, in the Senate, they will need the support of at least a handful of Democrats to move the bill to the President’s desk.

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While most attention was focused on the dramatic return of Senator John McCain to the Senate, the VA bill went down to an embarrassing defeat.
While most attention was focused on the dramatic return of Senator John McCain to the Senate, the VA bill went down to an embarrassing defeat.

A U.S. House of Representatives appropriation to fund the Veterans Choice Program surprisingly went down to defeat on Monday. The VA Choice Program is set to run out of money in September, and VA officials have been calling for Congress to provide additional funding for the program. Republican leaders, hoping to expedite the bill’s passage and thinking that it was not controversial, submitted the bill in a process that required the votes of two-thirds of the representatives. The 219-186 vote fell well short of the necessary two-thirds, and voting fell largely along party lines.

Many veterans service organizations (VSOs) were critical of the bill and called on the House to make substantial changes to it. Seven VSOs signed a joint statement calling for the bill’s defeat. “As organizations who represent and support the interests of America’s 21 million veterans, and in fulfillment of our mandate to ensure that the men and women who served are able to receive the health care and benefits they need and deserve, we are calling on Members of Congress to defeat the House vote on unacceptable choice funding legislation (S. 114, with amendments),” the statement read.

AMVETS, Disabled American Veterans , Military Officers Association of America, Military Order of the Purple Heart, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Vietnam Veterans of America, and Wounded Warrior Project all signed on to the statement. The chief complaint was that the legislation “includes funding only for the ‘choice’ program which provides additional community care options, but makes no investment in VA and uses ‘savings’ from other veterans benefits or services to ‘pay’ for the ‘choice’ program.”

The bill would have allocated $2 billion for the Veterans Choice Program, taken funding for veteran  housing loan fees, and would reduce the pensions for some veterans living in nursing facilities that also could be paid for under the Medicaid program.

The fate of the bill and funding for the Veterans Choice Program remains unclear. Senate and House veterans committees seem to be far apart on how to fund the program and for efforts to make more substantive changes to the program. Although House Republicans eventually may be able to pass a bill without Democrats, in the Senate, they will need the support of at least a handful of Democrats to move the bill to the President’s desk.

A U.S. House of Representatives appropriation to fund the Veterans Choice Program surprisingly went down to defeat on Monday. The VA Choice Program is set to run out of money in September, and VA officials have been calling for Congress to provide additional funding for the program. Republican leaders, hoping to expedite the bill’s passage and thinking that it was not controversial, submitted the bill in a process that required the votes of two-thirds of the representatives. The 219-186 vote fell well short of the necessary two-thirds, and voting fell largely along party lines.

Many veterans service organizations (VSOs) were critical of the bill and called on the House to make substantial changes to it. Seven VSOs signed a joint statement calling for the bill’s defeat. “As organizations who represent and support the interests of America’s 21 million veterans, and in fulfillment of our mandate to ensure that the men and women who served are able to receive the health care and benefits they need and deserve, we are calling on Members of Congress to defeat the House vote on unacceptable choice funding legislation (S. 114, with amendments),” the statement read.

AMVETS, Disabled American Veterans , Military Officers Association of America, Military Order of the Purple Heart, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Vietnam Veterans of America, and Wounded Warrior Project all signed on to the statement. The chief complaint was that the legislation “includes funding only for the ‘choice’ program which provides additional community care options, but makes no investment in VA and uses ‘savings’ from other veterans benefits or services to ‘pay’ for the ‘choice’ program.”

The bill would have allocated $2 billion for the Veterans Choice Program, taken funding for veteran  housing loan fees, and would reduce the pensions for some veterans living in nursing facilities that also could be paid for under the Medicaid program.

The fate of the bill and funding for the Veterans Choice Program remains unclear. Senate and House veterans committees seem to be far apart on how to fund the program and for efforts to make more substantive changes to the program. Although House Republicans eventually may be able to pass a bill without Democrats, in the Senate, they will need the support of at least a handful of Democrats to move the bill to the President’s desk.

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AI Scribes or VHA Docs: Which Created Better Clinical Notes?

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Artificial intelligence (AI) scribes produced lower-quality documentation of clinical notes than human clinicians, and especially struggled in settings with background noise or clinicians wearing masks, a new Veterans Health Administration (VHA) study finds.

In 5 simulated clinical cases, notes written by various AI programs scored lower than reports produced by humans on the modified Physician Documentation Quality Instrument (PDQI-9), a measurement of note quality scale, reported Ashok Reddy, MD, MSc, of the University of Washington and Veterans Affairs Puget Sound Health Care System, Seattle, et al in the April issue of Annals of Internal Medicine.

AI scribes scored lower compared with humans across all domains, including accuracy, thoroughness, and usefulness. There was an especially large gap in scores on the 50-point PDQI-9 in an acute low back pain case (human, 43.8 points; AI, 20.3 points; difference, 23.5 points).

“For clinicians, AI scribes should be regarded as tools for generating draft documentation that requires review and editing, rather than as a substitute for clinician-authored notes,” the authors wrote. “Although ambient AI scribes hold promise for reducing clinician burden, rigorous and ongoing evaluation of their quality is essential to ensure that these tools enhance rather than compromise the quality of clinical care.”

AI Scribe Use is Widespread

Taylor N. Anderson, MD, a clinical informatics fellow at Oregon Health & Science University, Portland, is familiar with the study findings and noted that the use of AI scribes in medicine has grown rapidly. All major health organizations are either using it or facing “enormous pressure” from clinicians to do so, she told Federal Practitioner

Previous research has linked the use of AI scribes for clinical notes to less electronic health record usage and documentation time for clinicians, leading to more time for patient visits. Still, the quality of clinical notes written by AI is “quite variable across vendors,” Anderson said.

Anderson led a 2025 study that examined 5 AI scribe platforms and found an average of 3.0 errors per case with “potential for moderate-to-severe harm.”

For the new study on the simulated cases, part of a VHA-sponsored “technology sprint” via Challenge.gov, researchers developed audio descriptions of 5 clinical cases reflecting common patient encounters in primary care: acute low back pain, chest pain, a new diagnosis of diabetes, a pharmacy consultation, and a follow-up with a nurse case manager for heart failure. 

Two cases included non-English accents, 1 included background noise, and 1 featured speech through a medical mask. All the “patients” were played by what the authors described as “trained standardized patient actors.”

For each case, 3 humans and 11 AI scribe programs produced clinical notes. The clinical notes were then evaluated by 6 raters.

Researchers found that AI scribe-generated notes scored worse than human-generated notes across all 10 domains of the modified PDQI-9 (accuracy, thoroughness, usefulness, organization, comprehensiveness, succinctness, synthesization, internal consistency, and freedom from hallucination and bias).

There were especially large gaps between the AI and human notes in the domains of thoroughness, organization, and usefulness. Even wider gaps were observed for the encounters with noise and mask usage.

“These findings highlight that although ambient AI scribes can generate complete notes, the overall quality remains broadly below that of human-authored documentation,” the authors wrote. 

No Comparison Between AI Scribes

The researchers noted that “given contractual limitations, we cannot interpret the results for specific vendors.” They also noted that the study did not use professional scribes, who may produce even higher-quality results, and the humans were not producing notes in a real-world clinical environment.

Anderson, the clinical informatics fellow, pointed out that the study does not examine the common scenario in which a clinician edits notes produced by an AI scribe. In fact, she said, there is no current research on this, failing to examine “the postediting note that would actually go into the chart.”

In an accompanying commentary, collaborative scientist Aaron Tierney, PhD, and Kristine Lee, MD, an associate executive director, both with the Permanente Medical Group, California, called for future research to focus on “real-world performance, promote the development of documentation policies that prioritize patient care over billing requirements, and systematically incorporate patient perspectives into assessments of quality.”

Why AI Misses the Mark

In an interview with Federal Practitioner, AI researcher Maxim Topaz, PhD, RN, MA, an associate professor of Nursing and Data Science at Columbia University School of Nursing, New York City, who is familiar with the study but did not participate in it, praised the research. 

He pointed out that AI has trouble accurately representing clinical encounters because they “tend to fill gaps with plausible-sounding language, which can mask omissions and make errors harder to catch.” Also, “ambient scribes can only document what is verbalized aloud. Physical exam findings the clinician notices but does not narrate, nonverbal cues, and patient-initiated concerns that drift past in conversation are systematically underrepresented.”

Moving forward, Topaz advised clinicians to “treat AI-generated notes as a first draft, not a finished product. Read them carefully, especially for omissions, which the current evidence suggests are by far the most common error type and which are harder to spot than fabrications because the surrounding note still reads coherently.”

 

Two study authors disclosed employment by the US Department of Veterans Affairs. Other authors had no disclosures. The commentary authors have no disclosures. Anderson has no disclosures. Topaz discloses 

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Artificial intelligence (AI) scribes produced lower-quality documentation of clinical notes than human clinicians, and especially struggled in settings with background noise or clinicians wearing masks, a new Veterans Health Administration (VHA) study finds.

In 5 simulated clinical cases, notes written by various AI programs scored lower than reports produced by humans on the modified Physician Documentation Quality Instrument (PDQI-9), a measurement of note quality scale, reported Ashok Reddy, MD, MSc, of the University of Washington and Veterans Affairs Puget Sound Health Care System, Seattle, et al in the April issue of Annals of Internal Medicine.

AI scribes scored lower compared with humans across all domains, including accuracy, thoroughness, and usefulness. There was an especially large gap in scores on the 50-point PDQI-9 in an acute low back pain case (human, 43.8 points; AI, 20.3 points; difference, 23.5 points).

“For clinicians, AI scribes should be regarded as tools for generating draft documentation that requires review and editing, rather than as a substitute for clinician-authored notes,” the authors wrote. “Although ambient AI scribes hold promise for reducing clinician burden, rigorous and ongoing evaluation of their quality is essential to ensure that these tools enhance rather than compromise the quality of clinical care.”

AI Scribe Use is Widespread

Taylor N. Anderson, MD, a clinical informatics fellow at Oregon Health & Science University, Portland, is familiar with the study findings and noted that the use of AI scribes in medicine has grown rapidly. All major health organizations are either using it or facing “enormous pressure” from clinicians to do so, she told Federal Practitioner

Previous research has linked the use of AI scribes for clinical notes to less electronic health record usage and documentation time for clinicians, leading to more time for patient visits. Still, the quality of clinical notes written by AI is “quite variable across vendors,” Anderson said.

Anderson led a 2025 study that examined 5 AI scribe platforms and found an average of 3.0 errors per case with “potential for moderate-to-severe harm.”

For the new study on the simulated cases, part of a VHA-sponsored “technology sprint” via Challenge.gov, researchers developed audio descriptions of 5 clinical cases reflecting common patient encounters in primary care: acute low back pain, chest pain, a new diagnosis of diabetes, a pharmacy consultation, and a follow-up with a nurse case manager for heart failure. 

Two cases included non-English accents, 1 included background noise, and 1 featured speech through a medical mask. All the “patients” were played by what the authors described as “trained standardized patient actors.”

For each case, 3 humans and 11 AI scribe programs produced clinical notes. The clinical notes were then evaluated by 6 raters.

Researchers found that AI scribe-generated notes scored worse than human-generated notes across all 10 domains of the modified PDQI-9 (accuracy, thoroughness, usefulness, organization, comprehensiveness, succinctness, synthesization, internal consistency, and freedom from hallucination and bias).

There were especially large gaps between the AI and human notes in the domains of thoroughness, organization, and usefulness. Even wider gaps were observed for the encounters with noise and mask usage.

“These findings highlight that although ambient AI scribes can generate complete notes, the overall quality remains broadly below that of human-authored documentation,” the authors wrote. 

No Comparison Between AI Scribes

The researchers noted that “given contractual limitations, we cannot interpret the results for specific vendors.” They also noted that the study did not use professional scribes, who may produce even higher-quality results, and the humans were not producing notes in a real-world clinical environment.

Anderson, the clinical informatics fellow, pointed out that the study does not examine the common scenario in which a clinician edits notes produced by an AI scribe. In fact, she said, there is no current research on this, failing to examine “the postediting note that would actually go into the chart.”

In an accompanying commentary, collaborative scientist Aaron Tierney, PhD, and Kristine Lee, MD, an associate executive director, both with the Permanente Medical Group, California, called for future research to focus on “real-world performance, promote the development of documentation policies that prioritize patient care over billing requirements, and systematically incorporate patient perspectives into assessments of quality.”

Why AI Misses the Mark

In an interview with Federal Practitioner, AI researcher Maxim Topaz, PhD, RN, MA, an associate professor of Nursing and Data Science at Columbia University School of Nursing, New York City, who is familiar with the study but did not participate in it, praised the research. 

He pointed out that AI has trouble accurately representing clinical encounters because they “tend to fill gaps with plausible-sounding language, which can mask omissions and make errors harder to catch.” Also, “ambient scribes can only document what is verbalized aloud. Physical exam findings the clinician notices but does not narrate, nonverbal cues, and patient-initiated concerns that drift past in conversation are systematically underrepresented.”

Moving forward, Topaz advised clinicians to “treat AI-generated notes as a first draft, not a finished product. Read them carefully, especially for omissions, which the current evidence suggests are by far the most common error type and which are harder to spot than fabrications because the surrounding note still reads coherently.”

 

Two study authors disclosed employment by the US Department of Veterans Affairs. Other authors had no disclosures. The commentary authors have no disclosures. Anderson has no disclosures. Topaz discloses 

Artificial intelligence (AI) scribes produced lower-quality documentation of clinical notes than human clinicians, and especially struggled in settings with background noise or clinicians wearing masks, a new Veterans Health Administration (VHA) study finds.

In 5 simulated clinical cases, notes written by various AI programs scored lower than reports produced by humans on the modified Physician Documentation Quality Instrument (PDQI-9), a measurement of note quality scale, reported Ashok Reddy, MD, MSc, of the University of Washington and Veterans Affairs Puget Sound Health Care System, Seattle, et al in the April issue of Annals of Internal Medicine.

AI scribes scored lower compared with humans across all domains, including accuracy, thoroughness, and usefulness. There was an especially large gap in scores on the 50-point PDQI-9 in an acute low back pain case (human, 43.8 points; AI, 20.3 points; difference, 23.5 points).

“For clinicians, AI scribes should be regarded as tools for generating draft documentation that requires review and editing, rather than as a substitute for clinician-authored notes,” the authors wrote. “Although ambient AI scribes hold promise for reducing clinician burden, rigorous and ongoing evaluation of their quality is essential to ensure that these tools enhance rather than compromise the quality of clinical care.”

AI Scribe Use is Widespread

Taylor N. Anderson, MD, a clinical informatics fellow at Oregon Health & Science University, Portland, is familiar with the study findings and noted that the use of AI scribes in medicine has grown rapidly. All major health organizations are either using it or facing “enormous pressure” from clinicians to do so, she told Federal Practitioner

Previous research has linked the use of AI scribes for clinical notes to less electronic health record usage and documentation time for clinicians, leading to more time for patient visits. Still, the quality of clinical notes written by AI is “quite variable across vendors,” Anderson said.

Anderson led a 2025 study that examined 5 AI scribe platforms and found an average of 3.0 errors per case with “potential for moderate-to-severe harm.”

For the new study on the simulated cases, part of a VHA-sponsored “technology sprint” via Challenge.gov, researchers developed audio descriptions of 5 clinical cases reflecting common patient encounters in primary care: acute low back pain, chest pain, a new diagnosis of diabetes, a pharmacy consultation, and a follow-up with a nurse case manager for heart failure. 

Two cases included non-English accents, 1 included background noise, and 1 featured speech through a medical mask. All the “patients” were played by what the authors described as “trained standardized patient actors.”

For each case, 3 humans and 11 AI scribe programs produced clinical notes. The clinical notes were then evaluated by 6 raters.

Researchers found that AI scribe-generated notes scored worse than human-generated notes across all 10 domains of the modified PDQI-9 (accuracy, thoroughness, usefulness, organization, comprehensiveness, succinctness, synthesization, internal consistency, and freedom from hallucination and bias).

There were especially large gaps between the AI and human notes in the domains of thoroughness, organization, and usefulness. Even wider gaps were observed for the encounters with noise and mask usage.

“These findings highlight that although ambient AI scribes can generate complete notes, the overall quality remains broadly below that of human-authored documentation,” the authors wrote. 

No Comparison Between AI Scribes

The researchers noted that “given contractual limitations, we cannot interpret the results for specific vendors.” They also noted that the study did not use professional scribes, who may produce even higher-quality results, and the humans were not producing notes in a real-world clinical environment.

Anderson, the clinical informatics fellow, pointed out that the study does not examine the common scenario in which a clinician edits notes produced by an AI scribe. In fact, she said, there is no current research on this, failing to examine “the postediting note that would actually go into the chart.”

In an accompanying commentary, collaborative scientist Aaron Tierney, PhD, and Kristine Lee, MD, an associate executive director, both with the Permanente Medical Group, California, called for future research to focus on “real-world performance, promote the development of documentation policies that prioritize patient care over billing requirements, and systematically incorporate patient perspectives into assessments of quality.”

Why AI Misses the Mark

In an interview with Federal Practitioner, AI researcher Maxim Topaz, PhD, RN, MA, an associate professor of Nursing and Data Science at Columbia University School of Nursing, New York City, who is familiar with the study but did not participate in it, praised the research. 

He pointed out that AI has trouble accurately representing clinical encounters because they “tend to fill gaps with plausible-sounding language, which can mask omissions and make errors harder to catch.” Also, “ambient scribes can only document what is verbalized aloud. Physical exam findings the clinician notices but does not narrate, nonverbal cues, and patient-initiated concerns that drift past in conversation are systematically underrepresented.”

Moving forward, Topaz advised clinicians to “treat AI-generated notes as a first draft, not a finished product. Read them carefully, especially for omissions, which the current evidence suggests are by far the most common error type and which are harder to spot than fabrications because the surrounding note still reads coherently.”

 

Two study authors disclosed employment by the US Department of Veterans Affairs. Other authors had no disclosures. The commentary authors have no disclosures. Anderson has no disclosures. Topaz discloses 

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State Firearm Laws Linked to Veteran Suicide Rates

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TOPLINE: Among veterans and demographically matched nonveterans from 2002 to 2019, higher state household firearm ownership was associated with higher rates of deaths by suicide, while greater state firearm law restrictiveness was associated with lower rates of deaths by suicide. In 2017 to 2019 models, these associations were seen for both veterans and matched nonveterans and driven primarily by firearm deaths by suicide rates.

METHODOLOGY:

  • US state-level data across 6 consecutive 3-year periods from 2002-2019, stratified suicide rates by veteran status (veteran vs matched nonveterans) and method (firearm vs nonfirearm). 

  • Data sources included US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Office of Mental Health and Suicide Prevention counts matched to the National Death Index, plus Centers for Disease Control suicide counts and population estimates by sex and age. 

  • Participants included veterans with state- and period-specific death suicide counts and population denominators from the VetPop model, and a matched nonveteran comparison created by comparing state deaths by suicide data to veterans’ age and gender distributions. 

  • Exposure measures included annual state household firearm ownership rate estimates carried forward to 2017-2019, and a 7-item state firearm policy restrictiveness index derived from the RAND Corporation state firearm law database.

TAKEAWAY:

  • Average death by suicide rates from 2002-2019 were 28.2 per 100,000 for veterans and 27.5 per 100,000 for matched nonveterans, with most deaths involving a firearm. 

  • Across states, the maximum average death by suicide rate was about 3 times the minimum over the study period, and veteran and matched nonveteran state patterns aligned closely. 

  • Higher household firearm ownership was associated with higher firearm death by suicide rates for veterans and matched nonveterans from 2017-2019.

  • Greater firearm law restrictiveness, equivalent to 3 additional restrictive laws, was associated with fewer firearm deaths by suicide for veterans and matched nonveterans from 2017-2019.

IN PRACTICE: The results suggest that changes to state firearm laws and policies should be investigated as a possibly cost-effective primary prevention strategy for reducing suicide rates among veterans and nonveterans,” the authors wrote.

SOURCE:The study was led by Andrew R. Morral, PhD, RAND Corporation in Arlington, Virginia, and Terry L. Schell, PhD, and Adam Scherling, RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California and published online in Injury Prevention.

LIMITATIONS: The estimates are correlational and should not be interpreted as causal effect estimates, as most interstate variation in gun ownership and firearm laws predates the beginning of the available VA death by suicide data, limiting the analytical approach to identify causal effects. VA does not share microdata on veteran suicide, requiring construction of a matched comparison sample of nonveterans by estimating veteran decedent removal from general population suicide totals within cells of a 5-way table based on publicly released 3-way tables, introducing imprecision. Veteran suicide counts are known to undercount suicides among veterans who separated from the military prior to 1974, likely resulting in a slight underestimate of veteran suicide rates for the oldest cohort of veterans, particularly in earlier study periods. Restricting analysis to identify modeled effects solely through limited changes in state firearm ownership and policies during the study period yields imprecise effect estimates.

DISCLOSURES: This work received support from a grant provided by The RAND Epstein Family Veterans Policy Research Institute, established through a contribution from Daniel J. Epstein via the Epstein Family Foundation. Neither the Institute, the Foundation, nor Mr. Epstein participated in the design, conduct, analysis, or drafting of this report. The authors disclosed no relevant conflicts of interest.

This article was created using several editorial tools, including AI, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication.

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TOPLINE: Among veterans and demographically matched nonveterans from 2002 to 2019, higher state household firearm ownership was associated with higher rates of deaths by suicide, while greater state firearm law restrictiveness was associated with lower rates of deaths by suicide. In 2017 to 2019 models, these associations were seen for both veterans and matched nonveterans and driven primarily by firearm deaths by suicide rates.

METHODOLOGY:

  • US state-level data across 6 consecutive 3-year periods from 2002-2019, stratified suicide rates by veteran status (veteran vs matched nonveterans) and method (firearm vs nonfirearm). 

  • Data sources included US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Office of Mental Health and Suicide Prevention counts matched to the National Death Index, plus Centers for Disease Control suicide counts and population estimates by sex and age. 

  • Participants included veterans with state- and period-specific death suicide counts and population denominators from the VetPop model, and a matched nonveteran comparison created by comparing state deaths by suicide data to veterans’ age and gender distributions. 

  • Exposure measures included annual state household firearm ownership rate estimates carried forward to 2017-2019, and a 7-item state firearm policy restrictiveness index derived from the RAND Corporation state firearm law database.

TAKEAWAY:

  • Average death by suicide rates from 2002-2019 were 28.2 per 100,000 for veterans and 27.5 per 100,000 for matched nonveterans, with most deaths involving a firearm. 

  • Across states, the maximum average death by suicide rate was about 3 times the minimum over the study period, and veteran and matched nonveteran state patterns aligned closely. 

  • Higher household firearm ownership was associated with higher firearm death by suicide rates for veterans and matched nonveterans from 2017-2019.

  • Greater firearm law restrictiveness, equivalent to 3 additional restrictive laws, was associated with fewer firearm deaths by suicide for veterans and matched nonveterans from 2017-2019.

IN PRACTICE: The results suggest that changes to state firearm laws and policies should be investigated as a possibly cost-effective primary prevention strategy for reducing suicide rates among veterans and nonveterans,” the authors wrote.

SOURCE:The study was led by Andrew R. Morral, PhD, RAND Corporation in Arlington, Virginia, and Terry L. Schell, PhD, and Adam Scherling, RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California and published online in Injury Prevention.

LIMITATIONS: The estimates are correlational and should not be interpreted as causal effect estimates, as most interstate variation in gun ownership and firearm laws predates the beginning of the available VA death by suicide data, limiting the analytical approach to identify causal effects. VA does not share microdata on veteran suicide, requiring construction of a matched comparison sample of nonveterans by estimating veteran decedent removal from general population suicide totals within cells of a 5-way table based on publicly released 3-way tables, introducing imprecision. Veteran suicide counts are known to undercount suicides among veterans who separated from the military prior to 1974, likely resulting in a slight underestimate of veteran suicide rates for the oldest cohort of veterans, particularly in earlier study periods. Restricting analysis to identify modeled effects solely through limited changes in state firearm ownership and policies during the study period yields imprecise effect estimates.

DISCLOSURES: This work received support from a grant provided by The RAND Epstein Family Veterans Policy Research Institute, established through a contribution from Daniel J. Epstein via the Epstein Family Foundation. Neither the Institute, the Foundation, nor Mr. Epstein participated in the design, conduct, analysis, or drafting of this report. The authors disclosed no relevant conflicts of interest.

This article was created using several editorial tools, including AI, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication.

TOPLINE: Among veterans and demographically matched nonveterans from 2002 to 2019, higher state household firearm ownership was associated with higher rates of deaths by suicide, while greater state firearm law restrictiveness was associated with lower rates of deaths by suicide. In 2017 to 2019 models, these associations were seen for both veterans and matched nonveterans and driven primarily by firearm deaths by suicide rates.

METHODOLOGY:

  • US state-level data across 6 consecutive 3-year periods from 2002-2019, stratified suicide rates by veteran status (veteran vs matched nonveterans) and method (firearm vs nonfirearm). 

  • Data sources included US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Office of Mental Health and Suicide Prevention counts matched to the National Death Index, plus Centers for Disease Control suicide counts and population estimates by sex and age. 

  • Participants included veterans with state- and period-specific death suicide counts and population denominators from the VetPop model, and a matched nonveteran comparison created by comparing state deaths by suicide data to veterans’ age and gender distributions. 

  • Exposure measures included annual state household firearm ownership rate estimates carried forward to 2017-2019, and a 7-item state firearm policy restrictiveness index derived from the RAND Corporation state firearm law database.

TAKEAWAY:

  • Average death by suicide rates from 2002-2019 were 28.2 per 100,000 for veterans and 27.5 per 100,000 for matched nonveterans, with most deaths involving a firearm. 

  • Across states, the maximum average death by suicide rate was about 3 times the minimum over the study period, and veteran and matched nonveteran state patterns aligned closely. 

  • Higher household firearm ownership was associated with higher firearm death by suicide rates for veterans and matched nonveterans from 2017-2019.

  • Greater firearm law restrictiveness, equivalent to 3 additional restrictive laws, was associated with fewer firearm deaths by suicide for veterans and matched nonveterans from 2017-2019.

IN PRACTICE: The results suggest that changes to state firearm laws and policies should be investigated as a possibly cost-effective primary prevention strategy for reducing suicide rates among veterans and nonveterans,” the authors wrote.

SOURCE:The study was led by Andrew R. Morral, PhD, RAND Corporation in Arlington, Virginia, and Terry L. Schell, PhD, and Adam Scherling, RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California and published online in Injury Prevention.

LIMITATIONS: The estimates are correlational and should not be interpreted as causal effect estimates, as most interstate variation in gun ownership and firearm laws predates the beginning of the available VA death by suicide data, limiting the analytical approach to identify causal effects. VA does not share microdata on veteran suicide, requiring construction of a matched comparison sample of nonveterans by estimating veteran decedent removal from general population suicide totals within cells of a 5-way table based on publicly released 3-way tables, introducing imprecision. Veteran suicide counts are known to undercount suicides among veterans who separated from the military prior to 1974, likely resulting in a slight underestimate of veteran suicide rates for the oldest cohort of veterans, particularly in earlier study periods. Restricting analysis to identify modeled effects solely through limited changes in state firearm ownership and policies during the study period yields imprecise effect estimates.

DISCLOSURES: This work received support from a grant provided by The RAND Epstein Family Veterans Policy Research Institute, established through a contribution from Daniel J. Epstein via the Epstein Family Foundation. Neither the Institute, the Foundation, nor Mr. Epstein participated in the design, conduct, analysis, or drafting of this report. The authors disclosed no relevant conflicts of interest.

This article was created using several editorial tools, including AI, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication.

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New Scheduler Connects Veterans to Community Care Faster

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New Scheduler Connects Veterans to Community Care Faster

The US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has adopted new technology designed to make it easier and faster for veterans to schedule appointments with community care health care practitioners (HCPs).

Through the External Provider Scheduling (EPS) system, VA employees can access the scheduling systems of participating community care HCPs. As of March 2026, 27,000 community care HCPs were participating in EPS across 78 medical specialties.

Without this system, VA employees have to call multiple community care HCPs and relay that information back to veterans before booking an appointment. As a result, a single VA employee could only schedule a handful of community care appointments per day, and it could take days or even weeks to book an appointment for a veteran.

Now, the new system—implemented in all VA facilities starting in late 2025—enables VA employees to schedule as many as 25 appointments daily.

“We are making it easier and more convenient than ever for those who have worn the uniform to choose the care that best fits their lifestyle,” VA Secretary Doug Collins said in a news release.

The VA goal is to sign up thousands of additional community care HCPs in 2026 as part of its continuing efforts to deliver timely, veteran-centered care. There is no cost for institutions to participate in the program.

Select Medical, an outpatient rehabilitation organization with > 1900 centers in 39 states and the District of Columbia, became aware of this opportunity in the first half of 2025: “At that time, we met with key VA stakeholders to learn more about the new program, the challenges it would address, and how it worked to evaluate our ability to participate,” said Chad Smith, president of the company’s outpatient division, headquartered in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania.

“We immediately saw the value in what the VA was seeking to accomplish and wanted to be part of providing increased access to exceptional care for our nation’s veterans,” Smith said.

In July 2025, Smith noted, Select Medical piloted the program in 2 states. After successful deployment, the organization broadened its participation to 15 states, offering “seamless access to care” to > 3000 veterans. They receive outpatient rehabilitative care, including physical and occupational therapy.

“The External Provider Scheduling system creates a more streamlined way for veterans and VA administrators to manage the appointment process,” Smith said.

Northwell Health in Lake Success, New York, expressed interest in the program last summer when approached by the VA and “jumped at it,” said Juan Serrano, MBA, MS, vice president of military liaison services at Northwell Health.

The Long Island-based system, which already had a long-standing relationship with the VA, rolled out the program to give veterans the ability to see community care HCPs, Serrano said.

The program started in November, with the first appointment booked in December. From then until the end of April, the program booked 69 appointments for almost 80 veterans, with gastroenterology and otolaryngology representing the highest volume specialties.

Veterans also have gained entry to several other specialty clinics, including imaging services. The program has decreased waiting times for veterans’ appointments and helped them establish rapport with community care HCPs, Serrano said.

“One of the biggest setbacks and difficulties veterans experience is timely access to care outside of the VA,” he said, adding, “as an organization, we made a pledge to create a pathway for veterans to complement the work of the VA and give veterans access to our network.”

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The US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has adopted new technology designed to make it easier and faster for veterans to schedule appointments with community care health care practitioners (HCPs).

Through the External Provider Scheduling (EPS) system, VA employees can access the scheduling systems of participating community care HCPs. As of March 2026, 27,000 community care HCPs were participating in EPS across 78 medical specialties.

Without this system, VA employees have to call multiple community care HCPs and relay that information back to veterans before booking an appointment. As a result, a single VA employee could only schedule a handful of community care appointments per day, and it could take days or even weeks to book an appointment for a veteran.

Now, the new system—implemented in all VA facilities starting in late 2025—enables VA employees to schedule as many as 25 appointments daily.

“We are making it easier and more convenient than ever for those who have worn the uniform to choose the care that best fits their lifestyle,” VA Secretary Doug Collins said in a news release.

The VA goal is to sign up thousands of additional community care HCPs in 2026 as part of its continuing efforts to deliver timely, veteran-centered care. There is no cost for institutions to participate in the program.

Select Medical, an outpatient rehabilitation organization with > 1900 centers in 39 states and the District of Columbia, became aware of this opportunity in the first half of 2025: “At that time, we met with key VA stakeholders to learn more about the new program, the challenges it would address, and how it worked to evaluate our ability to participate,” said Chad Smith, president of the company’s outpatient division, headquartered in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania.

“We immediately saw the value in what the VA was seeking to accomplish and wanted to be part of providing increased access to exceptional care for our nation’s veterans,” Smith said.

In July 2025, Smith noted, Select Medical piloted the program in 2 states. After successful deployment, the organization broadened its participation to 15 states, offering “seamless access to care” to > 3000 veterans. They receive outpatient rehabilitative care, including physical and occupational therapy.

“The External Provider Scheduling system creates a more streamlined way for veterans and VA administrators to manage the appointment process,” Smith said.

Northwell Health in Lake Success, New York, expressed interest in the program last summer when approached by the VA and “jumped at it,” said Juan Serrano, MBA, MS, vice president of military liaison services at Northwell Health.

The Long Island-based system, which already had a long-standing relationship with the VA, rolled out the program to give veterans the ability to see community care HCPs, Serrano said.

The program started in November, with the first appointment booked in December. From then until the end of April, the program booked 69 appointments for almost 80 veterans, with gastroenterology and otolaryngology representing the highest volume specialties.

Veterans also have gained entry to several other specialty clinics, including imaging services. The program has decreased waiting times for veterans’ appointments and helped them establish rapport with community care HCPs, Serrano said.

“One of the biggest setbacks and difficulties veterans experience is timely access to care outside of the VA,” he said, adding, “as an organization, we made a pledge to create a pathway for veterans to complement the work of the VA and give veterans access to our network.”

The US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has adopted new technology designed to make it easier and faster for veterans to schedule appointments with community care health care practitioners (HCPs).

Through the External Provider Scheduling (EPS) system, VA employees can access the scheduling systems of participating community care HCPs. As of March 2026, 27,000 community care HCPs were participating in EPS across 78 medical specialties.

Without this system, VA employees have to call multiple community care HCPs and relay that information back to veterans before booking an appointment. As a result, a single VA employee could only schedule a handful of community care appointments per day, and it could take days or even weeks to book an appointment for a veteran.

Now, the new system—implemented in all VA facilities starting in late 2025—enables VA employees to schedule as many as 25 appointments daily.

“We are making it easier and more convenient than ever for those who have worn the uniform to choose the care that best fits their lifestyle,” VA Secretary Doug Collins said in a news release.

The VA goal is to sign up thousands of additional community care HCPs in 2026 as part of its continuing efforts to deliver timely, veteran-centered care. There is no cost for institutions to participate in the program.

Select Medical, an outpatient rehabilitation organization with > 1900 centers in 39 states and the District of Columbia, became aware of this opportunity in the first half of 2025: “At that time, we met with key VA stakeholders to learn more about the new program, the challenges it would address, and how it worked to evaluate our ability to participate,” said Chad Smith, president of the company’s outpatient division, headquartered in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania.

“We immediately saw the value in what the VA was seeking to accomplish and wanted to be part of providing increased access to exceptional care for our nation’s veterans,” Smith said.

In July 2025, Smith noted, Select Medical piloted the program in 2 states. After successful deployment, the organization broadened its participation to 15 states, offering “seamless access to care” to > 3000 veterans. They receive outpatient rehabilitative care, including physical and occupational therapy.

“The External Provider Scheduling system creates a more streamlined way for veterans and VA administrators to manage the appointment process,” Smith said.

Northwell Health in Lake Success, New York, expressed interest in the program last summer when approached by the VA and “jumped at it,” said Juan Serrano, MBA, MS, vice president of military liaison services at Northwell Health.

The Long Island-based system, which already had a long-standing relationship with the VA, rolled out the program to give veterans the ability to see community care HCPs, Serrano said.

The program started in November, with the first appointment booked in December. From then until the end of April, the program booked 69 appointments for almost 80 veterans, with gastroenterology and otolaryngology representing the highest volume specialties.

Veterans also have gained entry to several other specialty clinics, including imaging services. The program has decreased waiting times for veterans’ appointments and helped them establish rapport with community care HCPs, Serrano said.

“One of the biggest setbacks and difficulties veterans experience is timely access to care outside of the VA,” he said, adding, “as an organization, we made a pledge to create a pathway for veterans to complement the work of the VA and give veterans access to our network.”

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