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Meaninful Use of HIT: Are Hospitalists Eligible?
On March 7, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) released a proposed rule: Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program—Stage 2. This rule is more commonly known as “Stage 2 of meaningful use.” At more than 130 pages, the rule builds upon Stage 1 of the program mainly by increasing measurement thresholds and requiring higher levels of system functionality.
Although there are no major surprises within the proposed rule, there is always one very basic yet very important question that surfaces when meaningful use makes headlines: Are hospitalists eligible for health information technology (HIT) incentives and thus subject to the meaningful use requirements?
“No” is the short answer to this question. Although physicians, including hospitalists, are considered eligible professionals (EPs) under the HIT incentive program, a subset of EPs are defined as hospital-based EPs and, therefore, are not subject to the program’s requirements. CMS defines a hospital-based eligible professional as an EP who furnishes 90% or more of their covered professional services in either the inpatient division or ED of a hospital.
While some may call this an exemption for hospitalists, it is not that definitive. Hospitalists are still “eligible,” and the determination is not made by specialty, but by pattern of practice. This means that hospitalists could find themselves on the hook for future penalties if their practice patterns expand beyond CMS’ 90% threshold.
An example of this would be a hospitalist who spends time doing rounds at a nursing home. Today, this might constitute only a small percentage of a hospitalist’s practice, but with an increasingly aging population, it is not inconceivable that this small percentage could exceed 10% within five or 10 years.
With this in mind, and a similar scenario also present in the Electronic Prescribing Incentive Program (eRx), SHM has consistently pointed out the issue to CMS and is working to find an acceptable solution.
Although hospitalists are not currently subject to physician meaningful-use requirements, the program has another category of eligibility that will certainly affect hospitalists: the eligible hospital, or EH. Many hospitalists are directly involved with HIT implementation efforts at their institutions or are indirectly working with these systems as they are implemented and expanded in hospitals across the country.
Given the 90% eligibility threshold and the role of HIT in hospitals, it is important for hospitalists to stay current and informed on meaningful use and HIT policy. Involvement with one of SHM’s HIT related committees is a clear way to stay informed in this ever-evolving area, and SHM’s efforts can be reviewed on the Advocacy page of SHM’s website: www.hospitalmedicine.org/advocacy.
For the most up-to-date information on what is being done at the federal level, the Office of the National Coordinator (ONC) has a wealth of information available at www.healthit.gov/.
SHM will continue to monitor and analyze developments and changes to EHR policy, but it also looks to you, its members, for experience and insight.
On March 7, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) released a proposed rule: Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program—Stage 2. This rule is more commonly known as “Stage 2 of meaningful use.” At more than 130 pages, the rule builds upon Stage 1 of the program mainly by increasing measurement thresholds and requiring higher levels of system functionality.
Although there are no major surprises within the proposed rule, there is always one very basic yet very important question that surfaces when meaningful use makes headlines: Are hospitalists eligible for health information technology (HIT) incentives and thus subject to the meaningful use requirements?
“No” is the short answer to this question. Although physicians, including hospitalists, are considered eligible professionals (EPs) under the HIT incentive program, a subset of EPs are defined as hospital-based EPs and, therefore, are not subject to the program’s requirements. CMS defines a hospital-based eligible professional as an EP who furnishes 90% or more of their covered professional services in either the inpatient division or ED of a hospital.
While some may call this an exemption for hospitalists, it is not that definitive. Hospitalists are still “eligible,” and the determination is not made by specialty, but by pattern of practice. This means that hospitalists could find themselves on the hook for future penalties if their practice patterns expand beyond CMS’ 90% threshold.
An example of this would be a hospitalist who spends time doing rounds at a nursing home. Today, this might constitute only a small percentage of a hospitalist’s practice, but with an increasingly aging population, it is not inconceivable that this small percentage could exceed 10% within five or 10 years.
With this in mind, and a similar scenario also present in the Electronic Prescribing Incentive Program (eRx), SHM has consistently pointed out the issue to CMS and is working to find an acceptable solution.
Although hospitalists are not currently subject to physician meaningful-use requirements, the program has another category of eligibility that will certainly affect hospitalists: the eligible hospital, or EH. Many hospitalists are directly involved with HIT implementation efforts at their institutions or are indirectly working with these systems as they are implemented and expanded in hospitals across the country.
Given the 90% eligibility threshold and the role of HIT in hospitals, it is important for hospitalists to stay current and informed on meaningful use and HIT policy. Involvement with one of SHM’s HIT related committees is a clear way to stay informed in this ever-evolving area, and SHM’s efforts can be reviewed on the Advocacy page of SHM’s website: www.hospitalmedicine.org/advocacy.
For the most up-to-date information on what is being done at the federal level, the Office of the National Coordinator (ONC) has a wealth of information available at www.healthit.gov/.
SHM will continue to monitor and analyze developments and changes to EHR policy, but it also looks to you, its members, for experience and insight.
On March 7, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) released a proposed rule: Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program—Stage 2. This rule is more commonly known as “Stage 2 of meaningful use.” At more than 130 pages, the rule builds upon Stage 1 of the program mainly by increasing measurement thresholds and requiring higher levels of system functionality.
Although there are no major surprises within the proposed rule, there is always one very basic yet very important question that surfaces when meaningful use makes headlines: Are hospitalists eligible for health information technology (HIT) incentives and thus subject to the meaningful use requirements?
“No” is the short answer to this question. Although physicians, including hospitalists, are considered eligible professionals (EPs) under the HIT incentive program, a subset of EPs are defined as hospital-based EPs and, therefore, are not subject to the program’s requirements. CMS defines a hospital-based eligible professional as an EP who furnishes 90% or more of their covered professional services in either the inpatient division or ED of a hospital.
While some may call this an exemption for hospitalists, it is not that definitive. Hospitalists are still “eligible,” and the determination is not made by specialty, but by pattern of practice. This means that hospitalists could find themselves on the hook for future penalties if their practice patterns expand beyond CMS’ 90% threshold.
An example of this would be a hospitalist who spends time doing rounds at a nursing home. Today, this might constitute only a small percentage of a hospitalist’s practice, but with an increasingly aging population, it is not inconceivable that this small percentage could exceed 10% within five or 10 years.
With this in mind, and a similar scenario also present in the Electronic Prescribing Incentive Program (eRx), SHM has consistently pointed out the issue to CMS and is working to find an acceptable solution.
Although hospitalists are not currently subject to physician meaningful-use requirements, the program has another category of eligibility that will certainly affect hospitalists: the eligible hospital, or EH. Many hospitalists are directly involved with HIT implementation efforts at their institutions or are indirectly working with these systems as they are implemented and expanded in hospitals across the country.
Given the 90% eligibility threshold and the role of HIT in hospitals, it is important for hospitalists to stay current and informed on meaningful use and HIT policy. Involvement with one of SHM’s HIT related committees is a clear way to stay informed in this ever-evolving area, and SHM’s efforts can be reviewed on the Advocacy page of SHM’s website: www.hospitalmedicine.org/advocacy.
For the most up-to-date information on what is being done at the federal level, the Office of the National Coordinator (ONC) has a wealth of information available at www.healthit.gov/.
SHM will continue to monitor and analyze developments and changes to EHR policy, but it also looks to you, its members, for experience and insight.
Beware Hospital Compare? New Measures Highlight Questions Surrounding Healthcare Quality Report Cards
—Anne-Marie J. Audet, MD, MSc, SM, vice president, Health System Quality and Efficiency, Commonwealth Fund
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has been publicly reporting performance measures on its Hospital Compare website (www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov) since 2005, focusing on processes of care, patient outcomes, patient satisfaction, patient safety, and other measures. A recent addition of patient-safety metrics has rekindled skeptical questions about the validity, purpose, and effectiveness of public healthcare quality report cards, while highlighting the need for hospitalists and their institutions to remain vigilant in the struggle to ensure that they are compared and rewarded fairly and appropriately.
Provocative Measures
Last fall, CMS began posting “Serious Complications and Deaths” measures, developed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). The measures score individual hospitals according to the rates at which their patients suffer from:
- Pneumothorax due to medical treatment;
- Post-operative VTE;
- Post-operative abdominal or pelvic dehiscence; and
- Accidental lacerations from medical treatment.
Four other serious complication measures (pressure ulcers, catheter and bloodstream infections, and hip fractures from falling after surgery) are folded into a separate composite score for each hospital, while another composite score for “Deaths for Certain Conditions” is based on a hospital’s post-admission mortality rate for hip fractures, acute MI, heart failure, stroke, GI bleed, and pneumonia.
National and local media reports have thrust these dramatic metrics into the public eye, putting many hospitals on the spot to explain their putative breaches of patient safety. A closer inspection of the metrics, however, reveals plausible criticisms of their shortcomings.
Methodological Weakness
The new metrics are derived from Medicare claims data instead of medical chart abstractions, which experts say weakens their validity significantly and makes their use for provider profiling questionable. Moreover, claims data are based on records that were never designed to capture the sort of clinical nuances needed for valid and equitable risk adjustment (see “Methodological Challenges to Quality Metrics,” below). “Serious Complications and Deaths” rates based on these data, critics maintain, lack validity for meaningful hospital comparisons because they can exaggerate problems at hospitals that treat a high volume of complicated patients and use more invasive procedures to do so, such as teaching hospitals in academic medical centers.1
The ante gets upped when CMS eventually begins adding patient-safety measures to the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP) program, which rewards or punishes hospitals financially, depending on their performance on the metrics. CMS is considering adding the Serious Complications and Deaths measures to the HVPB program in the near future.
As the science of documenting and reporting patient harm struggles to find its footing, physicians and hospitals have to be more vigilant than ever to adopt a unified, organized approach to advocate the most appropriate processes and outcomes for which they will be held accountable, and avoid being cast in a reactive mode when metrics are imposed on them, says Patrick J. Torcson, MD, MMM, FACP, SFHM, chair of SHM’s Performance Measurement and Reporting Committee, and director of hospital medicine at St. Tammany Parish Hospital in Shreveport, La.
Last year, SHM sent comments to then-CMS administrator Don Berwick, expressing concern that the patient-safety measures CMS proposes to include in the HVBP program in fiscal-year 2014 are not endorsed by the National Quality Forum (NQF), that they are derived from billing and payment data that are not intended to be used primarily for clinical purposes, that the outcome measures are not entirely preventable even with the best of care, and that they are not adequately risk-adjusted.
“While it’s easy to agree with the experts that Hospital Compare’s patient-safety measures are not ready for prime time, it’s no longer acceptable simply to say, ‘These metrics are irrelevant,’” Dr. Torcson cautions. “We also must be aware of the evolution and inexorable movement of the nation’s healthcare quality and safety agenda. SHM embraces the triple aim of providing better care to our patients, promoting better health of patient populations, and doing so at a lower cost.”
The Power of “Why?”
Despite its imperfections, Hospital Compare’s greatest value is the power of its transparency, which fosters healthy discussion among providers, patients, and payors, according to Anne-Marie J. Audet, MD, MSc, SM, vice president for Health System Quality and Efficiency for the Commonwealth Fund. “That transparency gets providers’ attention and leads them to make changes that can translate into better performance,” she says, noting how hospital care for patients with heart attack, heart failure, and pneumonia has steadily improved in recent years, with the worst performers in 2009 doing as well or better than the best performers in 2004.
“There are also examples of hospitals that have gone from a median of four central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSI) per 1,000 line-days to zero because they decided not to take the status quo as acceptable,” says Stephen C. Schoenbaum, MD, MPH, special advisor to the president of the Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation. Dr. Schoenbaum played a significant role in the development of the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set, or HEDIS.
“There is no such thing as a perfect measure in which some adjustment or better collection method would not affect the numbers,” he notes. “Ideally, you want any publicly reported measure to get the poorer performers to come up with a way to explain their result. Or, even better, to improve their result.”
Methodological criticisms of CMS’ new “Serious Complications and Deaths” measures may be justified, Dr. Audet concedes, but she also notes that rigorous validation and reliability testing of quality measures is an expensive process. “To get where we want to go in American healthcare, we need a more thoroughly supported measure development infrastructure,” she says.
“In the meantime, providers will be probing the implications of their numbers, asking why they got the numbers they did, and what can be done about it. This attention can only lead to improvement, both in the measures themselves and in the care delivered.”
Indeed, one of the hospitals that was listed as having a high rate of accidental cuts and lacerations in the new measures found most of those cuts had been intended by the surgeon but erroneously billed to Medicare under the code for an accidental cut. Even with its methodological flaws, the Hospital Compare data led to root-cause analysis and improvement in coding.
Hospitalists’ Role
Hospitalists, according to Dr. Torcson, will be critical to the successful performance of hospitals under the HVPB program, as experts in quality and quality-measurement adherence. Hospitalists care for more hospitalized patients than any other physician group, and many believe they are uniquely positioned to lead the system-level changes and quality-improvement (QI) efforts that will be required.
“Hospitalists and their hospitals, practicing in alignment, become champions for their patients,” Dr. Torcson says. “SHM supported the HVBP program, and we foresee that the alignment of performance and payment within the program will inevitably result in better clinical outcomes for our patients.”
Chris Guadagnino is a freelance writer in Philadelphia.
References
- Experts question Medicare’s effort to rate hospitals’ patient safety records. Kaiser Health News website. Available at: http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2012/February/13/medicare-hospital-patient-safety-records.aspx. Accessed March 12, 2012.
- Shahian DM, Iezzoni LI, Meyer GS, Kirle L, Normand ST. Hospital-wide mortality as a quality metric: conceptual and methodological challenges. Am J Med Qual. 2012;27:112.
—Anne-Marie J. Audet, MD, MSc, SM, vice president, Health System Quality and Efficiency, Commonwealth Fund
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has been publicly reporting performance measures on its Hospital Compare website (www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov) since 2005, focusing on processes of care, patient outcomes, patient satisfaction, patient safety, and other measures. A recent addition of patient-safety metrics has rekindled skeptical questions about the validity, purpose, and effectiveness of public healthcare quality report cards, while highlighting the need for hospitalists and their institutions to remain vigilant in the struggle to ensure that they are compared and rewarded fairly and appropriately.
Provocative Measures
Last fall, CMS began posting “Serious Complications and Deaths” measures, developed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). The measures score individual hospitals according to the rates at which their patients suffer from:
- Pneumothorax due to medical treatment;
- Post-operative VTE;
- Post-operative abdominal or pelvic dehiscence; and
- Accidental lacerations from medical treatment.
Four other serious complication measures (pressure ulcers, catheter and bloodstream infections, and hip fractures from falling after surgery) are folded into a separate composite score for each hospital, while another composite score for “Deaths for Certain Conditions” is based on a hospital’s post-admission mortality rate for hip fractures, acute MI, heart failure, stroke, GI bleed, and pneumonia.
National and local media reports have thrust these dramatic metrics into the public eye, putting many hospitals on the spot to explain their putative breaches of patient safety. A closer inspection of the metrics, however, reveals plausible criticisms of their shortcomings.
Methodological Weakness
The new metrics are derived from Medicare claims data instead of medical chart abstractions, which experts say weakens their validity significantly and makes their use for provider profiling questionable. Moreover, claims data are based on records that were never designed to capture the sort of clinical nuances needed for valid and equitable risk adjustment (see “Methodological Challenges to Quality Metrics,” below). “Serious Complications and Deaths” rates based on these data, critics maintain, lack validity for meaningful hospital comparisons because they can exaggerate problems at hospitals that treat a high volume of complicated patients and use more invasive procedures to do so, such as teaching hospitals in academic medical centers.1
The ante gets upped when CMS eventually begins adding patient-safety measures to the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP) program, which rewards or punishes hospitals financially, depending on their performance on the metrics. CMS is considering adding the Serious Complications and Deaths measures to the HVPB program in the near future.
As the science of documenting and reporting patient harm struggles to find its footing, physicians and hospitals have to be more vigilant than ever to adopt a unified, organized approach to advocate the most appropriate processes and outcomes for which they will be held accountable, and avoid being cast in a reactive mode when metrics are imposed on them, says Patrick J. Torcson, MD, MMM, FACP, SFHM, chair of SHM’s Performance Measurement and Reporting Committee, and director of hospital medicine at St. Tammany Parish Hospital in Shreveport, La.
Last year, SHM sent comments to then-CMS administrator Don Berwick, expressing concern that the patient-safety measures CMS proposes to include in the HVBP program in fiscal-year 2014 are not endorsed by the National Quality Forum (NQF), that they are derived from billing and payment data that are not intended to be used primarily for clinical purposes, that the outcome measures are not entirely preventable even with the best of care, and that they are not adequately risk-adjusted.
“While it’s easy to agree with the experts that Hospital Compare’s patient-safety measures are not ready for prime time, it’s no longer acceptable simply to say, ‘These metrics are irrelevant,’” Dr. Torcson cautions. “We also must be aware of the evolution and inexorable movement of the nation’s healthcare quality and safety agenda. SHM embraces the triple aim of providing better care to our patients, promoting better health of patient populations, and doing so at a lower cost.”
The Power of “Why?”
Despite its imperfections, Hospital Compare’s greatest value is the power of its transparency, which fosters healthy discussion among providers, patients, and payors, according to Anne-Marie J. Audet, MD, MSc, SM, vice president for Health System Quality and Efficiency for the Commonwealth Fund. “That transparency gets providers’ attention and leads them to make changes that can translate into better performance,” she says, noting how hospital care for patients with heart attack, heart failure, and pneumonia has steadily improved in recent years, with the worst performers in 2009 doing as well or better than the best performers in 2004.
“There are also examples of hospitals that have gone from a median of four central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSI) per 1,000 line-days to zero because they decided not to take the status quo as acceptable,” says Stephen C. Schoenbaum, MD, MPH, special advisor to the president of the Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation. Dr. Schoenbaum played a significant role in the development of the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set, or HEDIS.
“There is no such thing as a perfect measure in which some adjustment or better collection method would not affect the numbers,” he notes. “Ideally, you want any publicly reported measure to get the poorer performers to come up with a way to explain their result. Or, even better, to improve their result.”
Methodological criticisms of CMS’ new “Serious Complications and Deaths” measures may be justified, Dr. Audet concedes, but she also notes that rigorous validation and reliability testing of quality measures is an expensive process. “To get where we want to go in American healthcare, we need a more thoroughly supported measure development infrastructure,” she says.
“In the meantime, providers will be probing the implications of their numbers, asking why they got the numbers they did, and what can be done about it. This attention can only lead to improvement, both in the measures themselves and in the care delivered.”
Indeed, one of the hospitals that was listed as having a high rate of accidental cuts and lacerations in the new measures found most of those cuts had been intended by the surgeon but erroneously billed to Medicare under the code for an accidental cut. Even with its methodological flaws, the Hospital Compare data led to root-cause analysis and improvement in coding.
Hospitalists’ Role
Hospitalists, according to Dr. Torcson, will be critical to the successful performance of hospitals under the HVPB program, as experts in quality and quality-measurement adherence. Hospitalists care for more hospitalized patients than any other physician group, and many believe they are uniquely positioned to lead the system-level changes and quality-improvement (QI) efforts that will be required.
“Hospitalists and their hospitals, practicing in alignment, become champions for their patients,” Dr. Torcson says. “SHM supported the HVBP program, and we foresee that the alignment of performance and payment within the program will inevitably result in better clinical outcomes for our patients.”
Chris Guadagnino is a freelance writer in Philadelphia.
References
- Experts question Medicare’s effort to rate hospitals’ patient safety records. Kaiser Health News website. Available at: http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2012/February/13/medicare-hospital-patient-safety-records.aspx. Accessed March 12, 2012.
- Shahian DM, Iezzoni LI, Meyer GS, Kirle L, Normand ST. Hospital-wide mortality as a quality metric: conceptual and methodological challenges. Am J Med Qual. 2012;27:112.
—Anne-Marie J. Audet, MD, MSc, SM, vice president, Health System Quality and Efficiency, Commonwealth Fund
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has been publicly reporting performance measures on its Hospital Compare website (www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov) since 2005, focusing on processes of care, patient outcomes, patient satisfaction, patient safety, and other measures. A recent addition of patient-safety metrics has rekindled skeptical questions about the validity, purpose, and effectiveness of public healthcare quality report cards, while highlighting the need for hospitalists and their institutions to remain vigilant in the struggle to ensure that they are compared and rewarded fairly and appropriately.
Provocative Measures
Last fall, CMS began posting “Serious Complications and Deaths” measures, developed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). The measures score individual hospitals according to the rates at which their patients suffer from:
- Pneumothorax due to medical treatment;
- Post-operative VTE;
- Post-operative abdominal or pelvic dehiscence; and
- Accidental lacerations from medical treatment.
Four other serious complication measures (pressure ulcers, catheter and bloodstream infections, and hip fractures from falling after surgery) are folded into a separate composite score for each hospital, while another composite score for “Deaths for Certain Conditions” is based on a hospital’s post-admission mortality rate for hip fractures, acute MI, heart failure, stroke, GI bleed, and pneumonia.
National and local media reports have thrust these dramatic metrics into the public eye, putting many hospitals on the spot to explain their putative breaches of patient safety. A closer inspection of the metrics, however, reveals plausible criticisms of their shortcomings.
Methodological Weakness
The new metrics are derived from Medicare claims data instead of medical chart abstractions, which experts say weakens their validity significantly and makes their use for provider profiling questionable. Moreover, claims data are based on records that were never designed to capture the sort of clinical nuances needed for valid and equitable risk adjustment (see “Methodological Challenges to Quality Metrics,” below). “Serious Complications and Deaths” rates based on these data, critics maintain, lack validity for meaningful hospital comparisons because they can exaggerate problems at hospitals that treat a high volume of complicated patients and use more invasive procedures to do so, such as teaching hospitals in academic medical centers.1
The ante gets upped when CMS eventually begins adding patient-safety measures to the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP) program, which rewards or punishes hospitals financially, depending on their performance on the metrics. CMS is considering adding the Serious Complications and Deaths measures to the HVPB program in the near future.
As the science of documenting and reporting patient harm struggles to find its footing, physicians and hospitals have to be more vigilant than ever to adopt a unified, organized approach to advocate the most appropriate processes and outcomes for which they will be held accountable, and avoid being cast in a reactive mode when metrics are imposed on them, says Patrick J. Torcson, MD, MMM, FACP, SFHM, chair of SHM’s Performance Measurement and Reporting Committee, and director of hospital medicine at St. Tammany Parish Hospital in Shreveport, La.
Last year, SHM sent comments to then-CMS administrator Don Berwick, expressing concern that the patient-safety measures CMS proposes to include in the HVBP program in fiscal-year 2014 are not endorsed by the National Quality Forum (NQF), that they are derived from billing and payment data that are not intended to be used primarily for clinical purposes, that the outcome measures are not entirely preventable even with the best of care, and that they are not adequately risk-adjusted.
“While it’s easy to agree with the experts that Hospital Compare’s patient-safety measures are not ready for prime time, it’s no longer acceptable simply to say, ‘These metrics are irrelevant,’” Dr. Torcson cautions. “We also must be aware of the evolution and inexorable movement of the nation’s healthcare quality and safety agenda. SHM embraces the triple aim of providing better care to our patients, promoting better health of patient populations, and doing so at a lower cost.”
The Power of “Why?”
Despite its imperfections, Hospital Compare’s greatest value is the power of its transparency, which fosters healthy discussion among providers, patients, and payors, according to Anne-Marie J. Audet, MD, MSc, SM, vice president for Health System Quality and Efficiency for the Commonwealth Fund. “That transparency gets providers’ attention and leads them to make changes that can translate into better performance,” she says, noting how hospital care for patients with heart attack, heart failure, and pneumonia has steadily improved in recent years, with the worst performers in 2009 doing as well or better than the best performers in 2004.
“There are also examples of hospitals that have gone from a median of four central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSI) per 1,000 line-days to zero because they decided not to take the status quo as acceptable,” says Stephen C. Schoenbaum, MD, MPH, special advisor to the president of the Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation. Dr. Schoenbaum played a significant role in the development of the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set, or HEDIS.
“There is no such thing as a perfect measure in which some adjustment or better collection method would not affect the numbers,” he notes. “Ideally, you want any publicly reported measure to get the poorer performers to come up with a way to explain their result. Or, even better, to improve their result.”
Methodological criticisms of CMS’ new “Serious Complications and Deaths” measures may be justified, Dr. Audet concedes, but she also notes that rigorous validation and reliability testing of quality measures is an expensive process. “To get where we want to go in American healthcare, we need a more thoroughly supported measure development infrastructure,” she says.
“In the meantime, providers will be probing the implications of their numbers, asking why they got the numbers they did, and what can be done about it. This attention can only lead to improvement, both in the measures themselves and in the care delivered.”
Indeed, one of the hospitals that was listed as having a high rate of accidental cuts and lacerations in the new measures found most of those cuts had been intended by the surgeon but erroneously billed to Medicare under the code for an accidental cut. Even with its methodological flaws, the Hospital Compare data led to root-cause analysis and improvement in coding.
Hospitalists’ Role
Hospitalists, according to Dr. Torcson, will be critical to the successful performance of hospitals under the HVPB program, as experts in quality and quality-measurement adherence. Hospitalists care for more hospitalized patients than any other physician group, and many believe they are uniquely positioned to lead the system-level changes and quality-improvement (QI) efforts that will be required.
“Hospitalists and their hospitals, practicing in alignment, become champions for their patients,” Dr. Torcson says. “SHM supported the HVBP program, and we foresee that the alignment of performance and payment within the program will inevitably result in better clinical outcomes for our patients.”
Chris Guadagnino is a freelance writer in Philadelphia.
References
- Experts question Medicare’s effort to rate hospitals’ patient safety records. Kaiser Health News website. Available at: http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2012/February/13/medicare-hospital-patient-safety-records.aspx. Accessed March 12, 2012.
- Shahian DM, Iezzoni LI, Meyer GS, Kirle L, Normand ST. Hospital-wide mortality as a quality metric: conceptual and methodological challenges. Am J Med Qual. 2012;27:112.
Cleveland Clinic Builds Urgency around Patient Experiences
Efforts to create a greater sense of urgency over patient satisfaction within the hospitalist service at the Cleveland Clinic using an eight-step model for changing organizational culture were outlined in an abstract presented at HM11.
“Attention to the doctor-patient experience should be our guiding principle,” explains lead author and hospitalist Vicente Velez, MD. “No matter how complex the science of medicine gets, the art is equally important.” Physicians can be taught skills in effective communication with their patients and families, Dr. Velez adds.
The initiative began four years ago after the department identified low patient satisfaction scores as a “credibility crisis.” Leadership sprung into action, promoting a vision that HM should be known for its ability to communicate. “Regardless of individual communication style, a proper self-introduction, eliciting the patient’s perspective, and an explanation of the daily plan of care were things we all had to develop as habits,” he says.
Individual projects to advance the agenda included:
- Communication training offered to all physicians at the Cleveland Clinic;
- New business cards with the hospitalists’ pictures on them;
- A pre-discharge “fly-by” visit from the hospitalist;
- Post-discharge callbacks to patients; and
- Joint physician-nurse rounding.
The service now shares its Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems Survey (HCAHPS) satisfaction scores for individual physicians in small groups or one-on-one meetings. The department recognizes high performers. Overall satisfaction scores rose to between 76% and 86%, up from 69% at the start of the project, Dr. Velez says.
Reference
Efforts to create a greater sense of urgency over patient satisfaction within the hospitalist service at the Cleveland Clinic using an eight-step model for changing organizational culture were outlined in an abstract presented at HM11.
“Attention to the doctor-patient experience should be our guiding principle,” explains lead author and hospitalist Vicente Velez, MD. “No matter how complex the science of medicine gets, the art is equally important.” Physicians can be taught skills in effective communication with their patients and families, Dr. Velez adds.
The initiative began four years ago after the department identified low patient satisfaction scores as a “credibility crisis.” Leadership sprung into action, promoting a vision that HM should be known for its ability to communicate. “Regardless of individual communication style, a proper self-introduction, eliciting the patient’s perspective, and an explanation of the daily plan of care were things we all had to develop as habits,” he says.
Individual projects to advance the agenda included:
- Communication training offered to all physicians at the Cleveland Clinic;
- New business cards with the hospitalists’ pictures on them;
- A pre-discharge “fly-by” visit from the hospitalist;
- Post-discharge callbacks to patients; and
- Joint physician-nurse rounding.
The service now shares its Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems Survey (HCAHPS) satisfaction scores for individual physicians in small groups or one-on-one meetings. The department recognizes high performers. Overall satisfaction scores rose to between 76% and 86%, up from 69% at the start of the project, Dr. Velez says.
Reference
Efforts to create a greater sense of urgency over patient satisfaction within the hospitalist service at the Cleveland Clinic using an eight-step model for changing organizational culture were outlined in an abstract presented at HM11.
“Attention to the doctor-patient experience should be our guiding principle,” explains lead author and hospitalist Vicente Velez, MD. “No matter how complex the science of medicine gets, the art is equally important.” Physicians can be taught skills in effective communication with their patients and families, Dr. Velez adds.
The initiative began four years ago after the department identified low patient satisfaction scores as a “credibility crisis.” Leadership sprung into action, promoting a vision that HM should be known for its ability to communicate. “Regardless of individual communication style, a proper self-introduction, eliciting the patient’s perspective, and an explanation of the daily plan of care were things we all had to develop as habits,” he says.
Individual projects to advance the agenda included:
- Communication training offered to all physicians at the Cleveland Clinic;
- New business cards with the hospitalists’ pictures on them;
- A pre-discharge “fly-by” visit from the hospitalist;
- Post-discharge callbacks to patients; and
- Joint physician-nurse rounding.
The service now shares its Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems Survey (HCAHPS) satisfaction scores for individual physicians in small groups or one-on-one meetings. The department recognizes high performers. Overall satisfaction scores rose to between 76% and 86%, up from 69% at the start of the project, Dr. Velez says.
Reference
By the Numbers: 3,000
Approximate number of million-dollar hospitalization bills in Northern California hospitals in 2010, up from 430 a decade earlier, according to statistics from the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development.1 More than 20% of the giant bills—typically for complicated, life-saving procedures and lengthy hospital stays following critical illness or trauma—went to the parents of newborn babies with catastrophic illnesses. Organ transplants were also associated with extended hospital stays and million-dollar price tags.
Medical bills are a major factor in two-thirds of personal bankruptcy cases, although most of the largest bills will be lowered significantly, as much as 80%, after negotiations between hospitals and insurers.
Reference
Approximate number of million-dollar hospitalization bills in Northern California hospitals in 2010, up from 430 a decade earlier, according to statistics from the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development.1 More than 20% of the giant bills—typically for complicated, life-saving procedures and lengthy hospital stays following critical illness or trauma—went to the parents of newborn babies with catastrophic illnesses. Organ transplants were also associated with extended hospital stays and million-dollar price tags.
Medical bills are a major factor in two-thirds of personal bankruptcy cases, although most of the largest bills will be lowered significantly, as much as 80%, after negotiations between hospitals and insurers.
Reference
Approximate number of million-dollar hospitalization bills in Northern California hospitals in 2010, up from 430 a decade earlier, according to statistics from the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development.1 More than 20% of the giant bills—typically for complicated, life-saving procedures and lengthy hospital stays following critical illness or trauma—went to the parents of newborn babies with catastrophic illnesses. Organ transplants were also associated with extended hospital stays and million-dollar price tags.
Medical bills are a major factor in two-thirds of personal bankruptcy cases, although most of the largest bills will be lowered significantly, as much as 80%, after negotiations between hospitals and insurers.
Reference
C. Diff Deaths at All-Time High
Both incidence and deaths related to the bacterial infection Clostridium difficile have reached an all-time high, according to the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which calls C. diff “a formidable opponent” and a widespread safety issue. A total of 14,000 deaths related to C. diff were reported during the period of 2006-2007, compared with 3,000 in 1999-2000. A quarter of infections now appear first in hospitalized patients, with the rest in nursing home residents or patients in doctors’ offices.
L. Clifford McDonald, MD, CDC epidemiologist and lead author of a recent CDC Vital Signs report on the subject, recommended several steps for reducing C. diff infections, starting with better antibiotic stewardship, early detection and isolation for those who test positive, use of gloves and gowns when treating them, and informing the receiving medical team when those patients are transferred.1 Dr. McDonald also noted that state-led hospital collaboratives in Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York have reduced infection rates by 20%.
Another recent example of successful antibiotic stewardship comes from the University of Maryland Medical Center (UMMC) and Health Day News, summarizing a study in the journal Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology.2
A seven-year stewardship program using an anti-microbial monitoring team generated a $3 million reduction in the hospital’s annual budget for antibiotics by its third year, with no increase in death rates, hospital readmissions, or length of stay. After seven years, antibiotic spending per patient per day had been cut by nearly half. The antibiotic stewardship program was canceled in 2008 in favor of providing more infectious-disease consulting as an alternative mode of stewardship. Over the subsequent two years, antibiotic costs went back up 32%, reports lead author Harold Standiford, MD.
“Our results clearly show that an antimicrobial stewardship program like the one at UMMC is safe, effective, and makes good financial sense,” he says, adding physicians should eliminate wasteful healthcare spending.
References
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Vital signs: preventing Clostridium difficile infections. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention website. Available at: http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6109a3.htm. Accessed March 29, 2012.
- Standiford HC, Chan S, Tripoli M, Weekes E, Forrest GN. Antimicrobial stewardship at a large tertiary care academic medical center: cost analysis before, during, and after a 7-year program. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol. 2012;33(4);338-345.
Both incidence and deaths related to the bacterial infection Clostridium difficile have reached an all-time high, according to the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which calls C. diff “a formidable opponent” and a widespread safety issue. A total of 14,000 deaths related to C. diff were reported during the period of 2006-2007, compared with 3,000 in 1999-2000. A quarter of infections now appear first in hospitalized patients, with the rest in nursing home residents or patients in doctors’ offices.
L. Clifford McDonald, MD, CDC epidemiologist and lead author of a recent CDC Vital Signs report on the subject, recommended several steps for reducing C. diff infections, starting with better antibiotic stewardship, early detection and isolation for those who test positive, use of gloves and gowns when treating them, and informing the receiving medical team when those patients are transferred.1 Dr. McDonald also noted that state-led hospital collaboratives in Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York have reduced infection rates by 20%.
Another recent example of successful antibiotic stewardship comes from the University of Maryland Medical Center (UMMC) and Health Day News, summarizing a study in the journal Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology.2
A seven-year stewardship program using an anti-microbial monitoring team generated a $3 million reduction in the hospital’s annual budget for antibiotics by its third year, with no increase in death rates, hospital readmissions, or length of stay. After seven years, antibiotic spending per patient per day had been cut by nearly half. The antibiotic stewardship program was canceled in 2008 in favor of providing more infectious-disease consulting as an alternative mode of stewardship. Over the subsequent two years, antibiotic costs went back up 32%, reports lead author Harold Standiford, MD.
“Our results clearly show that an antimicrobial stewardship program like the one at UMMC is safe, effective, and makes good financial sense,” he says, adding physicians should eliminate wasteful healthcare spending.
References
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Vital signs: preventing Clostridium difficile infections. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention website. Available at: http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6109a3.htm. Accessed March 29, 2012.
- Standiford HC, Chan S, Tripoli M, Weekes E, Forrest GN. Antimicrobial stewardship at a large tertiary care academic medical center: cost analysis before, during, and after a 7-year program. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol. 2012;33(4);338-345.
Both incidence and deaths related to the bacterial infection Clostridium difficile have reached an all-time high, according to the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which calls C. diff “a formidable opponent” and a widespread safety issue. A total of 14,000 deaths related to C. diff were reported during the period of 2006-2007, compared with 3,000 in 1999-2000. A quarter of infections now appear first in hospitalized patients, with the rest in nursing home residents or patients in doctors’ offices.
L. Clifford McDonald, MD, CDC epidemiologist and lead author of a recent CDC Vital Signs report on the subject, recommended several steps for reducing C. diff infections, starting with better antibiotic stewardship, early detection and isolation for those who test positive, use of gloves and gowns when treating them, and informing the receiving medical team when those patients are transferred.1 Dr. McDonald also noted that state-led hospital collaboratives in Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York have reduced infection rates by 20%.
Another recent example of successful antibiotic stewardship comes from the University of Maryland Medical Center (UMMC) and Health Day News, summarizing a study in the journal Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology.2
A seven-year stewardship program using an anti-microbial monitoring team generated a $3 million reduction in the hospital’s annual budget for antibiotics by its third year, with no increase in death rates, hospital readmissions, or length of stay. After seven years, antibiotic spending per patient per day had been cut by nearly half. The antibiotic stewardship program was canceled in 2008 in favor of providing more infectious-disease consulting as an alternative mode of stewardship. Over the subsequent two years, antibiotic costs went back up 32%, reports lead author Harold Standiford, MD.
“Our results clearly show that an antimicrobial stewardship program like the one at UMMC is safe, effective, and makes good financial sense,” he says, adding physicians should eliminate wasteful healthcare spending.
References
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Vital signs: preventing Clostridium difficile infections. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention website. Available at: http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6109a3.htm. Accessed March 29, 2012.
- Standiford HC, Chan S, Tripoli M, Weekes E, Forrest GN. Antimicrobial stewardship at a large tertiary care academic medical center: cost analysis before, during, and after a 7-year program. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol. 2012;33(4);338-345.
AMA Microsite Offers New Practice-Management Resources
In January, the American Medical Association (AMA) announced a redesigned website for its Practice Management Center (PMC), a resource designed to help physicians manage their practice more effectively. The PMC includes an online library of tools to help physicians streamline their administrative and business practices, with new sections on practice operations, claims revenue cycle management, and health insurer relations.
An estimated 7,000 visitors access the center each month. Physicians can sign up for practice management alerts or join an online community.
One particular resource that might be useful to hospitalists is a sample hospital-physician employment agreement.
In January, the American Medical Association (AMA) announced a redesigned website for its Practice Management Center (PMC), a resource designed to help physicians manage their practice more effectively. The PMC includes an online library of tools to help physicians streamline their administrative and business practices, with new sections on practice operations, claims revenue cycle management, and health insurer relations.
An estimated 7,000 visitors access the center each month. Physicians can sign up for practice management alerts or join an online community.
One particular resource that might be useful to hospitalists is a sample hospital-physician employment agreement.
In January, the American Medical Association (AMA) announced a redesigned website for its Practice Management Center (PMC), a resource designed to help physicians manage their practice more effectively. The PMC includes an online library of tools to help physicians streamline their administrative and business practices, with new sections on practice operations, claims revenue cycle management, and health insurer relations.
An estimated 7,000 visitors access the center each month. Physicians can sign up for practice management alerts or join an online community.
One particular resource that might be useful to hospitalists is a sample hospital-physician employment agreement.
Hospital Quality Reporting Fails to Impact Death Rates
A study in the March issue of Health Affairs concludes that Hospital Compare, the government’s national hospital quality data reporting system, has produced no reductions in 30-day mortality rates for heart attacks and pneumonia, beyond what would be expected due to existing trends and ongoing innovations in care.1 The data were inconclusive on the impact of reporting on heart failure.
The survey covers Medicare claims data from 2000 to 2008. Its authors say it is one of the strongest studies yet, suggesting that Medicare’s public reporting has little or no impact on actual hospital quality—at least according to current metrics. The jury is still out on Medicare’s efforts to improve hospital quality of care with public reporting, with more study needed, according to lead author Andrew Ryan, MD, of Weill Cornell Medical College in New York City.
Reference
A study in the March issue of Health Affairs concludes that Hospital Compare, the government’s national hospital quality data reporting system, has produced no reductions in 30-day mortality rates for heart attacks and pneumonia, beyond what would be expected due to existing trends and ongoing innovations in care.1 The data were inconclusive on the impact of reporting on heart failure.
The survey covers Medicare claims data from 2000 to 2008. Its authors say it is one of the strongest studies yet, suggesting that Medicare’s public reporting has little or no impact on actual hospital quality—at least according to current metrics. The jury is still out on Medicare’s efforts to improve hospital quality of care with public reporting, with more study needed, according to lead author Andrew Ryan, MD, of Weill Cornell Medical College in New York City.
Reference
A study in the March issue of Health Affairs concludes that Hospital Compare, the government’s national hospital quality data reporting system, has produced no reductions in 30-day mortality rates for heart attacks and pneumonia, beyond what would be expected due to existing trends and ongoing innovations in care.1 The data were inconclusive on the impact of reporting on heart failure.
The survey covers Medicare claims data from 2000 to 2008. Its authors say it is one of the strongest studies yet, suggesting that Medicare’s public reporting has little or no impact on actual hospital quality—at least according to current metrics. The jury is still out on Medicare’s efforts to improve hospital quality of care with public reporting, with more study needed, according to lead author Andrew Ryan, MD, of Weill Cornell Medical College in New York City.
Reference
SHM Should Create Task Force to Explore Reimbursement Methodology Change
One of the The Hospitalist newsmagazine’s features over the years is frequent articles educating physicians about Medicare reimbursement. Nothing wrong with that. Reimbursement for “sepsis” is better than for “urosepsis,” and that’s important for us to know.
However, I think it’s about time that we physicians take a stand and try to change some of the ridiculous word games going on in Medicare reimbursement circles. Why do we stand idly by and let some bureaucrat decree that if we write “urosepsis,” Medicare reimburses markedly less, even though we are treating exactly the same thing if we write “sepsis from UTI”? Why are we not fighting the asinine “bullet” system, in which we get substantially “downcoded” if we miss one trivial bullet in our physical exam that has no bearing on our assessment or plan for the patient? Why have we allowed this travesty to pass through unchallenged? Sure, this is the system now and has been, but do we need to continue to accept these inane reimbursement mechanisms?
I propose we develop a team from within SHM, maybe with some help from other physician organizations, to infiltrate, badger, or whatever it takes to advocate change to a reimbursement system that is more intuitive to physicians. The system should reimburse us for the value we add to the patient encounter. For example, how about reimbursement for nonprocedural visits measured not on history/exam bullets but on the complexity of your assessment and plan, including patient/family counseling and/ or care coordination?
Then we can read articles showing what we are doing to change/improve the Medicare reimbursement landscape instead of just learning how to comply with the current system.
Jim Fulmer, MD, site medical director,
Baptist Primary Care Hospitalist System,
Baptist Medical Center— Downtown Campus,
One of the The Hospitalist newsmagazine’s features over the years is frequent articles educating physicians about Medicare reimbursement. Nothing wrong with that. Reimbursement for “sepsis” is better than for “urosepsis,” and that’s important for us to know.
However, I think it’s about time that we physicians take a stand and try to change some of the ridiculous word games going on in Medicare reimbursement circles. Why do we stand idly by and let some bureaucrat decree that if we write “urosepsis,” Medicare reimburses markedly less, even though we are treating exactly the same thing if we write “sepsis from UTI”? Why are we not fighting the asinine “bullet” system, in which we get substantially “downcoded” if we miss one trivial bullet in our physical exam that has no bearing on our assessment or plan for the patient? Why have we allowed this travesty to pass through unchallenged? Sure, this is the system now and has been, but do we need to continue to accept these inane reimbursement mechanisms?
I propose we develop a team from within SHM, maybe with some help from other physician organizations, to infiltrate, badger, or whatever it takes to advocate change to a reimbursement system that is more intuitive to physicians. The system should reimburse us for the value we add to the patient encounter. For example, how about reimbursement for nonprocedural visits measured not on history/exam bullets but on the complexity of your assessment and plan, including patient/family counseling and/ or care coordination?
Then we can read articles showing what we are doing to change/improve the Medicare reimbursement landscape instead of just learning how to comply with the current system.
Jim Fulmer, MD, site medical director,
Baptist Primary Care Hospitalist System,
Baptist Medical Center— Downtown Campus,
One of the The Hospitalist newsmagazine’s features over the years is frequent articles educating physicians about Medicare reimbursement. Nothing wrong with that. Reimbursement for “sepsis” is better than for “urosepsis,” and that’s important for us to know.
However, I think it’s about time that we physicians take a stand and try to change some of the ridiculous word games going on in Medicare reimbursement circles. Why do we stand idly by and let some bureaucrat decree that if we write “urosepsis,” Medicare reimburses markedly less, even though we are treating exactly the same thing if we write “sepsis from UTI”? Why are we not fighting the asinine “bullet” system, in which we get substantially “downcoded” if we miss one trivial bullet in our physical exam that has no bearing on our assessment or plan for the patient? Why have we allowed this travesty to pass through unchallenged? Sure, this is the system now and has been, but do we need to continue to accept these inane reimbursement mechanisms?
I propose we develop a team from within SHM, maybe with some help from other physician organizations, to infiltrate, badger, or whatever it takes to advocate change to a reimbursement system that is more intuitive to physicians. The system should reimburse us for the value we add to the patient encounter. For example, how about reimbursement for nonprocedural visits measured not on history/exam bullets but on the complexity of your assessment and plan, including patient/family counseling and/ or care coordination?
Then we can read articles showing what we are doing to change/improve the Medicare reimbursement landscape instead of just learning how to comply with the current system.
Jim Fulmer, MD, site medical director,
Baptist Primary Care Hospitalist System,
Baptist Medical Center— Downtown Campus,
Do Not Swab Any Superficial Dermatologic Wound Without Sterilizing the Surface
I would broaden the comment in the April 2012 article “10 Things Hospitalists Should Know about Infectious Diseases” regarding culturing decubitus ulcers to: “Do not swab any superficial dermatologic wound without sterilizing the surface and then subsequently expressing a sample from the underlying tissue.” I tell my trainees that, unless they sterilize, they might as well culture their ties and send that instead.
Clifford A. Kaye, MD, assistant professor,
Wayne State University SOM,
associate medical director of quality and hospital utilization,
Henry Ford Hospital, Detroit
I would broaden the comment in the April 2012 article “10 Things Hospitalists Should Know about Infectious Diseases” regarding culturing decubitus ulcers to: “Do not swab any superficial dermatologic wound without sterilizing the surface and then subsequently expressing a sample from the underlying tissue.” I tell my trainees that, unless they sterilize, they might as well culture their ties and send that instead.
Clifford A. Kaye, MD, assistant professor,
Wayne State University SOM,
associate medical director of quality and hospital utilization,
Henry Ford Hospital, Detroit
I would broaden the comment in the April 2012 article “10 Things Hospitalists Should Know about Infectious Diseases” regarding culturing decubitus ulcers to: “Do not swab any superficial dermatologic wound without sterilizing the surface and then subsequently expressing a sample from the underlying tissue.” I tell my trainees that, unless they sterilize, they might as well culture their ties and send that instead.
Clifford A. Kaye, MD, assistant professor,
Wayne State University SOM,
associate medical director of quality and hospital utilization,
Henry Ford Hospital, Detroit
Inadequate Assessment of Man With Depression
Inadequate Assessment of Man With Depression
A 35-year-old Ohio man was arrested for DUI. Because he exhibited suicidal tendencies and signs of depression, he was transported to an emergency department, where he was evaluated by three emergency physicians. He was then discharged to a facility for individuals who need to sleep off the effects of alcohol after drinking too much. He was left at the facility without any paperwork or any indications that he was experiencing depression or suicidal ideation. Within minutes of his being dropped off, he hanged himself in a bathroom.
The plaintiff alleged negligence in the three emergency physicians’ assessment and treatment of the decedent’s depression, suicidal ideation, and comorbid conditions; according to the plaintiff, the defendants failed to provide proper dosing and monitoring of the effectiveness of the antidepressant medication they prescribed. Additionally, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants failed to obtain and document an adequate health history.
The defendants claimed that the decedent’s injuries were self-inflicted and that proper treatment was provided. The defendants contended that the decedent denied a desire to commit suicide and said he wanted to receive treatment for alcohol abuse.
OUTCOME
According to a published account, a defense verdict was returned.
COMMENT
Medical malpractice cases commonly arise from mental health treatment. If emergency diagnosis and treatment of mental health conditions is within your scope of practice, be cautious and proceed formally. There are a few steps clinicians can take to ensure that the patient is receiving optimal care while lowering malpractice risk.
Use diagnostic terms appropriately, accurately, and precisely. Referring to a patient who is having a bad day as depressed is sloppy; describing a withdrawn patient as antisocial is often incorrect.
Always show concern for patients, and let the record reflect your concern for the patient’s well-being. Avoid making disparaging remarks that may be overheard, repeated, and used as evidence at trial. Jurors confronted with such remarks will be invited to infer that the clinician did not care about the patient, did not respect the patient, made value judgments about the patient, or considered treating mental health problems a bother.
Perform a proper psychiatric exam. While time constraints will preclude a full psychiatric workup, we should obtain a history of present illness and previous history, including hospitalizations. In addition, we should perform a mental status examination. This includes an objective determination of:
• General appearance
• Attitude/rapport
• Speech
• Behavior
• Orientation
• Mood
• Affect
• Thought process and content
• Memory
• Ability to perform calculations
• Judgment, and
• Higher cortical functioning (eg, interpretation of complex ideas).
The mental status exam is important because it adds objective data to the patient’s subjective history of present illness and may be useful in defending the clinician’s decisions. If you rarely perform a mental status exam, use a template or checklist when you do to ensure completeness.
Address suicidality and homicidality forthrightly. These areas represent the lion’s share of mental health malpractice cases. Any cause for concern should be acted upon fully and formally, with documentation to support your rationale and actions.
Don’t reach for psychotropic agents too quickly or without adequate follow-up. A skilled plaintiff’s lawyer can develop an entire theory of the case around a clinician’s rash use of “a pill to solve the patient’s problems.” Therefore, it is generally recommended to start psychoactive medications in conjunction with a comprehensive plan to monitor the patient’s response and overall functioning.
In this case, a defense verdict was returned. It is probable that the emergency physicians’ records demonstrated appropriate concern for the patient, and the jurors determined that the patient’s suicide was unfortunate but unforeseeable. —DML
Antiviral Ordered, Administration Delayed
Early one afternoon, a 36-year-old Pennsylvania woman was brought to a hospital emergency department by her mother, who reported that her daughter had sounded confused in a phone conversation. The patient had been experiencing virus-like symptoms for several days.
CT was performed with normal findings; a lumbar puncture showed inflammation, which was interpreted as evidence of a viral condition. The defendant emergency physician consulted with an infectious disease specialist, who recommended administration of acyclovir, stat. The emergency physician wrote the order but without the stat notation.
An hour later, the infectious disease physician arrived to examine the patient and ordered acyclovir, stat. The medication was still not administered for another three hours, by which time the patient was comatose. She was then transferred emergently to another hospital, where she was placed in a drug-induced coma.
After three weeks’ hospitalization, the patient was transferred to an inpatient rehabilitation facility. She sustained severe short-term memory loss and requires 24-hour care.
The plaintiff claimed that she was infected with herpesviral encephalitis and that acyclovir should have been administered as soon as stroke was ruled out by CT.
The defendant physicians claimed that they ordered timely administration of acyclovir but that the hospital failed to administer it. The defendants also claimed that the plaintiff’s symptoms were consistent with several conditions and that a diagnosis was made promptly after testing. The defendants maintained that the diagnosis of herpesviral encephalitis can take days but was reached for the plaintiff in just five hours. The defendants also claimed that the delay in the administration of acyclovir had no bearing on the patient’s outcome, as it takes several weeks of acyclovir administration to kill this virus.
OUTCOME
The hospital settled for a confidential amount shortly before trial. A jury found the hospital and the two physicians negligent, but determined that only the hospital’s negligence caused the plaintiff harm. A $23 million verdict was returned against the hospital.
COMMENT
This is a substantial verdict against the hospital. The physician defendants were found to have breached the standard of care, but no causal relationship was seen between this breach and the damages sustained by the plaintiff. In contrast, the jurors found the hospital’s breach causally related to the plaintiff’s poor outcome.
To obtain recovery on a tort theory of negligence, a plaintiff must prove four elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
• A legal duty to act. This exists any time there is a clinician-patient relationship in a professional setting.
• Breach of the standard of care.
• Harm.
• A determination that the clinician’s breach of the standard of care caused the harm.
These last three elements are generally established and rebutted through expert testimony.
In this case, it is unclear how the jurors came to the conclusion that the physicians breached the standard of care. Presumptively, the jurors may have faulted the emergency physician for ordering the acyclovir without the stat designation; and the infectious disease physician, for taking one hour after consultation to arrive at the patient’s bedside for examination (although this time frame seems reasonable). In the final analysis, however, the jurors did not believe that the five-hour time period from the patient’s admission to diagnosis was causal, but did believe that the three-hour delay from presumptive diagnosis to administration of acyclovir was causally correlated with the patient’s resulting condition.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior (Latin for “let the master answer”), the hospital is responsible for the action of its nurses. Here, the jury found the nurses’ delay in administering the acyclovir problematic.
When action must be taken immediately in a ward setting, it may or may not be reasonable simply to make a stat designation and expect immediate action. In this case, it may have been useful to communicate directly with the patient’s nurse and explain why timeliness was critical—particularly because a busy nurse may not see a stat order immediately or may not consider the administration of an antiviral medication particularly time sensitive.
This case would have been difficult for the defense attorney. The infectious disease physician’s main defense, that the correct treatment was ordered but not given by the nurse, amounted to finger-pointing among professional defendants. Jurors expect professionals to work as a team and view finger-pointing as an admission of liability.
Further, the hospital’s main point of defense was that the administration of acyclovir was not especially time sensitive, although the attending infectious disease physician behaved at all times as though it was: giving verbal instructions that the acyclovir was required immediately, arriving at the patient’s bedside within one hour, and reiterating the order for acyclovir on a stat basis. This left defense counsel with an uphill road to climb to convince a jury that the administration of acyclovir was not especially time sensitive. —DML
Cases reprinted with permission from Medical Malpractice Verdicts, Settlements and Experts, Lewis Laska, Editor, (800) 298-6288.
Inadequate Assessment of Man With Depression
A 35-year-old Ohio man was arrested for DUI. Because he exhibited suicidal tendencies and signs of depression, he was transported to an emergency department, where he was evaluated by three emergency physicians. He was then discharged to a facility for individuals who need to sleep off the effects of alcohol after drinking too much. He was left at the facility without any paperwork or any indications that he was experiencing depression or suicidal ideation. Within minutes of his being dropped off, he hanged himself in a bathroom.
The plaintiff alleged negligence in the three emergency physicians’ assessment and treatment of the decedent’s depression, suicidal ideation, and comorbid conditions; according to the plaintiff, the defendants failed to provide proper dosing and monitoring of the effectiveness of the antidepressant medication they prescribed. Additionally, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants failed to obtain and document an adequate health history.
The defendants claimed that the decedent’s injuries were self-inflicted and that proper treatment was provided. The defendants contended that the decedent denied a desire to commit suicide and said he wanted to receive treatment for alcohol abuse.
OUTCOME
According to a published account, a defense verdict was returned.
COMMENT
Medical malpractice cases commonly arise from mental health treatment. If emergency diagnosis and treatment of mental health conditions is within your scope of practice, be cautious and proceed formally. There are a few steps clinicians can take to ensure that the patient is receiving optimal care while lowering malpractice risk.
Use diagnostic terms appropriately, accurately, and precisely. Referring to a patient who is having a bad day as depressed is sloppy; describing a withdrawn patient as antisocial is often incorrect.
Always show concern for patients, and let the record reflect your concern for the patient’s well-being. Avoid making disparaging remarks that may be overheard, repeated, and used as evidence at trial. Jurors confronted with such remarks will be invited to infer that the clinician did not care about the patient, did not respect the patient, made value judgments about the patient, or considered treating mental health problems a bother.
Perform a proper psychiatric exam. While time constraints will preclude a full psychiatric workup, we should obtain a history of present illness and previous history, including hospitalizations. In addition, we should perform a mental status examination. This includes an objective determination of:
• General appearance
• Attitude/rapport
• Speech
• Behavior
• Orientation
• Mood
• Affect
• Thought process and content
• Memory
• Ability to perform calculations
• Judgment, and
• Higher cortical functioning (eg, interpretation of complex ideas).
The mental status exam is important because it adds objective data to the patient’s subjective history of present illness and may be useful in defending the clinician’s decisions. If you rarely perform a mental status exam, use a template or checklist when you do to ensure completeness.
Address suicidality and homicidality forthrightly. These areas represent the lion’s share of mental health malpractice cases. Any cause for concern should be acted upon fully and formally, with documentation to support your rationale and actions.
Don’t reach for psychotropic agents too quickly or without adequate follow-up. A skilled plaintiff’s lawyer can develop an entire theory of the case around a clinician’s rash use of “a pill to solve the patient’s problems.” Therefore, it is generally recommended to start psychoactive medications in conjunction with a comprehensive plan to monitor the patient’s response and overall functioning.
In this case, a defense verdict was returned. It is probable that the emergency physicians’ records demonstrated appropriate concern for the patient, and the jurors determined that the patient’s suicide was unfortunate but unforeseeable. —DML
Antiviral Ordered, Administration Delayed
Early one afternoon, a 36-year-old Pennsylvania woman was brought to a hospital emergency department by her mother, who reported that her daughter had sounded confused in a phone conversation. The patient had been experiencing virus-like symptoms for several days.
CT was performed with normal findings; a lumbar puncture showed inflammation, which was interpreted as evidence of a viral condition. The defendant emergency physician consulted with an infectious disease specialist, who recommended administration of acyclovir, stat. The emergency physician wrote the order but without the stat notation.
An hour later, the infectious disease physician arrived to examine the patient and ordered acyclovir, stat. The medication was still not administered for another three hours, by which time the patient was comatose. She was then transferred emergently to another hospital, where she was placed in a drug-induced coma.
After three weeks’ hospitalization, the patient was transferred to an inpatient rehabilitation facility. She sustained severe short-term memory loss and requires 24-hour care.
The plaintiff claimed that she was infected with herpesviral encephalitis and that acyclovir should have been administered as soon as stroke was ruled out by CT.
The defendant physicians claimed that they ordered timely administration of acyclovir but that the hospital failed to administer it. The defendants also claimed that the plaintiff’s symptoms were consistent with several conditions and that a diagnosis was made promptly after testing. The defendants maintained that the diagnosis of herpesviral encephalitis can take days but was reached for the plaintiff in just five hours. The defendants also claimed that the delay in the administration of acyclovir had no bearing on the patient’s outcome, as it takes several weeks of acyclovir administration to kill this virus.
OUTCOME
The hospital settled for a confidential amount shortly before trial. A jury found the hospital and the two physicians negligent, but determined that only the hospital’s negligence caused the plaintiff harm. A $23 million verdict was returned against the hospital.
COMMENT
This is a substantial verdict against the hospital. The physician defendants were found to have breached the standard of care, but no causal relationship was seen between this breach and the damages sustained by the plaintiff. In contrast, the jurors found the hospital’s breach causally related to the plaintiff’s poor outcome.
To obtain recovery on a tort theory of negligence, a plaintiff must prove four elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
• A legal duty to act. This exists any time there is a clinician-patient relationship in a professional setting.
• Breach of the standard of care.
• Harm.
• A determination that the clinician’s breach of the standard of care caused the harm.
These last three elements are generally established and rebutted through expert testimony.
In this case, it is unclear how the jurors came to the conclusion that the physicians breached the standard of care. Presumptively, the jurors may have faulted the emergency physician for ordering the acyclovir without the stat designation; and the infectious disease physician, for taking one hour after consultation to arrive at the patient’s bedside for examination (although this time frame seems reasonable). In the final analysis, however, the jurors did not believe that the five-hour time period from the patient’s admission to diagnosis was causal, but did believe that the three-hour delay from presumptive diagnosis to administration of acyclovir was causally correlated with the patient’s resulting condition.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior (Latin for “let the master answer”), the hospital is responsible for the action of its nurses. Here, the jury found the nurses’ delay in administering the acyclovir problematic.
When action must be taken immediately in a ward setting, it may or may not be reasonable simply to make a stat designation and expect immediate action. In this case, it may have been useful to communicate directly with the patient’s nurse and explain why timeliness was critical—particularly because a busy nurse may not see a stat order immediately or may not consider the administration of an antiviral medication particularly time sensitive.
This case would have been difficult for the defense attorney. The infectious disease physician’s main defense, that the correct treatment was ordered but not given by the nurse, amounted to finger-pointing among professional defendants. Jurors expect professionals to work as a team and view finger-pointing as an admission of liability.
Further, the hospital’s main point of defense was that the administration of acyclovir was not especially time sensitive, although the attending infectious disease physician behaved at all times as though it was: giving verbal instructions that the acyclovir was required immediately, arriving at the patient’s bedside within one hour, and reiterating the order for acyclovir on a stat basis. This left defense counsel with an uphill road to climb to convince a jury that the administration of acyclovir was not especially time sensitive. —DML
Cases reprinted with permission from Medical Malpractice Verdicts, Settlements and Experts, Lewis Laska, Editor, (800) 298-6288.
Inadequate Assessment of Man With Depression
A 35-year-old Ohio man was arrested for DUI. Because he exhibited suicidal tendencies and signs of depression, he was transported to an emergency department, where he was evaluated by three emergency physicians. He was then discharged to a facility for individuals who need to sleep off the effects of alcohol after drinking too much. He was left at the facility without any paperwork or any indications that he was experiencing depression or suicidal ideation. Within minutes of his being dropped off, he hanged himself in a bathroom.
The plaintiff alleged negligence in the three emergency physicians’ assessment and treatment of the decedent’s depression, suicidal ideation, and comorbid conditions; according to the plaintiff, the defendants failed to provide proper dosing and monitoring of the effectiveness of the antidepressant medication they prescribed. Additionally, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants failed to obtain and document an adequate health history.
The defendants claimed that the decedent’s injuries were self-inflicted and that proper treatment was provided. The defendants contended that the decedent denied a desire to commit suicide and said he wanted to receive treatment for alcohol abuse.
OUTCOME
According to a published account, a defense verdict was returned.
COMMENT
Medical malpractice cases commonly arise from mental health treatment. If emergency diagnosis and treatment of mental health conditions is within your scope of practice, be cautious and proceed formally. There are a few steps clinicians can take to ensure that the patient is receiving optimal care while lowering malpractice risk.
Use diagnostic terms appropriately, accurately, and precisely. Referring to a patient who is having a bad day as depressed is sloppy; describing a withdrawn patient as antisocial is often incorrect.
Always show concern for patients, and let the record reflect your concern for the patient’s well-being. Avoid making disparaging remarks that may be overheard, repeated, and used as evidence at trial. Jurors confronted with such remarks will be invited to infer that the clinician did not care about the patient, did not respect the patient, made value judgments about the patient, or considered treating mental health problems a bother.
Perform a proper psychiatric exam. While time constraints will preclude a full psychiatric workup, we should obtain a history of present illness and previous history, including hospitalizations. In addition, we should perform a mental status examination. This includes an objective determination of:
• General appearance
• Attitude/rapport
• Speech
• Behavior
• Orientation
• Mood
• Affect
• Thought process and content
• Memory
• Ability to perform calculations
• Judgment, and
• Higher cortical functioning (eg, interpretation of complex ideas).
The mental status exam is important because it adds objective data to the patient’s subjective history of present illness and may be useful in defending the clinician’s decisions. If you rarely perform a mental status exam, use a template or checklist when you do to ensure completeness.
Address suicidality and homicidality forthrightly. These areas represent the lion’s share of mental health malpractice cases. Any cause for concern should be acted upon fully and formally, with documentation to support your rationale and actions.
Don’t reach for psychotropic agents too quickly or without adequate follow-up. A skilled plaintiff’s lawyer can develop an entire theory of the case around a clinician’s rash use of “a pill to solve the patient’s problems.” Therefore, it is generally recommended to start psychoactive medications in conjunction with a comprehensive plan to monitor the patient’s response and overall functioning.
In this case, a defense verdict was returned. It is probable that the emergency physicians’ records demonstrated appropriate concern for the patient, and the jurors determined that the patient’s suicide was unfortunate but unforeseeable. —DML
Antiviral Ordered, Administration Delayed
Early one afternoon, a 36-year-old Pennsylvania woman was brought to a hospital emergency department by her mother, who reported that her daughter had sounded confused in a phone conversation. The patient had been experiencing virus-like symptoms for several days.
CT was performed with normal findings; a lumbar puncture showed inflammation, which was interpreted as evidence of a viral condition. The defendant emergency physician consulted with an infectious disease specialist, who recommended administration of acyclovir, stat. The emergency physician wrote the order but without the stat notation.
An hour later, the infectious disease physician arrived to examine the patient and ordered acyclovir, stat. The medication was still not administered for another three hours, by which time the patient was comatose. She was then transferred emergently to another hospital, where she was placed in a drug-induced coma.
After three weeks’ hospitalization, the patient was transferred to an inpatient rehabilitation facility. She sustained severe short-term memory loss and requires 24-hour care.
The plaintiff claimed that she was infected with herpesviral encephalitis and that acyclovir should have been administered as soon as stroke was ruled out by CT.
The defendant physicians claimed that they ordered timely administration of acyclovir but that the hospital failed to administer it. The defendants also claimed that the plaintiff’s symptoms were consistent with several conditions and that a diagnosis was made promptly after testing. The defendants maintained that the diagnosis of herpesviral encephalitis can take days but was reached for the plaintiff in just five hours. The defendants also claimed that the delay in the administration of acyclovir had no bearing on the patient’s outcome, as it takes several weeks of acyclovir administration to kill this virus.
OUTCOME
The hospital settled for a confidential amount shortly before trial. A jury found the hospital and the two physicians negligent, but determined that only the hospital’s negligence caused the plaintiff harm. A $23 million verdict was returned against the hospital.
COMMENT
This is a substantial verdict against the hospital. The physician defendants were found to have breached the standard of care, but no causal relationship was seen between this breach and the damages sustained by the plaintiff. In contrast, the jurors found the hospital’s breach causally related to the plaintiff’s poor outcome.
To obtain recovery on a tort theory of negligence, a plaintiff must prove four elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
• A legal duty to act. This exists any time there is a clinician-patient relationship in a professional setting.
• Breach of the standard of care.
• Harm.
• A determination that the clinician’s breach of the standard of care caused the harm.
These last three elements are generally established and rebutted through expert testimony.
In this case, it is unclear how the jurors came to the conclusion that the physicians breached the standard of care. Presumptively, the jurors may have faulted the emergency physician for ordering the acyclovir without the stat designation; and the infectious disease physician, for taking one hour after consultation to arrive at the patient’s bedside for examination (although this time frame seems reasonable). In the final analysis, however, the jurors did not believe that the five-hour time period from the patient’s admission to diagnosis was causal, but did believe that the three-hour delay from presumptive diagnosis to administration of acyclovir was causally correlated with the patient’s resulting condition.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior (Latin for “let the master answer”), the hospital is responsible for the action of its nurses. Here, the jury found the nurses’ delay in administering the acyclovir problematic.
When action must be taken immediately in a ward setting, it may or may not be reasonable simply to make a stat designation and expect immediate action. In this case, it may have been useful to communicate directly with the patient’s nurse and explain why timeliness was critical—particularly because a busy nurse may not see a stat order immediately or may not consider the administration of an antiviral medication particularly time sensitive.
This case would have been difficult for the defense attorney. The infectious disease physician’s main defense, that the correct treatment was ordered but not given by the nurse, amounted to finger-pointing among professional defendants. Jurors expect professionals to work as a team and view finger-pointing as an admission of liability.
Further, the hospital’s main point of defense was that the administration of acyclovir was not especially time sensitive, although the attending infectious disease physician behaved at all times as though it was: giving verbal instructions that the acyclovir was required immediately, arriving at the patient’s bedside within one hour, and reiterating the order for acyclovir on a stat basis. This left defense counsel with an uphill road to climb to convince a jury that the administration of acyclovir was not especially time sensitive. —DML
Cases reprinted with permission from Medical Malpractice Verdicts, Settlements and Experts, Lewis Laska, Editor, (800) 298-6288.