Inadequate INR Monitoring in Woman Taking Warfarin

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Inadequate INR Monitoring in Woman Taking Warfarin

In July 2009, a 59-year-old California woman was diagnosed with atrial fibrillation and congestive heart failure. She was seen by the on-call cardiologist, who prescribed warfarin but discontinued it after a few days.

The patient then underwent heart surgery and was placed on warfarin again to prevent potential clotting associated with a mechanical heart valve. While in the hospital, the patient underwent daily international normalized ratio (INR) testing, resulting in several discontinuations of warfarin therapy. At the time of discharge, the patient's INR was measured at 2.2—below the patient's therapeutic range. As a result, she was given a new prescription for warfarin (2 mg/d).

At the patient's follow-up office appointment, the cardiologist checked her INR level, which was 3.1. Eight days later, the patient was seen in the office again, and a call was made to the cardiologist six days after that visit, but no further blood tests were performed.

Eight days after the call, the woman was found unresponsive, with evidence of gastrointestinal bleeding. She was taken to an emergency department, where her INR level was at least 24.4—the highest level it was possible for the equipment to measure. The patient also had evidence of bleeding in the lungs and other areas. She died early the following morning.

The plaintiff claimed that the defendants (ie, the defendant cardiologist and his practice group) failed to monitor the decedent's INR properly, although the defendant cardiologist knew the importance of monitoring the INR in a patient using warfarin.

The defendant claimed that the INR level taken after the decedent's hospital stay was within normal range and that monitoring performed at the hospital and at his office was appropriate in frequency. The defendant also claimed that the decedent's death was the result of sepsis, not exsanguination.

 

Outcome
According to a published account, a verdict of $1,136,648 was returned. After adjustment according to California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, the total recovery was $386,648.

 

Comment
From the facts given, we know that the patient had unstable warfarin levels postoperatively, requiring that the dose be withheld "several times" during her hospitalization.

Eight days after discharge, the cardiologist saw the patient. Fourteen days later, the patient bled fatally with an INR of 24.4. Thus, it is apparent that the INR was not checked for 22 days following the patient's discharge.

Given the fact that warfarin had to be stopped several times during the patient's hospitalization—and the probability that she had a new target INR, following valve replacement with a mechanical valve—most jurors would have little difficulty concluding that the standard of care was breached.

It is unclear whether the cardiologist or perhaps the patient's primary care provider was to follow her INR postdischarge. That was the causative problem: uncertainty over whose responsibility it was to perform this important monitoring.

While drawing analogies between sports and medicine is often unsuitable, a baseball analogy serves well. A pop fly is hit to deep outfield between two outfielders. Each could easily catch the ball, yet each thinks the other will act. Neither one acts, so the ball drops between the two players, and the team, charged with an error, faces possible loss of the game.

Many malpractice cases involve such a "pop fly" misjudgment: Clinicians fail to act on the mistaken belief that another will. The consequence of an easily handled matter is error and perhaps death.

This problem can be prevented. Within your referral network, establish clear guidelines to determine which clinician is responsible for surveillance, monitoring, and maintenance for any given condition. In the absence of a clear, mutually understood plan, each clinician should take the initiative to manage the patient or conclusively establish who will. This understanding should be shared with the patient and communicated in the record. Many lives may be saved if the responsibilities among clinicians are clear. —DML

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In July 2009, a 59-year-old California woman was diagnosed with atrial fibrillation and congestive heart failure. She was seen by the on-call cardiologist, who prescribed warfarin but discontinued it after a few days.

The patient then underwent heart surgery and was placed on warfarin again to prevent potential clotting associated with a mechanical heart valve. While in the hospital, the patient underwent daily international normalized ratio (INR) testing, resulting in several discontinuations of warfarin therapy. At the time of discharge, the patient's INR was measured at 2.2—below the patient's therapeutic range. As a result, she was given a new prescription for warfarin (2 mg/d).

At the patient's follow-up office appointment, the cardiologist checked her INR level, which was 3.1. Eight days later, the patient was seen in the office again, and a call was made to the cardiologist six days after that visit, but no further blood tests were performed.

Eight days after the call, the woman was found unresponsive, with evidence of gastrointestinal bleeding. She was taken to an emergency department, where her INR level was at least 24.4—the highest level it was possible for the equipment to measure. The patient also had evidence of bleeding in the lungs and other areas. She died early the following morning.

The plaintiff claimed that the defendants (ie, the defendant cardiologist and his practice group) failed to monitor the decedent's INR properly, although the defendant cardiologist knew the importance of monitoring the INR in a patient using warfarin.

The defendant claimed that the INR level taken after the decedent's hospital stay was within normal range and that monitoring performed at the hospital and at his office was appropriate in frequency. The defendant also claimed that the decedent's death was the result of sepsis, not exsanguination.

 

Outcome
According to a published account, a verdict of $1,136,648 was returned. After adjustment according to California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, the total recovery was $386,648.

 

Comment
From the facts given, we know that the patient had unstable warfarin levels postoperatively, requiring that the dose be withheld "several times" during her hospitalization.

Eight days after discharge, the cardiologist saw the patient. Fourteen days later, the patient bled fatally with an INR of 24.4. Thus, it is apparent that the INR was not checked for 22 days following the patient's discharge.

Given the fact that warfarin had to be stopped several times during the patient's hospitalization—and the probability that she had a new target INR, following valve replacement with a mechanical valve—most jurors would have little difficulty concluding that the standard of care was breached.

It is unclear whether the cardiologist or perhaps the patient's primary care provider was to follow her INR postdischarge. That was the causative problem: uncertainty over whose responsibility it was to perform this important monitoring.

While drawing analogies between sports and medicine is often unsuitable, a baseball analogy serves well. A pop fly is hit to deep outfield between two outfielders. Each could easily catch the ball, yet each thinks the other will act. Neither one acts, so the ball drops between the two players, and the team, charged with an error, faces possible loss of the game.

Many malpractice cases involve such a "pop fly" misjudgment: Clinicians fail to act on the mistaken belief that another will. The consequence of an easily handled matter is error and perhaps death.

This problem can be prevented. Within your referral network, establish clear guidelines to determine which clinician is responsible for surveillance, monitoring, and maintenance for any given condition. In the absence of a clear, mutually understood plan, each clinician should take the initiative to manage the patient or conclusively establish who will. This understanding should be shared with the patient and communicated in the record. Many lives may be saved if the responsibilities among clinicians are clear. —DML

In July 2009, a 59-year-old California woman was diagnosed with atrial fibrillation and congestive heart failure. She was seen by the on-call cardiologist, who prescribed warfarin but discontinued it after a few days.

The patient then underwent heart surgery and was placed on warfarin again to prevent potential clotting associated with a mechanical heart valve. While in the hospital, the patient underwent daily international normalized ratio (INR) testing, resulting in several discontinuations of warfarin therapy. At the time of discharge, the patient's INR was measured at 2.2—below the patient's therapeutic range. As a result, she was given a new prescription for warfarin (2 mg/d).

At the patient's follow-up office appointment, the cardiologist checked her INR level, which was 3.1. Eight days later, the patient was seen in the office again, and a call was made to the cardiologist six days after that visit, but no further blood tests were performed.

Eight days after the call, the woman was found unresponsive, with evidence of gastrointestinal bleeding. She was taken to an emergency department, where her INR level was at least 24.4—the highest level it was possible for the equipment to measure. The patient also had evidence of bleeding in the lungs and other areas. She died early the following morning.

The plaintiff claimed that the defendants (ie, the defendant cardiologist and his practice group) failed to monitor the decedent's INR properly, although the defendant cardiologist knew the importance of monitoring the INR in a patient using warfarin.

The defendant claimed that the INR level taken after the decedent's hospital stay was within normal range and that monitoring performed at the hospital and at his office was appropriate in frequency. The defendant also claimed that the decedent's death was the result of sepsis, not exsanguination.

 

Outcome
According to a published account, a verdict of $1,136,648 was returned. After adjustment according to California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, the total recovery was $386,648.

 

Comment
From the facts given, we know that the patient had unstable warfarin levels postoperatively, requiring that the dose be withheld "several times" during her hospitalization.

Eight days after discharge, the cardiologist saw the patient. Fourteen days later, the patient bled fatally with an INR of 24.4. Thus, it is apparent that the INR was not checked for 22 days following the patient's discharge.

Given the fact that warfarin had to be stopped several times during the patient's hospitalization—and the probability that she had a new target INR, following valve replacement with a mechanical valve—most jurors would have little difficulty concluding that the standard of care was breached.

It is unclear whether the cardiologist or perhaps the patient's primary care provider was to follow her INR postdischarge. That was the causative problem: uncertainty over whose responsibility it was to perform this important monitoring.

While drawing analogies between sports and medicine is often unsuitable, a baseball analogy serves well. A pop fly is hit to deep outfield between two outfielders. Each could easily catch the ball, yet each thinks the other will act. Neither one acts, so the ball drops between the two players, and the team, charged with an error, faces possible loss of the game.

Many malpractice cases involve such a "pop fly" misjudgment: Clinicians fail to act on the mistaken belief that another will. The consequence of an easily handled matter is error and perhaps death.

This problem can be prevented. Within your referral network, establish clear guidelines to determine which clinician is responsible for surveillance, monitoring, and maintenance for any given condition. In the absence of a clear, mutually understood plan, each clinician should take the initiative to manage the patient or conclusively establish who will. This understanding should be shared with the patient and communicated in the record. Many lives may be saved if the responsibilities among clinicians are clear. —DML

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EHRs and medicolegal risk: How they help, when they could hurt

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EHRs and medicolegal risk: How they help, when they could hurt

HAVE YOU READ THESE RELATED ARTICLES?

Survey: Many physicians plan to leave or scale down practice
Janelle Yates (February 2012)

Is private ObGyn practice on its way out?
Lucia DiVenere, MA (October 2011)

The medical record has evolved considerably since it originated in ancient Greece as a narrative of cure.1 For one thing, it’s now electronic. For another, it’s no longer a medical record but a health record. According to the US Department of Health and Human Services, the distinction is not a trivial one. A medical record is used by clinicians mostly for diagnosis and treatment, whereas the health record focuses on the total wellbeing of the patient.2 The medical record is used primarily within a practice. The electronic health record (EHR) reaches across borders to other offices, institutions, and clinicians.

Use of the EHR has been stimulated by the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act,3 which offers grants and incentives for “meaningful use” of electronic records.4 After 2014, medical practices that do not use EHRs will face a financial penalty that amounts to 2% of 2013 clinical revenue.

EHRs have been hailed as a panacea and derided as anathema. Whatever your perspective, there is no denying that they dramatically increase the immediate and easy availability of information and, therefore, influence decision-making in regard to medical care, cost-effectiveness, and patient safety. EHRs have the potential to improve communication, broaden access to information, and help guide clinical decision-making through the use of best-practice algorithms. When used properly—which means taking advantage of the EHR’s full potential and adapting to the way information is organized and analyzed—the EHR can reduce adverse events and help defend the appropriateness of the care provided. This lowers your medicolegal risk. When used improperly or haphazardly, they may increase that risk. In this article, we elaborate on both.

EHRs have many benefits

Improved communication. EHRs facilitate communication between healthcare providers. A primary care physician can access a consultant’s report practically as it is written. Providers also can carry on a dialogue electronically, planning together for care that will best serve the patient, with less redundancy and time.

The EHR also facilitates communication between physician and patient, allowing the physician to see the patient’s recent history and plan her management while speaking to her on the phone. Issues can be addressed with greater accuracy and expediency, leading to reduced anxiety for the patient and increased compliance.

Seamless integration. Information can be entered into the EHR and integrated into the full record more seamlessly than it is with written records. And data can be entered once and used many times.

Enhanced decision-making. Decision-making depends on careful analysis of a clinical scenario. Protocols, templates, and order sets embedded in the EHR can reduce medical errors by identifying scenarios for the physician to review.5,6

The EHR can also highlight adverse drug-drug interactions and help avoid potential allergic reactions. Murphy and colleagues reported a reduction of medical errors by utilizing a pharmacy-driven EHR component—a reduction from 90% to 47% on the surgical unit and from 57% to 33% on the medicine unit.7

Improved documentation. The EHR can enhance documentation by offering specific and detailed templates for informed consent, making it more comprehensive than a handwritten notation of the risks and benefits.

Decipherability is another strength of the EHR. Because physicians are notorious for poor handwriting skills, some hospitals now require a writing sample as part of their privileging process. The EHR avoids this issue entirely.8 Typos and grammatical errors are minimized by spellchecking and grammar-correcting programs written into the EHR.

Quality assurance. Timely evaluation of approaches to clinical care is available to physicians as well as hospitals that use EHRs.9 An individual physician can perform personal quality-assurance audits. And hospital management can gather cumulative statistics more quickly and easily.5,6,10,11

Patient data can be accessed independent of medical department, with lab tests, imaging studies, and pathology reports readily available for review. And accessibility is available regardless of geographic location.

Risks are bountiful, too

EHRs are not perfect, and neither are their users. EHRs present the potential for problems related to absent or erroneous data entry, patient privacy issues, misunderstanding and misuse of software, and development of metadata.

With initial use, EHRs can create documentation gaps with the transition from paper to electronic records. In addition, inadequate provider training can create new error pathways, and a failure to use EHRs consistently can lead to loss of data and communication errors. These gaps and errors can increase medicolegal risk, as can the more extensive documentation often seen with early use, which creates more discoverable data. The temptation to cut and paste risks repeating earlier errors and omitting new information.

 

 

Another area of risk involves communication with the patient via email. A failure to reply could result in claims of negligence, and information overload could obscure pertinent pieces of information. And a departure from clinical decision support could be used by the patient to defend allegations of negligence.

With widespread use of EHRs, improved access to data could change the “duty” owed to the patient. In addition, clinical decision support embedded within the software could become the de facto “standard of care.”

The learning curve can be steep

The learning curve for EHRs may be steep and, at times, discouraging. One reason is that data are organized differently than in the conventional paper record, where information is read and analyzed in a progressive and stepwise manner, as in an analog or vertical system. The EHR is a digital format, so finding information requires digital (horizontal) inquiry. Information is, therefore, utilized in both horizontal and vertical formats in everyday situations. If data are entered incorrectly, all subsequent decisions could be flawed. And if the EHR suggests a plan, and that plan is not performed by the provider, the risk of liability could increase.

Privacy could be jeopardized

Inadvertent violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) with an EHR could increase medicolegal risk. For example, HIPAA allows for patients to make corrections to inaccurate information in their personal documents, but access by the patient could require the physician to review all records viewed by the patient after visit notes have been entered. This could drive up the cost of practice and reduce face-to-face time between physician and patient. Patients are not necessarily the best judges of which information is most important in their medical records.

Internet access raises concerns about the privacy of sensitive issues and misuse of information. Making a patient’s protected health information accessible electronically leaves physicians and hospitals at risk for a government fine or lawsuit. In several instances, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has levied fines against small practices and government agencies.

In one case, HHS fined Phoenix Cardiac Surgery in Phoenix, Arizona, $100,000 for posting surgery and appointment schedules on an Internet-based calendar that was accessible to the public.12 In another, HHS fined the Massachusetts Eye and Ear Infirmary in Boston $1.5 million after it reported the loss of an encrypted personal laptop containing the protected health information of patients and research subjects.13 The Alaska Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) agreed to pay HHS $1.7 million after it reported the loss of a USB drive—possibly containing protected health information—from the vehicle of a DHSS employee.14

In traditional physician practices that employ handwritten records, the potential for compromise of patient information is limited. An organization may lose a few patient charts in the office and recover from the loss without incident. With the EHR, the loss poses a significant threat. The cases mentioned above were attributed to negligence or ignorance. The consequences could be worse if the compromise of EHR data is determined to be intentional. On September 4, 2010, hackers may have exposed the personal information of approximately 9,493 patients at Southwest Seattle Orthopaedics and Sports Medicine in Burien, Washington. Even with the best encryption technology, any electronic system remains vulnerable to external attack.

Metadata reveal how original data are used

Another concern regarding EHRs involves metadata—”data about data content.”15 Metadata is structured information that describes, locates, explains, or manages information. Metadata relevant to the EHR includes the data and time it was reviewed by the provider and whether it was manipulated in any way. Clearly, there is a potential for use and misuse by third-party reviewers.

Specialty-specific EHRs are recommended

Many ObGyns have found that most EHR systems are inadequate to the task of recording and analyzing information relevant to their specialty. Obstetric care is episodic and frequent. Data are added into the flow that must be considered at each visit, such as gestational age, fetal growth, labs (and normative values), prenatal diagnostic studies, and so on, representing both vertical and horizontal processing.16

The legal discovery process poses challenges that have not yet been resolved

The legal discovery process grants all parties to a lawsuit equal access to information. Under ideal circumstances, the EHR can provide comprehensive data more quickly than traditional records can. The problem is determining what constitutes relevant data and which party has the burden or benefit of making that decision. Uncontrolled access has the potential to violate privacy and privilege requirements.

Rules regarding discovery are still being debated in regard to their applicability to digital discovery.17 Even before a lawsuit is filed, the potential for “data mining” by third parties could lead to allegations of malpractice.

 

 

How to use EHRs responsibly without increasing risk

Good communication between patient and provider is paramount in the provision of quality medical care. Adherence to evidence-based standards with thorough documentation always serves the best interests of both patients and providers. The EHR can facilitate this process.

Our recommendations for appropriate use of your EHR include:

  • Spend time learning the ins and outs of your particular EHR, and make sure your staff does the same. This will help reduce the likelihood that errors will be introduced into the record and ensure consistent use.
  • Use individual sign-ons for anyone involved in data entry. This step facilitates the identification of users responsible for inaccurate use or errors, so that the situation can be addressed efficiently.
  • Do not let third parties enter or manipulate data. This could jeopardize patient privacy, as well as the integrity of the record itself.
  • Track all data entry on a regular basis. The frequency of tracking should be a function of routine as well as clinical circumstance. All new data from the previous interval should be reviewed at the time of the subsequent visit in order to direct care and ensure proper data entry.

Because of the considerable risk of liability claims in ObGyn practice, it is critical that the medical record accurately and precisely reflects the circumstances of each case. The EHR can be an effective and useful tool to document what occurred (and when) in a clinical scenario.18 As with all medical records, completeness and accuracy are the first and best defense against allegations of medical malpractice.

References

1. The Casebooks Project. History of Medical Record-keeping. http://www.magicandmedicine.hps.cam.ac.uk/on-astrological-medicine/further-reading/history-of-medical-record-keeping/. Accessed February 26 2013.

2. US Department of Health and Human Services. EMR vs EHR—What is the difference? Health IT Buzz. http://www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/electronic-health-and-medical-records/emr-vs-ehr-difference/. Accessed February 20, 2013.

3. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009. HITECH Act. Pub L No 111-5 Div A tit XIII Div B tit IV Feb 17 2009, 123 stat 226, 467. Codified in scattered sections of 42 USCA.

4. Mangalmurti S, Murtagh L, Mello M. Medical malpractice liability in the age of electronic health records. N Engl J Med. 2010;363(21):2060-2067.

5. Reid P, Compton D, Grossman J, et al. Building a Better Delivery System: A New Engineering/Healthcare Partnership. Committee on Engineering and the Health Care System, Institute of Medicine and the National Academy of Engineering. Washington, DC: National Academies Press; 2005.

6. Grossman J. Disruptive innovation in healthcare: challenges for engineering. The Bridge. 2008;38:10-16.

7. Murphy E, Oxencis C, Klauck J, et al. Medication reconciliation at an academic medical center; implementation of a comprehensive program from admission to discharge. Am J Health-System Pharmacy. 2009;66(23):2126-2131.

8. Schuler R. The smart grid: a bridge between emerging technologies society and the environment. The Bridge. 2010;40:42-49.

9. Haberman S, Feldman J, Merhi Z, et al. Effect of clinical decision support on documentation compliance in an electronic medical record. Obstet Gynecol. 2009;114(2 Pt 1):311-317.

10. Hasley S. Decision support and patient safety: the time has come. Am J Obstet Gynecol. 2011;204(6):461-465.

11. Lagrew D, Stutman H, Sicaeros L. Voluntary physician adoption of an inpatient electronic medical record by obstetrician-gynecologists. Am J Obstet Gynecol. 2008;198(6):690.e1-e6.

12. Dolan PL. $100,000 HIPAA fine designed to send message to small physician practices. American Medical News. 2012. http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2012/04/30/bisd0502.htm. Accessed February 26, 2013.

13. US Department of Health and Human Services. Massachusetts provider settles HIPAA case for $1.5 million [news release]. September 17 2012. http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/09/20120917a.html. Accessed February 26, 2013.

14. US Department of Health and Human Services. Alaska settles HIPAA security case for $1,700,000 [news release]. June 26, 2012. http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/06/20120626a.html. Accessed February 26, 2013.

15. National Information Standards Organization. Understanding Metadata. Bethesda MD: NISO Press; 2004. http://www.niso.org/publications/press/UnderstandingMetadata.pdf. Accessed February 26, 2013.

16. McCoy M, Diamond A, Strunk A. Special requirements of electronic medical record systems in obstetrics and gynecology. Obstet Gynecol. 2010;116(1):140-143.

17. The Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Impact of Digital Discovery. http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/digitaldiscovery/digdisc_library_4.html. Accessed February 26 2013.

18. Quinn M, Kats A, Kleinman K, et al. The relationship between electronic health records and malpractice claims. Arch Intern Med. 2012;172(15):1187-1188.

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Martin L. Gimovsky, MD
Dr. Gimovsky is a Maternal-Fetal Medicine Specialist at Newark Beth Israel Medical Center in Newark, New Jersey, and Clinical Professor of Obstetrics, Gynecology, and Reproductive Medicine at Mount Sinai School of Medicine in New York City.

Baohuong N. Tran, DO
Dr. Tran is a House Officer in Obstetrics and Gynecology at Newark Beth Israel Medical Center in Newark, New Jersey.

The authors report no financial relationships relevant to this article.

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Dr. Gimovsky is a Maternal-Fetal Medicine Specialist at Newark Beth Israel Medical Center in Newark, New Jersey, and Clinical Professor of Obstetrics, Gynecology, and Reproductive Medicine at Mount Sinai School of Medicine in New York City.

Baohuong N. Tran, DO
Dr. Tran is a House Officer in Obstetrics and Gynecology at Newark Beth Israel Medical Center in Newark, New Jersey.

The authors report no financial relationships relevant to this article.

Author and Disclosure Information

Martin L. Gimovsky, MD
Dr. Gimovsky is a Maternal-Fetal Medicine Specialist at Newark Beth Israel Medical Center in Newark, New Jersey, and Clinical Professor of Obstetrics, Gynecology, and Reproductive Medicine at Mount Sinai School of Medicine in New York City.

Baohuong N. Tran, DO
Dr. Tran is a House Officer in Obstetrics and Gynecology at Newark Beth Israel Medical Center in Newark, New Jersey.

The authors report no financial relationships relevant to this article.

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HAVE YOU READ THESE RELATED ARTICLES?

Survey: Many physicians plan to leave or scale down practice
Janelle Yates (February 2012)

Is private ObGyn practice on its way out?
Lucia DiVenere, MA (October 2011)

The medical record has evolved considerably since it originated in ancient Greece as a narrative of cure.1 For one thing, it’s now electronic. For another, it’s no longer a medical record but a health record. According to the US Department of Health and Human Services, the distinction is not a trivial one. A medical record is used by clinicians mostly for diagnosis and treatment, whereas the health record focuses on the total wellbeing of the patient.2 The medical record is used primarily within a practice. The electronic health record (EHR) reaches across borders to other offices, institutions, and clinicians.

Use of the EHR has been stimulated by the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act,3 which offers grants and incentives for “meaningful use” of electronic records.4 After 2014, medical practices that do not use EHRs will face a financial penalty that amounts to 2% of 2013 clinical revenue.

EHRs have been hailed as a panacea and derided as anathema. Whatever your perspective, there is no denying that they dramatically increase the immediate and easy availability of information and, therefore, influence decision-making in regard to medical care, cost-effectiveness, and patient safety. EHRs have the potential to improve communication, broaden access to information, and help guide clinical decision-making through the use of best-practice algorithms. When used properly—which means taking advantage of the EHR’s full potential and adapting to the way information is organized and analyzed—the EHR can reduce adverse events and help defend the appropriateness of the care provided. This lowers your medicolegal risk. When used improperly or haphazardly, they may increase that risk. In this article, we elaborate on both.

EHRs have many benefits

Improved communication. EHRs facilitate communication between healthcare providers. A primary care physician can access a consultant’s report practically as it is written. Providers also can carry on a dialogue electronically, planning together for care that will best serve the patient, with less redundancy and time.

The EHR also facilitates communication between physician and patient, allowing the physician to see the patient’s recent history and plan her management while speaking to her on the phone. Issues can be addressed with greater accuracy and expediency, leading to reduced anxiety for the patient and increased compliance.

Seamless integration. Information can be entered into the EHR and integrated into the full record more seamlessly than it is with written records. And data can be entered once and used many times.

Enhanced decision-making. Decision-making depends on careful analysis of a clinical scenario. Protocols, templates, and order sets embedded in the EHR can reduce medical errors by identifying scenarios for the physician to review.5,6

The EHR can also highlight adverse drug-drug interactions and help avoid potential allergic reactions. Murphy and colleagues reported a reduction of medical errors by utilizing a pharmacy-driven EHR component—a reduction from 90% to 47% on the surgical unit and from 57% to 33% on the medicine unit.7

Improved documentation. The EHR can enhance documentation by offering specific and detailed templates for informed consent, making it more comprehensive than a handwritten notation of the risks and benefits.

Decipherability is another strength of the EHR. Because physicians are notorious for poor handwriting skills, some hospitals now require a writing sample as part of their privileging process. The EHR avoids this issue entirely.8 Typos and grammatical errors are minimized by spellchecking and grammar-correcting programs written into the EHR.

Quality assurance. Timely evaluation of approaches to clinical care is available to physicians as well as hospitals that use EHRs.9 An individual physician can perform personal quality-assurance audits. And hospital management can gather cumulative statistics more quickly and easily.5,6,10,11

Patient data can be accessed independent of medical department, with lab tests, imaging studies, and pathology reports readily available for review. And accessibility is available regardless of geographic location.

Risks are bountiful, too

EHRs are not perfect, and neither are their users. EHRs present the potential for problems related to absent or erroneous data entry, patient privacy issues, misunderstanding and misuse of software, and development of metadata.

With initial use, EHRs can create documentation gaps with the transition from paper to electronic records. In addition, inadequate provider training can create new error pathways, and a failure to use EHRs consistently can lead to loss of data and communication errors. These gaps and errors can increase medicolegal risk, as can the more extensive documentation often seen with early use, which creates more discoverable data. The temptation to cut and paste risks repeating earlier errors and omitting new information.

 

 

Another area of risk involves communication with the patient via email. A failure to reply could result in claims of negligence, and information overload could obscure pertinent pieces of information. And a departure from clinical decision support could be used by the patient to defend allegations of negligence.

With widespread use of EHRs, improved access to data could change the “duty” owed to the patient. In addition, clinical decision support embedded within the software could become the de facto “standard of care.”

The learning curve can be steep

The learning curve for EHRs may be steep and, at times, discouraging. One reason is that data are organized differently than in the conventional paper record, where information is read and analyzed in a progressive and stepwise manner, as in an analog or vertical system. The EHR is a digital format, so finding information requires digital (horizontal) inquiry. Information is, therefore, utilized in both horizontal and vertical formats in everyday situations. If data are entered incorrectly, all subsequent decisions could be flawed. And if the EHR suggests a plan, and that plan is not performed by the provider, the risk of liability could increase.

Privacy could be jeopardized

Inadvertent violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) with an EHR could increase medicolegal risk. For example, HIPAA allows for patients to make corrections to inaccurate information in their personal documents, but access by the patient could require the physician to review all records viewed by the patient after visit notes have been entered. This could drive up the cost of practice and reduce face-to-face time between physician and patient. Patients are not necessarily the best judges of which information is most important in their medical records.

Internet access raises concerns about the privacy of sensitive issues and misuse of information. Making a patient’s protected health information accessible electronically leaves physicians and hospitals at risk for a government fine or lawsuit. In several instances, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has levied fines against small practices and government agencies.

In one case, HHS fined Phoenix Cardiac Surgery in Phoenix, Arizona, $100,000 for posting surgery and appointment schedules on an Internet-based calendar that was accessible to the public.12 In another, HHS fined the Massachusetts Eye and Ear Infirmary in Boston $1.5 million after it reported the loss of an encrypted personal laptop containing the protected health information of patients and research subjects.13 The Alaska Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) agreed to pay HHS $1.7 million after it reported the loss of a USB drive—possibly containing protected health information—from the vehicle of a DHSS employee.14

In traditional physician practices that employ handwritten records, the potential for compromise of patient information is limited. An organization may lose a few patient charts in the office and recover from the loss without incident. With the EHR, the loss poses a significant threat. The cases mentioned above were attributed to negligence or ignorance. The consequences could be worse if the compromise of EHR data is determined to be intentional. On September 4, 2010, hackers may have exposed the personal information of approximately 9,493 patients at Southwest Seattle Orthopaedics and Sports Medicine in Burien, Washington. Even with the best encryption technology, any electronic system remains vulnerable to external attack.

Metadata reveal how original data are used

Another concern regarding EHRs involves metadata—”data about data content.”15 Metadata is structured information that describes, locates, explains, or manages information. Metadata relevant to the EHR includes the data and time it was reviewed by the provider and whether it was manipulated in any way. Clearly, there is a potential for use and misuse by third-party reviewers.

Specialty-specific EHRs are recommended

Many ObGyns have found that most EHR systems are inadequate to the task of recording and analyzing information relevant to their specialty. Obstetric care is episodic and frequent. Data are added into the flow that must be considered at each visit, such as gestational age, fetal growth, labs (and normative values), prenatal diagnostic studies, and so on, representing both vertical and horizontal processing.16

The legal discovery process poses challenges that have not yet been resolved

The legal discovery process grants all parties to a lawsuit equal access to information. Under ideal circumstances, the EHR can provide comprehensive data more quickly than traditional records can. The problem is determining what constitutes relevant data and which party has the burden or benefit of making that decision. Uncontrolled access has the potential to violate privacy and privilege requirements.

Rules regarding discovery are still being debated in regard to their applicability to digital discovery.17 Even before a lawsuit is filed, the potential for “data mining” by third parties could lead to allegations of malpractice.

 

 

How to use EHRs responsibly without increasing risk

Good communication between patient and provider is paramount in the provision of quality medical care. Adherence to evidence-based standards with thorough documentation always serves the best interests of both patients and providers. The EHR can facilitate this process.

Our recommendations for appropriate use of your EHR include:

  • Spend time learning the ins and outs of your particular EHR, and make sure your staff does the same. This will help reduce the likelihood that errors will be introduced into the record and ensure consistent use.
  • Use individual sign-ons for anyone involved in data entry. This step facilitates the identification of users responsible for inaccurate use or errors, so that the situation can be addressed efficiently.
  • Do not let third parties enter or manipulate data. This could jeopardize patient privacy, as well as the integrity of the record itself.
  • Track all data entry on a regular basis. The frequency of tracking should be a function of routine as well as clinical circumstance. All new data from the previous interval should be reviewed at the time of the subsequent visit in order to direct care and ensure proper data entry.

Because of the considerable risk of liability claims in ObGyn practice, it is critical that the medical record accurately and precisely reflects the circumstances of each case. The EHR can be an effective and useful tool to document what occurred (and when) in a clinical scenario.18 As with all medical records, completeness and accuracy are the first and best defense against allegations of medical malpractice.

HAVE YOU READ THESE RELATED ARTICLES?

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Lucia DiVenere, MA (October 2011)

The medical record has evolved considerably since it originated in ancient Greece as a narrative of cure.1 For one thing, it’s now electronic. For another, it’s no longer a medical record but a health record. According to the US Department of Health and Human Services, the distinction is not a trivial one. A medical record is used by clinicians mostly for diagnosis and treatment, whereas the health record focuses on the total wellbeing of the patient.2 The medical record is used primarily within a practice. The electronic health record (EHR) reaches across borders to other offices, institutions, and clinicians.

Use of the EHR has been stimulated by the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act,3 which offers grants and incentives for “meaningful use” of electronic records.4 After 2014, medical practices that do not use EHRs will face a financial penalty that amounts to 2% of 2013 clinical revenue.

EHRs have been hailed as a panacea and derided as anathema. Whatever your perspective, there is no denying that they dramatically increase the immediate and easy availability of information and, therefore, influence decision-making in regard to medical care, cost-effectiveness, and patient safety. EHRs have the potential to improve communication, broaden access to information, and help guide clinical decision-making through the use of best-practice algorithms. When used properly—which means taking advantage of the EHR’s full potential and adapting to the way information is organized and analyzed—the EHR can reduce adverse events and help defend the appropriateness of the care provided. This lowers your medicolegal risk. When used improperly or haphazardly, they may increase that risk. In this article, we elaborate on both.

EHRs have many benefits

Improved communication. EHRs facilitate communication between healthcare providers. A primary care physician can access a consultant’s report practically as it is written. Providers also can carry on a dialogue electronically, planning together for care that will best serve the patient, with less redundancy and time.

The EHR also facilitates communication between physician and patient, allowing the physician to see the patient’s recent history and plan her management while speaking to her on the phone. Issues can be addressed with greater accuracy and expediency, leading to reduced anxiety for the patient and increased compliance.

Seamless integration. Information can be entered into the EHR and integrated into the full record more seamlessly than it is with written records. And data can be entered once and used many times.

Enhanced decision-making. Decision-making depends on careful analysis of a clinical scenario. Protocols, templates, and order sets embedded in the EHR can reduce medical errors by identifying scenarios for the physician to review.5,6

The EHR can also highlight adverse drug-drug interactions and help avoid potential allergic reactions. Murphy and colleagues reported a reduction of medical errors by utilizing a pharmacy-driven EHR component—a reduction from 90% to 47% on the surgical unit and from 57% to 33% on the medicine unit.7

Improved documentation. The EHR can enhance documentation by offering specific and detailed templates for informed consent, making it more comprehensive than a handwritten notation of the risks and benefits.

Decipherability is another strength of the EHR. Because physicians are notorious for poor handwriting skills, some hospitals now require a writing sample as part of their privileging process. The EHR avoids this issue entirely.8 Typos and grammatical errors are minimized by spellchecking and grammar-correcting programs written into the EHR.

Quality assurance. Timely evaluation of approaches to clinical care is available to physicians as well as hospitals that use EHRs.9 An individual physician can perform personal quality-assurance audits. And hospital management can gather cumulative statistics more quickly and easily.5,6,10,11

Patient data can be accessed independent of medical department, with lab tests, imaging studies, and pathology reports readily available for review. And accessibility is available regardless of geographic location.

Risks are bountiful, too

EHRs are not perfect, and neither are their users. EHRs present the potential for problems related to absent or erroneous data entry, patient privacy issues, misunderstanding and misuse of software, and development of metadata.

With initial use, EHRs can create documentation gaps with the transition from paper to electronic records. In addition, inadequate provider training can create new error pathways, and a failure to use EHRs consistently can lead to loss of data and communication errors. These gaps and errors can increase medicolegal risk, as can the more extensive documentation often seen with early use, which creates more discoverable data. The temptation to cut and paste risks repeating earlier errors and omitting new information.

 

 

Another area of risk involves communication with the patient via email. A failure to reply could result in claims of negligence, and information overload could obscure pertinent pieces of information. And a departure from clinical decision support could be used by the patient to defend allegations of negligence.

With widespread use of EHRs, improved access to data could change the “duty” owed to the patient. In addition, clinical decision support embedded within the software could become the de facto “standard of care.”

The learning curve can be steep

The learning curve for EHRs may be steep and, at times, discouraging. One reason is that data are organized differently than in the conventional paper record, where information is read and analyzed in a progressive and stepwise manner, as in an analog or vertical system. The EHR is a digital format, so finding information requires digital (horizontal) inquiry. Information is, therefore, utilized in both horizontal and vertical formats in everyday situations. If data are entered incorrectly, all subsequent decisions could be flawed. And if the EHR suggests a plan, and that plan is not performed by the provider, the risk of liability could increase.

Privacy could be jeopardized

Inadvertent violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) with an EHR could increase medicolegal risk. For example, HIPAA allows for patients to make corrections to inaccurate information in their personal documents, but access by the patient could require the physician to review all records viewed by the patient after visit notes have been entered. This could drive up the cost of practice and reduce face-to-face time between physician and patient. Patients are not necessarily the best judges of which information is most important in their medical records.

Internet access raises concerns about the privacy of sensitive issues and misuse of information. Making a patient’s protected health information accessible electronically leaves physicians and hospitals at risk for a government fine or lawsuit. In several instances, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has levied fines against small practices and government agencies.

In one case, HHS fined Phoenix Cardiac Surgery in Phoenix, Arizona, $100,000 for posting surgery and appointment schedules on an Internet-based calendar that was accessible to the public.12 In another, HHS fined the Massachusetts Eye and Ear Infirmary in Boston $1.5 million after it reported the loss of an encrypted personal laptop containing the protected health information of patients and research subjects.13 The Alaska Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) agreed to pay HHS $1.7 million after it reported the loss of a USB drive—possibly containing protected health information—from the vehicle of a DHSS employee.14

In traditional physician practices that employ handwritten records, the potential for compromise of patient information is limited. An organization may lose a few patient charts in the office and recover from the loss without incident. With the EHR, the loss poses a significant threat. The cases mentioned above were attributed to negligence or ignorance. The consequences could be worse if the compromise of EHR data is determined to be intentional. On September 4, 2010, hackers may have exposed the personal information of approximately 9,493 patients at Southwest Seattle Orthopaedics and Sports Medicine in Burien, Washington. Even with the best encryption technology, any electronic system remains vulnerable to external attack.

Metadata reveal how original data are used

Another concern regarding EHRs involves metadata—”data about data content.”15 Metadata is structured information that describes, locates, explains, or manages information. Metadata relevant to the EHR includes the data and time it was reviewed by the provider and whether it was manipulated in any way. Clearly, there is a potential for use and misuse by third-party reviewers.

Specialty-specific EHRs are recommended

Many ObGyns have found that most EHR systems are inadequate to the task of recording and analyzing information relevant to their specialty. Obstetric care is episodic and frequent. Data are added into the flow that must be considered at each visit, such as gestational age, fetal growth, labs (and normative values), prenatal diagnostic studies, and so on, representing both vertical and horizontal processing.16

The legal discovery process poses challenges that have not yet been resolved

The legal discovery process grants all parties to a lawsuit equal access to information. Under ideal circumstances, the EHR can provide comprehensive data more quickly than traditional records can. The problem is determining what constitutes relevant data and which party has the burden or benefit of making that decision. Uncontrolled access has the potential to violate privacy and privilege requirements.

Rules regarding discovery are still being debated in regard to their applicability to digital discovery.17 Even before a lawsuit is filed, the potential for “data mining” by third parties could lead to allegations of malpractice.

 

 

How to use EHRs responsibly without increasing risk

Good communication between patient and provider is paramount in the provision of quality medical care. Adherence to evidence-based standards with thorough documentation always serves the best interests of both patients and providers. The EHR can facilitate this process.

Our recommendations for appropriate use of your EHR include:

  • Spend time learning the ins and outs of your particular EHR, and make sure your staff does the same. This will help reduce the likelihood that errors will be introduced into the record and ensure consistent use.
  • Use individual sign-ons for anyone involved in data entry. This step facilitates the identification of users responsible for inaccurate use or errors, so that the situation can be addressed efficiently.
  • Do not let third parties enter or manipulate data. This could jeopardize patient privacy, as well as the integrity of the record itself.
  • Track all data entry on a regular basis. The frequency of tracking should be a function of routine as well as clinical circumstance. All new data from the previous interval should be reviewed at the time of the subsequent visit in order to direct care and ensure proper data entry.

Because of the considerable risk of liability claims in ObGyn practice, it is critical that the medical record accurately and precisely reflects the circumstances of each case. The EHR can be an effective and useful tool to document what occurred (and when) in a clinical scenario.18 As with all medical records, completeness and accuracy are the first and best defense against allegations of medical malpractice.

References

1. The Casebooks Project. History of Medical Record-keeping. http://www.magicandmedicine.hps.cam.ac.uk/on-astrological-medicine/further-reading/history-of-medical-record-keeping/. Accessed February 26 2013.

2. US Department of Health and Human Services. EMR vs EHR—What is the difference? Health IT Buzz. http://www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/electronic-health-and-medical-records/emr-vs-ehr-difference/. Accessed February 20, 2013.

3. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009. HITECH Act. Pub L No 111-5 Div A tit XIII Div B tit IV Feb 17 2009, 123 stat 226, 467. Codified in scattered sections of 42 USCA.

4. Mangalmurti S, Murtagh L, Mello M. Medical malpractice liability in the age of electronic health records. N Engl J Med. 2010;363(21):2060-2067.

5. Reid P, Compton D, Grossman J, et al. Building a Better Delivery System: A New Engineering/Healthcare Partnership. Committee on Engineering and the Health Care System, Institute of Medicine and the National Academy of Engineering. Washington, DC: National Academies Press; 2005.

6. Grossman J. Disruptive innovation in healthcare: challenges for engineering. The Bridge. 2008;38:10-16.

7. Murphy E, Oxencis C, Klauck J, et al. Medication reconciliation at an academic medical center; implementation of a comprehensive program from admission to discharge. Am J Health-System Pharmacy. 2009;66(23):2126-2131.

8. Schuler R. The smart grid: a bridge between emerging technologies society and the environment. The Bridge. 2010;40:42-49.

9. Haberman S, Feldman J, Merhi Z, et al. Effect of clinical decision support on documentation compliance in an electronic medical record. Obstet Gynecol. 2009;114(2 Pt 1):311-317.

10. Hasley S. Decision support and patient safety: the time has come. Am J Obstet Gynecol. 2011;204(6):461-465.

11. Lagrew D, Stutman H, Sicaeros L. Voluntary physician adoption of an inpatient electronic medical record by obstetrician-gynecologists. Am J Obstet Gynecol. 2008;198(6):690.e1-e6.

12. Dolan PL. $100,000 HIPAA fine designed to send message to small physician practices. American Medical News. 2012. http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2012/04/30/bisd0502.htm. Accessed February 26, 2013.

13. US Department of Health and Human Services. Massachusetts provider settles HIPAA case for $1.5 million [news release]. September 17 2012. http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/09/20120917a.html. Accessed February 26, 2013.

14. US Department of Health and Human Services. Alaska settles HIPAA security case for $1,700,000 [news release]. June 26, 2012. http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/06/20120626a.html. Accessed February 26, 2013.

15. National Information Standards Organization. Understanding Metadata. Bethesda MD: NISO Press; 2004. http://www.niso.org/publications/press/UnderstandingMetadata.pdf. Accessed February 26, 2013.

16. McCoy M, Diamond A, Strunk A. Special requirements of electronic medical record systems in obstetrics and gynecology. Obstet Gynecol. 2010;116(1):140-143.

17. The Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Impact of Digital Discovery. http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/digitaldiscovery/digdisc_library_4.html. Accessed February 26 2013.

18. Quinn M, Kats A, Kleinman K, et al. The relationship between electronic health records and malpractice claims. Arch Intern Med. 2012;172(15):1187-1188.

References

1. The Casebooks Project. History of Medical Record-keeping. http://www.magicandmedicine.hps.cam.ac.uk/on-astrological-medicine/further-reading/history-of-medical-record-keeping/. Accessed February 26 2013.

2. US Department of Health and Human Services. EMR vs EHR—What is the difference? Health IT Buzz. http://www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/electronic-health-and-medical-records/emr-vs-ehr-difference/. Accessed February 20, 2013.

3. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009. HITECH Act. Pub L No 111-5 Div A tit XIII Div B tit IV Feb 17 2009, 123 stat 226, 467. Codified in scattered sections of 42 USCA.

4. Mangalmurti S, Murtagh L, Mello M. Medical malpractice liability in the age of electronic health records. N Engl J Med. 2010;363(21):2060-2067.

5. Reid P, Compton D, Grossman J, et al. Building a Better Delivery System: A New Engineering/Healthcare Partnership. Committee on Engineering and the Health Care System, Institute of Medicine and the National Academy of Engineering. Washington, DC: National Academies Press; 2005.

6. Grossman J. Disruptive innovation in healthcare: challenges for engineering. The Bridge. 2008;38:10-16.

7. Murphy E, Oxencis C, Klauck J, et al. Medication reconciliation at an academic medical center; implementation of a comprehensive program from admission to discharge. Am J Health-System Pharmacy. 2009;66(23):2126-2131.

8. Schuler R. The smart grid: a bridge between emerging technologies society and the environment. The Bridge. 2010;40:42-49.

9. Haberman S, Feldman J, Merhi Z, et al. Effect of clinical decision support on documentation compliance in an electronic medical record. Obstet Gynecol. 2009;114(2 Pt 1):311-317.

10. Hasley S. Decision support and patient safety: the time has come. Am J Obstet Gynecol. 2011;204(6):461-465.

11. Lagrew D, Stutman H, Sicaeros L. Voluntary physician adoption of an inpatient electronic medical record by obstetrician-gynecologists. Am J Obstet Gynecol. 2008;198(6):690.e1-e6.

12. Dolan PL. $100,000 HIPAA fine designed to send message to small physician practices. American Medical News. 2012. http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2012/04/30/bisd0502.htm. Accessed February 26, 2013.

13. US Department of Health and Human Services. Massachusetts provider settles HIPAA case for $1.5 million [news release]. September 17 2012. http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/09/20120917a.html. Accessed February 26, 2013.

14. US Department of Health and Human Services. Alaska settles HIPAA security case for $1,700,000 [news release]. June 26, 2012. http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/06/20120626a.html. Accessed February 26, 2013.

15. National Information Standards Organization. Understanding Metadata. Bethesda MD: NISO Press; 2004. http://www.niso.org/publications/press/UnderstandingMetadata.pdf. Accessed February 26, 2013.

16. McCoy M, Diamond A, Strunk A. Special requirements of electronic medical record systems in obstetrics and gynecology. Obstet Gynecol. 2010;116(1):140-143.

17. The Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Impact of Digital Discovery. http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/digitaldiscovery/digdisc_library_4.html. Accessed February 26 2013.

18. Quinn M, Kats A, Kleinman K, et al. The relationship between electronic health records and malpractice claims. Arch Intern Med. 2012;172(15):1187-1188.

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EHRs and medicolegal risk: How they help, when they could hurt
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EHR, electronic medical record, electronic health record, medicolegal risk, when EHRs can help, when EHRs could hurt, risks of electronic health records, patient privacy, minimize risk from electronic health records, risks of EHRs, Martin L. Gimovsky, MD, Baohuong N. Tran, DO, Newark Beth Israel Medical Center
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Obese mother gains another 60 lb before delivery … and more

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Obese mother gains another 60 lb before delivery … and more

Obese mother gains another 60 lb before delivery

AN OBESE WOMAN with a family history of diabetes had previously given birth to a large baby. Even though she expressed her concern that this fetus would also be macrosomic, the ObGyn planned for spontaneous vaginal delivery. At 39 weeks’ gestation, after gaining 60 lb, she went to the hospital requesting induction of labor; the ObGyn reluctantly agreed. Labor was lengthy, forceps-assisted delivery was performed, and a shoulder dystocia was encountered. The baby was born with respiratory distress, a brachial plexus injury, bruises on his right cheek and both ears, and multiple rib fractures. After transfer to a children’s hospital, surgical exploration revealed avulsion of the C6 root nerve from the spinal cord and damage to C5, C7, and C8 nerve roots. Several surgical repairs and physical therapy have led to some improvement, but the child is permanently injured. His right arm is shorter than the left, his right hand is smaller, and he has less strength and range of motion in the right arm. He also has excessive tearing in the right eye and his right eyelid droops.

PARENTS’ CLAIM The ObGyn failed to recognize the risk of delivering a macrosomic baby and did not consider cesarean delivery. The brachial plexus injury was due to downward traction applied during delivery.

PHYSICIAN’S DEFENSE There was no negligence. The brachial plexus injury was not caused by downward traction.

VERDICT A $4.1 million Indiana verdict was returned, but was reduced to the state cap of $1.25 million.

Failure to follow-up on mass: $1.97M verdict

AFTER STAGE II OVARIAN CANCER was found in 1999, a woman underwent surgery and chemotherapy, and was told she was cancer-free. She had regular visits between 2000 and 2008 with another surgical oncologist after her first surgeon moved. In 2004, the oncologist documented finding a round fullness during a pelvic exam. A CT scan confirmed a mass in the pelvic cul-de-sac.

In August 2008, the patient was treated for deep venous thrombosis in her leg. The attending physician saw the pelvic mass on imaging, and a biopsy indicated a recurrence of ovarian cancer. After chemotherapy, the patient underwent surgery, but the tumor was unresectable. In early 2011, testing revealed metastasis to the spine, sternum, pelvic bone, arm, and lung.

PATIENT’S CLAIM The surgeon did not properly investigate the mass resulting in a delayed diagnosis of cancer recurrence. The patient alleged that the surgical oncologist repeatedly stated that the mass had not changed and was most likely fluid; it was nothing to worry about. Radiology reports indicated a suspicion of cancer.

DEFENDANTS’ DEFENSE The oncologist repeatedly told the patient that the mass should be biopsied, but the patient refused because she was dealing with other medical issues. The radiologist argued that reports to the oncologist included everything needed to diagnose the cancer.

VERDICT A Pennsylvania jury found the surgical oncologist fully at fault and returned a $1,971,455 verdict.

Incomplete tubal ligation

BEFORE DELIVERY OF HER THIRD CHILD, a 26-year-old woman requested sterilization using tubal ligation. After delivery, the ObGyn performed a bilateral tubal ligation. The pathologist’s report indicated that the ligation was incomplete: the left fallopian tube had not been fully removed. The ObGyn failed to note the report’s results in the patient’s record, nor did he advise the patient. Two years later, the patient delivered a fourth child.

PATIENT’S CLAIM The patient alleged wrongful birth against both the ObGyn and pathologist. The ObGyn was negligent for not reacting to the pathologist’s report of incomplete tubal ligation, and for not informing the patient. The pathologist should have verbally confirmed receipt of the report with the ObGyn.

PHYSICIANS’ DEFENSE The ObGyn settled before trial. The pathologist claimed he had properly interpreted the specimen and reported the results.

VERDICT A Louisiana jury found the ObGyn fully at fault and assessed additional damages of $56,252 to the $100,000 settlement.

Where did this foreign body come from?

A WOMAN SUFFERED FROM PELVIC PAIN caused by adhesions following two cesarean deliveries and a hysterectomy. In January 2003, her ObGyn performed laparotomy to reduce adhesions from prior surgeries and place Gore-Tex mesh to prevent future adhesions. In October 2010, the patient reported epigastric pain, and went to a different surgeon (her insurance changed). A CT scan identified a foreign body encapsulated in scar tissue in the patient’s lower abdomen/pelvis. The surgeon removed the foreign body.

PATIENT’S CLAIM The ObGyn and hospital were negligent in conducting the 2003 procedure; the foreign object was a retained surgical sponge.

DEFENDANTS’ DEFENSE The foreign body removed in 2010 was the Gore-Tex mesh placed in 2003. The mesh became encapsulated in scar tissue due to the patient’s propensity to develop adhesions, and then moved within the patient’s body. Surgical sponges have embedded radiopaque tracers; CT scans in 2003 and 2010 did not detect any radiopaque tracers.

VERDICT A California defense verdict was returned.

 

 

Massive bleed during sacrocolpopexy

AFTER A 72-YEAR-OLD WOMAN developed pelvic organ prolapse, her urologist performed an abdominal sacrocolpopexy. As the urologist attempted to gain access to the sacral prominence, a tear in the median sacral vein expanded to involve the inferior vena cava and left iliac vein. Massive bleeding occurred and multiple units of blood were transfused. A general surgeon successfully repaired the vascular injuries. The patient was hospitalized for 16 days, received home healthcare, and fully recovered.

PATIENT’S CLAIM The urologist was negligent in overaggressive manipulation of the median sacral vein, causing it to avulse.

PHYSICIAN’S DEFENSE Bleeds of this type are a known complication of the procedure.

VERDICT A Michigan defense verdict was returned.

Was it hypoxia or autism?

AFTER SEVERAL HOURS IN LABOR, a fetal heart-rate monitor indicated decreasing fetal heart rate that led to terminal bradycardia. The ObGyn was called and performed an emergency cesarean delivery. The child was diagnosed with brain damage at 2 years of age.

PARENTS’ CLAIM A cesarean delivery should have been planned because of the fetal weight (8 lb 11 oz). A hypoxic event occurred during labor. Ultrasonography would have shown that the fetus was inverted and that the baby’s face was covered by one of its hands. Delivery was not properly managed, and fetal distress was not reported to the ObGyn in a timely manner.

DEFENDANTS’ DEFENSE The infant’s weight was not sufficient to warrant a cesarean delivery. The infant did not suffer hypoxia. The child’s abnormalities only emerged in the second year of life. An MRI at that time did not indicate brain damage. The child’s development with subsequent regression suggests autism.

VERDICT A New York defense verdict was returned.

Should mammography have been diagnostic?

A 46-YEAR-OLD WOMAN with a family history of breast cancer had regular annual screenings. In December 2006, the patient reported pain, hardness, and burning in her left breast to her gynecologist. A radiologist interpreted the mammography as normal. In May 2007, the patient found a lump in her left breast. Testing indicated she had stage IV breast cancer. She died 2 months after the trial concluded.

PATIENT’S CLAIM The 2006 mammogram was performed as a screening mammography, but should have been diagnostic, considering her family history and reported symptoms. The radiologist improperly interpreted the films.

DEFENDANTS’ DEFENSE The hospital staff testified that the patient did not report pain, hardness, and burning in her left breast when she presented for the 2006 mammography. The radiologist claimed his screening and interpretation were appropriate.

VERDICT The Louisiana court granted the patient’s motion for judgment, and awarded $558,000 in medical costs and $1.3 million in noneconomic damages, totalling $1.808 million. This was reduced to the $500,000 statutory cap.

References

These cases were selected by the editors of OBG Management from Medical Malpractice Verdicts, Settlements & Experts, with permission of the editor, Lewis Laska (www.verdictslaska.com). The information available to the editors about the cases presented here is sometimes incomplete. Moreover, the cases may or may not have merit. Nevertheless, these cases represent the types of clinical situations that typically result in litigation and are meant to illustrate nationwide variation in jury verdicts and awards.

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Obese mother gains another 60 lb before delivery

AN OBESE WOMAN with a family history of diabetes had previously given birth to a large baby. Even though she expressed her concern that this fetus would also be macrosomic, the ObGyn planned for spontaneous vaginal delivery. At 39 weeks’ gestation, after gaining 60 lb, she went to the hospital requesting induction of labor; the ObGyn reluctantly agreed. Labor was lengthy, forceps-assisted delivery was performed, and a shoulder dystocia was encountered. The baby was born with respiratory distress, a brachial plexus injury, bruises on his right cheek and both ears, and multiple rib fractures. After transfer to a children’s hospital, surgical exploration revealed avulsion of the C6 root nerve from the spinal cord and damage to C5, C7, and C8 nerve roots. Several surgical repairs and physical therapy have led to some improvement, but the child is permanently injured. His right arm is shorter than the left, his right hand is smaller, and he has less strength and range of motion in the right arm. He also has excessive tearing in the right eye and his right eyelid droops.

PARENTS’ CLAIM The ObGyn failed to recognize the risk of delivering a macrosomic baby and did not consider cesarean delivery. The brachial plexus injury was due to downward traction applied during delivery.

PHYSICIAN’S DEFENSE There was no negligence. The brachial plexus injury was not caused by downward traction.

VERDICT A $4.1 million Indiana verdict was returned, but was reduced to the state cap of $1.25 million.

Failure to follow-up on mass: $1.97M verdict

AFTER STAGE II OVARIAN CANCER was found in 1999, a woman underwent surgery and chemotherapy, and was told she was cancer-free. She had regular visits between 2000 and 2008 with another surgical oncologist after her first surgeon moved. In 2004, the oncologist documented finding a round fullness during a pelvic exam. A CT scan confirmed a mass in the pelvic cul-de-sac.

In August 2008, the patient was treated for deep venous thrombosis in her leg. The attending physician saw the pelvic mass on imaging, and a biopsy indicated a recurrence of ovarian cancer. After chemotherapy, the patient underwent surgery, but the tumor was unresectable. In early 2011, testing revealed metastasis to the spine, sternum, pelvic bone, arm, and lung.

PATIENT’S CLAIM The surgeon did not properly investigate the mass resulting in a delayed diagnosis of cancer recurrence. The patient alleged that the surgical oncologist repeatedly stated that the mass had not changed and was most likely fluid; it was nothing to worry about. Radiology reports indicated a suspicion of cancer.

DEFENDANTS’ DEFENSE The oncologist repeatedly told the patient that the mass should be biopsied, but the patient refused because she was dealing with other medical issues. The radiologist argued that reports to the oncologist included everything needed to diagnose the cancer.

VERDICT A Pennsylvania jury found the surgical oncologist fully at fault and returned a $1,971,455 verdict.

Incomplete tubal ligation

BEFORE DELIVERY OF HER THIRD CHILD, a 26-year-old woman requested sterilization using tubal ligation. After delivery, the ObGyn performed a bilateral tubal ligation. The pathologist’s report indicated that the ligation was incomplete: the left fallopian tube had not been fully removed. The ObGyn failed to note the report’s results in the patient’s record, nor did he advise the patient. Two years later, the patient delivered a fourth child.

PATIENT’S CLAIM The patient alleged wrongful birth against both the ObGyn and pathologist. The ObGyn was negligent for not reacting to the pathologist’s report of incomplete tubal ligation, and for not informing the patient. The pathologist should have verbally confirmed receipt of the report with the ObGyn.

PHYSICIANS’ DEFENSE The ObGyn settled before trial. The pathologist claimed he had properly interpreted the specimen and reported the results.

VERDICT A Louisiana jury found the ObGyn fully at fault and assessed additional damages of $56,252 to the $100,000 settlement.

Where did this foreign body come from?

A WOMAN SUFFERED FROM PELVIC PAIN caused by adhesions following two cesarean deliveries and a hysterectomy. In January 2003, her ObGyn performed laparotomy to reduce adhesions from prior surgeries and place Gore-Tex mesh to prevent future adhesions. In October 2010, the patient reported epigastric pain, and went to a different surgeon (her insurance changed). A CT scan identified a foreign body encapsulated in scar tissue in the patient’s lower abdomen/pelvis. The surgeon removed the foreign body.

PATIENT’S CLAIM The ObGyn and hospital were negligent in conducting the 2003 procedure; the foreign object was a retained surgical sponge.

DEFENDANTS’ DEFENSE The foreign body removed in 2010 was the Gore-Tex mesh placed in 2003. The mesh became encapsulated in scar tissue due to the patient’s propensity to develop adhesions, and then moved within the patient’s body. Surgical sponges have embedded radiopaque tracers; CT scans in 2003 and 2010 did not detect any radiopaque tracers.

VERDICT A California defense verdict was returned.

 

 

Massive bleed during sacrocolpopexy

AFTER A 72-YEAR-OLD WOMAN developed pelvic organ prolapse, her urologist performed an abdominal sacrocolpopexy. As the urologist attempted to gain access to the sacral prominence, a tear in the median sacral vein expanded to involve the inferior vena cava and left iliac vein. Massive bleeding occurred and multiple units of blood were transfused. A general surgeon successfully repaired the vascular injuries. The patient was hospitalized for 16 days, received home healthcare, and fully recovered.

PATIENT’S CLAIM The urologist was negligent in overaggressive manipulation of the median sacral vein, causing it to avulse.

PHYSICIAN’S DEFENSE Bleeds of this type are a known complication of the procedure.

VERDICT A Michigan defense verdict was returned.

Was it hypoxia or autism?

AFTER SEVERAL HOURS IN LABOR, a fetal heart-rate monitor indicated decreasing fetal heart rate that led to terminal bradycardia. The ObGyn was called and performed an emergency cesarean delivery. The child was diagnosed with brain damage at 2 years of age.

PARENTS’ CLAIM A cesarean delivery should have been planned because of the fetal weight (8 lb 11 oz). A hypoxic event occurred during labor. Ultrasonography would have shown that the fetus was inverted and that the baby’s face was covered by one of its hands. Delivery was not properly managed, and fetal distress was not reported to the ObGyn in a timely manner.

DEFENDANTS’ DEFENSE The infant’s weight was not sufficient to warrant a cesarean delivery. The infant did not suffer hypoxia. The child’s abnormalities only emerged in the second year of life. An MRI at that time did not indicate brain damage. The child’s development with subsequent regression suggests autism.

VERDICT A New York defense verdict was returned.

Should mammography have been diagnostic?

A 46-YEAR-OLD WOMAN with a family history of breast cancer had regular annual screenings. In December 2006, the patient reported pain, hardness, and burning in her left breast to her gynecologist. A radiologist interpreted the mammography as normal. In May 2007, the patient found a lump in her left breast. Testing indicated she had stage IV breast cancer. She died 2 months after the trial concluded.

PATIENT’S CLAIM The 2006 mammogram was performed as a screening mammography, but should have been diagnostic, considering her family history and reported symptoms. The radiologist improperly interpreted the films.

DEFENDANTS’ DEFENSE The hospital staff testified that the patient did not report pain, hardness, and burning in her left breast when she presented for the 2006 mammography. The radiologist claimed his screening and interpretation were appropriate.

VERDICT The Louisiana court granted the patient’s motion for judgment, and awarded $558,000 in medical costs and $1.3 million in noneconomic damages, totalling $1.808 million. This was reduced to the $500,000 statutory cap.

Obese mother gains another 60 lb before delivery

AN OBESE WOMAN with a family history of diabetes had previously given birth to a large baby. Even though she expressed her concern that this fetus would also be macrosomic, the ObGyn planned for spontaneous vaginal delivery. At 39 weeks’ gestation, after gaining 60 lb, she went to the hospital requesting induction of labor; the ObGyn reluctantly agreed. Labor was lengthy, forceps-assisted delivery was performed, and a shoulder dystocia was encountered. The baby was born with respiratory distress, a brachial plexus injury, bruises on his right cheek and both ears, and multiple rib fractures. After transfer to a children’s hospital, surgical exploration revealed avulsion of the C6 root nerve from the spinal cord and damage to C5, C7, and C8 nerve roots. Several surgical repairs and physical therapy have led to some improvement, but the child is permanently injured. His right arm is shorter than the left, his right hand is smaller, and he has less strength and range of motion in the right arm. He also has excessive tearing in the right eye and his right eyelid droops.

PARENTS’ CLAIM The ObGyn failed to recognize the risk of delivering a macrosomic baby and did not consider cesarean delivery. The brachial plexus injury was due to downward traction applied during delivery.

PHYSICIAN’S DEFENSE There was no negligence. The brachial plexus injury was not caused by downward traction.

VERDICT A $4.1 million Indiana verdict was returned, but was reduced to the state cap of $1.25 million.

Failure to follow-up on mass: $1.97M verdict

AFTER STAGE II OVARIAN CANCER was found in 1999, a woman underwent surgery and chemotherapy, and was told she was cancer-free. She had regular visits between 2000 and 2008 with another surgical oncologist after her first surgeon moved. In 2004, the oncologist documented finding a round fullness during a pelvic exam. A CT scan confirmed a mass in the pelvic cul-de-sac.

In August 2008, the patient was treated for deep venous thrombosis in her leg. The attending physician saw the pelvic mass on imaging, and a biopsy indicated a recurrence of ovarian cancer. After chemotherapy, the patient underwent surgery, but the tumor was unresectable. In early 2011, testing revealed metastasis to the spine, sternum, pelvic bone, arm, and lung.

PATIENT’S CLAIM The surgeon did not properly investigate the mass resulting in a delayed diagnosis of cancer recurrence. The patient alleged that the surgical oncologist repeatedly stated that the mass had not changed and was most likely fluid; it was nothing to worry about. Radiology reports indicated a suspicion of cancer.

DEFENDANTS’ DEFENSE The oncologist repeatedly told the patient that the mass should be biopsied, but the patient refused because she was dealing with other medical issues. The radiologist argued that reports to the oncologist included everything needed to diagnose the cancer.

VERDICT A Pennsylvania jury found the surgical oncologist fully at fault and returned a $1,971,455 verdict.

Incomplete tubal ligation

BEFORE DELIVERY OF HER THIRD CHILD, a 26-year-old woman requested sterilization using tubal ligation. After delivery, the ObGyn performed a bilateral tubal ligation. The pathologist’s report indicated that the ligation was incomplete: the left fallopian tube had not been fully removed. The ObGyn failed to note the report’s results in the patient’s record, nor did he advise the patient. Two years later, the patient delivered a fourth child.

PATIENT’S CLAIM The patient alleged wrongful birth against both the ObGyn and pathologist. The ObGyn was negligent for not reacting to the pathologist’s report of incomplete tubal ligation, and for not informing the patient. The pathologist should have verbally confirmed receipt of the report with the ObGyn.

PHYSICIANS’ DEFENSE The ObGyn settled before trial. The pathologist claimed he had properly interpreted the specimen and reported the results.

VERDICT A Louisiana jury found the ObGyn fully at fault and assessed additional damages of $56,252 to the $100,000 settlement.

Where did this foreign body come from?

A WOMAN SUFFERED FROM PELVIC PAIN caused by adhesions following two cesarean deliveries and a hysterectomy. In January 2003, her ObGyn performed laparotomy to reduce adhesions from prior surgeries and place Gore-Tex mesh to prevent future adhesions. In October 2010, the patient reported epigastric pain, and went to a different surgeon (her insurance changed). A CT scan identified a foreign body encapsulated in scar tissue in the patient’s lower abdomen/pelvis. The surgeon removed the foreign body.

PATIENT’S CLAIM The ObGyn and hospital were negligent in conducting the 2003 procedure; the foreign object was a retained surgical sponge.

DEFENDANTS’ DEFENSE The foreign body removed in 2010 was the Gore-Tex mesh placed in 2003. The mesh became encapsulated in scar tissue due to the patient’s propensity to develop adhesions, and then moved within the patient’s body. Surgical sponges have embedded radiopaque tracers; CT scans in 2003 and 2010 did not detect any radiopaque tracers.

VERDICT A California defense verdict was returned.

 

 

Massive bleed during sacrocolpopexy

AFTER A 72-YEAR-OLD WOMAN developed pelvic organ prolapse, her urologist performed an abdominal sacrocolpopexy. As the urologist attempted to gain access to the sacral prominence, a tear in the median sacral vein expanded to involve the inferior vena cava and left iliac vein. Massive bleeding occurred and multiple units of blood were transfused. A general surgeon successfully repaired the vascular injuries. The patient was hospitalized for 16 days, received home healthcare, and fully recovered.

PATIENT’S CLAIM The urologist was negligent in overaggressive manipulation of the median sacral vein, causing it to avulse.

PHYSICIAN’S DEFENSE Bleeds of this type are a known complication of the procedure.

VERDICT A Michigan defense verdict was returned.

Was it hypoxia or autism?

AFTER SEVERAL HOURS IN LABOR, a fetal heart-rate monitor indicated decreasing fetal heart rate that led to terminal bradycardia. The ObGyn was called and performed an emergency cesarean delivery. The child was diagnosed with brain damage at 2 years of age.

PARENTS’ CLAIM A cesarean delivery should have been planned because of the fetal weight (8 lb 11 oz). A hypoxic event occurred during labor. Ultrasonography would have shown that the fetus was inverted and that the baby’s face was covered by one of its hands. Delivery was not properly managed, and fetal distress was not reported to the ObGyn in a timely manner.

DEFENDANTS’ DEFENSE The infant’s weight was not sufficient to warrant a cesarean delivery. The infant did not suffer hypoxia. The child’s abnormalities only emerged in the second year of life. An MRI at that time did not indicate brain damage. The child’s development with subsequent regression suggests autism.

VERDICT A New York defense verdict was returned.

Should mammography have been diagnostic?

A 46-YEAR-OLD WOMAN with a family history of breast cancer had regular annual screenings. In December 2006, the patient reported pain, hardness, and burning in her left breast to her gynecologist. A radiologist interpreted the mammography as normal. In May 2007, the patient found a lump in her left breast. Testing indicated she had stage IV breast cancer. She died 2 months after the trial concluded.

PATIENT’S CLAIM The 2006 mammogram was performed as a screening mammography, but should have been diagnostic, considering her family history and reported symptoms. The radiologist improperly interpreted the films.

DEFENDANTS’ DEFENSE The hospital staff testified that the patient did not report pain, hardness, and burning in her left breast when she presented for the 2006 mammography. The radiologist claimed his screening and interpretation were appropriate.

VERDICT The Louisiana court granted the patient’s motion for judgment, and awarded $558,000 in medical costs and $1.3 million in noneconomic damages, totalling $1.808 million. This was reduced to the $500,000 statutory cap.

References

These cases were selected by the editors of OBG Management from Medical Malpractice Verdicts, Settlements & Experts, with permission of the editor, Lewis Laska (www.verdictslaska.com). The information available to the editors about the cases presented here is sometimes incomplete. Moreover, the cases may or may not have merit. Nevertheless, these cases represent the types of clinical situations that typically result in litigation and are meant to illustrate nationwide variation in jury verdicts and awards.

We want to hear from you! Tell us what you think.

References

These cases were selected by the editors of OBG Management from Medical Malpractice Verdicts, Settlements & Experts, with permission of the editor, Lewis Laska (www.verdictslaska.com). The information available to the editors about the cases presented here is sometimes incomplete. Moreover, the cases may or may not have merit. Nevertheless, these cases represent the types of clinical situations that typically result in litigation and are meant to illustrate nationwide variation in jury verdicts and awards.

We want to hear from you! Tell us what you think.

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Obese mother gains another 60 lb before delivery … and more
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STOP all activities that may lead to further shoulder impaction when you suspect possible shoulder dystocia

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STOP all activities that may lead to further shoulder impaction when you suspect possible shoulder dystocia
START your “rehearsed” algorithm immediately when shoulder dystocia is recognized

Shoulder dystocia is an obstetric complication that occurs in up to 1.4% of deliveries.1 Although the vast majority can be managed successfully, the complication is associated with risk of fetal injury. The most serious injury is brachial plexus palsy, which occurs in 4% to 40% of shoulder dystocia cases, although less than 10% of these injuries are permanent. Other injuries include fractures of the clavicle and humerus; in rare instances the complication may be associated with fetal asphyxia and death. Early recognition of the complication followed by an orderly approach to management will reduce the risk of fetal injury.

First, recognize shoulder dystocia and take control

Recognition of shoulder dystocia immediately followed by avoidance of further impaction, particularly of the anterior shoulder against the symphysis pubis, will likely increase the chances of successful resolution.

These factors should lead you to anticipate shoulder dystocia during delivery:

  • suspected macrosomia
  • diabetic parturient
  • prolonged second stage.

However, a high percentage of cases occur in women without risk factors. Because persistent or forceful traction, used in an attempt to deliver the anterior shoulder, may be one of the causes of brachial plexus injury, early recognition of shoulder dystocia, followed by a halt of further traction, reduces the risk of that injury.

In my experience, if some movement of the anterior shoulder does not occur after 2 to 3 seconds of gentle downward guidance, you need to consider the possibility of shoulder dystocia. It is also important to take control of the situation: Instruct the patient to stop pushing and family members to stop urging the patient to push.

DID YOU READ THESE ARTICLES ON SHOULDER DYSTOCIA?

Click here to read 5 recent articles on shoulder dystocia

Avoid panic. Initiate a care-team management algorithm.

Having a management algorithm that can be quickly recalled and initiated allows the care team to proceed in an orderly fashion and remain calm and avoid panic, particularly if the dystocia is severe. In obstetric emergencies, panic is your enemy, leading to inefficient activity, team confusion, and an increased likelihood that an error in judgment (too much traction, fundal pressure) may occur. I advise my residents that whenever there are risk factors for shoulder dystocia, or it is suspected for any reason, to do a mental run-through of the management steps.

Rehearse the algorithm. It will make a difference in the delivery room.

To most effectively use a management algorithm, rehearsal using team training drills or simulation is necessary. Studies support simulation and team training even for individuals who have completed training in obstetrics or midwifery. Crofts and colleagues videotaped 450 simulations of shoulder dystocia involving 95 certified nurse midwives and 45 physicians.2 The authors noted that 1) shoulder dystocia could not be resolved in 57% of cases, and 2) there was frequent confusion regarding how to perform the internal maneuvers, with poor communication among team members. This same group of researchers later demonstrated that skills in managing shoulder dystocia improved significantly after simulation training. In fact, a high proportion of “trainees” maintained their skill level when tested a year later.3

Finally, when evaluating the impact of training on actual clinical outcomes in their hospital, Crofts and colleagues noted that the rate of obstetric brachial plexus injury fell from 7.4% in a 4-year period prior to training, to 2.3% in a 4-year period after training.4

Practice within your own L&D unit

The use of in situ simulation (ie, simulation within the labor and delivery unit) has two major advantages:

  • It is more realistic than practicing within a lab. Systems issues, such as lack of a uniform procedure for getting help or a lack of chairs in the labor room to assist with performance of suprapubic pressure, can be identified.
  • The full team, including ward clerks and other support personnel, can be part of the simulation more readily.

The box on this page provides a possible process to use in managing shoulder dystocia. If there has not been an opportunity for this training, practitioners, at the very least, should be cognizant of the steps they are going to take in managing such cases.

Steps in the management of shoulder dystocia

  • Recognition of shoulder dystocia
  • Stop bearing down and stop traction
  • Communicate with staff and patient
  • Call for help and begin timekeeping
  • Initiate the McRoberts maneuver*
  • Suprapubic pressure (may be combined with Rubin’s maneuver, pushing on anterior or posterior shoulder to rotate to an oblique position)*
  • Attempt delivery of posterior arm (episiotomy can be performed at this step, if needed)*,**
  • Woods screw or Rubin’s maneuver*,**
  • Repeat above steps if delivery not accomplished
  • Gaskin (all fours) maneuver*
  • Zavanelli maneuver and cesarean delivery
  • Document event and communicate with patient and family (use of checklists such as the one published by ACOG may help standardize the process)

* The patient can resume bearing down and the clinician can use gentle downward guidance after performing the maneuver. If there is no progress, continue to the next maneuver.

** Order of performance of secondary maneuvers may vary, although Gaskin maneuver may be best carried out near the end due to the need for repositioning and possible reduced patient mobility due to epidural anesthesia.

 

 

What should you do after primary maneuvers fail?

Try to deliver the posterior arm. Although the order of maneuvers in the proposed algorithm may vary, a recent study using a database of more than 130,000 deliveries suggests that use of posterior arm delivery after failure of primary maneuvers, such as McRoberts or suprapubic pressure, may more likely result in resolution.5

Start from the beginning, and try again. If the first set of maneuvers does not resolve the problem, running through them again usually leads to success. Although the risk of fetal hypoxia increases the longer it takes to resolve the dystocia, it may actually facilitate delivery because fetal tone may also decrease.

Zavanelli maneuver. In general, use of the Zavanelli maneuver with replacement of the fetal head accompanied by cesarean section is a last resort; there is a lack of data to support its use earlier in the process or more frequently. This maneuver requires reversing the cardinal movements related to head descent in order to successfully complete replacement.

Shoulder dystocia in obese patients proves more difficult

In my own experience with obese patients, suprapubic pressure is often ineffective due to the presence of a large fat pad or pannus. Use of an anterior Rubin’s maneuver to rotate the shoulders about 30° to the oblique often facilitates delivery.

Liberal use of episiotomy to facilitate posterior arm delivery or rotational maneuvers is often necessary with obese patients.

Documentation is key

Documentation of the dystocia event in the patient’s permanent record should not occur until after the care team has discussed the case. This will ensure that the maneuvers utilized and the related timing of events are recorded accurately. This is critically important should a lawsuit occur, since discrepancies or errors in charting will hamper defense of the case. A checklist, such as the one provided by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, lists key points that should be recorded and outlines important steps related to the event.6

We want to hear from you! Tell us what you think.

HAVE YOU READ THESE MEDICAL VERDICTS ON SHOULDER DYSTOCIA?

Most of our monthly Medical Verdicts columns include cases about shoulder dystocia, brachial plexus injury, or Erb’s palsy. CLICK HERE to read those from 2012 and 2013.

References

1. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. ACOG Practice Bulletin No. 40: Shoulder dystocia. Obstet Gynecol. 2002;100(5 Part 1):1045-1050.

2. Crofts JF, Fox R, Ellis D, Winter C, Hinshaw K, Draycott TJ. Observations from 450 shoulder dystocia simulations: lessons for skills training. Obstet Gynecol. 2008;112(4):906-912.

3. Crofts JF, Bartlett C, Ellis D, Hunt LP, Fox R, Draycott TJ. Management of shoulder dystocia: skill retention 6 and 12 months after training. Obstet Gynecol. 2007;110(5):1069-1074.

4. Draycott TJ, Crofts JF, Ash JP, et al. Improving neonatal outcome through practical shoulder dystocia training. Obstet Gynecol. 2008;112(1):14-20.

5. Hoffman MK, Bailit JL, Branch DW, et al. Consortium on Safe Labor. A comparison of obstetric maneuvers for the acute management of shoulder dystocia. Obstet Gynecol. 2011;117(6):1272-1278.

6. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. Patient Safety Checklist, Number 6: Documenting shoulder dystocia. http://www.acog.org/Resources_And_Publications/Patient_Safety_Checklists. Published August 2012. Accessed February 12, 2013.

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START your “rehearsed” algorithm immediately when shoulder dystocia is recognized
START your “rehearsed” algorithm immediately when shoulder dystocia is recognized

Shoulder dystocia is an obstetric complication that occurs in up to 1.4% of deliveries.1 Although the vast majority can be managed successfully, the complication is associated with risk of fetal injury. The most serious injury is brachial plexus palsy, which occurs in 4% to 40% of shoulder dystocia cases, although less than 10% of these injuries are permanent. Other injuries include fractures of the clavicle and humerus; in rare instances the complication may be associated with fetal asphyxia and death. Early recognition of the complication followed by an orderly approach to management will reduce the risk of fetal injury.

First, recognize shoulder dystocia and take control

Recognition of shoulder dystocia immediately followed by avoidance of further impaction, particularly of the anterior shoulder against the symphysis pubis, will likely increase the chances of successful resolution.

These factors should lead you to anticipate shoulder dystocia during delivery:

  • suspected macrosomia
  • diabetic parturient
  • prolonged second stage.

However, a high percentage of cases occur in women without risk factors. Because persistent or forceful traction, used in an attempt to deliver the anterior shoulder, may be one of the causes of brachial plexus injury, early recognition of shoulder dystocia, followed by a halt of further traction, reduces the risk of that injury.

In my experience, if some movement of the anterior shoulder does not occur after 2 to 3 seconds of gentle downward guidance, you need to consider the possibility of shoulder dystocia. It is also important to take control of the situation: Instruct the patient to stop pushing and family members to stop urging the patient to push.

DID YOU READ THESE ARTICLES ON SHOULDER DYSTOCIA?

Click here to read 5 recent articles on shoulder dystocia

Avoid panic. Initiate a care-team management algorithm.

Having a management algorithm that can be quickly recalled and initiated allows the care team to proceed in an orderly fashion and remain calm and avoid panic, particularly if the dystocia is severe. In obstetric emergencies, panic is your enemy, leading to inefficient activity, team confusion, and an increased likelihood that an error in judgment (too much traction, fundal pressure) may occur. I advise my residents that whenever there are risk factors for shoulder dystocia, or it is suspected for any reason, to do a mental run-through of the management steps.

Rehearse the algorithm. It will make a difference in the delivery room.

To most effectively use a management algorithm, rehearsal using team training drills or simulation is necessary. Studies support simulation and team training even for individuals who have completed training in obstetrics or midwifery. Crofts and colleagues videotaped 450 simulations of shoulder dystocia involving 95 certified nurse midwives and 45 physicians.2 The authors noted that 1) shoulder dystocia could not be resolved in 57% of cases, and 2) there was frequent confusion regarding how to perform the internal maneuvers, with poor communication among team members. This same group of researchers later demonstrated that skills in managing shoulder dystocia improved significantly after simulation training. In fact, a high proportion of “trainees” maintained their skill level when tested a year later.3

Finally, when evaluating the impact of training on actual clinical outcomes in their hospital, Crofts and colleagues noted that the rate of obstetric brachial plexus injury fell from 7.4% in a 4-year period prior to training, to 2.3% in a 4-year period after training.4

Practice within your own L&D unit

The use of in situ simulation (ie, simulation within the labor and delivery unit) has two major advantages:

  • It is more realistic than practicing within a lab. Systems issues, such as lack of a uniform procedure for getting help or a lack of chairs in the labor room to assist with performance of suprapubic pressure, can be identified.
  • The full team, including ward clerks and other support personnel, can be part of the simulation more readily.

The box on this page provides a possible process to use in managing shoulder dystocia. If there has not been an opportunity for this training, practitioners, at the very least, should be cognizant of the steps they are going to take in managing such cases.

Steps in the management of shoulder dystocia

  • Recognition of shoulder dystocia
  • Stop bearing down and stop traction
  • Communicate with staff and patient
  • Call for help and begin timekeeping
  • Initiate the McRoberts maneuver*
  • Suprapubic pressure (may be combined with Rubin’s maneuver, pushing on anterior or posterior shoulder to rotate to an oblique position)*
  • Attempt delivery of posterior arm (episiotomy can be performed at this step, if needed)*,**
  • Woods screw or Rubin’s maneuver*,**
  • Repeat above steps if delivery not accomplished
  • Gaskin (all fours) maneuver*
  • Zavanelli maneuver and cesarean delivery
  • Document event and communicate with patient and family (use of checklists such as the one published by ACOG may help standardize the process)

* The patient can resume bearing down and the clinician can use gentle downward guidance after performing the maneuver. If there is no progress, continue to the next maneuver.

** Order of performance of secondary maneuvers may vary, although Gaskin maneuver may be best carried out near the end due to the need for repositioning and possible reduced patient mobility due to epidural anesthesia.

 

 

What should you do after primary maneuvers fail?

Try to deliver the posterior arm. Although the order of maneuvers in the proposed algorithm may vary, a recent study using a database of more than 130,000 deliveries suggests that use of posterior arm delivery after failure of primary maneuvers, such as McRoberts or suprapubic pressure, may more likely result in resolution.5

Start from the beginning, and try again. If the first set of maneuvers does not resolve the problem, running through them again usually leads to success. Although the risk of fetal hypoxia increases the longer it takes to resolve the dystocia, it may actually facilitate delivery because fetal tone may also decrease.

Zavanelli maneuver. In general, use of the Zavanelli maneuver with replacement of the fetal head accompanied by cesarean section is a last resort; there is a lack of data to support its use earlier in the process or more frequently. This maneuver requires reversing the cardinal movements related to head descent in order to successfully complete replacement.

Shoulder dystocia in obese patients proves more difficult

In my own experience with obese patients, suprapubic pressure is often ineffective due to the presence of a large fat pad or pannus. Use of an anterior Rubin’s maneuver to rotate the shoulders about 30° to the oblique often facilitates delivery.

Liberal use of episiotomy to facilitate posterior arm delivery or rotational maneuvers is often necessary with obese patients.

Documentation is key

Documentation of the dystocia event in the patient’s permanent record should not occur until after the care team has discussed the case. This will ensure that the maneuvers utilized and the related timing of events are recorded accurately. This is critically important should a lawsuit occur, since discrepancies or errors in charting will hamper defense of the case. A checklist, such as the one provided by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, lists key points that should be recorded and outlines important steps related to the event.6

We want to hear from you! Tell us what you think.

HAVE YOU READ THESE MEDICAL VERDICTS ON SHOULDER DYSTOCIA?

Most of our monthly Medical Verdicts columns include cases about shoulder dystocia, brachial plexus injury, or Erb’s palsy. CLICK HERE to read those from 2012 and 2013.

Shoulder dystocia is an obstetric complication that occurs in up to 1.4% of deliveries.1 Although the vast majority can be managed successfully, the complication is associated with risk of fetal injury. The most serious injury is brachial plexus palsy, which occurs in 4% to 40% of shoulder dystocia cases, although less than 10% of these injuries are permanent. Other injuries include fractures of the clavicle and humerus; in rare instances the complication may be associated with fetal asphyxia and death. Early recognition of the complication followed by an orderly approach to management will reduce the risk of fetal injury.

First, recognize shoulder dystocia and take control

Recognition of shoulder dystocia immediately followed by avoidance of further impaction, particularly of the anterior shoulder against the symphysis pubis, will likely increase the chances of successful resolution.

These factors should lead you to anticipate shoulder dystocia during delivery:

  • suspected macrosomia
  • diabetic parturient
  • prolonged second stage.

However, a high percentage of cases occur in women without risk factors. Because persistent or forceful traction, used in an attempt to deliver the anterior shoulder, may be one of the causes of brachial plexus injury, early recognition of shoulder dystocia, followed by a halt of further traction, reduces the risk of that injury.

In my experience, if some movement of the anterior shoulder does not occur after 2 to 3 seconds of gentle downward guidance, you need to consider the possibility of shoulder dystocia. It is also important to take control of the situation: Instruct the patient to stop pushing and family members to stop urging the patient to push.

DID YOU READ THESE ARTICLES ON SHOULDER DYSTOCIA?

Click here to read 5 recent articles on shoulder dystocia

Avoid panic. Initiate a care-team management algorithm.

Having a management algorithm that can be quickly recalled and initiated allows the care team to proceed in an orderly fashion and remain calm and avoid panic, particularly if the dystocia is severe. In obstetric emergencies, panic is your enemy, leading to inefficient activity, team confusion, and an increased likelihood that an error in judgment (too much traction, fundal pressure) may occur. I advise my residents that whenever there are risk factors for shoulder dystocia, or it is suspected for any reason, to do a mental run-through of the management steps.

Rehearse the algorithm. It will make a difference in the delivery room.

To most effectively use a management algorithm, rehearsal using team training drills or simulation is necessary. Studies support simulation and team training even for individuals who have completed training in obstetrics or midwifery. Crofts and colleagues videotaped 450 simulations of shoulder dystocia involving 95 certified nurse midwives and 45 physicians.2 The authors noted that 1) shoulder dystocia could not be resolved in 57% of cases, and 2) there was frequent confusion regarding how to perform the internal maneuvers, with poor communication among team members. This same group of researchers later demonstrated that skills in managing shoulder dystocia improved significantly after simulation training. In fact, a high proportion of “trainees” maintained their skill level when tested a year later.3

Finally, when evaluating the impact of training on actual clinical outcomes in their hospital, Crofts and colleagues noted that the rate of obstetric brachial plexus injury fell from 7.4% in a 4-year period prior to training, to 2.3% in a 4-year period after training.4

Practice within your own L&D unit

The use of in situ simulation (ie, simulation within the labor and delivery unit) has two major advantages:

  • It is more realistic than practicing within a lab. Systems issues, such as lack of a uniform procedure for getting help or a lack of chairs in the labor room to assist with performance of suprapubic pressure, can be identified.
  • The full team, including ward clerks and other support personnel, can be part of the simulation more readily.

The box on this page provides a possible process to use in managing shoulder dystocia. If there has not been an opportunity for this training, practitioners, at the very least, should be cognizant of the steps they are going to take in managing such cases.

Steps in the management of shoulder dystocia

  • Recognition of shoulder dystocia
  • Stop bearing down and stop traction
  • Communicate with staff and patient
  • Call for help and begin timekeeping
  • Initiate the McRoberts maneuver*
  • Suprapubic pressure (may be combined with Rubin’s maneuver, pushing on anterior or posterior shoulder to rotate to an oblique position)*
  • Attempt delivery of posterior arm (episiotomy can be performed at this step, if needed)*,**
  • Woods screw or Rubin’s maneuver*,**
  • Repeat above steps if delivery not accomplished
  • Gaskin (all fours) maneuver*
  • Zavanelli maneuver and cesarean delivery
  • Document event and communicate with patient and family (use of checklists such as the one published by ACOG may help standardize the process)

* The patient can resume bearing down and the clinician can use gentle downward guidance after performing the maneuver. If there is no progress, continue to the next maneuver.

** Order of performance of secondary maneuvers may vary, although Gaskin maneuver may be best carried out near the end due to the need for repositioning and possible reduced patient mobility due to epidural anesthesia.

 

 

What should you do after primary maneuvers fail?

Try to deliver the posterior arm. Although the order of maneuvers in the proposed algorithm may vary, a recent study using a database of more than 130,000 deliveries suggests that use of posterior arm delivery after failure of primary maneuvers, such as McRoberts or suprapubic pressure, may more likely result in resolution.5

Start from the beginning, and try again. If the first set of maneuvers does not resolve the problem, running through them again usually leads to success. Although the risk of fetal hypoxia increases the longer it takes to resolve the dystocia, it may actually facilitate delivery because fetal tone may also decrease.

Zavanelli maneuver. In general, use of the Zavanelli maneuver with replacement of the fetal head accompanied by cesarean section is a last resort; there is a lack of data to support its use earlier in the process or more frequently. This maneuver requires reversing the cardinal movements related to head descent in order to successfully complete replacement.

Shoulder dystocia in obese patients proves more difficult

In my own experience with obese patients, suprapubic pressure is often ineffective due to the presence of a large fat pad or pannus. Use of an anterior Rubin’s maneuver to rotate the shoulders about 30° to the oblique often facilitates delivery.

Liberal use of episiotomy to facilitate posterior arm delivery or rotational maneuvers is often necessary with obese patients.

Documentation is key

Documentation of the dystocia event in the patient’s permanent record should not occur until after the care team has discussed the case. This will ensure that the maneuvers utilized and the related timing of events are recorded accurately. This is critically important should a lawsuit occur, since discrepancies or errors in charting will hamper defense of the case. A checklist, such as the one provided by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, lists key points that should be recorded and outlines important steps related to the event.6

We want to hear from you! Tell us what you think.

HAVE YOU READ THESE MEDICAL VERDICTS ON SHOULDER DYSTOCIA?

Most of our monthly Medical Verdicts columns include cases about shoulder dystocia, brachial plexus injury, or Erb’s palsy. CLICK HERE to read those from 2012 and 2013.

References

1. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. ACOG Practice Bulletin No. 40: Shoulder dystocia. Obstet Gynecol. 2002;100(5 Part 1):1045-1050.

2. Crofts JF, Fox R, Ellis D, Winter C, Hinshaw K, Draycott TJ. Observations from 450 shoulder dystocia simulations: lessons for skills training. Obstet Gynecol. 2008;112(4):906-912.

3. Crofts JF, Bartlett C, Ellis D, Hunt LP, Fox R, Draycott TJ. Management of shoulder dystocia: skill retention 6 and 12 months after training. Obstet Gynecol. 2007;110(5):1069-1074.

4. Draycott TJ, Crofts JF, Ash JP, et al. Improving neonatal outcome through practical shoulder dystocia training. Obstet Gynecol. 2008;112(1):14-20.

5. Hoffman MK, Bailit JL, Branch DW, et al. Consortium on Safe Labor. A comparison of obstetric maneuvers for the acute management of shoulder dystocia. Obstet Gynecol. 2011;117(6):1272-1278.

6. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. Patient Safety Checklist, Number 6: Documenting shoulder dystocia. http://www.acog.org/Resources_And_Publications/Patient_Safety_Checklists. Published August 2012. Accessed February 12, 2013.

References

1. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. ACOG Practice Bulletin No. 40: Shoulder dystocia. Obstet Gynecol. 2002;100(5 Part 1):1045-1050.

2. Crofts JF, Fox R, Ellis D, Winter C, Hinshaw K, Draycott TJ. Observations from 450 shoulder dystocia simulations: lessons for skills training. Obstet Gynecol. 2008;112(4):906-912.

3. Crofts JF, Bartlett C, Ellis D, Hunt LP, Fox R, Draycott TJ. Management of shoulder dystocia: skill retention 6 and 12 months after training. Obstet Gynecol. 2007;110(5):1069-1074.

4. Draycott TJ, Crofts JF, Ash JP, et al. Improving neonatal outcome through practical shoulder dystocia training. Obstet Gynecol. 2008;112(1):14-20.

5. Hoffman MK, Bailit JL, Branch DW, et al. Consortium on Safe Labor. A comparison of obstetric maneuvers for the acute management of shoulder dystocia. Obstet Gynecol. 2011;117(6):1272-1278.

6. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. Patient Safety Checklist, Number 6: Documenting shoulder dystocia. http://www.acog.org/Resources_And_Publications/Patient_Safety_Checklists. Published August 2012. Accessed February 12, 2013.

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John Nelson: Why Spinal Epidural Abcess Poses A Particular Liability Risk for Hospitalists

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John Nelson: Why Spinal Epidural Abcess Poses A Particular Liability Risk for Hospitalists

Delayed diagnosis of, or treatment for, a spinal epidural abscess (SEA): that will be the case over which you are sued.

Over the last 15 years, I’ve served as an expert witness for six or seven malpractice cases. Most were related to spinal cord injuries, and in all but one of those, the etiology was epidural abscess. I’ve been asked to review about 40 or 50 additional cases, and while I’ve turned them down (I just don’t have time to do reviews), I nearly always ask about the clinical picture in every case. A significant number have been SEA-related. This experience has convinced me that SEA poses a particular liability risk for hospitalists.

Of course, it is patients who bear the real risk and unfortunate consequences of SEA. Being a defendant physician in a lawsuit is stressful, but it’s nothing compared to the distress of permanent loss of neurologic function. To prevent permanent sequelae, we need to maintain a very high index of suspicion to try to make a prompt diagnosis, and ensure immediate intervention once the diagnosis is made.

Being a defendant physician in a lawsuit is stressful, but it's nothing compared to the distress of permanent loss of neurologic function.

Data from Malpractice Insurers

I had the pleasure of getting to know a number of leaders at The Doctor’s Company, a large malpractice insurer that provides malpractice policies for all specialties, including a lot of hospitalists. From 2007 to 2011, they closed 28 SEA-related claims, for which they spent an average of $212,000 defending each one. Eleven of the 28 resulted in indemnity payments averaging $754,000 each (median was $455,000). These dollar amounts are roughly double what might be seen for all other claims and reflect only the payments made on behalf of the company’s insured doctors. The total award to each patient was likely much higher, because in most cases, several defendants (other doctors and a hospital) probably paid money to the patient.

The Physician Insurers Association of America (PIAA) “is the insurance industry trade association representing domestic and international medical professional liability insurance companies.” Their member malpractice insurance companies have the opportunity to report claims data that PIAA aggregates and makes available. Data from 2002 to 2011 showed 312 closed claims related to any diagnosis (not just SEA) for hospitalists, with an average indemnity payment of $272,553 (the highest hospitalist-related payment was $1.4 million). The most common allegations related to paid claims were 1) “errors in diagnosis,” 2) “failure/delay in referral or consultation,” and 3) “failure to supervise/monitor case.” Although only three of the 312 claims were related to “diseases of the spinal cord,” that was exceeded in frequency only by “diabetes.”

I think these numbers from the malpractice insurance industry support my concern that SEA is a high-risk area, but it doesn’t really support my anecdotal experience that SEA is clearly hospitalists’ highest-risk area. Maybe SEA is only one of several high-risk areas. Nevertheless, I’m going to stick to my sensationalist guns to get your attention.

Why Is Epidural Abscess a High Risk?

There likely are several reasons SEA is a treacherous liability problem. It can lead to devastating permanent disabling neurologic deficits in people who were previously healthy, and if the medical care was substandard, then significant financial compensation seems appropriate.

Delays in diagnosis of SEA are common. It can be a very sneaky illness that in the early stages is very easy to confuse with less-serious causes of back pain or fever. Even though I think about this particular diagnosis all the time, just last year I had a patient who reported an increase in his usual back pain. I felt reassured that he had no neurologic deficit or fever, and took the time to explain why there was no reason to repeat the spine MRI that had been done about two weeks prior to admission. But he was insistent that he have another MRI, and after a day or two I finally agreed to order it, assuring him it would not explain the cause of his pain. But it did. He had a significant SEA and went to emergency surgery. I was stunned, and profoundly relieved that he had no neurologic sequelae.

 

 

One of the remarkable things I’ve seen in the cases I’ve reviewed is that even when there is clear cause for concern, there is too often no action taken. In a number of cases, the nurses’ note indicates increasing back pain, loss of ability to stand, urinary retention, and other alarming signs. Yet the doctors either never learn of these issues, or they choose to attribute them to other causes.

Even when the diagnosis of SEA is clearly established, it is all too common for doctors caring for the patient not to act on this information. In several cases I reviewed, a radiologist had documented reporting the diagnosis to the hospitalist (and in one case the neurosurgeon as well), yet nothing was done for 12 hours or more. It is hard to imagine that establishing this diagnosis doesn’t reliably lead to an emergent response, but it doesn’t. (In some cases, nonsurgical management may be an option, but in these malpractices cases, there was just a failure to act on the diagnosis with any sort of plan.)

Practice Management Perspective

I usually discuss hospitalist practice operations in this space—things like work schedules and compensation. But attending to risk management is one component of effective practice operations, so I thought I’d raise the topic here. Obviously, there is a lot more to hospitalist risk management than one diagnosis, but a column on the whole universe of risk management would probably serve no purpose other than as a sleep aid. I hope that by focusing solely on SEA, there is some chance that you’ll remember it, and you’ll make sure that you disprove my first two sentences.

Lowering your risk of a malpractice lawsuit is valuable and worth spending time on. But far more important is that by keeping the diagnosis in mind, and ensuring that you act emergently when there is cause for concern, you might save someone from the devastating consequences of this disease.


Dr. Nelson has been a practicing hospitalist since 1988. He is co-founder and past president of SHM, and principal in Nelson Flores Hospital Medicine Consultants. He is co-director for SHM’s “Best Practices in Managing a Hospital Medicine Program” course. Write to him at [email protected].

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Delayed diagnosis of, or treatment for, a spinal epidural abscess (SEA): that will be the case over which you are sued.

Over the last 15 years, I’ve served as an expert witness for six or seven malpractice cases. Most were related to spinal cord injuries, and in all but one of those, the etiology was epidural abscess. I’ve been asked to review about 40 or 50 additional cases, and while I’ve turned them down (I just don’t have time to do reviews), I nearly always ask about the clinical picture in every case. A significant number have been SEA-related. This experience has convinced me that SEA poses a particular liability risk for hospitalists.

Of course, it is patients who bear the real risk and unfortunate consequences of SEA. Being a defendant physician in a lawsuit is stressful, but it’s nothing compared to the distress of permanent loss of neurologic function. To prevent permanent sequelae, we need to maintain a very high index of suspicion to try to make a prompt diagnosis, and ensure immediate intervention once the diagnosis is made.

Being a defendant physician in a lawsuit is stressful, but it's nothing compared to the distress of permanent loss of neurologic function.

Data from Malpractice Insurers

I had the pleasure of getting to know a number of leaders at The Doctor’s Company, a large malpractice insurer that provides malpractice policies for all specialties, including a lot of hospitalists. From 2007 to 2011, they closed 28 SEA-related claims, for which they spent an average of $212,000 defending each one. Eleven of the 28 resulted in indemnity payments averaging $754,000 each (median was $455,000). These dollar amounts are roughly double what might be seen for all other claims and reflect only the payments made on behalf of the company’s insured doctors. The total award to each patient was likely much higher, because in most cases, several defendants (other doctors and a hospital) probably paid money to the patient.

The Physician Insurers Association of America (PIAA) “is the insurance industry trade association representing domestic and international medical professional liability insurance companies.” Their member malpractice insurance companies have the opportunity to report claims data that PIAA aggregates and makes available. Data from 2002 to 2011 showed 312 closed claims related to any diagnosis (not just SEA) for hospitalists, with an average indemnity payment of $272,553 (the highest hospitalist-related payment was $1.4 million). The most common allegations related to paid claims were 1) “errors in diagnosis,” 2) “failure/delay in referral or consultation,” and 3) “failure to supervise/monitor case.” Although only three of the 312 claims were related to “diseases of the spinal cord,” that was exceeded in frequency only by “diabetes.”

I think these numbers from the malpractice insurance industry support my concern that SEA is a high-risk area, but it doesn’t really support my anecdotal experience that SEA is clearly hospitalists’ highest-risk area. Maybe SEA is only one of several high-risk areas. Nevertheless, I’m going to stick to my sensationalist guns to get your attention.

Why Is Epidural Abscess a High Risk?

There likely are several reasons SEA is a treacherous liability problem. It can lead to devastating permanent disabling neurologic deficits in people who were previously healthy, and if the medical care was substandard, then significant financial compensation seems appropriate.

Delays in diagnosis of SEA are common. It can be a very sneaky illness that in the early stages is very easy to confuse with less-serious causes of back pain or fever. Even though I think about this particular diagnosis all the time, just last year I had a patient who reported an increase in his usual back pain. I felt reassured that he had no neurologic deficit or fever, and took the time to explain why there was no reason to repeat the spine MRI that had been done about two weeks prior to admission. But he was insistent that he have another MRI, and after a day or two I finally agreed to order it, assuring him it would not explain the cause of his pain. But it did. He had a significant SEA and went to emergency surgery. I was stunned, and profoundly relieved that he had no neurologic sequelae.

 

 

One of the remarkable things I’ve seen in the cases I’ve reviewed is that even when there is clear cause for concern, there is too often no action taken. In a number of cases, the nurses’ note indicates increasing back pain, loss of ability to stand, urinary retention, and other alarming signs. Yet the doctors either never learn of these issues, or they choose to attribute them to other causes.

Even when the diagnosis of SEA is clearly established, it is all too common for doctors caring for the patient not to act on this information. In several cases I reviewed, a radiologist had documented reporting the diagnosis to the hospitalist (and in one case the neurosurgeon as well), yet nothing was done for 12 hours or more. It is hard to imagine that establishing this diagnosis doesn’t reliably lead to an emergent response, but it doesn’t. (In some cases, nonsurgical management may be an option, but in these malpractices cases, there was just a failure to act on the diagnosis with any sort of plan.)

Practice Management Perspective

I usually discuss hospitalist practice operations in this space—things like work schedules and compensation. But attending to risk management is one component of effective practice operations, so I thought I’d raise the topic here. Obviously, there is a lot more to hospitalist risk management than one diagnosis, but a column on the whole universe of risk management would probably serve no purpose other than as a sleep aid. I hope that by focusing solely on SEA, there is some chance that you’ll remember it, and you’ll make sure that you disprove my first two sentences.

Lowering your risk of a malpractice lawsuit is valuable and worth spending time on. But far more important is that by keeping the diagnosis in mind, and ensuring that you act emergently when there is cause for concern, you might save someone from the devastating consequences of this disease.


Dr. Nelson has been a practicing hospitalist since 1988. He is co-founder and past president of SHM, and principal in Nelson Flores Hospital Medicine Consultants. He is co-director for SHM’s “Best Practices in Managing a Hospital Medicine Program” course. Write to him at [email protected].

Delayed diagnosis of, or treatment for, a spinal epidural abscess (SEA): that will be the case over which you are sued.

Over the last 15 years, I’ve served as an expert witness for six or seven malpractice cases. Most were related to spinal cord injuries, and in all but one of those, the etiology was epidural abscess. I’ve been asked to review about 40 or 50 additional cases, and while I’ve turned them down (I just don’t have time to do reviews), I nearly always ask about the clinical picture in every case. A significant number have been SEA-related. This experience has convinced me that SEA poses a particular liability risk for hospitalists.

Of course, it is patients who bear the real risk and unfortunate consequences of SEA. Being a defendant physician in a lawsuit is stressful, but it’s nothing compared to the distress of permanent loss of neurologic function. To prevent permanent sequelae, we need to maintain a very high index of suspicion to try to make a prompt diagnosis, and ensure immediate intervention once the diagnosis is made.

Being a defendant physician in a lawsuit is stressful, but it's nothing compared to the distress of permanent loss of neurologic function.

Data from Malpractice Insurers

I had the pleasure of getting to know a number of leaders at The Doctor’s Company, a large malpractice insurer that provides malpractice policies for all specialties, including a lot of hospitalists. From 2007 to 2011, they closed 28 SEA-related claims, for which they spent an average of $212,000 defending each one. Eleven of the 28 resulted in indemnity payments averaging $754,000 each (median was $455,000). These dollar amounts are roughly double what might be seen for all other claims and reflect only the payments made on behalf of the company’s insured doctors. The total award to each patient was likely much higher, because in most cases, several defendants (other doctors and a hospital) probably paid money to the patient.

The Physician Insurers Association of America (PIAA) “is the insurance industry trade association representing domestic and international medical professional liability insurance companies.” Their member malpractice insurance companies have the opportunity to report claims data that PIAA aggregates and makes available. Data from 2002 to 2011 showed 312 closed claims related to any diagnosis (not just SEA) for hospitalists, with an average indemnity payment of $272,553 (the highest hospitalist-related payment was $1.4 million). The most common allegations related to paid claims were 1) “errors in diagnosis,” 2) “failure/delay in referral or consultation,” and 3) “failure to supervise/monitor case.” Although only three of the 312 claims were related to “diseases of the spinal cord,” that was exceeded in frequency only by “diabetes.”

I think these numbers from the malpractice insurance industry support my concern that SEA is a high-risk area, but it doesn’t really support my anecdotal experience that SEA is clearly hospitalists’ highest-risk area. Maybe SEA is only one of several high-risk areas. Nevertheless, I’m going to stick to my sensationalist guns to get your attention.

Why Is Epidural Abscess a High Risk?

There likely are several reasons SEA is a treacherous liability problem. It can lead to devastating permanent disabling neurologic deficits in people who were previously healthy, and if the medical care was substandard, then significant financial compensation seems appropriate.

Delays in diagnosis of SEA are common. It can be a very sneaky illness that in the early stages is very easy to confuse with less-serious causes of back pain or fever. Even though I think about this particular diagnosis all the time, just last year I had a patient who reported an increase in his usual back pain. I felt reassured that he had no neurologic deficit or fever, and took the time to explain why there was no reason to repeat the spine MRI that had been done about two weeks prior to admission. But he was insistent that he have another MRI, and after a day or two I finally agreed to order it, assuring him it would not explain the cause of his pain. But it did. He had a significant SEA and went to emergency surgery. I was stunned, and profoundly relieved that he had no neurologic sequelae.

 

 

One of the remarkable things I’ve seen in the cases I’ve reviewed is that even when there is clear cause for concern, there is too often no action taken. In a number of cases, the nurses’ note indicates increasing back pain, loss of ability to stand, urinary retention, and other alarming signs. Yet the doctors either never learn of these issues, or they choose to attribute them to other causes.

Even when the diagnosis of SEA is clearly established, it is all too common for doctors caring for the patient not to act on this information. In several cases I reviewed, a radiologist had documented reporting the diagnosis to the hospitalist (and in one case the neurosurgeon as well), yet nothing was done for 12 hours or more. It is hard to imagine that establishing this diagnosis doesn’t reliably lead to an emergent response, but it doesn’t. (In some cases, nonsurgical management may be an option, but in these malpractices cases, there was just a failure to act on the diagnosis with any sort of plan.)

Practice Management Perspective

I usually discuss hospitalist practice operations in this space—things like work schedules and compensation. But attending to risk management is one component of effective practice operations, so I thought I’d raise the topic here. Obviously, there is a lot more to hospitalist risk management than one diagnosis, but a column on the whole universe of risk management would probably serve no purpose other than as a sleep aid. I hope that by focusing solely on SEA, there is some chance that you’ll remember it, and you’ll make sure that you disprove my first two sentences.

Lowering your risk of a malpractice lawsuit is valuable and worth spending time on. But far more important is that by keeping the diagnosis in mind, and ensuring that you act emergently when there is cause for concern, you might save someone from the devastating consequences of this disease.


Dr. Nelson has been a practicing hospitalist since 1988. He is co-founder and past president of SHM, and principal in Nelson Flores Hospital Medicine Consultants. He is co-director for SHM’s “Best Practices in Managing a Hospital Medicine Program” course. Write to him at [email protected].

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ONLINE EXCLUSIVE: How to take the fear out of expanding a hospitalist group

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Click here to listen to Brian Hazen, MD, medical director of Inova Fairfax Hospital Group in Fairfax, Va.

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ONLINE EXCLUSIVE: American Pain Society Board Member Discusses Opioid Risks, Rewards, and Why Continuing Education is a Must

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Click here to listen to Scott Strassels, PhD, PharmD, BCPS, an assistant professor in the College of Pharmacy at the University of Texas at Austin and a board member of the American Pain Society, discuss the risks and rewards of opioid therapies, and why continuing education is important for all clinicians.

 

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Click here to listen to Scott Strassels, PhD, PharmD, BCPS, an assistant professor in the College of Pharmacy at the University of Texas at Austin and a board member of the American Pain Society, discuss the risks and rewards of opioid therapies, and why continuing education is important for all clinicians.

 

Click here to listen to Scott Strassels, PhD, PharmD, BCPS, an assistant professor in the College of Pharmacy at the University of Texas at Austin and a board member of the American Pain Society, discuss the risks and rewards of opioid therapies, and why continuing education is important for all clinicians.

 

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Hospitalist Rajan Gurunathan, MD, Stresses Commitment and Community

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Rajan Gurunathan, MD, was an undergraduate student at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore in the early 1990s weighing his career options.

“I went through a lot of permutations, actually,” he says. “Scientist, clinical researcher, doctor, physician/scientist—all of those things entered my mind at some point.”

He applied to dual-track MD and PhD programs, but ultimately decided that interacting with people—patients in particular—was the goal for him. He earned his medical degree from UMDNJ-Robert Wood Johnson Medical School in Camden, N.J., and completed his internship in the department of medicine at St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center in New York City, not far from where he grew up as a child in northern New Jersey.

And he never left.

I’ve always enjoyed the collegiality of a hospital environment in terms of multiple disciplines working together in ways to help care for patients. It’s a paradox in the sense that it’s fascinating to see disease and be able to be impactful in that way, but it’s also unfortunate sometimes to see what people have to go through.

—Anthony Back, MD, professor of medicine, University of Washington, Seattle

Dr. Gurunathan has risen through the ranks at St. Luke’s-Roosevelt, from resident to chief resident to chief of the section of hospital medicine. He is a faculty member for the Clinical Quality Fellowship Program at the Great New York Hospital Association and an assistant clinical professor of medicine at Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons in New York.

His long tenure at St. Luke’s-Roosevelt has been “an incredible experience because I really get a sense and feeling of commitment from the community,” he adds. “I’ve seen it grow over time and see how the needs have changed and how the service the hospital has been able to provide has only grown over time.”

After several years of presenting posters at SHM’s annual meetings, Dr. Gurunathan joined Team Hospitalist in April 2012 to become an even more active member of his specialty.

QUESTION: When you started as an intern 15 years ago, did you expect that you’d still be at the same institution?

Answer: No, I wouldn’t have expected that at all. In fact, there was a time where I was briefly considering a general medicine fellowship at Johns Hopkins, and I was prepared to go there. And family circumstances, etc., made me decide not to move on and to make a commitment and join the department as faculty, first as a chief and then as faculty. And I was really lucky to have those opportunities, because while my course didn’t go exactly the way that I’d planned, I wouldn’t have changed a thing.

Q: When you now deal with the residents and younger staff members, what’s that experience like for you?

A: It’s a really neat experience, and often brings a chuckle to my face when I see that they’re frustrated about the same things, because I can certainly commiserate. But I can really also see the value of what they provide every day, and having been in their shoes, I know a little bit about what they’ve been through and the work that they do. So I have a real appreciation for that.

Q: What brought you to hospital medicine?

A: I’ve always enjoyed the collegiality of a hospital environment in terms of multiple disciplines working together in ways to help care for patients. It’s a paradox in the sense that it’s fascinating to see disease and be able to be impactful in that way, but it’s also unfortunate sometimes to see what people have to go through.

 

 

Q: Is there something specific about the setting that’s kept you in the academic world?

A: A lot of things, actually. As I mentioned, hospitals in general should have a collegial nature. Again, it’s a really nice place where people share a unique common goal of banding together and fighting a goal, and academic departments are the same. So it’s being with people with like-minded intellectual interests. And we’re fortunate enough to have a number of strong mentors within the department who have had a lot of clinical training and bring a lot of experience and a wealth of knowledge, and being able to utilize their experience and draw from their experiences only makes people better clinicians. And we’re fortunate enough to have a pretty supportive department in general where there is a lot of collegiality and camaraderie.

Q: As an administrator, what is the value of being an SHM member, to you?

A: I think what I’ve seen administratively is the changing face of healthcare and how hospitals are going to need to continue to transform with time due to things that are both regulatory- and quality-of-care-based, in terms of improving outcomes and keeping people healthy. SHM has really embraced [those changes] and taken them head-on for really important reasons, not only in terms of helping people adapt to the changing landscape, but also training them in the ways that we need to be thinking about problems now and in the future.

Q: You’ve attended multiple annual meetings and presented posters. What value have you taken out of them, and would you recommend the experience to others?

A: Absolutely. I think as people develop, it’s good to always learn new skills, and my clinical research is an area that I would actually like to build up. So I’ve had a little bit of exposure, and it’s been nice to be able to draw from the resources of SHM and be able to partake. We presented something last year, which was a really neat experience, and we’re looking to bring some new faculty this year and encourage them to get involved in the scholarship process. These are the kinds of things that can really help hone skills, and that’s a good thing.

Q: Once you’re inside the doors of a New York City hospital, is daily practice much different than anywhere else?

A: I would say yes and no. I would say no in that I think all hospitals are really neat places and really incredible places. I heard somebody say once at a talk that hospitals were places of refuge, and I really do believe that. That being said, I think there is something slightly unique about New York City in a lot of ways. Certainly the challenges that New York City hospitals face are somewhat unique in terms of patient population, difficulty in socioeconomic factors, insurance issues. I think they are really fun places to work, but they’re not for the faint of heart.


Richard Quinn is a freelance writer in New Jersey.

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Rajan Gurunathan, MD, was an undergraduate student at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore in the early 1990s weighing his career options.

“I went through a lot of permutations, actually,” he says. “Scientist, clinical researcher, doctor, physician/scientist—all of those things entered my mind at some point.”

He applied to dual-track MD and PhD programs, but ultimately decided that interacting with people—patients in particular—was the goal for him. He earned his medical degree from UMDNJ-Robert Wood Johnson Medical School in Camden, N.J., and completed his internship in the department of medicine at St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center in New York City, not far from where he grew up as a child in northern New Jersey.

And he never left.

I’ve always enjoyed the collegiality of a hospital environment in terms of multiple disciplines working together in ways to help care for patients. It’s a paradox in the sense that it’s fascinating to see disease and be able to be impactful in that way, but it’s also unfortunate sometimes to see what people have to go through.

—Anthony Back, MD, professor of medicine, University of Washington, Seattle

Dr. Gurunathan has risen through the ranks at St. Luke’s-Roosevelt, from resident to chief resident to chief of the section of hospital medicine. He is a faculty member for the Clinical Quality Fellowship Program at the Great New York Hospital Association and an assistant clinical professor of medicine at Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons in New York.

His long tenure at St. Luke’s-Roosevelt has been “an incredible experience because I really get a sense and feeling of commitment from the community,” he adds. “I’ve seen it grow over time and see how the needs have changed and how the service the hospital has been able to provide has only grown over time.”

After several years of presenting posters at SHM’s annual meetings, Dr. Gurunathan joined Team Hospitalist in April 2012 to become an even more active member of his specialty.

QUESTION: When you started as an intern 15 years ago, did you expect that you’d still be at the same institution?

Answer: No, I wouldn’t have expected that at all. In fact, there was a time where I was briefly considering a general medicine fellowship at Johns Hopkins, and I was prepared to go there. And family circumstances, etc., made me decide not to move on and to make a commitment and join the department as faculty, first as a chief and then as faculty. And I was really lucky to have those opportunities, because while my course didn’t go exactly the way that I’d planned, I wouldn’t have changed a thing.

Q: When you now deal with the residents and younger staff members, what’s that experience like for you?

A: It’s a really neat experience, and often brings a chuckle to my face when I see that they’re frustrated about the same things, because I can certainly commiserate. But I can really also see the value of what they provide every day, and having been in their shoes, I know a little bit about what they’ve been through and the work that they do. So I have a real appreciation for that.

Q: What brought you to hospital medicine?

A: I’ve always enjoyed the collegiality of a hospital environment in terms of multiple disciplines working together in ways to help care for patients. It’s a paradox in the sense that it’s fascinating to see disease and be able to be impactful in that way, but it’s also unfortunate sometimes to see what people have to go through.

 

 

Q: Is there something specific about the setting that’s kept you in the academic world?

A: A lot of things, actually. As I mentioned, hospitals in general should have a collegial nature. Again, it’s a really nice place where people share a unique common goal of banding together and fighting a goal, and academic departments are the same. So it’s being with people with like-minded intellectual interests. And we’re fortunate enough to have a number of strong mentors within the department who have had a lot of clinical training and bring a lot of experience and a wealth of knowledge, and being able to utilize their experience and draw from their experiences only makes people better clinicians. And we’re fortunate enough to have a pretty supportive department in general where there is a lot of collegiality and camaraderie.

Q: As an administrator, what is the value of being an SHM member, to you?

A: I think what I’ve seen administratively is the changing face of healthcare and how hospitals are going to need to continue to transform with time due to things that are both regulatory- and quality-of-care-based, in terms of improving outcomes and keeping people healthy. SHM has really embraced [those changes] and taken them head-on for really important reasons, not only in terms of helping people adapt to the changing landscape, but also training them in the ways that we need to be thinking about problems now and in the future.

Q: You’ve attended multiple annual meetings and presented posters. What value have you taken out of them, and would you recommend the experience to others?

A: Absolutely. I think as people develop, it’s good to always learn new skills, and my clinical research is an area that I would actually like to build up. So I’ve had a little bit of exposure, and it’s been nice to be able to draw from the resources of SHM and be able to partake. We presented something last year, which was a really neat experience, and we’re looking to bring some new faculty this year and encourage them to get involved in the scholarship process. These are the kinds of things that can really help hone skills, and that’s a good thing.

Q: Once you’re inside the doors of a New York City hospital, is daily practice much different than anywhere else?

A: I would say yes and no. I would say no in that I think all hospitals are really neat places and really incredible places. I heard somebody say once at a talk that hospitals were places of refuge, and I really do believe that. That being said, I think there is something slightly unique about New York City in a lot of ways. Certainly the challenges that New York City hospitals face are somewhat unique in terms of patient population, difficulty in socioeconomic factors, insurance issues. I think they are really fun places to work, but they’re not for the faint of heart.


Richard Quinn is a freelance writer in New Jersey.

Rajan Gurunathan, MD, was an undergraduate student at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore in the early 1990s weighing his career options.

“I went through a lot of permutations, actually,” he says. “Scientist, clinical researcher, doctor, physician/scientist—all of those things entered my mind at some point.”

He applied to dual-track MD and PhD programs, but ultimately decided that interacting with people—patients in particular—was the goal for him. He earned his medical degree from UMDNJ-Robert Wood Johnson Medical School in Camden, N.J., and completed his internship in the department of medicine at St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center in New York City, not far from where he grew up as a child in northern New Jersey.

And he never left.

I’ve always enjoyed the collegiality of a hospital environment in terms of multiple disciplines working together in ways to help care for patients. It’s a paradox in the sense that it’s fascinating to see disease and be able to be impactful in that way, but it’s also unfortunate sometimes to see what people have to go through.

—Anthony Back, MD, professor of medicine, University of Washington, Seattle

Dr. Gurunathan has risen through the ranks at St. Luke’s-Roosevelt, from resident to chief resident to chief of the section of hospital medicine. He is a faculty member for the Clinical Quality Fellowship Program at the Great New York Hospital Association and an assistant clinical professor of medicine at Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons in New York.

His long tenure at St. Luke’s-Roosevelt has been “an incredible experience because I really get a sense and feeling of commitment from the community,” he adds. “I’ve seen it grow over time and see how the needs have changed and how the service the hospital has been able to provide has only grown over time.”

After several years of presenting posters at SHM’s annual meetings, Dr. Gurunathan joined Team Hospitalist in April 2012 to become an even more active member of his specialty.

QUESTION: When you started as an intern 15 years ago, did you expect that you’d still be at the same institution?

Answer: No, I wouldn’t have expected that at all. In fact, there was a time where I was briefly considering a general medicine fellowship at Johns Hopkins, and I was prepared to go there. And family circumstances, etc., made me decide not to move on and to make a commitment and join the department as faculty, first as a chief and then as faculty. And I was really lucky to have those opportunities, because while my course didn’t go exactly the way that I’d planned, I wouldn’t have changed a thing.

Q: When you now deal with the residents and younger staff members, what’s that experience like for you?

A: It’s a really neat experience, and often brings a chuckle to my face when I see that they’re frustrated about the same things, because I can certainly commiserate. But I can really also see the value of what they provide every day, and having been in their shoes, I know a little bit about what they’ve been through and the work that they do. So I have a real appreciation for that.

Q: What brought you to hospital medicine?

A: I’ve always enjoyed the collegiality of a hospital environment in terms of multiple disciplines working together in ways to help care for patients. It’s a paradox in the sense that it’s fascinating to see disease and be able to be impactful in that way, but it’s also unfortunate sometimes to see what people have to go through.

 

 

Q: Is there something specific about the setting that’s kept you in the academic world?

A: A lot of things, actually. As I mentioned, hospitals in general should have a collegial nature. Again, it’s a really nice place where people share a unique common goal of banding together and fighting a goal, and academic departments are the same. So it’s being with people with like-minded intellectual interests. And we’re fortunate enough to have a number of strong mentors within the department who have had a lot of clinical training and bring a lot of experience and a wealth of knowledge, and being able to utilize their experience and draw from their experiences only makes people better clinicians. And we’re fortunate enough to have a pretty supportive department in general where there is a lot of collegiality and camaraderie.

Q: As an administrator, what is the value of being an SHM member, to you?

A: I think what I’ve seen administratively is the changing face of healthcare and how hospitals are going to need to continue to transform with time due to things that are both regulatory- and quality-of-care-based, in terms of improving outcomes and keeping people healthy. SHM has really embraced [those changes] and taken them head-on for really important reasons, not only in terms of helping people adapt to the changing landscape, but also training them in the ways that we need to be thinking about problems now and in the future.

Q: You’ve attended multiple annual meetings and presented posters. What value have you taken out of them, and would you recommend the experience to others?

A: Absolutely. I think as people develop, it’s good to always learn new skills, and my clinical research is an area that I would actually like to build up. So I’ve had a little bit of exposure, and it’s been nice to be able to draw from the resources of SHM and be able to partake. We presented something last year, which was a really neat experience, and we’re looking to bring some new faculty this year and encourage them to get involved in the scholarship process. These are the kinds of things that can really help hone skills, and that’s a good thing.

Q: Once you’re inside the doors of a New York City hospital, is daily practice much different than anywhere else?

A: I would say yes and no. I would say no in that I think all hospitals are really neat places and really incredible places. I heard somebody say once at a talk that hospitals were places of refuge, and I really do believe that. That being said, I think there is something slightly unique about New York City in a lot of ways. Certainly the challenges that New York City hospitals face are somewhat unique in terms of patient population, difficulty in socioeconomic factors, insurance issues. I think they are really fun places to work, but they’re not for the faint of heart.


Richard Quinn is a freelance writer in New Jersey.

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Inadequate Management of Wheezing, Coughing Infant

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Inadequate Management of Wheezing, Coughing Infant

Inadequate Management of Wheezing, Coughing Infant
A six-week-old infant was brought to a Mississippi hospital emergency department (ED) at about 10:30 PM with signs of wheezing, coughing, and decreased playfulness. Thirty minutes later, he was evaluated by the emergency physician. Initial test results included an oxygen saturation (SaO2) level of 100%, but she suspected pneumonia and ordered further tests.

The child underwent a breathing treatment, and his condition appeared to be improving. About 45 minutes after his initial evaluation, while being transported for a chest x-ray, he experienced cardiorespiratory arrest. Resuscitation was unsuccessful.

The plaintiff claimed that the emergency physician should have consulted a pediatrician, conducted continuous electronic monitoring of the infant, and administered oxygen.

The defendant claimed that the infant was properly monitored and that oxygen was not required, since his oxygen saturation level was 100%. Additionally, the defendant claimed she was cross-trained as a pediatrician and that the outcome would have been the same, regardless of treatment, because the child had advanced, severe pneumonia.

Outcome
According to a published account, a defense verdict was returned for the defendant emergency physician. Claims involving the defendant hospital were subject to decision by the court, which was also a defense verdict.

Comment
This case illustrates the potential pitfalls of relying too heavily on any one diagnostic element. In this case, there was an arguable overreliance on pulse oximetry values to exclude a clinically significant respiratory condition.

Diagnosing pneumonia can be difficult, and the clinical gestalt must be considered. A low pulse oximetry reading itself should be concerning, whereas normal pulse oximetry itself should not be reassuring when the patient exhibits tachypnea or other signs of distress. In one study, pulse oximetry was studied to determine whether it could be used to exclude pneumonia in children younger than 2 years presenting with respiratory complaints. It could not.1 In sum, SaO2 levels may be normal in patients with pathology, and while initially reassuring, may plummet after the patient tires.

In this case, the defendants prevailed. The case report does not provide the patient’s vital signs, but the use of bronchodilators and the x-ray order suggest that there was some degree of respiratory distress. Because the child experienced cardiorespiratory arrest after one hour and 15 minutes in the ED, the defense was likely able to convince the jury that this unfortunate infant faced a high mortality risk even with more aggressive treatment.

Some have called pulse oximetry the “fifth vital sign.” Don’t let it become the only one. The SaO2 must be interpreted in the context of the patient’s overall presentation and in view of the other vitals (especially respiratory rate). —DML

Cases reprinted with permission from Medical Malpractice Verdicts, Settlements and Experts, Lewis Laska, Editor, (800) 298-6288.

References
1. Tanen DA, Trocinski DR. The use of pulse oximetry to exclude pneumonia in children. Am J Emerg Med. 2002;20(6):521-523.

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Inadequate Management of Wheezing, Coughing Infant
A six-week-old infant was brought to a Mississippi hospital emergency department (ED) at about 10:30 PM with signs of wheezing, coughing, and decreased playfulness. Thirty minutes later, he was evaluated by the emergency physician. Initial test results included an oxygen saturation (SaO2) level of 100%, but she suspected pneumonia and ordered further tests.

The child underwent a breathing treatment, and his condition appeared to be improving. About 45 minutes after his initial evaluation, while being transported for a chest x-ray, he experienced cardiorespiratory arrest. Resuscitation was unsuccessful.

The plaintiff claimed that the emergency physician should have consulted a pediatrician, conducted continuous electronic monitoring of the infant, and administered oxygen.

The defendant claimed that the infant was properly monitored and that oxygen was not required, since his oxygen saturation level was 100%. Additionally, the defendant claimed she was cross-trained as a pediatrician and that the outcome would have been the same, regardless of treatment, because the child had advanced, severe pneumonia.

Outcome
According to a published account, a defense verdict was returned for the defendant emergency physician. Claims involving the defendant hospital were subject to decision by the court, which was also a defense verdict.

Comment
This case illustrates the potential pitfalls of relying too heavily on any one diagnostic element. In this case, there was an arguable overreliance on pulse oximetry values to exclude a clinically significant respiratory condition.

Diagnosing pneumonia can be difficult, and the clinical gestalt must be considered. A low pulse oximetry reading itself should be concerning, whereas normal pulse oximetry itself should not be reassuring when the patient exhibits tachypnea or other signs of distress. In one study, pulse oximetry was studied to determine whether it could be used to exclude pneumonia in children younger than 2 years presenting with respiratory complaints. It could not.1 In sum, SaO2 levels may be normal in patients with pathology, and while initially reassuring, may plummet after the patient tires.

In this case, the defendants prevailed. The case report does not provide the patient’s vital signs, but the use of bronchodilators and the x-ray order suggest that there was some degree of respiratory distress. Because the child experienced cardiorespiratory arrest after one hour and 15 minutes in the ED, the defense was likely able to convince the jury that this unfortunate infant faced a high mortality risk even with more aggressive treatment.

Some have called pulse oximetry the “fifth vital sign.” Don’t let it become the only one. The SaO2 must be interpreted in the context of the patient’s overall presentation and in view of the other vitals (especially respiratory rate). —DML

Cases reprinted with permission from Medical Malpractice Verdicts, Settlements and Experts, Lewis Laska, Editor, (800) 298-6288.

References
1. Tanen DA, Trocinski DR. The use of pulse oximetry to exclude pneumonia in children. Am J Emerg Med. 2002;20(6):521-523.

Inadequate Management of Wheezing, Coughing Infant
A six-week-old infant was brought to a Mississippi hospital emergency department (ED) at about 10:30 PM with signs of wheezing, coughing, and decreased playfulness. Thirty minutes later, he was evaluated by the emergency physician. Initial test results included an oxygen saturation (SaO2) level of 100%, but she suspected pneumonia and ordered further tests.

The child underwent a breathing treatment, and his condition appeared to be improving. About 45 minutes after his initial evaluation, while being transported for a chest x-ray, he experienced cardiorespiratory arrest. Resuscitation was unsuccessful.

The plaintiff claimed that the emergency physician should have consulted a pediatrician, conducted continuous electronic monitoring of the infant, and administered oxygen.

The defendant claimed that the infant was properly monitored and that oxygen was not required, since his oxygen saturation level was 100%. Additionally, the defendant claimed she was cross-trained as a pediatrician and that the outcome would have been the same, regardless of treatment, because the child had advanced, severe pneumonia.

Outcome
According to a published account, a defense verdict was returned for the defendant emergency physician. Claims involving the defendant hospital were subject to decision by the court, which was also a defense verdict.

Comment
This case illustrates the potential pitfalls of relying too heavily on any one diagnostic element. In this case, there was an arguable overreliance on pulse oximetry values to exclude a clinically significant respiratory condition.

Diagnosing pneumonia can be difficult, and the clinical gestalt must be considered. A low pulse oximetry reading itself should be concerning, whereas normal pulse oximetry itself should not be reassuring when the patient exhibits tachypnea or other signs of distress. In one study, pulse oximetry was studied to determine whether it could be used to exclude pneumonia in children younger than 2 years presenting with respiratory complaints. It could not.1 In sum, SaO2 levels may be normal in patients with pathology, and while initially reassuring, may plummet after the patient tires.

In this case, the defendants prevailed. The case report does not provide the patient’s vital signs, but the use of bronchodilators and the x-ray order suggest that there was some degree of respiratory distress. Because the child experienced cardiorespiratory arrest after one hour and 15 minutes in the ED, the defense was likely able to convince the jury that this unfortunate infant faced a high mortality risk even with more aggressive treatment.

Some have called pulse oximetry the “fifth vital sign.” Don’t let it become the only one. The SaO2 must be interpreted in the context of the patient’s overall presentation and in view of the other vitals (especially respiratory rate). —DML

Cases reprinted with permission from Medical Malpractice Verdicts, Settlements and Experts, Lewis Laska, Editor, (800) 298-6288.

References
1. Tanen DA, Trocinski DR. The use of pulse oximetry to exclude pneumonia in children. Am J Emerg Med. 2002;20(6):521-523.

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Failure to Order Colonoscopy Despite Patient's Family History

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Failure to Order Colonoscopy Despite Patient’s Family History
After receiving care from the defendant primary care physician since 1997, a Massachusetts woman presented in the fall of 2003 complaining of fatigue; she was diagnosed with iron deficiency anemia in January 2004. Two months later, she underwent a diagnostic colonoscopy, which revealed a mass in the transverse colon. Following surgery to remove the obstructing cancer, the patient received palliative care and died at age 52.

Plaintiff claimed that a colonoscopy should have been ordered for the decedent at an age 10 years earlier than the age at which her youngest family member had been diagnosed with colon cancer (ie, a maternal cousin diagnosed in her early 40s, in addition to her mother, diagnosed in her early 50s, and her maternal grandmother, diagnosed at age 75).

The defendant physician claimed that the decedent’s fatigue was due to depression and that she had declined further lab tests. A handwritten entry in the medical record from 1998 indicated that a colonoscopy had been ordered and performed with negative results. However, no report from the gastroenterologist nor any billing information from that procedure was ever found in the record.

The defendant claimed that it was the responsibility of the gastroenterologist, not the named defendant, to make follow-up appointments at appropriate intervals for colonoscopy, given the patient’s family history. The defendant also claimed that the criteria for performing colonoscopies between 1997 and 2004 were still evolving and that no standards had yet been set.

Outcome
According to a published account, a $950,000 settlement was reached.

Comment
The message here is clear: Primary care providers have a responsibility to track screening requirements—even when other specialists are involved and should also have responsibility. In this case, the issue is colonoscopy screening in an individual with a strong family history for colon cancer. The plaintiff correctly argued that a colonoscopy is appropriate at an age 10 years earlier than the affected relative’s age at diagnosis, or at age 40—whichever is younger. Also, the procedure should be repeated at five-year intervals in those at increased risk. These standards were published in 1997, contrary to the defendant’s allegations, and further supported in the literature in 1999.1,2

The plaintiff began treatment with the primary care provider in 1997, with a report of colonoscopy having been done some time in 1998, yielding normal results. Certainly a primary care provider would want documented evidence of the procedure, not just a note that one had been done. Even if a colonoscopy had been performed and the note is correct that findings were normal, the time for a repeat procedure should have been some time in 2003—the same time as the patient’s report of fatigue. This is the latest that a repeat screening should have been done. Any alarm symptom, such as anemia, weight loss, rectal bleeding, changes in bowel habits, or unexplained abdominal pain would require earlier colonoscopy.

I sympathize with the provider and his/her reliance upon the specialist to make the appropriate reminder. One would hope that reminders of this type would be made by the specialist. Ultimately, a specialist who failed to make a reminder might also be liable. However, the failure of the specialist does not relieve the primary care provider of responsibility.

Further, the allegation that the patient refused a lab test would also require documentation. Without it, we have a “he said, she said” situation with no way to confirm a patient failure to follow suggested medical direction. To a jury, a statement like this appears to be an obvious effort on the defendant’s part to explain away responsibility.

In my own practice as a family nurse practitioner specializing in gastroenterology, I review active patient files at every visit to confirm screening dates and any need for repeat screening. But often I see a patient only when screening visits actually occur, sometimes 10 years apart. When I am saying goodbye to a screening patient and telling them that we will contact them with a reminder at the time of the next scheduled screening, I also tell them to make a calendar reminder themselves. We use a computer system for reminders, but we all know that computers are fallible, as are humans. Every extra level of safety is important when it comes to these matters. Ultimately, however, the primary care provider is the one who sees a patient on a regular basis and has the opportunity, and thus the responsibility, to assure that screening matters are addressed.

What is also important is that this case and its outcome occurred even before the advent of the “medical home.” With the medical home concept in place, the responsibility would likely become even greater. —JP

 

 

Cases reprinted with permission from Medical Malpractice Verdicts, Settlements and Experts, Lewis Laska, Editor, (800) 298-6288.

References
1. Winawer SJ, Fletcher RH, Miller L, et al. Colorectal cancer screening: clinical guidelines and rationale. Gastroenterology. 1997;112 (2):594–642 [published corrections appear in Gastroenterology. 1997;112(3):1060 and 1998; 114(3):625].
2. Read TE, Kodner IJ. Colorectal cancer: risk factors and recommendations for early detection. Am Fam Physician. 1999;59(11):3083-3092.

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Failure to Order Colonoscopy Despite Patient’s Family History
After receiving care from the defendant primary care physician since 1997, a Massachusetts woman presented in the fall of 2003 complaining of fatigue; she was diagnosed with iron deficiency anemia in January 2004. Two months later, she underwent a diagnostic colonoscopy, which revealed a mass in the transverse colon. Following surgery to remove the obstructing cancer, the patient received palliative care and died at age 52.

Plaintiff claimed that a colonoscopy should have been ordered for the decedent at an age 10 years earlier than the age at which her youngest family member had been diagnosed with colon cancer (ie, a maternal cousin diagnosed in her early 40s, in addition to her mother, diagnosed in her early 50s, and her maternal grandmother, diagnosed at age 75).

The defendant physician claimed that the decedent’s fatigue was due to depression and that she had declined further lab tests. A handwritten entry in the medical record from 1998 indicated that a colonoscopy had been ordered and performed with negative results. However, no report from the gastroenterologist nor any billing information from that procedure was ever found in the record.

The defendant claimed that it was the responsibility of the gastroenterologist, not the named defendant, to make follow-up appointments at appropriate intervals for colonoscopy, given the patient’s family history. The defendant also claimed that the criteria for performing colonoscopies between 1997 and 2004 were still evolving and that no standards had yet been set.

Outcome
According to a published account, a $950,000 settlement was reached.

Comment
The message here is clear: Primary care providers have a responsibility to track screening requirements—even when other specialists are involved and should also have responsibility. In this case, the issue is colonoscopy screening in an individual with a strong family history for colon cancer. The plaintiff correctly argued that a colonoscopy is appropriate at an age 10 years earlier than the affected relative’s age at diagnosis, or at age 40—whichever is younger. Also, the procedure should be repeated at five-year intervals in those at increased risk. These standards were published in 1997, contrary to the defendant’s allegations, and further supported in the literature in 1999.1,2

The plaintiff began treatment with the primary care provider in 1997, with a report of colonoscopy having been done some time in 1998, yielding normal results. Certainly a primary care provider would want documented evidence of the procedure, not just a note that one had been done. Even if a colonoscopy had been performed and the note is correct that findings were normal, the time for a repeat procedure should have been some time in 2003—the same time as the patient’s report of fatigue. This is the latest that a repeat screening should have been done. Any alarm symptom, such as anemia, weight loss, rectal bleeding, changes in bowel habits, or unexplained abdominal pain would require earlier colonoscopy.

I sympathize with the provider and his/her reliance upon the specialist to make the appropriate reminder. One would hope that reminders of this type would be made by the specialist. Ultimately, a specialist who failed to make a reminder might also be liable. However, the failure of the specialist does not relieve the primary care provider of responsibility.

Further, the allegation that the patient refused a lab test would also require documentation. Without it, we have a “he said, she said” situation with no way to confirm a patient failure to follow suggested medical direction. To a jury, a statement like this appears to be an obvious effort on the defendant’s part to explain away responsibility.

In my own practice as a family nurse practitioner specializing in gastroenterology, I review active patient files at every visit to confirm screening dates and any need for repeat screening. But often I see a patient only when screening visits actually occur, sometimes 10 years apart. When I am saying goodbye to a screening patient and telling them that we will contact them with a reminder at the time of the next scheduled screening, I also tell them to make a calendar reminder themselves. We use a computer system for reminders, but we all know that computers are fallible, as are humans. Every extra level of safety is important when it comes to these matters. Ultimately, however, the primary care provider is the one who sees a patient on a regular basis and has the opportunity, and thus the responsibility, to assure that screening matters are addressed.

What is also important is that this case and its outcome occurred even before the advent of the “medical home.” With the medical home concept in place, the responsibility would likely become even greater. —JP

 

 

Cases reprinted with permission from Medical Malpractice Verdicts, Settlements and Experts, Lewis Laska, Editor, (800) 298-6288.

References
1. Winawer SJ, Fletcher RH, Miller L, et al. Colorectal cancer screening: clinical guidelines and rationale. Gastroenterology. 1997;112 (2):594–642 [published corrections appear in Gastroenterology. 1997;112(3):1060 and 1998; 114(3):625].
2. Read TE, Kodner IJ. Colorectal cancer: risk factors and recommendations for early detection. Am Fam Physician. 1999;59(11):3083-3092.

Failure to Order Colonoscopy Despite Patient’s Family History
After receiving care from the defendant primary care physician since 1997, a Massachusetts woman presented in the fall of 2003 complaining of fatigue; she was diagnosed with iron deficiency anemia in January 2004. Two months later, she underwent a diagnostic colonoscopy, which revealed a mass in the transverse colon. Following surgery to remove the obstructing cancer, the patient received palliative care and died at age 52.

Plaintiff claimed that a colonoscopy should have been ordered for the decedent at an age 10 years earlier than the age at which her youngest family member had been diagnosed with colon cancer (ie, a maternal cousin diagnosed in her early 40s, in addition to her mother, diagnosed in her early 50s, and her maternal grandmother, diagnosed at age 75).

The defendant physician claimed that the decedent’s fatigue was due to depression and that she had declined further lab tests. A handwritten entry in the medical record from 1998 indicated that a colonoscopy had been ordered and performed with negative results. However, no report from the gastroenterologist nor any billing information from that procedure was ever found in the record.

The defendant claimed that it was the responsibility of the gastroenterologist, not the named defendant, to make follow-up appointments at appropriate intervals for colonoscopy, given the patient’s family history. The defendant also claimed that the criteria for performing colonoscopies between 1997 and 2004 were still evolving and that no standards had yet been set.

Outcome
According to a published account, a $950,000 settlement was reached.

Comment
The message here is clear: Primary care providers have a responsibility to track screening requirements—even when other specialists are involved and should also have responsibility. In this case, the issue is colonoscopy screening in an individual with a strong family history for colon cancer. The plaintiff correctly argued that a colonoscopy is appropriate at an age 10 years earlier than the affected relative’s age at diagnosis, or at age 40—whichever is younger. Also, the procedure should be repeated at five-year intervals in those at increased risk. These standards were published in 1997, contrary to the defendant’s allegations, and further supported in the literature in 1999.1,2

The plaintiff began treatment with the primary care provider in 1997, with a report of colonoscopy having been done some time in 1998, yielding normal results. Certainly a primary care provider would want documented evidence of the procedure, not just a note that one had been done. Even if a colonoscopy had been performed and the note is correct that findings were normal, the time for a repeat procedure should have been some time in 2003—the same time as the patient’s report of fatigue. This is the latest that a repeat screening should have been done. Any alarm symptom, such as anemia, weight loss, rectal bleeding, changes in bowel habits, or unexplained abdominal pain would require earlier colonoscopy.

I sympathize with the provider and his/her reliance upon the specialist to make the appropriate reminder. One would hope that reminders of this type would be made by the specialist. Ultimately, a specialist who failed to make a reminder might also be liable. However, the failure of the specialist does not relieve the primary care provider of responsibility.

Further, the allegation that the patient refused a lab test would also require documentation. Without it, we have a “he said, she said” situation with no way to confirm a patient failure to follow suggested medical direction. To a jury, a statement like this appears to be an obvious effort on the defendant’s part to explain away responsibility.

In my own practice as a family nurse practitioner specializing in gastroenterology, I review active patient files at every visit to confirm screening dates and any need for repeat screening. But often I see a patient only when screening visits actually occur, sometimes 10 years apart. When I am saying goodbye to a screening patient and telling them that we will contact them with a reminder at the time of the next scheduled screening, I also tell them to make a calendar reminder themselves. We use a computer system for reminders, but we all know that computers are fallible, as are humans. Every extra level of safety is important when it comes to these matters. Ultimately, however, the primary care provider is the one who sees a patient on a regular basis and has the opportunity, and thus the responsibility, to assure that screening matters are addressed.

What is also important is that this case and its outcome occurred even before the advent of the “medical home.” With the medical home concept in place, the responsibility would likely become even greater. —JP

 

 

Cases reprinted with permission from Medical Malpractice Verdicts, Settlements and Experts, Lewis Laska, Editor, (800) 298-6288.

References
1. Winawer SJ, Fletcher RH, Miller L, et al. Colorectal cancer screening: clinical guidelines and rationale. Gastroenterology. 1997;112 (2):594–642 [published corrections appear in Gastroenterology. 1997;112(3):1060 and 1998; 114(3):625].
2. Read TE, Kodner IJ. Colorectal cancer: risk factors and recommendations for early detection. Am Fam Physician. 1999;59(11):3083-3092.

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