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Unmet needs and hassles of psychiatric practice
Recently, my umbrage at these practices soared to a new height when a colleague told me that he had to fight for, and then wait to receive, permission from an insurance employee to increase, by a notch, the maintenance dosage of a long-acting antipsychotic for his patient.
Can anyone justify why an absentee person who has never met the patient should, sight-unseen, second-guess our clinical judgment that a patient’s symptoms are still not well-controlled and require upward adjustment of the dosage? Why are insurance companies allowed to micromanage clinical decision-making? Such outrageous intrusiveness is a signal that insurance companies have “jumped the shark” in their effort to push business interests ahead of the needs of their subscribers.
Whose interests are being put first?
I recall instances when I refused to buckle to pressure from a patient’s third-party payer to switch from 1 antidepressant to another, a move that would save the insurer money but put my patient at risk of relapse. I informed the insurance company representative that my attorney was going to file a lawsuit on behalf of my depressed patient if he were to relapse or attempt suicide because he had been switched from an antidepressant that was working to another that might not.
Fighting back paid off: In each case, I was told the payer would “make an exception” for that patient.
Frustrations of this kind have become commonplace in psychiatric practice. They tend to detract from the stimulating and gratifying aspects of the care we provide, and reinforce the perception that insurance companies’ primary goal is to fatten profits, not facilitate patients’ return to health.
Here are other reasons for chronic frustration in psychiatric practice. They reflect serious, unmet needs that we hope will be resolved soon.
Improved diagnostic schema. We need a valid—and more than simply reliable—evidence-based diagnostic system that is rooted in scientifically established pathophysiology. The basic clinical elements of DSM-5 should be gradually amalgamated with rapidly emerging genetics and biological endophenotypes. The continuum of and boundary between “normal” and “pathologic” human behavior should be further clarified.
Biomarkers. Our field eagerly awaits development of biomarkers (laboratory tests) to bolster psychiatric practice in several ways, including:
• confirming the clinical diagnosis
• identifying biological subtypes
• monitoring response
• guiding selection of drugs
• predicting side effects
• measuring severity of disease.
Elusive parity. We’ve been patient, but we’re tired and angry at empty promises of full parity for psychiatric care. We’ve also had it with the stigmatizing and discriminatory “carve-out” status that allows insurance companies to treat reimbursement for psychiatric services more restrictively than for other medical and surgical specialties. Policy makers must end the egregious discrimination that gives half a loaf to some brain disorders (psychiatric) and a full loaf to other brain disorders (neurologic).
Better medications. We need a stronger commitment from the pharmaceutical industry, on which we rely entirely for development of psychoactive drugs, to wage a relentless war on serious mental illness. The private sector should accelerate translation of groundbreaking neuroscientific discoveries—thanks to research funded by the public sector, such as the National Institutes of Health—into innovative new mechanisms of action. Patients who suffer from psychiatric brain disorders for which there are no approved treatments await that commitment and bold action.
Collaborative care. Psychiatry needs a more consistent, more productive bidirectional relationship with primary care. A stronger bond will improve the care of patients on both sides and would, I believe, increase the satisfaction of clinical practice for both specialists. Because structure can facilitate function, co-locating providers can help achieve this vision.
Legal entanglement. Psychiatry must be unshackled from an oppressive set of laws that tie our hands when we treat patients with brain pathology who are incapable of understanding their illness and their need to be treated. Those laws were imposed long before scientific advances showed that prolonged and untreated episodes of psychosis, mania, depression, and anxiety are associated with neurotoxic processes (neuroinflammation, oxidative and nitrosative stress). Medical urgency and patient protection must trump legalisms, just as unconscious stroke and myocardial infarction patients are treated immediately without filing multiple forms or waiting for a court order.
Another legal beef: We psychiatrists are exasperated with the expanding criminalization of our patients— hapless victims of brain diseases that impair their reality testing and behavior. Should a person who suffers a first epileptic seizure or a stroke while driving and kills the driver of an oncoming car be incarcerated with hardened murderers and rapists and treated for epilepsy in a prison instead of a neurology ward? Our patients belong in a secure hospital, a medical asylum, where they are given compassionate medical care, not the degrading treatment afforded to a felon.
More resources. There is a dire need for psychiatric hospital beds in many parts of the country, because many wards were closed and renovated into more profitable, procedure-oriented specialties. There also is a severe shortage of psychiatrists in our country, as I discussed in my editorial, “Signs, symptoms, and treatment of psychiatrynemia,” (December 2014). The 25% of the population who suffer a mental disorder are clearly underserved at this time.
Furthermore, because today’s research is tomorrow’s new treatment, funding for psychiatric research must increase substantially to find cures and to thus reduce huge direct and indirect costs of mental illness and addictions.
Public enlightenment. A well-informed populace would be a major boon to our sophisticated medical specialty, which remains shrouded by primitive beliefs and archaic attitudes. For many people who desperately need mental health care, negative perceptions of psychiatric disorders and their treatment are a major impediment to seeking help. Psychiatrists can catalyze the process of enlightenment by dedicating time to elevating public understanding of the biology and the medical basis of mental illness.
All this notwithstanding, our work is gratifying
Despite the hassles and unmet needs I’ve enumerated, psychiatry continues to be one of the most exciting fields in medicine. We provide more therapeutic face-time and verbal interactions with our patients than any other medical specialty. Imagine, then, how much more enjoyable psychiatric practice would be if these pesky obstacles were eliminated and the unmet needs of patients and practitioners were addressed.
Recently, my umbrage at these practices soared to a new height when a colleague told me that he had to fight for, and then wait to receive, permission from an insurance employee to increase, by a notch, the maintenance dosage of a long-acting antipsychotic for his patient.
Can anyone justify why an absentee person who has never met the patient should, sight-unseen, second-guess our clinical judgment that a patient’s symptoms are still not well-controlled and require upward adjustment of the dosage? Why are insurance companies allowed to micromanage clinical decision-making? Such outrageous intrusiveness is a signal that insurance companies have “jumped the shark” in their effort to push business interests ahead of the needs of their subscribers.
Whose interests are being put first?
I recall instances when I refused to buckle to pressure from a patient’s third-party payer to switch from 1 antidepressant to another, a move that would save the insurer money but put my patient at risk of relapse. I informed the insurance company representative that my attorney was going to file a lawsuit on behalf of my depressed patient if he were to relapse or attempt suicide because he had been switched from an antidepressant that was working to another that might not.
Fighting back paid off: In each case, I was told the payer would “make an exception” for that patient.
Frustrations of this kind have become commonplace in psychiatric practice. They tend to detract from the stimulating and gratifying aspects of the care we provide, and reinforce the perception that insurance companies’ primary goal is to fatten profits, not facilitate patients’ return to health.
Here are other reasons for chronic frustration in psychiatric practice. They reflect serious, unmet needs that we hope will be resolved soon.
Improved diagnostic schema. We need a valid—and more than simply reliable—evidence-based diagnostic system that is rooted in scientifically established pathophysiology. The basic clinical elements of DSM-5 should be gradually amalgamated with rapidly emerging genetics and biological endophenotypes. The continuum of and boundary between “normal” and “pathologic” human behavior should be further clarified.
Biomarkers. Our field eagerly awaits development of biomarkers (laboratory tests) to bolster psychiatric practice in several ways, including:
• confirming the clinical diagnosis
• identifying biological subtypes
• monitoring response
• guiding selection of drugs
• predicting side effects
• measuring severity of disease.
Elusive parity. We’ve been patient, but we’re tired and angry at empty promises of full parity for psychiatric care. We’ve also had it with the stigmatizing and discriminatory “carve-out” status that allows insurance companies to treat reimbursement for psychiatric services more restrictively than for other medical and surgical specialties. Policy makers must end the egregious discrimination that gives half a loaf to some brain disorders (psychiatric) and a full loaf to other brain disorders (neurologic).
Better medications. We need a stronger commitment from the pharmaceutical industry, on which we rely entirely for development of psychoactive drugs, to wage a relentless war on serious mental illness. The private sector should accelerate translation of groundbreaking neuroscientific discoveries—thanks to research funded by the public sector, such as the National Institutes of Health—into innovative new mechanisms of action. Patients who suffer from psychiatric brain disorders for which there are no approved treatments await that commitment and bold action.
Collaborative care. Psychiatry needs a more consistent, more productive bidirectional relationship with primary care. A stronger bond will improve the care of patients on both sides and would, I believe, increase the satisfaction of clinical practice for both specialists. Because structure can facilitate function, co-locating providers can help achieve this vision.
Legal entanglement. Psychiatry must be unshackled from an oppressive set of laws that tie our hands when we treat patients with brain pathology who are incapable of understanding their illness and their need to be treated. Those laws were imposed long before scientific advances showed that prolonged and untreated episodes of psychosis, mania, depression, and anxiety are associated with neurotoxic processes (neuroinflammation, oxidative and nitrosative stress). Medical urgency and patient protection must trump legalisms, just as unconscious stroke and myocardial infarction patients are treated immediately without filing multiple forms or waiting for a court order.
Another legal beef: We psychiatrists are exasperated with the expanding criminalization of our patients— hapless victims of brain diseases that impair their reality testing and behavior. Should a person who suffers a first epileptic seizure or a stroke while driving and kills the driver of an oncoming car be incarcerated with hardened murderers and rapists and treated for epilepsy in a prison instead of a neurology ward? Our patients belong in a secure hospital, a medical asylum, where they are given compassionate medical care, not the degrading treatment afforded to a felon.
More resources. There is a dire need for psychiatric hospital beds in many parts of the country, because many wards were closed and renovated into more profitable, procedure-oriented specialties. There also is a severe shortage of psychiatrists in our country, as I discussed in my editorial, “Signs, symptoms, and treatment of psychiatrynemia,” (December 2014). The 25% of the population who suffer a mental disorder are clearly underserved at this time.
Furthermore, because today’s research is tomorrow’s new treatment, funding for psychiatric research must increase substantially to find cures and to thus reduce huge direct and indirect costs of mental illness and addictions.
Public enlightenment. A well-informed populace would be a major boon to our sophisticated medical specialty, which remains shrouded by primitive beliefs and archaic attitudes. For many people who desperately need mental health care, negative perceptions of psychiatric disorders and their treatment are a major impediment to seeking help. Psychiatrists can catalyze the process of enlightenment by dedicating time to elevating public understanding of the biology and the medical basis of mental illness.
All this notwithstanding, our work is gratifying
Despite the hassles and unmet needs I’ve enumerated, psychiatry continues to be one of the most exciting fields in medicine. We provide more therapeutic face-time and verbal interactions with our patients than any other medical specialty. Imagine, then, how much more enjoyable psychiatric practice would be if these pesky obstacles were eliminated and the unmet needs of patients and practitioners were addressed.
Recently, my umbrage at these practices soared to a new height when a colleague told me that he had to fight for, and then wait to receive, permission from an insurance employee to increase, by a notch, the maintenance dosage of a long-acting antipsychotic for his patient.
Can anyone justify why an absentee person who has never met the patient should, sight-unseen, second-guess our clinical judgment that a patient’s symptoms are still not well-controlled and require upward adjustment of the dosage? Why are insurance companies allowed to micromanage clinical decision-making? Such outrageous intrusiveness is a signal that insurance companies have “jumped the shark” in their effort to push business interests ahead of the needs of their subscribers.
Whose interests are being put first?
I recall instances when I refused to buckle to pressure from a patient’s third-party payer to switch from 1 antidepressant to another, a move that would save the insurer money but put my patient at risk of relapse. I informed the insurance company representative that my attorney was going to file a lawsuit on behalf of my depressed patient if he were to relapse or attempt suicide because he had been switched from an antidepressant that was working to another that might not.
Fighting back paid off: In each case, I was told the payer would “make an exception” for that patient.
Frustrations of this kind have become commonplace in psychiatric practice. They tend to detract from the stimulating and gratifying aspects of the care we provide, and reinforce the perception that insurance companies’ primary goal is to fatten profits, not facilitate patients’ return to health.
Here are other reasons for chronic frustration in psychiatric practice. They reflect serious, unmet needs that we hope will be resolved soon.
Improved diagnostic schema. We need a valid—and more than simply reliable—evidence-based diagnostic system that is rooted in scientifically established pathophysiology. The basic clinical elements of DSM-5 should be gradually amalgamated with rapidly emerging genetics and biological endophenotypes. The continuum of and boundary between “normal” and “pathologic” human behavior should be further clarified.
Biomarkers. Our field eagerly awaits development of biomarkers (laboratory tests) to bolster psychiatric practice in several ways, including:
• confirming the clinical diagnosis
• identifying biological subtypes
• monitoring response
• guiding selection of drugs
• predicting side effects
• measuring severity of disease.
Elusive parity. We’ve been patient, but we’re tired and angry at empty promises of full parity for psychiatric care. We’ve also had it with the stigmatizing and discriminatory “carve-out” status that allows insurance companies to treat reimbursement for psychiatric services more restrictively than for other medical and surgical specialties. Policy makers must end the egregious discrimination that gives half a loaf to some brain disorders (psychiatric) and a full loaf to other brain disorders (neurologic).
Better medications. We need a stronger commitment from the pharmaceutical industry, on which we rely entirely for development of psychoactive drugs, to wage a relentless war on serious mental illness. The private sector should accelerate translation of groundbreaking neuroscientific discoveries—thanks to research funded by the public sector, such as the National Institutes of Health—into innovative new mechanisms of action. Patients who suffer from psychiatric brain disorders for which there are no approved treatments await that commitment and bold action.
Collaborative care. Psychiatry needs a more consistent, more productive bidirectional relationship with primary care. A stronger bond will improve the care of patients on both sides and would, I believe, increase the satisfaction of clinical practice for both specialists. Because structure can facilitate function, co-locating providers can help achieve this vision.
Legal entanglement. Psychiatry must be unshackled from an oppressive set of laws that tie our hands when we treat patients with brain pathology who are incapable of understanding their illness and their need to be treated. Those laws were imposed long before scientific advances showed that prolonged and untreated episodes of psychosis, mania, depression, and anxiety are associated with neurotoxic processes (neuroinflammation, oxidative and nitrosative stress). Medical urgency and patient protection must trump legalisms, just as unconscious stroke and myocardial infarction patients are treated immediately without filing multiple forms or waiting for a court order.
Another legal beef: We psychiatrists are exasperated with the expanding criminalization of our patients— hapless victims of brain diseases that impair their reality testing and behavior. Should a person who suffers a first epileptic seizure or a stroke while driving and kills the driver of an oncoming car be incarcerated with hardened murderers and rapists and treated for epilepsy in a prison instead of a neurology ward? Our patients belong in a secure hospital, a medical asylum, where they are given compassionate medical care, not the degrading treatment afforded to a felon.
More resources. There is a dire need for psychiatric hospital beds in many parts of the country, because many wards were closed and renovated into more profitable, procedure-oriented specialties. There also is a severe shortage of psychiatrists in our country, as I discussed in my editorial, “Signs, symptoms, and treatment of psychiatrynemia,” (December 2014). The 25% of the population who suffer a mental disorder are clearly underserved at this time.
Furthermore, because today’s research is tomorrow’s new treatment, funding for psychiatric research must increase substantially to find cures and to thus reduce huge direct and indirect costs of mental illness and addictions.
Public enlightenment. A well-informed populace would be a major boon to our sophisticated medical specialty, which remains shrouded by primitive beliefs and archaic attitudes. For many people who desperately need mental health care, negative perceptions of psychiatric disorders and their treatment are a major impediment to seeking help. Psychiatrists can catalyze the process of enlightenment by dedicating time to elevating public understanding of the biology and the medical basis of mental illness.
All this notwithstanding, our work is gratifying
Despite the hassles and unmet needs I’ve enumerated, psychiatry continues to be one of the most exciting fields in medicine. We provide more therapeutic face-time and verbal interactions with our patients than any other medical specialty. Imagine, then, how much more enjoyable psychiatric practice would be if these pesky obstacles were eliminated and the unmet needs of patients and practitioners were addressed.
The patient refuses to cooperate. What can you do? What should you do?
The real estate business embraces the concept of ownership using the term “bundle of rights.” Real estate agents view full, unaffected ownership of a real property as complete (ie, undivided) and, when ownership is shared, talk about percentages of that bundle.
The same principle can be applied to guardianship. Because we are our own guardians, we own a full, undivided bundle of rights, including all our constitutional rights and the right to make decisions— even bad ones. Of course, an undivided bundle also means that we are fully responsible for the decisions we make.
When a patient requires representation
There may be a situation when we would give someone else the authority to represent us for a specific reason. In this case we would authorize this person to act on our behalf as we would do ourselves—yet we still retain 100% ownership of the “bundle,” and therefore can revoke this authorization at any time. The person we hire (appoint) to represent us will become our power of attorney (POA), and because we appoint this person for a specific situation (handle certain medical affairs, manage some financial affairs, sign real estate documents, etc.), this kind or POA is called “specific” or “special.” When we give someone the right to represent us in any or all of our affairs, this POA is called “general” or “durable.”
It is important to mention that as long as we continue to have psychological capacity and are willing to continue to be our own guardians (own 100% of the bundle of rights), we can terminate any POA we have appointed previously or designate another person to represent us as a “special” or “general” POA. Because of this, if an older patient—who is legally competent but physically unable to live on his (her) own— refuses to enter a long-term care facility, he (she) cannot be sent there against his will, even if the POA insists on it. Because of this, if the patient’s primary team strongly disagrees with this patient’s decision, his (her) “decision-making capacity” should be assessed and, if necessary, a competency hearing will need to be conducted. The court will then decide if this person is able (or unable) to handle his own affairs, and if the court decides that the person cannot be responsible to provide himself with food, health care, housing, and other necessities, the guardian (relative, friend, public administrator, etc.) will be appointed to do so.
Evaluating decision-making capacity
Determining “decision-making capacity” should not be confused with the legal concept of “competence.” We, physicians, often are called to evaluate a patient and give our opinion of the current level of this patient’s functioning (including his [her] decision-making capacity), and we—ourselves and a requesting team—need to be clear that it is merely our opinion and should be used as such. We need to remember that even if a patient is judged to be legally incompetent to handle financial affairs, he (she) might retain sufficient ability to make decisions about treatments.
We also need to remember that decision-making capacity can change, depending on medical conditions (severe anxiety, delirium), successful treatments, substance intoxication, etc. Because of this, we need to communicate to the requesting team that “decision-making ability” is situation-specific and time-specific, and that failure to make a decision on one issue should not be generalized to other aspects of the patient’s life.
Any physician can evaluate patient’s decision-making ability, but traditionally the psychiatry team is called to do so. It usually happens because the primary medical team needs us to provide “a third-party validation,” or because of the common misperception that only the psychiatric team can initiate a civil involuntary detention when necessary.
In any case, regardless of who evaluates the patient, specific points need to be addressed and the following questions need to be answered:
• Does the patient understand the nature of his (her) condition?
• Does the patient understand what treatment we are proposing or what he should do?
• Does the patient understand the consequences (good or bad) if he rejects our proposed action or treatment?
When information (discharge plan, treatment plan, etc.) is presented to patients, we should ask them to repeat it in their own words. We should not expect them to understand all of the technical aspects. We should consider patients’ intelligence level and their ability to communicate; if they can clearly verbalize their understanding of information and be consistent in their wish to continue with their decision, we have to declare that they have decision-making capability and able to proceed with their chosen treatment.
More matters that need to be mentioned
Restrictions on the patient. We need to remember that, even if a patient is thought to be able to make his own decisions, there may be some situations when he can be held in the hospital against his will. These usually are the cases when the patient is psychiatrically or medically unstable (unable to care of himself), but also if the patient is at risk of harming himself or others, subject of elder abuse, or suspected of being an abuser.
Restrictions on the practitioner. Even if the patient is determined to be lacking decision-making capacity, we, physicians, cannot perform tests, procedures, or do the placements without the patient’s agreement.
Informed consent doctrine is applicable in this case, and if performing a test or procedure is necessary (except life- or limb-saving emergencies, when doctrine of physician prerogative applies), or if there a disagreement in post-discharge placement, the emergency guardianship may need to be pursued.
Disclosure
Dr. Graypel reports no financial relationships with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
The real estate business embraces the concept of ownership using the term “bundle of rights.” Real estate agents view full, unaffected ownership of a real property as complete (ie, undivided) and, when ownership is shared, talk about percentages of that bundle.
The same principle can be applied to guardianship. Because we are our own guardians, we own a full, undivided bundle of rights, including all our constitutional rights and the right to make decisions— even bad ones. Of course, an undivided bundle also means that we are fully responsible for the decisions we make.
When a patient requires representation
There may be a situation when we would give someone else the authority to represent us for a specific reason. In this case we would authorize this person to act on our behalf as we would do ourselves—yet we still retain 100% ownership of the “bundle,” and therefore can revoke this authorization at any time. The person we hire (appoint) to represent us will become our power of attorney (POA), and because we appoint this person for a specific situation (handle certain medical affairs, manage some financial affairs, sign real estate documents, etc.), this kind or POA is called “specific” or “special.” When we give someone the right to represent us in any or all of our affairs, this POA is called “general” or “durable.”
It is important to mention that as long as we continue to have psychological capacity and are willing to continue to be our own guardians (own 100% of the bundle of rights), we can terminate any POA we have appointed previously or designate another person to represent us as a “special” or “general” POA. Because of this, if an older patient—who is legally competent but physically unable to live on his (her) own— refuses to enter a long-term care facility, he (she) cannot be sent there against his will, even if the POA insists on it. Because of this, if the patient’s primary team strongly disagrees with this patient’s decision, his (her) “decision-making capacity” should be assessed and, if necessary, a competency hearing will need to be conducted. The court will then decide if this person is able (or unable) to handle his own affairs, and if the court decides that the person cannot be responsible to provide himself with food, health care, housing, and other necessities, the guardian (relative, friend, public administrator, etc.) will be appointed to do so.
Evaluating decision-making capacity
Determining “decision-making capacity” should not be confused with the legal concept of “competence.” We, physicians, often are called to evaluate a patient and give our opinion of the current level of this patient’s functioning (including his [her] decision-making capacity), and we—ourselves and a requesting team—need to be clear that it is merely our opinion and should be used as such. We need to remember that even if a patient is judged to be legally incompetent to handle financial affairs, he (she) might retain sufficient ability to make decisions about treatments.
We also need to remember that decision-making capacity can change, depending on medical conditions (severe anxiety, delirium), successful treatments, substance intoxication, etc. Because of this, we need to communicate to the requesting team that “decision-making ability” is situation-specific and time-specific, and that failure to make a decision on one issue should not be generalized to other aspects of the patient’s life.
Any physician can evaluate patient’s decision-making ability, but traditionally the psychiatry team is called to do so. It usually happens because the primary medical team needs us to provide “a third-party validation,” or because of the common misperception that only the psychiatric team can initiate a civil involuntary detention when necessary.
In any case, regardless of who evaluates the patient, specific points need to be addressed and the following questions need to be answered:
• Does the patient understand the nature of his (her) condition?
• Does the patient understand what treatment we are proposing or what he should do?
• Does the patient understand the consequences (good or bad) if he rejects our proposed action or treatment?
When information (discharge plan, treatment plan, etc.) is presented to patients, we should ask them to repeat it in their own words. We should not expect them to understand all of the technical aspects. We should consider patients’ intelligence level and their ability to communicate; if they can clearly verbalize their understanding of information and be consistent in their wish to continue with their decision, we have to declare that they have decision-making capability and able to proceed with their chosen treatment.
More matters that need to be mentioned
Restrictions on the patient. We need to remember that, even if a patient is thought to be able to make his own decisions, there may be some situations when he can be held in the hospital against his will. These usually are the cases when the patient is psychiatrically or medically unstable (unable to care of himself), but also if the patient is at risk of harming himself or others, subject of elder abuse, or suspected of being an abuser.
Restrictions on the practitioner. Even if the patient is determined to be lacking decision-making capacity, we, physicians, cannot perform tests, procedures, or do the placements without the patient’s agreement.
Informed consent doctrine is applicable in this case, and if performing a test or procedure is necessary (except life- or limb-saving emergencies, when doctrine of physician prerogative applies), or if there a disagreement in post-discharge placement, the emergency guardianship may need to be pursued.
Disclosure
Dr. Graypel reports no financial relationships with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
The real estate business embraces the concept of ownership using the term “bundle of rights.” Real estate agents view full, unaffected ownership of a real property as complete (ie, undivided) and, when ownership is shared, talk about percentages of that bundle.
The same principle can be applied to guardianship. Because we are our own guardians, we own a full, undivided bundle of rights, including all our constitutional rights and the right to make decisions— even bad ones. Of course, an undivided bundle also means that we are fully responsible for the decisions we make.
When a patient requires representation
There may be a situation when we would give someone else the authority to represent us for a specific reason. In this case we would authorize this person to act on our behalf as we would do ourselves—yet we still retain 100% ownership of the “bundle,” and therefore can revoke this authorization at any time. The person we hire (appoint) to represent us will become our power of attorney (POA), and because we appoint this person for a specific situation (handle certain medical affairs, manage some financial affairs, sign real estate documents, etc.), this kind or POA is called “specific” or “special.” When we give someone the right to represent us in any or all of our affairs, this POA is called “general” or “durable.”
It is important to mention that as long as we continue to have psychological capacity and are willing to continue to be our own guardians (own 100% of the bundle of rights), we can terminate any POA we have appointed previously or designate another person to represent us as a “special” or “general” POA. Because of this, if an older patient—who is legally competent but physically unable to live on his (her) own— refuses to enter a long-term care facility, he (she) cannot be sent there against his will, even if the POA insists on it. Because of this, if the patient’s primary team strongly disagrees with this patient’s decision, his (her) “decision-making capacity” should be assessed and, if necessary, a competency hearing will need to be conducted. The court will then decide if this person is able (or unable) to handle his own affairs, and if the court decides that the person cannot be responsible to provide himself with food, health care, housing, and other necessities, the guardian (relative, friend, public administrator, etc.) will be appointed to do so.
Evaluating decision-making capacity
Determining “decision-making capacity” should not be confused with the legal concept of “competence.” We, physicians, often are called to evaluate a patient and give our opinion of the current level of this patient’s functioning (including his [her] decision-making capacity), and we—ourselves and a requesting team—need to be clear that it is merely our opinion and should be used as such. We need to remember that even if a patient is judged to be legally incompetent to handle financial affairs, he (she) might retain sufficient ability to make decisions about treatments.
We also need to remember that decision-making capacity can change, depending on medical conditions (severe anxiety, delirium), successful treatments, substance intoxication, etc. Because of this, we need to communicate to the requesting team that “decision-making ability” is situation-specific and time-specific, and that failure to make a decision on one issue should not be generalized to other aspects of the patient’s life.
Any physician can evaluate patient’s decision-making ability, but traditionally the psychiatry team is called to do so. It usually happens because the primary medical team needs us to provide “a third-party validation,” or because of the common misperception that only the psychiatric team can initiate a civil involuntary detention when necessary.
In any case, regardless of who evaluates the patient, specific points need to be addressed and the following questions need to be answered:
• Does the patient understand the nature of his (her) condition?
• Does the patient understand what treatment we are proposing or what he should do?
• Does the patient understand the consequences (good or bad) if he rejects our proposed action or treatment?
When information (discharge plan, treatment plan, etc.) is presented to patients, we should ask them to repeat it in their own words. We should not expect them to understand all of the technical aspects. We should consider patients’ intelligence level and their ability to communicate; if they can clearly verbalize their understanding of information and be consistent in their wish to continue with their decision, we have to declare that they have decision-making capability and able to proceed with their chosen treatment.
More matters that need to be mentioned
Restrictions on the patient. We need to remember that, even if a patient is thought to be able to make his own decisions, there may be some situations when he can be held in the hospital against his will. These usually are the cases when the patient is psychiatrically or medically unstable (unable to care of himself), but also if the patient is at risk of harming himself or others, subject of elder abuse, or suspected of being an abuser.
Restrictions on the practitioner. Even if the patient is determined to be lacking decision-making capacity, we, physicians, cannot perform tests, procedures, or do the placements without the patient’s agreement.
Informed consent doctrine is applicable in this case, and if performing a test or procedure is necessary (except life- or limb-saving emergencies, when doctrine of physician prerogative applies), or if there a disagreement in post-discharge placement, the emergency guardianship may need to be pursued.
Disclosure
Dr. Graypel reports no financial relationships with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
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Abnormal calcium level in a psychiatric presentation? Rule out parathyroid disease
In some patients, symptoms of depression, psychosis, delirium, or dementia exist concomitantly with, or as a result of, an abnormal (elevated or low) serum calcium concentration that has been precipitated by an unrecognized endocrinopathy. The apparent psychiatric presentations of such patients might reflect parathyroid pathology—not psychopathology.
Hypercalcemia and hypocalcemia often are related to a distinct spectrum of conditions, such as diseases of the parathyroid glands, kidneys, and various neoplasms including malignancies. Be alert to the possibility of parathyroid disease in patients whose presentation suggests mental illness concurrent with, or as a direct consequence of, an abnormal calcium level, and investigate appropriately.
The Table1-9 illustrates how 3 clinical laboratory tests—serum calcium, serum parathyroid hormone (PTH), and phosphate—can narrow the differential diagnosis when the clinical impression is parathyroid-related illness. Seek endocrinology consultation whenever a parathyroid-associated ailment is discovered or suspected. Serum calcium is routinely assayed in hospitalized patients; when managing a patient with treatment-refractory psychiatric illness, (1) always check the reported result of that test and (2) consider measuring PTH.
Case reports1
Case 1: Woman with chronic depression. The patient was hospitalized while suicidal. Serial serum calcium levels were 12.5 mg/dL and 15.8 mg/dL (reference range, 8.2–10.2 mg/dL). The PTH level was elevated at 287 pg/mL (reference range, 10–65 pg/mL).
After thyroid imaging, surgery revealed a parathyroid mass, which was resected. Histologic examination confirmed an adenoma.
The calcium concentration declined to 8.6 mg/dL postoperatively and stabilized at 9.2 mg/dL. Psychiatric symptoms resolved fully; she experienced a complete recovery.
Case 2: Man on long-term lithium maintenance. The patient was admitted in a delusional psychotic state. The serum calcium level was 14.3 mg/dL initially, decreasing to 11.5 mg/dL after lithium was discontinued. The PTH level was elevated at 97 pg/mL at admission, consistent with hyperparathyroidism.
A parathyroid adenoma was resected. Serum calcium level normalized at 10.7 mg/dL; psychosis resolved with striking, sustained improvement in mental status.
Full return to mental, physical health
The diagnosis of parathyroid adenoma in these 2 patients, which began with a psychiatric presentation, was properly made after an abnormal serum calcium level was documented. Surgical treatment of the endocrinopathy produced full remission and a return to normal mental and physical health.
Although psychiatric manifestations are associated with an abnormal serum calcium concentration, the severity of those presentations does not correlate with the degree of abnormality of the calcium level.10
Disclosures
The authors report no financial relationships with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
1. Velasco PJ, Manshadi M, Breen K, et al. Psychiatric aspects of parathyroid disease. Psychosomatics. 1999;40(6):486-490.
2. Harrop JS, Bailey JE, Woodhead JS. Incidence of hypercalcaemia and primary hyperparathyroidism in relation to the biochemical profile. J Clin Pathol. 1982; 35(4):395-400.
3. Assadi F. Hypophosphatemia: an evidence-based problem-solving approach to clinical cases. Iran J Kidney Dis. 2010;4(3):195-201.
4. Ozkhan B, Hatun S, Bereket A. Vitamin D intoxication. Turk J Pediatr. 2012;54(2):93-98.
5. Studdy PR, Bird R, Neville E, et al. Biochemical findings in sarcoidosis. J Clin Pathol. 1980;33(6):528-533.
6. Geller JL, Adam JS. Vitamin D therapy. Curr Osteoporos Rep. 2008;6(1):5-11.
7. Albaaj F, Hutchison A. Hyperphosphatemia in renal failure: causes, consequences and current management. Drugs. 2003;63(6):577-596.
8. Al-Azem H, Khan AA. Hypoparathyroidism. Best Pract Res Clin Endocrinol Metab. 2012;26(4):517-522.
9. Brown H, Englert E, Wallach S. The syndrome of pseudo-pseudohypoparathyroidism. AMA Arch Intern Med. 1956;98(4):517-524.
10. Pfitzenmeyer P, Besancenot JF, Verges B, et al. Primary hyperparathyroidism in very old patients. Eur J Med. 1993;2(8):453-456.
In some patients, symptoms of depression, psychosis, delirium, or dementia exist concomitantly with, or as a result of, an abnormal (elevated or low) serum calcium concentration that has been precipitated by an unrecognized endocrinopathy. The apparent psychiatric presentations of such patients might reflect parathyroid pathology—not psychopathology.
Hypercalcemia and hypocalcemia often are related to a distinct spectrum of conditions, such as diseases of the parathyroid glands, kidneys, and various neoplasms including malignancies. Be alert to the possibility of parathyroid disease in patients whose presentation suggests mental illness concurrent with, or as a direct consequence of, an abnormal calcium level, and investigate appropriately.
The Table1-9 illustrates how 3 clinical laboratory tests—serum calcium, serum parathyroid hormone (PTH), and phosphate—can narrow the differential diagnosis when the clinical impression is parathyroid-related illness. Seek endocrinology consultation whenever a parathyroid-associated ailment is discovered or suspected. Serum calcium is routinely assayed in hospitalized patients; when managing a patient with treatment-refractory psychiatric illness, (1) always check the reported result of that test and (2) consider measuring PTH.
Case reports1
Case 1: Woman with chronic depression. The patient was hospitalized while suicidal. Serial serum calcium levels were 12.5 mg/dL and 15.8 mg/dL (reference range, 8.2–10.2 mg/dL). The PTH level was elevated at 287 pg/mL (reference range, 10–65 pg/mL).
After thyroid imaging, surgery revealed a parathyroid mass, which was resected. Histologic examination confirmed an adenoma.
The calcium concentration declined to 8.6 mg/dL postoperatively and stabilized at 9.2 mg/dL. Psychiatric symptoms resolved fully; she experienced a complete recovery.
Case 2: Man on long-term lithium maintenance. The patient was admitted in a delusional psychotic state. The serum calcium level was 14.3 mg/dL initially, decreasing to 11.5 mg/dL after lithium was discontinued. The PTH level was elevated at 97 pg/mL at admission, consistent with hyperparathyroidism.
A parathyroid adenoma was resected. Serum calcium level normalized at 10.7 mg/dL; psychosis resolved with striking, sustained improvement in mental status.
Full return to mental, physical health
The diagnosis of parathyroid adenoma in these 2 patients, which began with a psychiatric presentation, was properly made after an abnormal serum calcium level was documented. Surgical treatment of the endocrinopathy produced full remission and a return to normal mental and physical health.
Although psychiatric manifestations are associated with an abnormal serum calcium concentration, the severity of those presentations does not correlate with the degree of abnormality of the calcium level.10
Disclosures
The authors report no financial relationships with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
In some patients, symptoms of depression, psychosis, delirium, or dementia exist concomitantly with, or as a result of, an abnormal (elevated or low) serum calcium concentration that has been precipitated by an unrecognized endocrinopathy. The apparent psychiatric presentations of such patients might reflect parathyroid pathology—not psychopathology.
Hypercalcemia and hypocalcemia often are related to a distinct spectrum of conditions, such as diseases of the parathyroid glands, kidneys, and various neoplasms including malignancies. Be alert to the possibility of parathyroid disease in patients whose presentation suggests mental illness concurrent with, or as a direct consequence of, an abnormal calcium level, and investigate appropriately.
The Table1-9 illustrates how 3 clinical laboratory tests—serum calcium, serum parathyroid hormone (PTH), and phosphate—can narrow the differential diagnosis when the clinical impression is parathyroid-related illness. Seek endocrinology consultation whenever a parathyroid-associated ailment is discovered or suspected. Serum calcium is routinely assayed in hospitalized patients; when managing a patient with treatment-refractory psychiatric illness, (1) always check the reported result of that test and (2) consider measuring PTH.
Case reports1
Case 1: Woman with chronic depression. The patient was hospitalized while suicidal. Serial serum calcium levels were 12.5 mg/dL and 15.8 mg/dL (reference range, 8.2–10.2 mg/dL). The PTH level was elevated at 287 pg/mL (reference range, 10–65 pg/mL).
After thyroid imaging, surgery revealed a parathyroid mass, which was resected. Histologic examination confirmed an adenoma.
The calcium concentration declined to 8.6 mg/dL postoperatively and stabilized at 9.2 mg/dL. Psychiatric symptoms resolved fully; she experienced a complete recovery.
Case 2: Man on long-term lithium maintenance. The patient was admitted in a delusional psychotic state. The serum calcium level was 14.3 mg/dL initially, decreasing to 11.5 mg/dL after lithium was discontinued. The PTH level was elevated at 97 pg/mL at admission, consistent with hyperparathyroidism.
A parathyroid adenoma was resected. Serum calcium level normalized at 10.7 mg/dL; psychosis resolved with striking, sustained improvement in mental status.
Full return to mental, physical health
The diagnosis of parathyroid adenoma in these 2 patients, which began with a psychiatric presentation, was properly made after an abnormal serum calcium level was documented. Surgical treatment of the endocrinopathy produced full remission and a return to normal mental and physical health.
Although psychiatric manifestations are associated with an abnormal serum calcium concentration, the severity of those presentations does not correlate with the degree of abnormality of the calcium level.10
Disclosures
The authors report no financial relationships with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
1. Velasco PJ, Manshadi M, Breen K, et al. Psychiatric aspects of parathyroid disease. Psychosomatics. 1999;40(6):486-490.
2. Harrop JS, Bailey JE, Woodhead JS. Incidence of hypercalcaemia and primary hyperparathyroidism in relation to the biochemical profile. J Clin Pathol. 1982; 35(4):395-400.
3. Assadi F. Hypophosphatemia: an evidence-based problem-solving approach to clinical cases. Iran J Kidney Dis. 2010;4(3):195-201.
4. Ozkhan B, Hatun S, Bereket A. Vitamin D intoxication. Turk J Pediatr. 2012;54(2):93-98.
5. Studdy PR, Bird R, Neville E, et al. Biochemical findings in sarcoidosis. J Clin Pathol. 1980;33(6):528-533.
6. Geller JL, Adam JS. Vitamin D therapy. Curr Osteoporos Rep. 2008;6(1):5-11.
7. Albaaj F, Hutchison A. Hyperphosphatemia in renal failure: causes, consequences and current management. Drugs. 2003;63(6):577-596.
8. Al-Azem H, Khan AA. Hypoparathyroidism. Best Pract Res Clin Endocrinol Metab. 2012;26(4):517-522.
9. Brown H, Englert E, Wallach S. The syndrome of pseudo-pseudohypoparathyroidism. AMA Arch Intern Med. 1956;98(4):517-524.
10. Pfitzenmeyer P, Besancenot JF, Verges B, et al. Primary hyperparathyroidism in very old patients. Eur J Med. 1993;2(8):453-456.
1. Velasco PJ, Manshadi M, Breen K, et al. Psychiatric aspects of parathyroid disease. Psychosomatics. 1999;40(6):486-490.
2. Harrop JS, Bailey JE, Woodhead JS. Incidence of hypercalcaemia and primary hyperparathyroidism in relation to the biochemical profile. J Clin Pathol. 1982; 35(4):395-400.
3. Assadi F. Hypophosphatemia: an evidence-based problem-solving approach to clinical cases. Iran J Kidney Dis. 2010;4(3):195-201.
4. Ozkhan B, Hatun S, Bereket A. Vitamin D intoxication. Turk J Pediatr. 2012;54(2):93-98.
5. Studdy PR, Bird R, Neville E, et al. Biochemical findings in sarcoidosis. J Clin Pathol. 1980;33(6):528-533.
6. Geller JL, Adam JS. Vitamin D therapy. Curr Osteoporos Rep. 2008;6(1):5-11.
7. Albaaj F, Hutchison A. Hyperphosphatemia in renal failure: causes, consequences and current management. Drugs. 2003;63(6):577-596.
8. Al-Azem H, Khan AA. Hypoparathyroidism. Best Pract Res Clin Endocrinol Metab. 2012;26(4):517-522.
9. Brown H, Englert E, Wallach S. The syndrome of pseudo-pseudohypoparathyroidism. AMA Arch Intern Med. 1956;98(4):517-524.
10. Pfitzenmeyer P, Besancenot JF, Verges B, et al. Primary hyperparathyroidism in very old patients. Eur J Med. 1993;2(8):453-456.
How to write a suicide risk assessment that’s clinically sound and legally defensible
Suicidologists and legal experts implore clinicians to document their suicide risk assessments (SRAs) thoroughly. It’s difficult, however, to find practical guidance on how to write a clinically sound, legally defensible SRA.
The crux of every SRA is written justification of suicide risk. That justification should reveal your thinking and present a well-reasoned basis for your decision.
Reasoned vs right
It’s more important to provide a justification of suicide risk that’s well-reasoned rather than one that’s right. Suicide is impossible to predict. Instead of prediction, legally we are asked to reasonably anticipate suicide based on clinical facts. In hindsight, especially in the context of a courtroom, decisions might look ill-considered. You need to craft a logical argument, be clear, and avoid jargon.
Convey thoroughness by covering each component of an SRA. Use the mnemonic device CAIPS to help the reader (and you) understand how a conclusion was reached based on the facts of the case.
Chronic and Acute factors. Address the chronic and acute factors that weigh heaviest in your mind. Chronic factors are conditions, past events, and demographics that generally do not change. Acute factors are recent events or conditions that potentially are modifiable. Pay attention to combinations of factors that dramatically elevate risk (eg, previous attempts in the context of acute depression). Avoid repeating every factor, especially when these are documented elsewhere, such as on a checklist.
Imminent warning signs for suicide. Address warning signs (Table 1),1 the nature of current suicidal thoughts (Table 2), and other aspects of mental status (eg, future orientation) that influenced your decision. Use words like “moreover,” “however,” and “in addition” to draw the reader’s attention to the building blocks of your argument.
Protective factors. Discuss the protective factors last; they deserve the least weight because none has been shown to immunize people against suicide. Don’t solely rely on your judgment of what is protective (eg, children in the home). Instead, elicit the patient’s reasons for living and dying. Be concerned if he (she) reports more of the latter.
Summary statement. Make an explicit statement about risk, focusing on imminent risk (ie, the next few hours and days). Avoid a “plot twist,” which is a risk level inconsistent with the preceding evidence, because it suggests an error in judgment. The Box gives an example of a justification that follows the CAIPS method.
Additional tips
Consider these strategies:
• Bolster your argument by explicitly addressing hopelessness (the strongest psychological correlate of suicide); use quotes from the patient that support your decision; refer to consultation with family members and colleagues; and include pertinent negatives to show completeness2 (ie, “denied suicide plans”).
• Critically resolve discrepancies between what the patient says and behavior that suggests suicidal intent (eg, a patient who minimizes suicidal intent but shopped for a gun yesterday).
• Last, while reviewing your justification, imagine that your patient completed suicide after leaving your office and that you are in court for negligence. In our experience, this exercise reveals dangerous errors of judgment. A clear and reasoned justification will reduce the risk of litigation and help you make prudent treatment plans.
Disclosures
The authors report no financial relationships with any companies whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
1. American Association of Suicidology. Know the warning signs of suicide. http://www.suicidology.org/resources/ warning-signs. Accessed February 9, 2014.
2. Ballas C. How to write a suicide note: practical tips for documenting the evaluation of a suicidal patient. Psychiatric Times. http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/articles/how-write-suicide-note-practical-tips-documenting-evaluation-suicidal-patient. Published May 1, 2007. Accessed July 29, 2013.
Suicidologists and legal experts implore clinicians to document their suicide risk assessments (SRAs) thoroughly. It’s difficult, however, to find practical guidance on how to write a clinically sound, legally defensible SRA.
The crux of every SRA is written justification of suicide risk. That justification should reveal your thinking and present a well-reasoned basis for your decision.
Reasoned vs right
It’s more important to provide a justification of suicide risk that’s well-reasoned rather than one that’s right. Suicide is impossible to predict. Instead of prediction, legally we are asked to reasonably anticipate suicide based on clinical facts. In hindsight, especially in the context of a courtroom, decisions might look ill-considered. You need to craft a logical argument, be clear, and avoid jargon.
Convey thoroughness by covering each component of an SRA. Use the mnemonic device CAIPS to help the reader (and you) understand how a conclusion was reached based on the facts of the case.
Chronic and Acute factors. Address the chronic and acute factors that weigh heaviest in your mind. Chronic factors are conditions, past events, and demographics that generally do not change. Acute factors are recent events or conditions that potentially are modifiable. Pay attention to combinations of factors that dramatically elevate risk (eg, previous attempts in the context of acute depression). Avoid repeating every factor, especially when these are documented elsewhere, such as on a checklist.
Imminent warning signs for suicide. Address warning signs (Table 1),1 the nature of current suicidal thoughts (Table 2), and other aspects of mental status (eg, future orientation) that influenced your decision. Use words like “moreover,” “however,” and “in addition” to draw the reader’s attention to the building blocks of your argument.
Protective factors. Discuss the protective factors last; they deserve the least weight because none has been shown to immunize people against suicide. Don’t solely rely on your judgment of what is protective (eg, children in the home). Instead, elicit the patient’s reasons for living and dying. Be concerned if he (she) reports more of the latter.
Summary statement. Make an explicit statement about risk, focusing on imminent risk (ie, the next few hours and days). Avoid a “plot twist,” which is a risk level inconsistent with the preceding evidence, because it suggests an error in judgment. The Box gives an example of a justification that follows the CAIPS method.
Additional tips
Consider these strategies:
• Bolster your argument by explicitly addressing hopelessness (the strongest psychological correlate of suicide); use quotes from the patient that support your decision; refer to consultation with family members and colleagues; and include pertinent negatives to show completeness2 (ie, “denied suicide plans”).
• Critically resolve discrepancies between what the patient says and behavior that suggests suicidal intent (eg, a patient who minimizes suicidal intent but shopped for a gun yesterday).
• Last, while reviewing your justification, imagine that your patient completed suicide after leaving your office and that you are in court for negligence. In our experience, this exercise reveals dangerous errors of judgment. A clear and reasoned justification will reduce the risk of litigation and help you make prudent treatment plans.
Disclosures
The authors report no financial relationships with any companies whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
Suicidologists and legal experts implore clinicians to document their suicide risk assessments (SRAs) thoroughly. It’s difficult, however, to find practical guidance on how to write a clinically sound, legally defensible SRA.
The crux of every SRA is written justification of suicide risk. That justification should reveal your thinking and present a well-reasoned basis for your decision.
Reasoned vs right
It’s more important to provide a justification of suicide risk that’s well-reasoned rather than one that’s right. Suicide is impossible to predict. Instead of prediction, legally we are asked to reasonably anticipate suicide based on clinical facts. In hindsight, especially in the context of a courtroom, decisions might look ill-considered. You need to craft a logical argument, be clear, and avoid jargon.
Convey thoroughness by covering each component of an SRA. Use the mnemonic device CAIPS to help the reader (and you) understand how a conclusion was reached based on the facts of the case.
Chronic and Acute factors. Address the chronic and acute factors that weigh heaviest in your mind. Chronic factors are conditions, past events, and demographics that generally do not change. Acute factors are recent events or conditions that potentially are modifiable. Pay attention to combinations of factors that dramatically elevate risk (eg, previous attempts in the context of acute depression). Avoid repeating every factor, especially when these are documented elsewhere, such as on a checklist.
Imminent warning signs for suicide. Address warning signs (Table 1),1 the nature of current suicidal thoughts (Table 2), and other aspects of mental status (eg, future orientation) that influenced your decision. Use words like “moreover,” “however,” and “in addition” to draw the reader’s attention to the building blocks of your argument.
Protective factors. Discuss the protective factors last; they deserve the least weight because none has been shown to immunize people against suicide. Don’t solely rely on your judgment of what is protective (eg, children in the home). Instead, elicit the patient’s reasons for living and dying. Be concerned if he (she) reports more of the latter.
Summary statement. Make an explicit statement about risk, focusing on imminent risk (ie, the next few hours and days). Avoid a “plot twist,” which is a risk level inconsistent with the preceding evidence, because it suggests an error in judgment. The Box gives an example of a justification that follows the CAIPS method.
Additional tips
Consider these strategies:
• Bolster your argument by explicitly addressing hopelessness (the strongest psychological correlate of suicide); use quotes from the patient that support your decision; refer to consultation with family members and colleagues; and include pertinent negatives to show completeness2 (ie, “denied suicide plans”).
• Critically resolve discrepancies between what the patient says and behavior that suggests suicidal intent (eg, a patient who minimizes suicidal intent but shopped for a gun yesterday).
• Last, while reviewing your justification, imagine that your patient completed suicide after leaving your office and that you are in court for negligence. In our experience, this exercise reveals dangerous errors of judgment. A clear and reasoned justification will reduce the risk of litigation and help you make prudent treatment plans.
Disclosures
The authors report no financial relationships with any companies whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
1. American Association of Suicidology. Know the warning signs of suicide. http://www.suicidology.org/resources/ warning-signs. Accessed February 9, 2014.
2. Ballas C. How to write a suicide note: practical tips for documenting the evaluation of a suicidal patient. Psychiatric Times. http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/articles/how-write-suicide-note-practical-tips-documenting-evaluation-suicidal-patient. Published May 1, 2007. Accessed July 29, 2013.
1. American Association of Suicidology. Know the warning signs of suicide. http://www.suicidology.org/resources/ warning-signs. Accessed February 9, 2014.
2. Ballas C. How to write a suicide note: practical tips for documenting the evaluation of a suicidal patient. Psychiatric Times. http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/articles/how-write-suicide-note-practical-tips-documenting-evaluation-suicidal-patient. Published May 1, 2007. Accessed July 29, 2013.
A teen with seizures, amnesia, and troubled family dynamics
CASE Seizures, amnesia
Ms. A, age 13, who has a history of seizures, presents to the emergency department (ED) with sudden onset of memory loss. Her family reports that she had been spending a normal evening at home with family and friends. After going to the bathroom, Ms. A became acutely confused and extremely upset, had slurred speech, and did not recognize anyone in the room except her mother.
Initial neurologic examination in the ED reports that Ms. A does not remember recent or remote past events. Her family denies any recent stressors.
Vital signs are within normal range. She has mild muscle soreness and gait instability, which is attributed to a presumed postictal phase. Her medication regimen includes: levetiracetam, 500 mg, 3 times a day; valproic acid, 1,000 mg/d; and oxcarbazepine, 2,400 mg/d, for seizure management.
Complete blood count and comprehensive metabolic panel are within normal limits. Pregnancy test is negative. Urine toxicology report is negative. Serum valproic acid level is 71 μg/mL; oxcarbazepine level, <2 μg/mL; ammonia level, 71 μg/dL (reference range, 15 to 45 μg/dL). Other than the aforementioned deficits, she is neurologically intact. The team thinks that her symptoms are part of a postictal phase of an unwitnessed seizure.
Ms. A is admitted to the inpatient medical unit for further work up. Along with the memory loss and seizures, she reports visual hallucinations.
What could be causing Ms. A’s amnesia?
a) a seizure disorder
b) malingering
c) posttraumatic stress disorder
d) traumatic brain injury
HISTORY Repeat ED visits
Ms. A’s mother reports that 3 years ago her daughter was treated for tics with quetiapine and aripiprazole, prescribed by a primary care physician. She received a short course of counseling 6 years ago after her sister was sexually abused by her grandfather. Approximately 6 months ago, Ms. A engaged in self-injurious behavior by cutting herself, and she briefly received counseling. There is no history of suicide attempts, psychiatric hospitalization, or a psychiatric diagnosis.
Medical and surgical history include viral meningitis at age 6 months. Medical records show a visit to the ED for abdominal pain after a classmate punched her in the abdomen, which resolved with supportive care. She was given a diagnosis of pediatric autoimmune neuropsychiatric disorders associated with streptococcal infections 6 years ago.
Ms. A developed multiple recurrent methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus abscesses a year ago, which lasted for 4 months; it was noted that she was self-inoculating by scratching eczema. She had a possible syncopal episode 5 months ago, but the medical work-up was normal. The pediatric neurology service diagnosed and treated seizures 4 months ago.
Levetiracetam was prescribed after a possible syncopal episode followed by a tonic-clonic seizure. Because she was still having seizure-like episodes with a single antiepileptic drug (AED), oxcarbazepine, then valproic acid were added. Whether her seizures were generalized or partial was inconclusive. The seizures were followed by a postictal phase lasting 3 minutes to 1 hour. Her last generalized tonic-clonic seizure was 1 month before admission.
Ms. A had 3 MRI studies of the brain over the past 3 years, which showed consistent and unchanged multifocal punctate white matter lesions. The findings represented gliosis from an old perivascular inflammation, trauma, or ischemic damage. There is no history of traumatic brain injury.
Her perinatal history is unremarkable, with normal vaginal delivery at 36 weeks (pre-term birth). All developmental milestones were on target.
Ms. A lives at home with her mother, 6-year-old brother, and stepfather. Her parents are divorced, but her biological father has been involved in her upbringing. She is in seventh grade, but is home schooled after she withdrew from school because of multiple seizure episodes. Ms. A denied bullying at school although she had been punched by a peer. It was unclear if it was a single incident or bullying continued and she was hesitant to disclose it.
The authors’ observations
We focus on the amnesia because it has an acute onset and it seems this is the first time Ms. A presented with this symptom. There is no need to wait for neurology consultation, even though organic causes of amnesia need to be ruled out. Our plan is to develop rapport with Ms. A, and then administer a mental status examination focusing on memory assessment. We understand that, because Ms. A’s chief concern is amnesia, she might not be able to provide many details. We start the initial interview with the family in the patient’s room to understand family dynamics, and then interview Ms. A alone.
EVALUATION Memory problems
On initial psychiatric interview, Ms. A can recognize some of her family members. She is seen in clean attire, with short hair, lying in the bed with good eye contact and a calm demeanor. She seems to be difficult to engage because of her reserved nature.
Ms. A displays some psychomotor retardation. She reports her mood as tired, and her affect is flat and mood incongruent. She is alert and oriented to person only; not to place, time, or situation. She can do a simple spelling task, perform 5-minute recall of 3 words, complete serial 3 subtractions, repeat phrases, read aloud, focus on a coin task, and name simple objects. She does not compare similar objects or answer simple historical or factual questions.
Ms. A replies “I don’t know” to most historical questions, such as her birthday, favorite color, and family members; she does not answer when asked how many legs a dog has, who is the current or past president, what month the Fourth of July is in, or when Christmas is. She can complete some memory tasks on the Mini-Mental State Examination, but does not attempt many others. Ms. A says she is upset about her memory deficit, but her affect was flat. Her mood and her affect were incongruent. She describes a vision of a “girl with black holes [for eyes]” in the corner of her hospital room telling her not to believe anyone and that the interviewers are lying to her. Also, she reports that “the girl” tells her to hurt herself and others, but she is not going to act on the commands because she knows it is not the right thing to do. When we ask Ms. A about a history of substance abuse, she says she has never heard of drugs or alcohol.
Overall, she displays multiple apparent deficits in declarative memory, both episodic and semantic. Regarding non-declarative or procedural memory, she can dress herself, use the bathroom independently, order meals off the menu, and feed herself, among other routine tasks, without difficulty.
According to Ms. A’s mother, Ms. A has shown a decline in overall functioning and personality changes during the past 5 months. She started to cut herself superficially on her forearms 6 months ago and also tried to change her appearance with a new hairstyle when school started. She displayed noticeably intense and disturbing writings, artwork, and conversations with others over 3 to 4 months.
She started experiencing seizures, with 3 to 4 seizures a day; however, she could attend sleepovers seizure-free. She had prolonged periods of seizures lasting up to an hour, much longer than would be expected clinically. She also had requested to go to the cemetery for unclear reasons (because the spirit wanted her to visit), and was observed mumbling under her breath.
Six years ago, Ms. A’s 6-year-old sister tried to suffocate her infant brother. Child protective services was involved and the sister was hospitalized in a psychiatric facility, where she was given a diagnosis of bipolar disorder; she was then transferred to foster care, and later placed in residential treatment. Her mother relinquished her parental rights and gave custody of Ms. A’s sister to the state.
Ms. A’s mother has a history of depression, but her younger brother is healthy. There is no history of autism, attention problems, tics, substance abuse, brain tumor, or intellectual disabilities in the family.
Which diagnosis does Ms. A’s presentation and history suggest?
a) dissociative amnesia
b) factitious disorder imposed on self
c) conversion disorder (neurological symptom disorder)
d) psychosis not otherwise specified
e) malingering
The authors’ observations
The history of unwitnessed seizures, sudden onset of visual hallucinations, and transient amnesia points to a possible postictal cause. Selective amnesia brings up the question of whether psychological components are driving the symptoms.
Her psychotic symptoms appear to be mediated by anxiety and possibly related to the trauma of losing her only sister when her mother relinquished custody to the state; the circumstances might have aroused feelings of insecurity or fear of abandonment and raised questions about her mother’s love toward her. Her sister’s abuse by a family member might have created reticence to trust others. These background experiences could be intensely conflicting at this age when the second separation individuation process commences, especially in an emotionally immature adolescent.
OUTCOME Medication change
The neurology team recommends discontinuing levetiracetam because the visual hallucinations, mood disturbance, and personality change could be adverse effects of the drug. Because of generalized uncontrolled body movements with staring episodes and unresponsiveness, an EEG is ordered to rule out ongoing seizures.
Ms. A recognizes the psychosomatic medicine team members when they interview her again. The team employs consistent reassurance and a non-confrontational approach. She spends 3 days in the medical unit during which she reports that the frequency of visual and auditory hallucinations decreases and her memory symptoms resolve. Her 24-hour EEG is negative for seizure activity, and the 24-hour video EEG does not show any signs of epileptogenic foci. Ms. A’s family declines inpatient psychiatric hospitalization.
Because of gradual improvement in Ms. A’s symptoms and no imminent safety concerns, she is discharged home with valproic acid, 1,000 mg/d, and oxcarbazepine, 1,200 mg/d, and follow-up appointments with her primary care physician, a neurologist, and a psychiatrist.
The authors’ observations
Dissociative amnesia
Generalized dissociative amnesia is difficult to differentiate from factitious disorder or malingering. According to DSM-5, there is loss of episodic memory in dissociative amnesia, in which the person is unable to recall the stressful event after trauma (Table 1).1 Although there have been case reports of dissociative amnesia with loss of semantic and procedural memory, episodic memory is the last to return.2 In Ms. A’s case, there was no immediate basis to explain amnesia onset, although she had experienced the trauma of losing her sister. She had episodic and mostly semantic memory loss.
Although organic causes can precipitate amnesia,3 Ms. A’s EEG and MRI results did not reflect that. Patients with a dissociative disorder often report some physical, sexual, or emotional abuse.4 Although Ms. A did not report any abuse, it cannot be completely ruled out because of her sister’s history of abuse.
Suicidality or self-injurious behavior is common among adults with dissociative amnesia, although it is not well studied in children.4,5 Generally, the constellation of primary dissociative symptoms that patients develop are forgetfulness, fragmentation, and emotional numbing. Ms. A presented with some of these features; did she, in fact, have dissociative amnesia?
Factitious amnesia
Factious amnesia (Table 2)6 is a symptom of factious disorder in which amnesia appears with the motivation to assume a sick role.3 Ms. A’s amnesia garnered significant attention from her mother and other family members; this may have been related to insecurity in her family relationships because her sister was given up to the state. She also could be afraid of entering adolescence and leaving her sister behind. Did she want more time to bond with her mother? Did she experience emotional benefit from being cared for by medical professionals?7 Her affect during interviews was blunted and her attitude was nonchalant, and her multiple visits to the hospital since childhood for abdominal pain, abscesses (it isn’t clear whether the abscesses were related to self-injury and scratching), tics, seizures, and, recently, amnesia and hallucinations indicated some desire to occupy a sick role. Furthermore, the severity of her symptoms seemed to be increasing over time, from somatic to neurologic (seizure-like episodes) to significant and less frequent psychiatric symptoms (amnesia and hallucinations). One could speculate that her symptoms were escalating because she was not receiving the attention she needed.
Malingered amnesia
Although malingering is not a psychiatric diagnosis, it can be a focus of clinical attention. It is challenging to identify malingered cognitive impairments.8 Children often have difficulty malingering symptoms because they have limited understanding of the illness they are trying to simulate.9 Many malingerers do not want to participate in their medical work up and might exhibit a hostile attitude toward examiners (Table 26). Clinicians could rely on family to provide information regarding history and inconsistencies in clinical deficits.9 The clinical interview, mental status examination, and collateral information are crucial for identifying malingering.
Most of Ms. A’s seizure-like episodes happened in specific contexts, such as in school, but not at friends’ houses, raising the question of whether she is aware of her episodes. Ms. A’s grades are consistently good; because she is being home schooled, there is no secondary gain from not going to school. There is no other reason to speculate that she was malingering.
The inconsistency of Ms. A’s symptoms and her compliance with assessment and treatment did not reflect malingering. Interestingly, Ms. A’s amnesia was retrograde in nature. There have been more studies on malingered anterograde amnesia8 than on retrograde amnesia, making her presentation even more unusual.
Amnesia presenting as conversion disorder
Amnesia as a symptom of conversion disorder is referred as psychogenic amnesia; the memory loss mostly is isolated retrograde amnesia.10 Ms. A likely had unconsciously produced symptoms of non-epileptic seizures, followed by auditory and visual hallucinations not related to her seizures, and then later developed selective transient amnesia. Conversion disorder seemed to be the diagnosis most consistent with her indifference (“la belle indifference”) and the significant attention she gained from the acute memory loss (Table 3).1 It seemed that she developed multiple symptoms in progression leading toward a conversion disorder diagnosis. The question arises whether Ms. A’s presentation is a gradually increasing cry for help or reflects depressive or anxiety symptoms, which often are comorbid with conversion disorder.
FOLLOW-UP Suicide attempt
Ms. A has frequent visits to the ED with symptoms of syncope and seizures and undergoes medical work-up and multiple EEGs. A prolonged 5-day video EEG is performed to assess seizure episodes after AEDs were withdrawn, but no seizure activity is elicited. She also has an ED visit for recurrent tic emergence.
The last visit in the ED is for a suicide attempt with overdose of an unknown quantity of unspecified pills. Ms. A talks to a social worker, who reports that Ms. A needed answers to such questions as why her grandfather abused her sister? Could she have stopped them and made a difference for the family?
The authors’ observations
Conversion disorder arises from unconscious psychological conflicts, needs, or responses to trauma. Ms. A’s consistent conflict about her sister and grandfather’s relationship was evident from occasions when she tried to confide in hospital staff. During an ED visit, she reported her sister’s abuse to a staff member. Another time, while recovering from sedation, she spontaneously spoke about her sister’s abuse. When asked again, she said she did not remember saying it.
Freud said that patients develop conversion disorder to avoid unacceptable conflicting thoughts and feelings.10 It appeared that Ms. A was struggling with these questions because she brought them up again when she visited the ED after the suicide attempt.
Dissociative symptoms arise from unstable parenting and disciplining styles with variable family dynamics. Patients show extreme detachment and emotional unresponsiveness akin to attachment disorder.11 Ms. A had inconsistent parenting because both her stepfather and biological father were involved with her care. Her mother had relinquished her parental rights to her sister, which indicated some attachment issues.
Ms. A’s idea that her mother was indifferent stemmed from her uncaring approach toward her sister and not able to understand her emotionally. Her amnesia could be thought of as “I don’t know you because I don’t remember that I am related to you.” The traumas of infancy (referred to as hidden traumas) that were a result of parent-child mismatch of needs and availability at times of distress might not be obvious to the examiner.11
Although Ms. A’s infancy was reported to be unremarkable, there always is a question, especially in a consultation-liaison setting, of whether conversion disorder might be masking an attachment problem. Perhaps with long-term psychotherapy, an attachment issue would be revealed.
Excluding an organic cause or a neurologic disorder is important when diagnosing conversion disorder10; Ms. A’s negative neurologic tests favored a diagnosis of amnesia due to conversion disorder. It appears that, although Ms. A presented with “transient amnesia,” she had underlying psychiatric symptoms, likely depression or anxiety. We were concerned about possible psychiatric comorbidity and recommended inpatient hospitalization to clarify the diagnosis and provide intensive therapy, but her family declined. She may have received outpatient services, but that was not documented.
Bottom Line
Psychogenic amnesia can be a form of conversion disorder or a symptom of
malingering; can occur in dissociative disorder; and can be factitious in nature.
Regardless of the cause, the condition requires continuous close follow up. Although organic causes of amnesia should be ruled out, mental health care can help address comorbid psychiatric symptoms and might change the course of the illness.
Related Resources
• Byatt N, Toor R. Young, pregnant, ataxic—and jilted. Current Psychiatry. 2015;14(1):44-49.
• Leipsic J. A teen who is wasting away. Current Psychiatry. 2013;12(6):40-45.
Drug Brand Names
Aripiprazole • Abilify Quetiapine • Seroquel
Levetiracetam • Keppra Valproic acid • Depakote
Oxcarbazepine • Trileptal
Disclosures
The authors report no financial relationship with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
1. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 5th ed. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association; 2013.
2. van der Hart O, Nijenhuis E. Generalized dissociative amnesia: episodic, semantic and procedural memories lost and found. Aust N Z J Psychiatry. 2001;35(5):589-560.
3. Ehrlich S, Pfeiffer E, Salbach H, et al. Factitious disorder in children and adolescents: a retrospective study. Psychosomatics. 2008;45(5):392-398.
4. Sar V, Akyüz G, Kundakçi T, et al. Childhood trauma, dissociation, and psychiatric comorbidity in patients with conversion disorder. Am J Psychiatry. 2004;161(12):2271-2276.
5. Kisiel CL, Lyons JS. Dissociation as a mediator of psychopathology among sexually abused children and adolescents. Am J Psychiatry. 2001;158(7):1034-1039.
6. Worley CB, Feldman MD, Hamilton JC. The case of factitious disorder versus malingering. http://www.psychiatrictimes. com/munchausen-syndrome/case-factitious-disorder-versus-malingering. Published October 30, 2009. Accessed January 27, 2015.
7. Hagglund LA. Challenges in the treatment of factitious disorder: a case study. Arch Psychiatr Nurs. 2009;23(1):58-64.
8. Jenkins KG, Kapur N, Kopelman MD. Retrograde amnesia and malingering. Curr Opin Neurol. 2009;22(6):601-605.
9. Walker JS. Malingering in children: fibs and faking. Child Adolesc Psychiatr Clin N Am. 2011;20(3):547-556.
10. Levenson JL. Psychiatric issues in neurology, part 4: amnestic syndromes and conversion disorder. Primary Psychiatry. http://primarypsychiatry.com/psychiatric-issues-in-neurology-part-4-amnestic-syndromes-and-conversion-disorder. Published March 1, 2008. Accessed February 3, 2015.
11. Lyons-Ruth K, Dutra L, Schuder MR, et al. From infant attachment disorganization to adult dissociation: relational adaptations or traumatic experiences? Psychiatr Clin North Am. 2006;29(1):63-86, viii.
CASE Seizures, amnesia
Ms. A, age 13, who has a history of seizures, presents to the emergency department (ED) with sudden onset of memory loss. Her family reports that she had been spending a normal evening at home with family and friends. After going to the bathroom, Ms. A became acutely confused and extremely upset, had slurred speech, and did not recognize anyone in the room except her mother.
Initial neurologic examination in the ED reports that Ms. A does not remember recent or remote past events. Her family denies any recent stressors.
Vital signs are within normal range. She has mild muscle soreness and gait instability, which is attributed to a presumed postictal phase. Her medication regimen includes: levetiracetam, 500 mg, 3 times a day; valproic acid, 1,000 mg/d; and oxcarbazepine, 2,400 mg/d, for seizure management.
Complete blood count and comprehensive metabolic panel are within normal limits. Pregnancy test is negative. Urine toxicology report is negative. Serum valproic acid level is 71 μg/mL; oxcarbazepine level, <2 μg/mL; ammonia level, 71 μg/dL (reference range, 15 to 45 μg/dL). Other than the aforementioned deficits, she is neurologically intact. The team thinks that her symptoms are part of a postictal phase of an unwitnessed seizure.
Ms. A is admitted to the inpatient medical unit for further work up. Along with the memory loss and seizures, she reports visual hallucinations.
What could be causing Ms. A’s amnesia?
a) a seizure disorder
b) malingering
c) posttraumatic stress disorder
d) traumatic brain injury
HISTORY Repeat ED visits
Ms. A’s mother reports that 3 years ago her daughter was treated for tics with quetiapine and aripiprazole, prescribed by a primary care physician. She received a short course of counseling 6 years ago after her sister was sexually abused by her grandfather. Approximately 6 months ago, Ms. A engaged in self-injurious behavior by cutting herself, and she briefly received counseling. There is no history of suicide attempts, psychiatric hospitalization, or a psychiatric diagnosis.
Medical and surgical history include viral meningitis at age 6 months. Medical records show a visit to the ED for abdominal pain after a classmate punched her in the abdomen, which resolved with supportive care. She was given a diagnosis of pediatric autoimmune neuropsychiatric disorders associated with streptococcal infections 6 years ago.
Ms. A developed multiple recurrent methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus abscesses a year ago, which lasted for 4 months; it was noted that she was self-inoculating by scratching eczema. She had a possible syncopal episode 5 months ago, but the medical work-up was normal. The pediatric neurology service diagnosed and treated seizures 4 months ago.
Levetiracetam was prescribed after a possible syncopal episode followed by a tonic-clonic seizure. Because she was still having seizure-like episodes with a single antiepileptic drug (AED), oxcarbazepine, then valproic acid were added. Whether her seizures were generalized or partial was inconclusive. The seizures were followed by a postictal phase lasting 3 minutes to 1 hour. Her last generalized tonic-clonic seizure was 1 month before admission.
Ms. A had 3 MRI studies of the brain over the past 3 years, which showed consistent and unchanged multifocal punctate white matter lesions. The findings represented gliosis from an old perivascular inflammation, trauma, or ischemic damage. There is no history of traumatic brain injury.
Her perinatal history is unremarkable, with normal vaginal delivery at 36 weeks (pre-term birth). All developmental milestones were on target.
Ms. A lives at home with her mother, 6-year-old brother, and stepfather. Her parents are divorced, but her biological father has been involved in her upbringing. She is in seventh grade, but is home schooled after she withdrew from school because of multiple seizure episodes. Ms. A denied bullying at school although she had been punched by a peer. It was unclear if it was a single incident or bullying continued and she was hesitant to disclose it.
The authors’ observations
We focus on the amnesia because it has an acute onset and it seems this is the first time Ms. A presented with this symptom. There is no need to wait for neurology consultation, even though organic causes of amnesia need to be ruled out. Our plan is to develop rapport with Ms. A, and then administer a mental status examination focusing on memory assessment. We understand that, because Ms. A’s chief concern is amnesia, she might not be able to provide many details. We start the initial interview with the family in the patient’s room to understand family dynamics, and then interview Ms. A alone.
EVALUATION Memory problems
On initial psychiatric interview, Ms. A can recognize some of her family members. She is seen in clean attire, with short hair, lying in the bed with good eye contact and a calm demeanor. She seems to be difficult to engage because of her reserved nature.
Ms. A displays some psychomotor retardation. She reports her mood as tired, and her affect is flat and mood incongruent. She is alert and oriented to person only; not to place, time, or situation. She can do a simple spelling task, perform 5-minute recall of 3 words, complete serial 3 subtractions, repeat phrases, read aloud, focus on a coin task, and name simple objects. She does not compare similar objects or answer simple historical or factual questions.
Ms. A replies “I don’t know” to most historical questions, such as her birthday, favorite color, and family members; she does not answer when asked how many legs a dog has, who is the current or past president, what month the Fourth of July is in, or when Christmas is. She can complete some memory tasks on the Mini-Mental State Examination, but does not attempt many others. Ms. A says she is upset about her memory deficit, but her affect was flat. Her mood and her affect were incongruent. She describes a vision of a “girl with black holes [for eyes]” in the corner of her hospital room telling her not to believe anyone and that the interviewers are lying to her. Also, she reports that “the girl” tells her to hurt herself and others, but she is not going to act on the commands because she knows it is not the right thing to do. When we ask Ms. A about a history of substance abuse, she says she has never heard of drugs or alcohol.
Overall, she displays multiple apparent deficits in declarative memory, both episodic and semantic. Regarding non-declarative or procedural memory, she can dress herself, use the bathroom independently, order meals off the menu, and feed herself, among other routine tasks, without difficulty.
According to Ms. A’s mother, Ms. A has shown a decline in overall functioning and personality changes during the past 5 months. She started to cut herself superficially on her forearms 6 months ago and also tried to change her appearance with a new hairstyle when school started. She displayed noticeably intense and disturbing writings, artwork, and conversations with others over 3 to 4 months.
She started experiencing seizures, with 3 to 4 seizures a day; however, she could attend sleepovers seizure-free. She had prolonged periods of seizures lasting up to an hour, much longer than would be expected clinically. She also had requested to go to the cemetery for unclear reasons (because the spirit wanted her to visit), and was observed mumbling under her breath.
Six years ago, Ms. A’s 6-year-old sister tried to suffocate her infant brother. Child protective services was involved and the sister was hospitalized in a psychiatric facility, where she was given a diagnosis of bipolar disorder; she was then transferred to foster care, and later placed in residential treatment. Her mother relinquished her parental rights and gave custody of Ms. A’s sister to the state.
Ms. A’s mother has a history of depression, but her younger brother is healthy. There is no history of autism, attention problems, tics, substance abuse, brain tumor, or intellectual disabilities in the family.
Which diagnosis does Ms. A’s presentation and history suggest?
a) dissociative amnesia
b) factitious disorder imposed on self
c) conversion disorder (neurological symptom disorder)
d) psychosis not otherwise specified
e) malingering
The authors’ observations
The history of unwitnessed seizures, sudden onset of visual hallucinations, and transient amnesia points to a possible postictal cause. Selective amnesia brings up the question of whether psychological components are driving the symptoms.
Her psychotic symptoms appear to be mediated by anxiety and possibly related to the trauma of losing her only sister when her mother relinquished custody to the state; the circumstances might have aroused feelings of insecurity or fear of abandonment and raised questions about her mother’s love toward her. Her sister’s abuse by a family member might have created reticence to trust others. These background experiences could be intensely conflicting at this age when the second separation individuation process commences, especially in an emotionally immature adolescent.
OUTCOME Medication change
The neurology team recommends discontinuing levetiracetam because the visual hallucinations, mood disturbance, and personality change could be adverse effects of the drug. Because of generalized uncontrolled body movements with staring episodes and unresponsiveness, an EEG is ordered to rule out ongoing seizures.
Ms. A recognizes the psychosomatic medicine team members when they interview her again. The team employs consistent reassurance and a non-confrontational approach. She spends 3 days in the medical unit during which she reports that the frequency of visual and auditory hallucinations decreases and her memory symptoms resolve. Her 24-hour EEG is negative for seizure activity, and the 24-hour video EEG does not show any signs of epileptogenic foci. Ms. A’s family declines inpatient psychiatric hospitalization.
Because of gradual improvement in Ms. A’s symptoms and no imminent safety concerns, she is discharged home with valproic acid, 1,000 mg/d, and oxcarbazepine, 1,200 mg/d, and follow-up appointments with her primary care physician, a neurologist, and a psychiatrist.
The authors’ observations
Dissociative amnesia
Generalized dissociative amnesia is difficult to differentiate from factitious disorder or malingering. According to DSM-5, there is loss of episodic memory in dissociative amnesia, in which the person is unable to recall the stressful event after trauma (Table 1).1 Although there have been case reports of dissociative amnesia with loss of semantic and procedural memory, episodic memory is the last to return.2 In Ms. A’s case, there was no immediate basis to explain amnesia onset, although she had experienced the trauma of losing her sister. She had episodic and mostly semantic memory loss.
Although organic causes can precipitate amnesia,3 Ms. A’s EEG and MRI results did not reflect that. Patients with a dissociative disorder often report some physical, sexual, or emotional abuse.4 Although Ms. A did not report any abuse, it cannot be completely ruled out because of her sister’s history of abuse.
Suicidality or self-injurious behavior is common among adults with dissociative amnesia, although it is not well studied in children.4,5 Generally, the constellation of primary dissociative symptoms that patients develop are forgetfulness, fragmentation, and emotional numbing. Ms. A presented with some of these features; did she, in fact, have dissociative amnesia?
Factitious amnesia
Factious amnesia (Table 2)6 is a symptom of factious disorder in which amnesia appears with the motivation to assume a sick role.3 Ms. A’s amnesia garnered significant attention from her mother and other family members; this may have been related to insecurity in her family relationships because her sister was given up to the state. She also could be afraid of entering adolescence and leaving her sister behind. Did she want more time to bond with her mother? Did she experience emotional benefit from being cared for by medical professionals?7 Her affect during interviews was blunted and her attitude was nonchalant, and her multiple visits to the hospital since childhood for abdominal pain, abscesses (it isn’t clear whether the abscesses were related to self-injury and scratching), tics, seizures, and, recently, amnesia and hallucinations indicated some desire to occupy a sick role. Furthermore, the severity of her symptoms seemed to be increasing over time, from somatic to neurologic (seizure-like episodes) to significant and less frequent psychiatric symptoms (amnesia and hallucinations). One could speculate that her symptoms were escalating because she was not receiving the attention she needed.
Malingered amnesia
Although malingering is not a psychiatric diagnosis, it can be a focus of clinical attention. It is challenging to identify malingered cognitive impairments.8 Children often have difficulty malingering symptoms because they have limited understanding of the illness they are trying to simulate.9 Many malingerers do not want to participate in their medical work up and might exhibit a hostile attitude toward examiners (Table 26). Clinicians could rely on family to provide information regarding history and inconsistencies in clinical deficits.9 The clinical interview, mental status examination, and collateral information are crucial for identifying malingering.
Most of Ms. A’s seizure-like episodes happened in specific contexts, such as in school, but not at friends’ houses, raising the question of whether she is aware of her episodes. Ms. A’s grades are consistently good; because she is being home schooled, there is no secondary gain from not going to school. There is no other reason to speculate that she was malingering.
The inconsistency of Ms. A’s symptoms and her compliance with assessment and treatment did not reflect malingering. Interestingly, Ms. A’s amnesia was retrograde in nature. There have been more studies on malingered anterograde amnesia8 than on retrograde amnesia, making her presentation even more unusual.
Amnesia presenting as conversion disorder
Amnesia as a symptom of conversion disorder is referred as psychogenic amnesia; the memory loss mostly is isolated retrograde amnesia.10 Ms. A likely had unconsciously produced symptoms of non-epileptic seizures, followed by auditory and visual hallucinations not related to her seizures, and then later developed selective transient amnesia. Conversion disorder seemed to be the diagnosis most consistent with her indifference (“la belle indifference”) and the significant attention she gained from the acute memory loss (Table 3).1 It seemed that she developed multiple symptoms in progression leading toward a conversion disorder diagnosis. The question arises whether Ms. A’s presentation is a gradually increasing cry for help or reflects depressive or anxiety symptoms, which often are comorbid with conversion disorder.
FOLLOW-UP Suicide attempt
Ms. A has frequent visits to the ED with symptoms of syncope and seizures and undergoes medical work-up and multiple EEGs. A prolonged 5-day video EEG is performed to assess seizure episodes after AEDs were withdrawn, but no seizure activity is elicited. She also has an ED visit for recurrent tic emergence.
The last visit in the ED is for a suicide attempt with overdose of an unknown quantity of unspecified pills. Ms. A talks to a social worker, who reports that Ms. A needed answers to such questions as why her grandfather abused her sister? Could she have stopped them and made a difference for the family?
The authors’ observations
Conversion disorder arises from unconscious psychological conflicts, needs, or responses to trauma. Ms. A’s consistent conflict about her sister and grandfather’s relationship was evident from occasions when she tried to confide in hospital staff. During an ED visit, she reported her sister’s abuse to a staff member. Another time, while recovering from sedation, she spontaneously spoke about her sister’s abuse. When asked again, she said she did not remember saying it.
Freud said that patients develop conversion disorder to avoid unacceptable conflicting thoughts and feelings.10 It appeared that Ms. A was struggling with these questions because she brought them up again when she visited the ED after the suicide attempt.
Dissociative symptoms arise from unstable parenting and disciplining styles with variable family dynamics. Patients show extreme detachment and emotional unresponsiveness akin to attachment disorder.11 Ms. A had inconsistent parenting because both her stepfather and biological father were involved with her care. Her mother had relinquished her parental rights to her sister, which indicated some attachment issues.
Ms. A’s idea that her mother was indifferent stemmed from her uncaring approach toward her sister and not able to understand her emotionally. Her amnesia could be thought of as “I don’t know you because I don’t remember that I am related to you.” The traumas of infancy (referred to as hidden traumas) that were a result of parent-child mismatch of needs and availability at times of distress might not be obvious to the examiner.11
Although Ms. A’s infancy was reported to be unremarkable, there always is a question, especially in a consultation-liaison setting, of whether conversion disorder might be masking an attachment problem. Perhaps with long-term psychotherapy, an attachment issue would be revealed.
Excluding an organic cause or a neurologic disorder is important when diagnosing conversion disorder10; Ms. A’s negative neurologic tests favored a diagnosis of amnesia due to conversion disorder. It appears that, although Ms. A presented with “transient amnesia,” she had underlying psychiatric symptoms, likely depression or anxiety. We were concerned about possible psychiatric comorbidity and recommended inpatient hospitalization to clarify the diagnosis and provide intensive therapy, but her family declined. She may have received outpatient services, but that was not documented.
Bottom Line
Psychogenic amnesia can be a form of conversion disorder or a symptom of
malingering; can occur in dissociative disorder; and can be factitious in nature.
Regardless of the cause, the condition requires continuous close follow up. Although organic causes of amnesia should be ruled out, mental health care can help address comorbid psychiatric symptoms and might change the course of the illness.
Related Resources
• Byatt N, Toor R. Young, pregnant, ataxic—and jilted. Current Psychiatry. 2015;14(1):44-49.
• Leipsic J. A teen who is wasting away. Current Psychiatry. 2013;12(6):40-45.
Drug Brand Names
Aripiprazole • Abilify Quetiapine • Seroquel
Levetiracetam • Keppra Valproic acid • Depakote
Oxcarbazepine • Trileptal
Disclosures
The authors report no financial relationship with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
CASE Seizures, amnesia
Ms. A, age 13, who has a history of seizures, presents to the emergency department (ED) with sudden onset of memory loss. Her family reports that she had been spending a normal evening at home with family and friends. After going to the bathroom, Ms. A became acutely confused and extremely upset, had slurred speech, and did not recognize anyone in the room except her mother.
Initial neurologic examination in the ED reports that Ms. A does not remember recent or remote past events. Her family denies any recent stressors.
Vital signs are within normal range. She has mild muscle soreness and gait instability, which is attributed to a presumed postictal phase. Her medication regimen includes: levetiracetam, 500 mg, 3 times a day; valproic acid, 1,000 mg/d; and oxcarbazepine, 2,400 mg/d, for seizure management.
Complete blood count and comprehensive metabolic panel are within normal limits. Pregnancy test is negative. Urine toxicology report is negative. Serum valproic acid level is 71 μg/mL; oxcarbazepine level, <2 μg/mL; ammonia level, 71 μg/dL (reference range, 15 to 45 μg/dL). Other than the aforementioned deficits, she is neurologically intact. The team thinks that her symptoms are part of a postictal phase of an unwitnessed seizure.
Ms. A is admitted to the inpatient medical unit for further work up. Along with the memory loss and seizures, she reports visual hallucinations.
What could be causing Ms. A’s amnesia?
a) a seizure disorder
b) malingering
c) posttraumatic stress disorder
d) traumatic brain injury
HISTORY Repeat ED visits
Ms. A’s mother reports that 3 years ago her daughter was treated for tics with quetiapine and aripiprazole, prescribed by a primary care physician. She received a short course of counseling 6 years ago after her sister was sexually abused by her grandfather. Approximately 6 months ago, Ms. A engaged in self-injurious behavior by cutting herself, and she briefly received counseling. There is no history of suicide attempts, psychiatric hospitalization, or a psychiatric diagnosis.
Medical and surgical history include viral meningitis at age 6 months. Medical records show a visit to the ED for abdominal pain after a classmate punched her in the abdomen, which resolved with supportive care. She was given a diagnosis of pediatric autoimmune neuropsychiatric disorders associated with streptococcal infections 6 years ago.
Ms. A developed multiple recurrent methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus abscesses a year ago, which lasted for 4 months; it was noted that she was self-inoculating by scratching eczema. She had a possible syncopal episode 5 months ago, but the medical work-up was normal. The pediatric neurology service diagnosed and treated seizures 4 months ago.
Levetiracetam was prescribed after a possible syncopal episode followed by a tonic-clonic seizure. Because she was still having seizure-like episodes with a single antiepileptic drug (AED), oxcarbazepine, then valproic acid were added. Whether her seizures were generalized or partial was inconclusive. The seizures were followed by a postictal phase lasting 3 minutes to 1 hour. Her last generalized tonic-clonic seizure was 1 month before admission.
Ms. A had 3 MRI studies of the brain over the past 3 years, which showed consistent and unchanged multifocal punctate white matter lesions. The findings represented gliosis from an old perivascular inflammation, trauma, or ischemic damage. There is no history of traumatic brain injury.
Her perinatal history is unremarkable, with normal vaginal delivery at 36 weeks (pre-term birth). All developmental milestones were on target.
Ms. A lives at home with her mother, 6-year-old brother, and stepfather. Her parents are divorced, but her biological father has been involved in her upbringing. She is in seventh grade, but is home schooled after she withdrew from school because of multiple seizure episodes. Ms. A denied bullying at school although she had been punched by a peer. It was unclear if it was a single incident or bullying continued and she was hesitant to disclose it.
The authors’ observations
We focus on the amnesia because it has an acute onset and it seems this is the first time Ms. A presented with this symptom. There is no need to wait for neurology consultation, even though organic causes of amnesia need to be ruled out. Our plan is to develop rapport with Ms. A, and then administer a mental status examination focusing on memory assessment. We understand that, because Ms. A’s chief concern is amnesia, she might not be able to provide many details. We start the initial interview with the family in the patient’s room to understand family dynamics, and then interview Ms. A alone.
EVALUATION Memory problems
On initial psychiatric interview, Ms. A can recognize some of her family members. She is seen in clean attire, with short hair, lying in the bed with good eye contact and a calm demeanor. She seems to be difficult to engage because of her reserved nature.
Ms. A displays some psychomotor retardation. She reports her mood as tired, and her affect is flat and mood incongruent. She is alert and oriented to person only; not to place, time, or situation. She can do a simple spelling task, perform 5-minute recall of 3 words, complete serial 3 subtractions, repeat phrases, read aloud, focus on a coin task, and name simple objects. She does not compare similar objects or answer simple historical or factual questions.
Ms. A replies “I don’t know” to most historical questions, such as her birthday, favorite color, and family members; she does not answer when asked how many legs a dog has, who is the current or past president, what month the Fourth of July is in, or when Christmas is. She can complete some memory tasks on the Mini-Mental State Examination, but does not attempt many others. Ms. A says she is upset about her memory deficit, but her affect was flat. Her mood and her affect were incongruent. She describes a vision of a “girl with black holes [for eyes]” in the corner of her hospital room telling her not to believe anyone and that the interviewers are lying to her. Also, she reports that “the girl” tells her to hurt herself and others, but she is not going to act on the commands because she knows it is not the right thing to do. When we ask Ms. A about a history of substance abuse, she says she has never heard of drugs or alcohol.
Overall, she displays multiple apparent deficits in declarative memory, both episodic and semantic. Regarding non-declarative or procedural memory, she can dress herself, use the bathroom independently, order meals off the menu, and feed herself, among other routine tasks, without difficulty.
According to Ms. A’s mother, Ms. A has shown a decline in overall functioning and personality changes during the past 5 months. She started to cut herself superficially on her forearms 6 months ago and also tried to change her appearance with a new hairstyle when school started. She displayed noticeably intense and disturbing writings, artwork, and conversations with others over 3 to 4 months.
She started experiencing seizures, with 3 to 4 seizures a day; however, she could attend sleepovers seizure-free. She had prolonged periods of seizures lasting up to an hour, much longer than would be expected clinically. She also had requested to go to the cemetery for unclear reasons (because the spirit wanted her to visit), and was observed mumbling under her breath.
Six years ago, Ms. A’s 6-year-old sister tried to suffocate her infant brother. Child protective services was involved and the sister was hospitalized in a psychiatric facility, where she was given a diagnosis of bipolar disorder; she was then transferred to foster care, and later placed in residential treatment. Her mother relinquished her parental rights and gave custody of Ms. A’s sister to the state.
Ms. A’s mother has a history of depression, but her younger brother is healthy. There is no history of autism, attention problems, tics, substance abuse, brain tumor, or intellectual disabilities in the family.
Which diagnosis does Ms. A’s presentation and history suggest?
a) dissociative amnesia
b) factitious disorder imposed on self
c) conversion disorder (neurological symptom disorder)
d) psychosis not otherwise specified
e) malingering
The authors’ observations
The history of unwitnessed seizures, sudden onset of visual hallucinations, and transient amnesia points to a possible postictal cause. Selective amnesia brings up the question of whether psychological components are driving the symptoms.
Her psychotic symptoms appear to be mediated by anxiety and possibly related to the trauma of losing her only sister when her mother relinquished custody to the state; the circumstances might have aroused feelings of insecurity or fear of abandonment and raised questions about her mother’s love toward her. Her sister’s abuse by a family member might have created reticence to trust others. These background experiences could be intensely conflicting at this age when the second separation individuation process commences, especially in an emotionally immature adolescent.
OUTCOME Medication change
The neurology team recommends discontinuing levetiracetam because the visual hallucinations, mood disturbance, and personality change could be adverse effects of the drug. Because of generalized uncontrolled body movements with staring episodes and unresponsiveness, an EEG is ordered to rule out ongoing seizures.
Ms. A recognizes the psychosomatic medicine team members when they interview her again. The team employs consistent reassurance and a non-confrontational approach. She spends 3 days in the medical unit during which she reports that the frequency of visual and auditory hallucinations decreases and her memory symptoms resolve. Her 24-hour EEG is negative for seizure activity, and the 24-hour video EEG does not show any signs of epileptogenic foci. Ms. A’s family declines inpatient psychiatric hospitalization.
Because of gradual improvement in Ms. A’s symptoms and no imminent safety concerns, she is discharged home with valproic acid, 1,000 mg/d, and oxcarbazepine, 1,200 mg/d, and follow-up appointments with her primary care physician, a neurologist, and a psychiatrist.
The authors’ observations
Dissociative amnesia
Generalized dissociative amnesia is difficult to differentiate from factitious disorder or malingering. According to DSM-5, there is loss of episodic memory in dissociative amnesia, in which the person is unable to recall the stressful event after trauma (Table 1).1 Although there have been case reports of dissociative amnesia with loss of semantic and procedural memory, episodic memory is the last to return.2 In Ms. A’s case, there was no immediate basis to explain amnesia onset, although she had experienced the trauma of losing her sister. She had episodic and mostly semantic memory loss.
Although organic causes can precipitate amnesia,3 Ms. A’s EEG and MRI results did not reflect that. Patients with a dissociative disorder often report some physical, sexual, or emotional abuse.4 Although Ms. A did not report any abuse, it cannot be completely ruled out because of her sister’s history of abuse.
Suicidality or self-injurious behavior is common among adults with dissociative amnesia, although it is not well studied in children.4,5 Generally, the constellation of primary dissociative symptoms that patients develop are forgetfulness, fragmentation, and emotional numbing. Ms. A presented with some of these features; did she, in fact, have dissociative amnesia?
Factitious amnesia
Factious amnesia (Table 2)6 is a symptom of factious disorder in which amnesia appears with the motivation to assume a sick role.3 Ms. A’s amnesia garnered significant attention from her mother and other family members; this may have been related to insecurity in her family relationships because her sister was given up to the state. She also could be afraid of entering adolescence and leaving her sister behind. Did she want more time to bond with her mother? Did she experience emotional benefit from being cared for by medical professionals?7 Her affect during interviews was blunted and her attitude was nonchalant, and her multiple visits to the hospital since childhood for abdominal pain, abscesses (it isn’t clear whether the abscesses were related to self-injury and scratching), tics, seizures, and, recently, amnesia and hallucinations indicated some desire to occupy a sick role. Furthermore, the severity of her symptoms seemed to be increasing over time, from somatic to neurologic (seizure-like episodes) to significant and less frequent psychiatric symptoms (amnesia and hallucinations). One could speculate that her symptoms were escalating because she was not receiving the attention she needed.
Malingered amnesia
Although malingering is not a psychiatric diagnosis, it can be a focus of clinical attention. It is challenging to identify malingered cognitive impairments.8 Children often have difficulty malingering symptoms because they have limited understanding of the illness they are trying to simulate.9 Many malingerers do not want to participate in their medical work up and might exhibit a hostile attitude toward examiners (Table 26). Clinicians could rely on family to provide information regarding history and inconsistencies in clinical deficits.9 The clinical interview, mental status examination, and collateral information are crucial for identifying malingering.
Most of Ms. A’s seizure-like episodes happened in specific contexts, such as in school, but not at friends’ houses, raising the question of whether she is aware of her episodes. Ms. A’s grades are consistently good; because she is being home schooled, there is no secondary gain from not going to school. There is no other reason to speculate that she was malingering.
The inconsistency of Ms. A’s symptoms and her compliance with assessment and treatment did not reflect malingering. Interestingly, Ms. A’s amnesia was retrograde in nature. There have been more studies on malingered anterograde amnesia8 than on retrograde amnesia, making her presentation even more unusual.
Amnesia presenting as conversion disorder
Amnesia as a symptom of conversion disorder is referred as psychogenic amnesia; the memory loss mostly is isolated retrograde amnesia.10 Ms. A likely had unconsciously produced symptoms of non-epileptic seizures, followed by auditory and visual hallucinations not related to her seizures, and then later developed selective transient amnesia. Conversion disorder seemed to be the diagnosis most consistent with her indifference (“la belle indifference”) and the significant attention she gained from the acute memory loss (Table 3).1 It seemed that she developed multiple symptoms in progression leading toward a conversion disorder diagnosis. The question arises whether Ms. A’s presentation is a gradually increasing cry for help or reflects depressive or anxiety symptoms, which often are comorbid with conversion disorder.
FOLLOW-UP Suicide attempt
Ms. A has frequent visits to the ED with symptoms of syncope and seizures and undergoes medical work-up and multiple EEGs. A prolonged 5-day video EEG is performed to assess seizure episodes after AEDs were withdrawn, but no seizure activity is elicited. She also has an ED visit for recurrent tic emergence.
The last visit in the ED is for a suicide attempt with overdose of an unknown quantity of unspecified pills. Ms. A talks to a social worker, who reports that Ms. A needed answers to such questions as why her grandfather abused her sister? Could she have stopped them and made a difference for the family?
The authors’ observations
Conversion disorder arises from unconscious psychological conflicts, needs, or responses to trauma. Ms. A’s consistent conflict about her sister and grandfather’s relationship was evident from occasions when she tried to confide in hospital staff. During an ED visit, she reported her sister’s abuse to a staff member. Another time, while recovering from sedation, she spontaneously spoke about her sister’s abuse. When asked again, she said she did not remember saying it.
Freud said that patients develop conversion disorder to avoid unacceptable conflicting thoughts and feelings.10 It appeared that Ms. A was struggling with these questions because she brought them up again when she visited the ED after the suicide attempt.
Dissociative symptoms arise from unstable parenting and disciplining styles with variable family dynamics. Patients show extreme detachment and emotional unresponsiveness akin to attachment disorder.11 Ms. A had inconsistent parenting because both her stepfather and biological father were involved with her care. Her mother had relinquished her parental rights to her sister, which indicated some attachment issues.
Ms. A’s idea that her mother was indifferent stemmed from her uncaring approach toward her sister and not able to understand her emotionally. Her amnesia could be thought of as “I don’t know you because I don’t remember that I am related to you.” The traumas of infancy (referred to as hidden traumas) that were a result of parent-child mismatch of needs and availability at times of distress might not be obvious to the examiner.11
Although Ms. A’s infancy was reported to be unremarkable, there always is a question, especially in a consultation-liaison setting, of whether conversion disorder might be masking an attachment problem. Perhaps with long-term psychotherapy, an attachment issue would be revealed.
Excluding an organic cause or a neurologic disorder is important when diagnosing conversion disorder10; Ms. A’s negative neurologic tests favored a diagnosis of amnesia due to conversion disorder. It appears that, although Ms. A presented with “transient amnesia,” she had underlying psychiatric symptoms, likely depression or anxiety. We were concerned about possible psychiatric comorbidity and recommended inpatient hospitalization to clarify the diagnosis and provide intensive therapy, but her family declined. She may have received outpatient services, but that was not documented.
Bottom Line
Psychogenic amnesia can be a form of conversion disorder or a symptom of
malingering; can occur in dissociative disorder; and can be factitious in nature.
Regardless of the cause, the condition requires continuous close follow up. Although organic causes of amnesia should be ruled out, mental health care can help address comorbid psychiatric symptoms and might change the course of the illness.
Related Resources
• Byatt N, Toor R. Young, pregnant, ataxic—and jilted. Current Psychiatry. 2015;14(1):44-49.
• Leipsic J. A teen who is wasting away. Current Psychiatry. 2013;12(6):40-45.
Drug Brand Names
Aripiprazole • Abilify Quetiapine • Seroquel
Levetiracetam • Keppra Valproic acid • Depakote
Oxcarbazepine • Trileptal
Disclosures
The authors report no financial relationship with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
1. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 5th ed. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association; 2013.
2. van der Hart O, Nijenhuis E. Generalized dissociative amnesia: episodic, semantic and procedural memories lost and found. Aust N Z J Psychiatry. 2001;35(5):589-560.
3. Ehrlich S, Pfeiffer E, Salbach H, et al. Factitious disorder in children and adolescents: a retrospective study. Psychosomatics. 2008;45(5):392-398.
4. Sar V, Akyüz G, Kundakçi T, et al. Childhood trauma, dissociation, and psychiatric comorbidity in patients with conversion disorder. Am J Psychiatry. 2004;161(12):2271-2276.
5. Kisiel CL, Lyons JS. Dissociation as a mediator of psychopathology among sexually abused children and adolescents. Am J Psychiatry. 2001;158(7):1034-1039.
6. Worley CB, Feldman MD, Hamilton JC. The case of factitious disorder versus malingering. http://www.psychiatrictimes. com/munchausen-syndrome/case-factitious-disorder-versus-malingering. Published October 30, 2009. Accessed January 27, 2015.
7. Hagglund LA. Challenges in the treatment of factitious disorder: a case study. Arch Psychiatr Nurs. 2009;23(1):58-64.
8. Jenkins KG, Kapur N, Kopelman MD. Retrograde amnesia and malingering. Curr Opin Neurol. 2009;22(6):601-605.
9. Walker JS. Malingering in children: fibs and faking. Child Adolesc Psychiatr Clin N Am. 2011;20(3):547-556.
10. Levenson JL. Psychiatric issues in neurology, part 4: amnestic syndromes and conversion disorder. Primary Psychiatry. http://primarypsychiatry.com/psychiatric-issues-in-neurology-part-4-amnestic-syndromes-and-conversion-disorder. Published March 1, 2008. Accessed February 3, 2015.
11. Lyons-Ruth K, Dutra L, Schuder MR, et al. From infant attachment disorganization to adult dissociation: relational adaptations or traumatic experiences? Psychiatr Clin North Am. 2006;29(1):63-86, viii.
1. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 5th ed. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association; 2013.
2. van der Hart O, Nijenhuis E. Generalized dissociative amnesia: episodic, semantic and procedural memories lost and found. Aust N Z J Psychiatry. 2001;35(5):589-560.
3. Ehrlich S, Pfeiffer E, Salbach H, et al. Factitious disorder in children and adolescents: a retrospective study. Psychosomatics. 2008;45(5):392-398.
4. Sar V, Akyüz G, Kundakçi T, et al. Childhood trauma, dissociation, and psychiatric comorbidity in patients with conversion disorder. Am J Psychiatry. 2004;161(12):2271-2276.
5. Kisiel CL, Lyons JS. Dissociation as a mediator of psychopathology among sexually abused children and adolescents. Am J Psychiatry. 2001;158(7):1034-1039.
6. Worley CB, Feldman MD, Hamilton JC. The case of factitious disorder versus malingering. http://www.psychiatrictimes. com/munchausen-syndrome/case-factitious-disorder-versus-malingering. Published October 30, 2009. Accessed January 27, 2015.
7. Hagglund LA. Challenges in the treatment of factitious disorder: a case study. Arch Psychiatr Nurs. 2009;23(1):58-64.
8. Jenkins KG, Kapur N, Kopelman MD. Retrograde amnesia and malingering. Curr Opin Neurol. 2009;22(6):601-605.
9. Walker JS. Malingering in children: fibs and faking. Child Adolesc Psychiatr Clin N Am. 2011;20(3):547-556.
10. Levenson JL. Psychiatric issues in neurology, part 4: amnestic syndromes and conversion disorder. Primary Psychiatry. http://primarypsychiatry.com/psychiatric-issues-in-neurology-part-4-amnestic-syndromes-and-conversion-disorder. Published March 1, 2008. Accessed February 3, 2015.
11. Lyons-Ruth K, Dutra L, Schuder MR, et al. From infant attachment disorganization to adult dissociation: relational adaptations or traumatic experiences? Psychiatr Clin North Am. 2006;29(1):63-86, viii.
Lisdexamfetamine for binge eating disorder: New indication
Lisdexamfetamine, approved by the FDA in 2007 for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), has a new indication: binge eating disorder (BED) (Table 1). BED is characterized by recurrent episodes of consuming a large amount of food in a short time. A prodrug of amphetamine, lisdexamfetamine is a Schedule-II controlled substance, with a high potential for abuse and the risk of severe psychological or physical dependence.
Lisdexamfetamine is not indicated for weight loss or obesity.
Dosage
For BED, the initial dosage of lisdexamfetamine is 30 mg/d in the morning, titrated by 20 mg/d per week to the target dosage of 50 to 70 mg/d. Maximum dosage is 70 mg/d. Morning dosing is recommended to avoid sleep disturbance.
Efficacy
The clinical efficacy of lisdexamfetamine was assessed in two 12-week parallel group, flexible-dose, placebo-controlled trials in adults with BED (age 18 to 55). Primary efficacy measure was the number of binge days per week. Both studies had a 4-week dose-optimization period and an 8-week dose-maintenance period and followed the same dosage protocol. Patients began treatment at 30 mg/d and after 1 week were titrated to 50 mg/d; increases to 70 mg/d were made if clinically necessary and well tolerated. Patients were maintained on the optimized dosage during the 8-week dose-maintenance period. A dosage of 30 mg/d did not produce a statistically significant effect, but 50 mg/d and 70 mg/d dosages were statistically superior to placebo. Patients taking lisdexamfetamine also had greater improvement on the Clinical Global Impression—Improvement scores, 4-week binge cessation, and greater reduction in the Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale Modified for Binge Eating score.
The prescribing information does not state if lisdexamfetamine should be continued long-term for treating BED.
Adverse reactions
In controlled trials, 5.1% of patients receiving lisdexamfetamine for BED discontinued the drug because of an adverse event, compared with 2.4% of patients receiving placebo. The most common adverse reactions in BED studies were dry mouth (36%), insomnia (20%), decreased appetite (8%), increased heart rate (8%), constipation (6%), and feeling jittery (6%). In trials of children, adolescents, and adults with ADHD, decreased appetite was more common (39%, 34%, and 27%, respectively) than in BED trials (Table 2). Anaphylactic reactions, Stevens-Johnson syndrome, angioedema, and urticaria have been described in postmarketing reports.
The safety of lisdexamfetamine for BED has not been studied in patients age <18, but has been studied in patients with ADHD.
Contraindications
Do not give lisdexamfetamine to patients who have a known hypersensitivity to amphetamine products or other ingredients in lisdexamfetamine capsules.
Lisdexamfetamine is contraindicated in patients who are taking a monoamine oxidase inhibitor, because of a risk of hypertensive crisis.
Related Resources
• Wilens TE. Lisdexamfetamine for ADHD. Current Psychiatry. 2007;6(6):96-98,105.
• Peat CM, Brownley KA, Berkman ND, et al. Binge eating disorder: evidence-based treatments. Current Psychiatry. 2012; 11(5):32-39.
Source: Vyvanse [package insert]. Wayne, PA: Shire; 2015.
Lisdexamfetamine, approved by the FDA in 2007 for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), has a new indication: binge eating disorder (BED) (Table 1). BED is characterized by recurrent episodes of consuming a large amount of food in a short time. A prodrug of amphetamine, lisdexamfetamine is a Schedule-II controlled substance, with a high potential for abuse and the risk of severe psychological or physical dependence.
Lisdexamfetamine is not indicated for weight loss or obesity.
Dosage
For BED, the initial dosage of lisdexamfetamine is 30 mg/d in the morning, titrated by 20 mg/d per week to the target dosage of 50 to 70 mg/d. Maximum dosage is 70 mg/d. Morning dosing is recommended to avoid sleep disturbance.
Efficacy
The clinical efficacy of lisdexamfetamine was assessed in two 12-week parallel group, flexible-dose, placebo-controlled trials in adults with BED (age 18 to 55). Primary efficacy measure was the number of binge days per week. Both studies had a 4-week dose-optimization period and an 8-week dose-maintenance period and followed the same dosage protocol. Patients began treatment at 30 mg/d and after 1 week were titrated to 50 mg/d; increases to 70 mg/d were made if clinically necessary and well tolerated. Patients were maintained on the optimized dosage during the 8-week dose-maintenance period. A dosage of 30 mg/d did not produce a statistically significant effect, but 50 mg/d and 70 mg/d dosages were statistically superior to placebo. Patients taking lisdexamfetamine also had greater improvement on the Clinical Global Impression—Improvement scores, 4-week binge cessation, and greater reduction in the Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale Modified for Binge Eating score.
The prescribing information does not state if lisdexamfetamine should be continued long-term for treating BED.
Adverse reactions
In controlled trials, 5.1% of patients receiving lisdexamfetamine for BED discontinued the drug because of an adverse event, compared with 2.4% of patients receiving placebo. The most common adverse reactions in BED studies were dry mouth (36%), insomnia (20%), decreased appetite (8%), increased heart rate (8%), constipation (6%), and feeling jittery (6%). In trials of children, adolescents, and adults with ADHD, decreased appetite was more common (39%, 34%, and 27%, respectively) than in BED trials (Table 2). Anaphylactic reactions, Stevens-Johnson syndrome, angioedema, and urticaria have been described in postmarketing reports.
The safety of lisdexamfetamine for BED has not been studied in patients age <18, but has been studied in patients with ADHD.
Contraindications
Do not give lisdexamfetamine to patients who have a known hypersensitivity to amphetamine products or other ingredients in lisdexamfetamine capsules.
Lisdexamfetamine is contraindicated in patients who are taking a monoamine oxidase inhibitor, because of a risk of hypertensive crisis.
Related Resources
• Wilens TE. Lisdexamfetamine for ADHD. Current Psychiatry. 2007;6(6):96-98,105.
• Peat CM, Brownley KA, Berkman ND, et al. Binge eating disorder: evidence-based treatments. Current Psychiatry. 2012; 11(5):32-39.
Lisdexamfetamine, approved by the FDA in 2007 for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), has a new indication: binge eating disorder (BED) (Table 1). BED is characterized by recurrent episodes of consuming a large amount of food in a short time. A prodrug of amphetamine, lisdexamfetamine is a Schedule-II controlled substance, with a high potential for abuse and the risk of severe psychological or physical dependence.
Lisdexamfetamine is not indicated for weight loss or obesity.
Dosage
For BED, the initial dosage of lisdexamfetamine is 30 mg/d in the morning, titrated by 20 mg/d per week to the target dosage of 50 to 70 mg/d. Maximum dosage is 70 mg/d. Morning dosing is recommended to avoid sleep disturbance.
Efficacy
The clinical efficacy of lisdexamfetamine was assessed in two 12-week parallel group, flexible-dose, placebo-controlled trials in adults with BED (age 18 to 55). Primary efficacy measure was the number of binge days per week. Both studies had a 4-week dose-optimization period and an 8-week dose-maintenance period and followed the same dosage protocol. Patients began treatment at 30 mg/d and after 1 week were titrated to 50 mg/d; increases to 70 mg/d were made if clinically necessary and well tolerated. Patients were maintained on the optimized dosage during the 8-week dose-maintenance period. A dosage of 30 mg/d did not produce a statistically significant effect, but 50 mg/d and 70 mg/d dosages were statistically superior to placebo. Patients taking lisdexamfetamine also had greater improvement on the Clinical Global Impression—Improvement scores, 4-week binge cessation, and greater reduction in the Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale Modified for Binge Eating score.
The prescribing information does not state if lisdexamfetamine should be continued long-term for treating BED.
Adverse reactions
In controlled trials, 5.1% of patients receiving lisdexamfetamine for BED discontinued the drug because of an adverse event, compared with 2.4% of patients receiving placebo. The most common adverse reactions in BED studies were dry mouth (36%), insomnia (20%), decreased appetite (8%), increased heart rate (8%), constipation (6%), and feeling jittery (6%). In trials of children, adolescents, and adults with ADHD, decreased appetite was more common (39%, 34%, and 27%, respectively) than in BED trials (Table 2). Anaphylactic reactions, Stevens-Johnson syndrome, angioedema, and urticaria have been described in postmarketing reports.
The safety of lisdexamfetamine for BED has not been studied in patients age <18, but has been studied in patients with ADHD.
Contraindications
Do not give lisdexamfetamine to patients who have a known hypersensitivity to amphetamine products or other ingredients in lisdexamfetamine capsules.
Lisdexamfetamine is contraindicated in patients who are taking a monoamine oxidase inhibitor, because of a risk of hypertensive crisis.
Related Resources
• Wilens TE. Lisdexamfetamine for ADHD. Current Psychiatry. 2007;6(6):96-98,105.
• Peat CM, Brownley KA, Berkman ND, et al. Binge eating disorder: evidence-based treatments. Current Psychiatry. 2012; 11(5):32-39.
Source: Vyvanse [package insert]. Wayne, PA: Shire; 2015.
Source: Vyvanse [package insert]. Wayne, PA: Shire; 2015.
Autonomy vs abuse: Can a patient choose a new power of attorney?
Dear Dr. Mossman,
At the hospital where I serve as the psychiatric consultant, a medical team asked me to evaluate a patient’s capacity to designate a new power of attorney (POA) for health care. The patient’s relatives want the change because they think the current POA—also a relative—is stealing the patient’s funds. The contentious family situation made me wonder: What legal risks might I face after I assess the patient’s capacity to choose a new POA?
Submitted by “Dr. P”
As America’s population ages, situations like the one Dr. P has encountered will become more common. Many variables—time constraints, patients’ cognitive impairments, lack of prior relationships with patients, complex medical situations, and strained family dynamics— can make these clinical situations complex and daunting.
Dr. P realizes that feuding relatives can redirect their anger toward a well-meaning physician who might appear to take sides in a dispute. Yet staying silent isn’t a good option, either: If the patient is being mistreated or abused, Dr. P may have a duty to initiate appropriate protective action.
In this article, we’ll respond to Dr. P’s question by examining these topics:
• what a POA is and the rationale for having one
• standards for capacity to choose a POA
• characteristics and dynamics of potential surrogates
• responding to possible elder abuse.
Surrogate decision-makers
People can lose their decision-making capacity because of dementia, acute or chronic illness, or sudden injury. Although autonomy and respecting decisions of mentally capable people are paramount American values, our legal system has several mechanisms that can be activated on behalf of people who have lost their decision-making capabilities.
When a careful evaluation suggests that a patient cannot make informed medical decisions, one solution is to turn to a surrogate decision-maker whom the patient previously has designated to act on his (her) behalf, should he (she) become incapacitated. A surrogate can make decisions based on the incapacitated person’s current utterances (eg, expressions of pain), previously expressed wishes about what should happen under certain circumstances, or the surrogate’s judgment of the person’s best interest.1
States have varied legal frameworks for establishing surrogacy and refer to a surrogate using terms such as proxy, agent, attorney-in-fact, and power of attorney.2 POA responsibilities can encompass a broad array of decision-making tasks or can be limited, for example, to handling banking transactions or managing estate planning.3,4 A POA can be “durable” and grant lasting power regardless of disability, or “springing” and operational only when the designator has lost capacity.
A health care POA designates a substitute decision-maker for medical care. The Patient Self-Determination Act and the Joint Commission obligate health care professionals to follow the decisions made by a legally valid POA. Generally, providers who follow a surrogate’s decision in good faith have legal immunity, but they must challenge a surrogate’s decision if it deviates widely from usual protocol.2
Legal standards
Dr. P received a consultation request that asked whether a patient with compromised medical decision-making powers nonetheless had the current capacity to choose a new POA.
To evaluate the patient’s capacity to designate a new POA, Dr. P must know what having this capacity means. What determines if someone has the capacity to designate a POA is a legal matter, and unless Dr. P is sure what the laws in her state say about this, she should consult a lawyer who can explain the jurisdiction’s applicable legal standards to her.5
The law generally presumes that adults are competent to make health care decisions, including decisions about appointing a POA.5 The law also recognizes that people with cognitive impairments or mental illnesses still can be competent to appoint POAs.4
Most states don’t have statutes that define the capacity to appoint a health care POA. In these jurisdictions, courts may apply standards similar to those concerning competence to enter into a contract.6Table 1 describes criteria in 4 states that do have statutory provisions concerning competence to designate a health care POA.
Approaching the evaluation
Before evaluating a person’s capacity to designate a POA, you should first understand the person’s medical condition and learn what powers the surrogate would have. A detailed description of the evaluation process lies beyond the scope of this article. For more information, please consult the structured interviews described by Moye et al4 and Soliman’s guide to the evaluation process.7
In addition to examining the patient’s psychological status and cognitive capacity, you also might have to consider contextual variables, such as:
• potential risks of not allowing the appointment of POA, including a delay in needed care
• the person’s relationship to the proposed POA
• possible power imbalances or evidence of coercion
• how the person would benefit from having the POA.8
People who have good marital or parent-child relationships are more likely to select loved ones as their POAs.9 Family members who have not previously served as surrogates or have not had talked with their loved ones about their preferences feel less confident exercising the duties of a POA.10 An evaluation, therefore, should consider the prior relationship between the designator and proposed surrogate, and particularly whether these parties have discussed the designator’s health care preferences. Table 2 lists potential pitfalls in POA evaluations.2,4,5,8,11-13,16
Responding to abuse
Accompanying the request for Dr. P’s evaluation were reports that the current POA had been stealing the patient’s funds. Financial exploitation of older people is not a rare phenomenon.14,15 Yet only about 1 in 25 cases is reported,16,17 and physicians discover as few as 2% of all reported cases.15
Many variables—the stress of the situation,8 pre-existing relationship dynamics,18 and caregiver psychopathology11—lead POAs to exploit their designator. Sometimes, family members believe that they are entitled to a relative’s money because of real or imagined transgressions19 or because they regard themselves as eventual heirs to their relative’s estate.16 Some designated POAs use designators’ funds simply because they need money. Kemp and Mosqueda20 have developed an evaluation framework for assessing possible financial abuse (Table 3).
Although reporting financial abuse can strain alliances between patients and their families, psychiatrists bear a responsibility to look out for the welfare of their older patients.8 Indeed, all 50 states have elder abuse statutes, most of which mandate reporting by physicians.21
Suspicion of financial abuse could indicate the need to evaluate the susceptible person’s capacity to make financial decisions.12 Depending on the patient’s circumstances and medical problems, further steps might include:
• contacting proper authorities, such as Adult Protective Services or the Department of Human Services
• contacting local law enforcement
• instituting procedures for emergency guardianship
• arranging for more in-home services for the patient or recommending a higher level of care
• developing a treatment plan for the patient’s medical and psychiatric problems
• communicating with other trusted family members.12,18
Bottom Line
Evaluating the capacity to appoint a power of attorney (POA) often requires awareness of social systems, family dynamics, and legal requirements, combined with the psychiatric data from a systematic individual assessment. Evaluating psychiatrists should understand what type of POA is being considered and the applicable legal standards in the jurisdictions where they work.
Disclosures
The authors report no financial relationships with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
1. Black PG, Derse AR, Derrington S, et al. Can a patient designate his doctor as his proxy decision maker? Pediatrics. 2013;131(5):986-990.
2. Pope TM. Legal fundamentals of surrogate decision making. Chest. 2012;141(4):1074-1081.
3. Araj V. Types of power of attorney: which POA is right for me? http://www.quickenloans.com/blog/types-power-attorney-poa#4zvT8F58fd6zVb2v.99. Published December 29, 2011. Accessed January 11, 2015.
4. Moye J, Sabatino CP, Weintraub Brendel R. Evaluation of the capacity to appoint a healthcare proxy. Am J Geriatr Psychiatry. 2013;21(4):326-336.
5. Whitman R. Capacity for lifetime and estate planning. Penn State L Rev. 2013;117(4):1061-1080.
6. Duke v Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., 2011 WL 864321 (Tenn. Ct. App).
7. Soliman S. Evaluating older adults’ capacity and need for guardianship. Current Psychiatry. 2012;11(4):39-42,52-53,A.
8. Katona C, Chiu E, Adelman S, et al. World psychiatric association section of old age psychiatry consensus statement on ethics and capacity in older people with mental disorders. Int J Geriatr Psychiatry. 2009;24(12):1319-1324.
9. Carr D, Moorman SM, Boerner K. End-of-life planning in a family context: does relationship quality affect whether (and with whom) older adults plan? J Gerontol B Psychol Sci Soc Sci. 2013;68(4):586-592.
10. Majesko A, Hong SY, Weissfeld L, et al. Identifying family members who may struggle in the role of surrogate decision maker. Crit Care Med. 2012;40(8):2281-2286.
11. Fulmer T, Guadagno L, Bitondo Dyer C, et al. Progress in elder abuse screening and assessment instruments. J Am Geriatr Soc. 2004;52(2):297-304.
12. Horning SM, Wilkins SS, Dhanani S, et al. A case of elder abuse and undue influence: assessment and treatment from a geriatric interdisciplinary team. Clin Case Stud. 2013;12:373-387.
13. Lui VW, Chiu CC, Ko RS, et al. The principle of assessing mental capacity for enduring power of attorney. Hong Kong Med J. 2014;20(1):59-62.
14. Acierno R, Hernandez-Tejada M, Muzzy W, et al. National Elder Mistreatment Study. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice; 2009.
15. Wilber KH, Reynolds SL. Introducing a framework for defining financial abuse of the elderly. J Elder Abuse Negl. 1996;8(2):61-80.
16. Mukherjee D. Financial exploitation of older adults in rural settings: a family perspective. J Elder Abuse Negl. 2013; 25(5):425-437.
17. Lifespan of Greater Rochester, Inc., Weill Cornell Medical Center of Cornell University, New York City Department for the Aging. Under the Radar: New York State Elder Abuse Prevalence Study. http://nyceac.com/wp-content/ uploads/2011/05/UndertheRadar051211.pdf. Published May 16, 2011. Accessed January 10, 2015.
18. Hall RCW, Hall RCW, Chapman MJ. Exploitation of the elderly: undue influence as a form of elder abuse. Clin Geriatr. 2005;13(2):28-36.
19. Kemp B, Liao S. Elder financial abuse: tips for the medical director. J Am Med Dir Assoc. 2006;7(9):591-593.
20. Kemp BJ, Mosqueda LA. Elder financial abuse: an evaluation framework and supporting evidence. J Am Geriatr Soc. 2005;53(7):1123-1127.
21. Stiegel S, Klem E. Reporting requirements: provisions and citations in Adult Protective Services laws, by state. http:// www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/ aging/docs/MandatoryReportingProvisionsChart. authcheckdam.pdf. Published 2007. Accessed January 9, 2015.
Dear Dr. Mossman,
At the hospital where I serve as the psychiatric consultant, a medical team asked me to evaluate a patient’s capacity to designate a new power of attorney (POA) for health care. The patient’s relatives want the change because they think the current POA—also a relative—is stealing the patient’s funds. The contentious family situation made me wonder: What legal risks might I face after I assess the patient’s capacity to choose a new POA?
Submitted by “Dr. P”
As America’s population ages, situations like the one Dr. P has encountered will become more common. Many variables—time constraints, patients’ cognitive impairments, lack of prior relationships with patients, complex medical situations, and strained family dynamics— can make these clinical situations complex and daunting.
Dr. P realizes that feuding relatives can redirect their anger toward a well-meaning physician who might appear to take sides in a dispute. Yet staying silent isn’t a good option, either: If the patient is being mistreated or abused, Dr. P may have a duty to initiate appropriate protective action.
In this article, we’ll respond to Dr. P’s question by examining these topics:
• what a POA is and the rationale for having one
• standards for capacity to choose a POA
• characteristics and dynamics of potential surrogates
• responding to possible elder abuse.
Surrogate decision-makers
People can lose their decision-making capacity because of dementia, acute or chronic illness, or sudden injury. Although autonomy and respecting decisions of mentally capable people are paramount American values, our legal system has several mechanisms that can be activated on behalf of people who have lost their decision-making capabilities.
When a careful evaluation suggests that a patient cannot make informed medical decisions, one solution is to turn to a surrogate decision-maker whom the patient previously has designated to act on his (her) behalf, should he (she) become incapacitated. A surrogate can make decisions based on the incapacitated person’s current utterances (eg, expressions of pain), previously expressed wishes about what should happen under certain circumstances, or the surrogate’s judgment of the person’s best interest.1
States have varied legal frameworks for establishing surrogacy and refer to a surrogate using terms such as proxy, agent, attorney-in-fact, and power of attorney.2 POA responsibilities can encompass a broad array of decision-making tasks or can be limited, for example, to handling banking transactions or managing estate planning.3,4 A POA can be “durable” and grant lasting power regardless of disability, or “springing” and operational only when the designator has lost capacity.
A health care POA designates a substitute decision-maker for medical care. The Patient Self-Determination Act and the Joint Commission obligate health care professionals to follow the decisions made by a legally valid POA. Generally, providers who follow a surrogate’s decision in good faith have legal immunity, but they must challenge a surrogate’s decision if it deviates widely from usual protocol.2
Legal standards
Dr. P received a consultation request that asked whether a patient with compromised medical decision-making powers nonetheless had the current capacity to choose a new POA.
To evaluate the patient’s capacity to designate a new POA, Dr. P must know what having this capacity means. What determines if someone has the capacity to designate a POA is a legal matter, and unless Dr. P is sure what the laws in her state say about this, she should consult a lawyer who can explain the jurisdiction’s applicable legal standards to her.5
The law generally presumes that adults are competent to make health care decisions, including decisions about appointing a POA.5 The law also recognizes that people with cognitive impairments or mental illnesses still can be competent to appoint POAs.4
Most states don’t have statutes that define the capacity to appoint a health care POA. In these jurisdictions, courts may apply standards similar to those concerning competence to enter into a contract.6Table 1 describes criteria in 4 states that do have statutory provisions concerning competence to designate a health care POA.
Approaching the evaluation
Before evaluating a person’s capacity to designate a POA, you should first understand the person’s medical condition and learn what powers the surrogate would have. A detailed description of the evaluation process lies beyond the scope of this article. For more information, please consult the structured interviews described by Moye et al4 and Soliman’s guide to the evaluation process.7
In addition to examining the patient’s psychological status and cognitive capacity, you also might have to consider contextual variables, such as:
• potential risks of not allowing the appointment of POA, including a delay in needed care
• the person’s relationship to the proposed POA
• possible power imbalances or evidence of coercion
• how the person would benefit from having the POA.8
People who have good marital or parent-child relationships are more likely to select loved ones as their POAs.9 Family members who have not previously served as surrogates or have not had talked with their loved ones about their preferences feel less confident exercising the duties of a POA.10 An evaluation, therefore, should consider the prior relationship between the designator and proposed surrogate, and particularly whether these parties have discussed the designator’s health care preferences. Table 2 lists potential pitfalls in POA evaluations.2,4,5,8,11-13,16
Responding to abuse
Accompanying the request for Dr. P’s evaluation were reports that the current POA had been stealing the patient’s funds. Financial exploitation of older people is not a rare phenomenon.14,15 Yet only about 1 in 25 cases is reported,16,17 and physicians discover as few as 2% of all reported cases.15
Many variables—the stress of the situation,8 pre-existing relationship dynamics,18 and caregiver psychopathology11—lead POAs to exploit their designator. Sometimes, family members believe that they are entitled to a relative’s money because of real or imagined transgressions19 or because they regard themselves as eventual heirs to their relative’s estate.16 Some designated POAs use designators’ funds simply because they need money. Kemp and Mosqueda20 have developed an evaluation framework for assessing possible financial abuse (Table 3).
Although reporting financial abuse can strain alliances between patients and their families, psychiatrists bear a responsibility to look out for the welfare of their older patients.8 Indeed, all 50 states have elder abuse statutes, most of which mandate reporting by physicians.21
Suspicion of financial abuse could indicate the need to evaluate the susceptible person’s capacity to make financial decisions.12 Depending on the patient’s circumstances and medical problems, further steps might include:
• contacting proper authorities, such as Adult Protective Services or the Department of Human Services
• contacting local law enforcement
• instituting procedures for emergency guardianship
• arranging for more in-home services for the patient or recommending a higher level of care
• developing a treatment plan for the patient’s medical and psychiatric problems
• communicating with other trusted family members.12,18
Bottom Line
Evaluating the capacity to appoint a power of attorney (POA) often requires awareness of social systems, family dynamics, and legal requirements, combined with the psychiatric data from a systematic individual assessment. Evaluating psychiatrists should understand what type of POA is being considered and the applicable legal standards in the jurisdictions where they work.
Disclosures
The authors report no financial relationships with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
Dear Dr. Mossman,
At the hospital where I serve as the psychiatric consultant, a medical team asked me to evaluate a patient’s capacity to designate a new power of attorney (POA) for health care. The patient’s relatives want the change because they think the current POA—also a relative—is stealing the patient’s funds. The contentious family situation made me wonder: What legal risks might I face after I assess the patient’s capacity to choose a new POA?
Submitted by “Dr. P”
As America’s population ages, situations like the one Dr. P has encountered will become more common. Many variables—time constraints, patients’ cognitive impairments, lack of prior relationships with patients, complex medical situations, and strained family dynamics— can make these clinical situations complex and daunting.
Dr. P realizes that feuding relatives can redirect their anger toward a well-meaning physician who might appear to take sides in a dispute. Yet staying silent isn’t a good option, either: If the patient is being mistreated or abused, Dr. P may have a duty to initiate appropriate protective action.
In this article, we’ll respond to Dr. P’s question by examining these topics:
• what a POA is and the rationale for having one
• standards for capacity to choose a POA
• characteristics and dynamics of potential surrogates
• responding to possible elder abuse.
Surrogate decision-makers
People can lose their decision-making capacity because of dementia, acute or chronic illness, or sudden injury. Although autonomy and respecting decisions of mentally capable people are paramount American values, our legal system has several mechanisms that can be activated on behalf of people who have lost their decision-making capabilities.
When a careful evaluation suggests that a patient cannot make informed medical decisions, one solution is to turn to a surrogate decision-maker whom the patient previously has designated to act on his (her) behalf, should he (she) become incapacitated. A surrogate can make decisions based on the incapacitated person’s current utterances (eg, expressions of pain), previously expressed wishes about what should happen under certain circumstances, or the surrogate’s judgment of the person’s best interest.1
States have varied legal frameworks for establishing surrogacy and refer to a surrogate using terms such as proxy, agent, attorney-in-fact, and power of attorney.2 POA responsibilities can encompass a broad array of decision-making tasks or can be limited, for example, to handling banking transactions or managing estate planning.3,4 A POA can be “durable” and grant lasting power regardless of disability, or “springing” and operational only when the designator has lost capacity.
A health care POA designates a substitute decision-maker for medical care. The Patient Self-Determination Act and the Joint Commission obligate health care professionals to follow the decisions made by a legally valid POA. Generally, providers who follow a surrogate’s decision in good faith have legal immunity, but they must challenge a surrogate’s decision if it deviates widely from usual protocol.2
Legal standards
Dr. P received a consultation request that asked whether a patient with compromised medical decision-making powers nonetheless had the current capacity to choose a new POA.
To evaluate the patient’s capacity to designate a new POA, Dr. P must know what having this capacity means. What determines if someone has the capacity to designate a POA is a legal matter, and unless Dr. P is sure what the laws in her state say about this, she should consult a lawyer who can explain the jurisdiction’s applicable legal standards to her.5
The law generally presumes that adults are competent to make health care decisions, including decisions about appointing a POA.5 The law also recognizes that people with cognitive impairments or mental illnesses still can be competent to appoint POAs.4
Most states don’t have statutes that define the capacity to appoint a health care POA. In these jurisdictions, courts may apply standards similar to those concerning competence to enter into a contract.6Table 1 describes criteria in 4 states that do have statutory provisions concerning competence to designate a health care POA.
Approaching the evaluation
Before evaluating a person’s capacity to designate a POA, you should first understand the person’s medical condition and learn what powers the surrogate would have. A detailed description of the evaluation process lies beyond the scope of this article. For more information, please consult the structured interviews described by Moye et al4 and Soliman’s guide to the evaluation process.7
In addition to examining the patient’s psychological status and cognitive capacity, you also might have to consider contextual variables, such as:
• potential risks of not allowing the appointment of POA, including a delay in needed care
• the person’s relationship to the proposed POA
• possible power imbalances or evidence of coercion
• how the person would benefit from having the POA.8
People who have good marital or parent-child relationships are more likely to select loved ones as their POAs.9 Family members who have not previously served as surrogates or have not had talked with their loved ones about their preferences feel less confident exercising the duties of a POA.10 An evaluation, therefore, should consider the prior relationship between the designator and proposed surrogate, and particularly whether these parties have discussed the designator’s health care preferences. Table 2 lists potential pitfalls in POA evaluations.2,4,5,8,11-13,16
Responding to abuse
Accompanying the request for Dr. P’s evaluation were reports that the current POA had been stealing the patient’s funds. Financial exploitation of older people is not a rare phenomenon.14,15 Yet only about 1 in 25 cases is reported,16,17 and physicians discover as few as 2% of all reported cases.15
Many variables—the stress of the situation,8 pre-existing relationship dynamics,18 and caregiver psychopathology11—lead POAs to exploit their designator. Sometimes, family members believe that they are entitled to a relative’s money because of real or imagined transgressions19 or because they regard themselves as eventual heirs to their relative’s estate.16 Some designated POAs use designators’ funds simply because they need money. Kemp and Mosqueda20 have developed an evaluation framework for assessing possible financial abuse (Table 3).
Although reporting financial abuse can strain alliances between patients and their families, psychiatrists bear a responsibility to look out for the welfare of their older patients.8 Indeed, all 50 states have elder abuse statutes, most of which mandate reporting by physicians.21
Suspicion of financial abuse could indicate the need to evaluate the susceptible person’s capacity to make financial decisions.12 Depending on the patient’s circumstances and medical problems, further steps might include:
• contacting proper authorities, such as Adult Protective Services or the Department of Human Services
• contacting local law enforcement
• instituting procedures for emergency guardianship
• arranging for more in-home services for the patient or recommending a higher level of care
• developing a treatment plan for the patient’s medical and psychiatric problems
• communicating with other trusted family members.12,18
Bottom Line
Evaluating the capacity to appoint a power of attorney (POA) often requires awareness of social systems, family dynamics, and legal requirements, combined with the psychiatric data from a systematic individual assessment. Evaluating psychiatrists should understand what type of POA is being considered and the applicable legal standards in the jurisdictions where they work.
Disclosures
The authors report no financial relationships with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
1. Black PG, Derse AR, Derrington S, et al. Can a patient designate his doctor as his proxy decision maker? Pediatrics. 2013;131(5):986-990.
2. Pope TM. Legal fundamentals of surrogate decision making. Chest. 2012;141(4):1074-1081.
3. Araj V. Types of power of attorney: which POA is right for me? http://www.quickenloans.com/blog/types-power-attorney-poa#4zvT8F58fd6zVb2v.99. Published December 29, 2011. Accessed January 11, 2015.
4. Moye J, Sabatino CP, Weintraub Brendel R. Evaluation of the capacity to appoint a healthcare proxy. Am J Geriatr Psychiatry. 2013;21(4):326-336.
5. Whitman R. Capacity for lifetime and estate planning. Penn State L Rev. 2013;117(4):1061-1080.
6. Duke v Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., 2011 WL 864321 (Tenn. Ct. App).
7. Soliman S. Evaluating older adults’ capacity and need for guardianship. Current Psychiatry. 2012;11(4):39-42,52-53,A.
8. Katona C, Chiu E, Adelman S, et al. World psychiatric association section of old age psychiatry consensus statement on ethics and capacity in older people with mental disorders. Int J Geriatr Psychiatry. 2009;24(12):1319-1324.
9. Carr D, Moorman SM, Boerner K. End-of-life planning in a family context: does relationship quality affect whether (and with whom) older adults plan? J Gerontol B Psychol Sci Soc Sci. 2013;68(4):586-592.
10. Majesko A, Hong SY, Weissfeld L, et al. Identifying family members who may struggle in the role of surrogate decision maker. Crit Care Med. 2012;40(8):2281-2286.
11. Fulmer T, Guadagno L, Bitondo Dyer C, et al. Progress in elder abuse screening and assessment instruments. J Am Geriatr Soc. 2004;52(2):297-304.
12. Horning SM, Wilkins SS, Dhanani S, et al. A case of elder abuse and undue influence: assessment and treatment from a geriatric interdisciplinary team. Clin Case Stud. 2013;12:373-387.
13. Lui VW, Chiu CC, Ko RS, et al. The principle of assessing mental capacity for enduring power of attorney. Hong Kong Med J. 2014;20(1):59-62.
14. Acierno R, Hernandez-Tejada M, Muzzy W, et al. National Elder Mistreatment Study. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice; 2009.
15. Wilber KH, Reynolds SL. Introducing a framework for defining financial abuse of the elderly. J Elder Abuse Negl. 1996;8(2):61-80.
16. Mukherjee D. Financial exploitation of older adults in rural settings: a family perspective. J Elder Abuse Negl. 2013; 25(5):425-437.
17. Lifespan of Greater Rochester, Inc., Weill Cornell Medical Center of Cornell University, New York City Department for the Aging. Under the Radar: New York State Elder Abuse Prevalence Study. http://nyceac.com/wp-content/ uploads/2011/05/UndertheRadar051211.pdf. Published May 16, 2011. Accessed January 10, 2015.
18. Hall RCW, Hall RCW, Chapman MJ. Exploitation of the elderly: undue influence as a form of elder abuse. Clin Geriatr. 2005;13(2):28-36.
19. Kemp B, Liao S. Elder financial abuse: tips for the medical director. J Am Med Dir Assoc. 2006;7(9):591-593.
20. Kemp BJ, Mosqueda LA. Elder financial abuse: an evaluation framework and supporting evidence. J Am Geriatr Soc. 2005;53(7):1123-1127.
21. Stiegel S, Klem E. Reporting requirements: provisions and citations in Adult Protective Services laws, by state. http:// www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/ aging/docs/MandatoryReportingProvisionsChart. authcheckdam.pdf. Published 2007. Accessed January 9, 2015.
1. Black PG, Derse AR, Derrington S, et al. Can a patient designate his doctor as his proxy decision maker? Pediatrics. 2013;131(5):986-990.
2. Pope TM. Legal fundamentals of surrogate decision making. Chest. 2012;141(4):1074-1081.
3. Araj V. Types of power of attorney: which POA is right for me? http://www.quickenloans.com/blog/types-power-attorney-poa#4zvT8F58fd6zVb2v.99. Published December 29, 2011. Accessed January 11, 2015.
4. Moye J, Sabatino CP, Weintraub Brendel R. Evaluation of the capacity to appoint a healthcare proxy. Am J Geriatr Psychiatry. 2013;21(4):326-336.
5. Whitman R. Capacity for lifetime and estate planning. Penn State L Rev. 2013;117(4):1061-1080.
6. Duke v Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., 2011 WL 864321 (Tenn. Ct. App).
7. Soliman S. Evaluating older adults’ capacity and need for guardianship. Current Psychiatry. 2012;11(4):39-42,52-53,A.
8. Katona C, Chiu E, Adelman S, et al. World psychiatric association section of old age psychiatry consensus statement on ethics and capacity in older people with mental disorders. Int J Geriatr Psychiatry. 2009;24(12):1319-1324.
9. Carr D, Moorman SM, Boerner K. End-of-life planning in a family context: does relationship quality affect whether (and with whom) older adults plan? J Gerontol B Psychol Sci Soc Sci. 2013;68(4):586-592.
10. Majesko A, Hong SY, Weissfeld L, et al. Identifying family members who may struggle in the role of surrogate decision maker. Crit Care Med. 2012;40(8):2281-2286.
11. Fulmer T, Guadagno L, Bitondo Dyer C, et al. Progress in elder abuse screening and assessment instruments. J Am Geriatr Soc. 2004;52(2):297-304.
12. Horning SM, Wilkins SS, Dhanani S, et al. A case of elder abuse and undue influence: assessment and treatment from a geriatric interdisciplinary team. Clin Case Stud. 2013;12:373-387.
13. Lui VW, Chiu CC, Ko RS, et al. The principle of assessing mental capacity for enduring power of attorney. Hong Kong Med J. 2014;20(1):59-62.
14. Acierno R, Hernandez-Tejada M, Muzzy W, et al. National Elder Mistreatment Study. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice; 2009.
15. Wilber KH, Reynolds SL. Introducing a framework for defining financial abuse of the elderly. J Elder Abuse Negl. 1996;8(2):61-80.
16. Mukherjee D. Financial exploitation of older adults in rural settings: a family perspective. J Elder Abuse Negl. 2013; 25(5):425-437.
17. Lifespan of Greater Rochester, Inc., Weill Cornell Medical Center of Cornell University, New York City Department for the Aging. Under the Radar: New York State Elder Abuse Prevalence Study. http://nyceac.com/wp-content/ uploads/2011/05/UndertheRadar051211.pdf. Published May 16, 2011. Accessed January 10, 2015.
18. Hall RCW, Hall RCW, Chapman MJ. Exploitation of the elderly: undue influence as a form of elder abuse. Clin Geriatr. 2005;13(2):28-36.
19. Kemp B, Liao S. Elder financial abuse: tips for the medical director. J Am Med Dir Assoc. 2006;7(9):591-593.
20. Kemp BJ, Mosqueda LA. Elder financial abuse: an evaluation framework and supporting evidence. J Am Geriatr Soc. 2005;53(7):1123-1127.
21. Stiegel S, Klem E. Reporting requirements: provisions and citations in Adult Protective Services laws, by state. http:// www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/ aging/docs/MandatoryReportingProvisionsChart. authcheckdam.pdf. Published 2007. Accessed January 9, 2015.
Telepsychiatry: Ready to consider a different kind of practice?
Too few psychiatrists. A growing number of patients. A new federal law, technological advances, and a generational shift in the way people communicate. Add them together and you have the perfect environment for telepsychiatry—the remote practice of psychiatry by means of telemedicine—to take root (Box 1). Although telepsychiatry has, in various forms, been around since the 1950s,1 only recently has it expanded into almost all areas of psychiatric practice.
Here are some observations from my daily work on why I see this method of delivering mental health care is poised to expand in 2015 and beyond. Does telepsychiatry make sense for you?
Lack of supply is a big driver
There are simply not enough psychiatrists where they are needed, which is the primary driver of the expansion of telepsychiatry. With 77% of counties in the United States reporting a shortage of psychiatrists2 and the “graying” of the psychiatric workforce,3 a more efficient way to make use of a psychiatrist’s time is needed. Telepsychiatry eliminates travel time and allows psychiatrists to visit distant sites virtually.
The shortage of psychiatric practitioners that we see today is only going to become worse. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 includes mental health care and substance abuse treatment among its 10 essential benefits; just as important, new rules arising from the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 limit restrictions on access to mental health care when insurance provides such coverage.4 These legislative initiatives likely will lead to increased demand for psychiatrists in all care settings—from outpatient consults to acute inpatient admissions.
Why so attractive an option?
The shortage of psychiatrists creates limitations on access to care. Fortunately, telemedicine has entered a new age, ushered in by widely available teleconferencing technology. Specialists from dermatology to surgery currently are using telemedicine; psychiatry is a good fit for telemedicine because of (1) the limited amount of “touch” required to make a psychiatric assessment, (2) significant improvements in video quality in recent years, and (3) a decrease in the stigma associated with visiting a psychiatrist.
A generation raised on the Internet is entering the health care marketplace. These consumers and clinicians are accustomed to using video for many daily activities, and they seek health information from the Web. Visiting a psychiatrist through teleconferencing isn’t strange or alienating to this generation; their comfort with technology allows them to have intimate exchanges on video.
Subspecialty particulars
The earliest adopters, not surprisingly, are in areas where the strain of shortage has been felt most, with pediatric, geriatric, and correctional psychiatrists leading the way. In these fields, a substantial literature supports the use of telepsychiatry from a number of practice perspectives.
Pediatric psychiatry. The literature shows that children, families, and clinicians are, on the whole, satisfied with telepsychiatry.5 Children and adolescents who have been shown to benefit from telepsychiatry include those with depression,6 posttraumatic stress disorder, and eating disorders.7 Based on a case series, some authors have asserted that telepsychiatry might be preferable to in-person treatment (Box 2).8
Geriatric psychiatry. Research shows that geriatric patients, who are most likely to feel threatened by new technology, accept telepsychiatry visits.9 For psychiatrists treating geriatric patients, telepsychiatry can significantly lower costs by cutting commuting10 and make more accessible for patients whose age makes them unable to drive.
Correctional psychiatry. Clinicians working in correctional psychiatry have been at the forefront of experimentation with telepsychiatry. The technology is a natural fit for this setting:
• Prisons often are located in remote locations.
• Psychiatrists can be reluctant to provide on-site services because of safety concerns.
With correctional telepsychiatry, not only are patient outcomes comparable with in-person psychiatry, but the cost of delivering care can be significantly lower.11 With the U.S. Department of Justice reporting that 50% of inmates have a diagnosable mental disorder, including substance abuse,12 the need for access to a psychiatrist in the correctional system is acute.
Telepsychiatry can confidently be provided in a number of settings:
• emergency rooms
• nursing homes
• offices of primary care physicians
• in-home care.
Clinical services in these settings have been offered, studied, and reviewed.13
Can confidentiality and security be assured?
As with any new medical tool, the risk and benefits must be weighed care fully. The most obvious risk is to privacy. Telepsychiatry visits, like all patient encounters, must be secure and confidential. Given the growing suspicion among the public and professionals who use computers that all data are at risk, clinicians must take appropriate cautions and, at the same time, warn patients of the risks. Readily available videoconferencing software, such as Skype, does not provide the level of security that patients expect from health care providers.14
Other common concerns about telepsychiatry are stable access to videoconferencing and the safety from hackers of necessary hardware. Medical device companies have created hardware and software for use in telepsychiatry that provide a Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act-compliant high-quality, stable, videoconferencing visit.
Do patients benefit?
Clinically, patients have fared well when they receive care through telepsychiatry. In some studies, however, clinicians have expressed some dissatisfaction with the technology13— understandable, given the value that psychiatry traditionally has put on sitting with the patient. As Knoedler15 described it, making the switch to telepsychiatry from in-person contact can engender loneliness in some physicians; not only is patient contact shifted to videoconferencing, but the psychiatrist loses the supportive environment of a busy clinical practice. Knoedler also pointed out that, on the other hand, telepsychiatry offers practitioners the opportunity to evaluate and treat people who otherwise would not have mental health care.
Obstacles—practical, knotty ones
Reimbursement and licensing. These are 2 pressing problems of telepsychiatry, although recent policy developments will help expand telepsychiatry and make it more appealing to physicians:
• Medicare reimburses for telepsychiatry in non-metropolitan areas.
• In 41 states, Medicaid has included telepsychiatry as a benefit.16
• Nine states offer a specific medical license for practicing telepsychiatry17 (in the remaining states, a full medical license must be obtained before one can provide telemedicine services).
• The Joint Commission has included language in its regulations that could expedite privileging of telepsychiatrists.18
Even with such advancements, problems with licensure, credentialing, privacy, security, confidentiality, informed consent, and professional liability remain.19 I urge you to do your research on these key areas before plunging in.
Changes to models of care. The risk that telepsychiatry poses to various models of care has to be considered. Telepsychiatry is a dramatic innovation, but it should be used to support only high-quality, evidence-based care to which patients are entitled.20 With new technology—as with new medications—use must be carefully monitored and scrutinized.
Although evidence of the value of telepsychiatry is growing, many methods of long-distance practice are still in their infancy. Data must be collected and poor outcomes assessed honestly to ensure that the “more-good-than-harm” mandate is met.
Good reasons to call this shift ‘inevitable’
The future of telepsychiatry includes expansion into new areas of practice. The move to providing services to patients where they happen to be—at work or home— seems inevitable:
• In rural areas, practitioners can communicate with patients so that they are cared for in their homes, without the expense of transportation.
• Employers can invest in workplace health clinics that use telemedicine services to reduce absenteeism.
• For psychiatrists, the ability to provide services to patients across a wide region, from a single convenient location, and at lower cost is an attractive prospect.
To conclude: telepsychiatry holds potential to provide greater reimbursement and improved quality of life for psychiatrists and patients: It allows physicians to choose where they live and work, and limits the number of unreimbursed commutes, and gives patients access to psychiatric care locally, without disruptive travel and delays.
Bottom Line
The exchange of medical information from 1 site to another by means of electronic communication has great potential to improve the health of patients and to alleviate the shortage of psychiatric practitioners across regions and settings. Pediatric, geriatric, and correctional psychiatry stand to benefit because of the nature of the patients and locations.
Related Resources
• American Telemedicine Association. Practice guidelines for video-based online mental health services. http://www. americantelemed.org/docs/default-source/standards/practice-guidelines-for-video-based-online-mental-health-services. pdf?sfvrsn=6. Published May 2013. Accessed February 10, 2015.
• Freudenberg N, Yellowlees PM. Telepsychiatry as part of a comprehensive care plan. Virtual Mentor. 2014;16(12):964-968.
• Kornbluh R. Telepsychiatry is a tool that we must exploit. Clinical Psychiatry News. August 7, 2014. http://www. clinicalpsychiatrynews.com/home/article/telepsychiatry-is-a-tool-that-we-must-exploit/28c87bec298e0aa208309fa 9bc48dedc.html.
• University of Colorado Denver. Telemental Health Guide. http:// www.tmhguide.org.
Disclosure
Dr. Kornbluh reports no financial relationships with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
1. Shore JH. Telepsychiatry: videoconferencing in the delivery of psychiatric care. Am J Psychiatry. 2013;170(3):256-262.
2. Konrad TR, Ellis AR, Thomas KC, et al. County-level estimates of need for mental health professionals in the United States. Psychiatr Serv. 2009;60(10):1307-1314.
3. Vernon DJ, Salsberg E, Erikson C, et al. Planning the future mental health workforce: with progress on coverage, what role will psychiatrists play? Acad Psychiatry. 2009;33(3):187-192.
4. Carrns A. Understanding new rules that widen mental health coverage. The New York Times. http://www. nytimes.com/2014/01/10/your-money/understanding-new-rules-that-widen-mental-health-coverage.html. Published January 9, 2014. Accessed February 10, 2015.
5. Myers KM, Valentine JM, Melzer SM. Feasibility, acceptability, and sustainability of telepsychiatry for children and adolescents. Psychiatr Serv. 2007;58(11):1493-1496.
6. Nelson EL, Barnard M, Cain S. Treating childhood depression over videoconferencing. Telemed J E Health. 2003;9(1):49-55.
7. Boydell KM, Hodgins M, Pignatiello A, et al. Using technology to deliver mental health services to children and youth: a scoping review. J Can Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry. 2014;23(2):87-99.
8. Pakyurek M, Yellowlees P, Hilty D. The child and adolescent telepsychiatry consultation: can it be a more effective clinical process for certain patients than conventional practice? Telemed J E Health. 2010;16(3):289-292.
9. Poon P, Hui E, Dai D, et al. Cognitive intervention for community-dwelling older persons with memory problems: telemedicine versus face-to-face treatment. Int J Geriatr Psychiatry. 2005;20(3):285-286.
10. Rabinowitz T, Murphy KM, Amour JL, et al. Benefits of a telepsychiatry consultation service for rural nursing home residents. Telemed J E Health. 2010;16(1):34-40.
11. Deslich SA, Thistlethwaite T, Coustasse A. Telepsychiatry in correctional facilities: using technology to improve access and decrease costs of mental health care in underserved populations. Perm J. 2013;17(3):80-86.
12. James DJ, Glaze LE. Mental health problems of prison and jail inmates. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji. pdf. Updated December 14, 2006. Accessed February 10, 2015.
13. Hilty DN, Ferrer DC, Parish MB, et al. The effectiveness of telemental health: a 2013 review. Telemed J E Health. 2013;19(6):444-454.
14. Maheu MM, Mcmenamin J. Telepsychiatry: the perils of using skype. Psychiatric Times. http://www. psychiatrictimes.com/blog/telepsychiatry-perils-using-skype. Published March 28, 2013. Accessed February 10, 2015.
15. Knoedler DW. Telepsychiatry: first week in the trenches. Psychiatric Times. http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/ blogs/couch-crisis/telepsychiatry-first-week-trenches. Published January 22, 2014. Accessed February 15, 2015.
16. Secure Telehealth. Medicaid reimburses for telehealth in 41 states. http://www.securetelehealth.com/medicaid-reimbursement.html. Updated January 15, 2015. Accessed February 10, 2015.
17. Federation of State Medical Boards. Telemedicine overview: Board-by-Board approach. http://library.fsmb.org/pdf/ grpol_telemedicine_licensure.pdf. Updated June 2013. Accessed February 10, 2015.
18. Joint Commission Perspectives. Accepted: final revisions to telemedicine standards. http://www.jointcommission. org/assets/1/6/Revisions_telemedicine_standards.pdf. Published January 2012. Accessed February 10, 2015.
19. Hyler SE, Gangure DP. Legal and ethical challenges in telepsychiatry. J Psychiatr Pract. 2004;10(4):272-276.
20. Kornbluh RA. Staying true to the mission: adapting telepsychiatry to a new environment. CNS Spectr. 2014;19(6):482-483.
Too few psychiatrists. A growing number of patients. A new federal law, technological advances, and a generational shift in the way people communicate. Add them together and you have the perfect environment for telepsychiatry—the remote practice of psychiatry by means of telemedicine—to take root (Box 1). Although telepsychiatry has, in various forms, been around since the 1950s,1 only recently has it expanded into almost all areas of psychiatric practice.
Here are some observations from my daily work on why I see this method of delivering mental health care is poised to expand in 2015 and beyond. Does telepsychiatry make sense for you?
Lack of supply is a big driver
There are simply not enough psychiatrists where they are needed, which is the primary driver of the expansion of telepsychiatry. With 77% of counties in the United States reporting a shortage of psychiatrists2 and the “graying” of the psychiatric workforce,3 a more efficient way to make use of a psychiatrist’s time is needed. Telepsychiatry eliminates travel time and allows psychiatrists to visit distant sites virtually.
The shortage of psychiatric practitioners that we see today is only going to become worse. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 includes mental health care and substance abuse treatment among its 10 essential benefits; just as important, new rules arising from the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 limit restrictions on access to mental health care when insurance provides such coverage.4 These legislative initiatives likely will lead to increased demand for psychiatrists in all care settings—from outpatient consults to acute inpatient admissions.
Why so attractive an option?
The shortage of psychiatrists creates limitations on access to care. Fortunately, telemedicine has entered a new age, ushered in by widely available teleconferencing technology. Specialists from dermatology to surgery currently are using telemedicine; psychiatry is a good fit for telemedicine because of (1) the limited amount of “touch” required to make a psychiatric assessment, (2) significant improvements in video quality in recent years, and (3) a decrease in the stigma associated with visiting a psychiatrist.
A generation raised on the Internet is entering the health care marketplace. These consumers and clinicians are accustomed to using video for many daily activities, and they seek health information from the Web. Visiting a psychiatrist through teleconferencing isn’t strange or alienating to this generation; their comfort with technology allows them to have intimate exchanges on video.
Subspecialty particulars
The earliest adopters, not surprisingly, are in areas where the strain of shortage has been felt most, with pediatric, geriatric, and correctional psychiatrists leading the way. In these fields, a substantial literature supports the use of telepsychiatry from a number of practice perspectives.
Pediatric psychiatry. The literature shows that children, families, and clinicians are, on the whole, satisfied with telepsychiatry.5 Children and adolescents who have been shown to benefit from telepsychiatry include those with depression,6 posttraumatic stress disorder, and eating disorders.7 Based on a case series, some authors have asserted that telepsychiatry might be preferable to in-person treatment (Box 2).8
Geriatric psychiatry. Research shows that geriatric patients, who are most likely to feel threatened by new technology, accept telepsychiatry visits.9 For psychiatrists treating geriatric patients, telepsychiatry can significantly lower costs by cutting commuting10 and make more accessible for patients whose age makes them unable to drive.
Correctional psychiatry. Clinicians working in correctional psychiatry have been at the forefront of experimentation with telepsychiatry. The technology is a natural fit for this setting:
• Prisons often are located in remote locations.
• Psychiatrists can be reluctant to provide on-site services because of safety concerns.
With correctional telepsychiatry, not only are patient outcomes comparable with in-person psychiatry, but the cost of delivering care can be significantly lower.11 With the U.S. Department of Justice reporting that 50% of inmates have a diagnosable mental disorder, including substance abuse,12 the need for access to a psychiatrist in the correctional system is acute.
Telepsychiatry can confidently be provided in a number of settings:
• emergency rooms
• nursing homes
• offices of primary care physicians
• in-home care.
Clinical services in these settings have been offered, studied, and reviewed.13
Can confidentiality and security be assured?
As with any new medical tool, the risk and benefits must be weighed care fully. The most obvious risk is to privacy. Telepsychiatry visits, like all patient encounters, must be secure and confidential. Given the growing suspicion among the public and professionals who use computers that all data are at risk, clinicians must take appropriate cautions and, at the same time, warn patients of the risks. Readily available videoconferencing software, such as Skype, does not provide the level of security that patients expect from health care providers.14
Other common concerns about telepsychiatry are stable access to videoconferencing and the safety from hackers of necessary hardware. Medical device companies have created hardware and software for use in telepsychiatry that provide a Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act-compliant high-quality, stable, videoconferencing visit.
Do patients benefit?
Clinically, patients have fared well when they receive care through telepsychiatry. In some studies, however, clinicians have expressed some dissatisfaction with the technology13— understandable, given the value that psychiatry traditionally has put on sitting with the patient. As Knoedler15 described it, making the switch to telepsychiatry from in-person contact can engender loneliness in some physicians; not only is patient contact shifted to videoconferencing, but the psychiatrist loses the supportive environment of a busy clinical practice. Knoedler also pointed out that, on the other hand, telepsychiatry offers practitioners the opportunity to evaluate and treat people who otherwise would not have mental health care.
Obstacles—practical, knotty ones
Reimbursement and licensing. These are 2 pressing problems of telepsychiatry, although recent policy developments will help expand telepsychiatry and make it more appealing to physicians:
• Medicare reimburses for telepsychiatry in non-metropolitan areas.
• In 41 states, Medicaid has included telepsychiatry as a benefit.16
• Nine states offer a specific medical license for practicing telepsychiatry17 (in the remaining states, a full medical license must be obtained before one can provide telemedicine services).
• The Joint Commission has included language in its regulations that could expedite privileging of telepsychiatrists.18
Even with such advancements, problems with licensure, credentialing, privacy, security, confidentiality, informed consent, and professional liability remain.19 I urge you to do your research on these key areas before plunging in.
Changes to models of care. The risk that telepsychiatry poses to various models of care has to be considered. Telepsychiatry is a dramatic innovation, but it should be used to support only high-quality, evidence-based care to which patients are entitled.20 With new technology—as with new medications—use must be carefully monitored and scrutinized.
Although evidence of the value of telepsychiatry is growing, many methods of long-distance practice are still in their infancy. Data must be collected and poor outcomes assessed honestly to ensure that the “more-good-than-harm” mandate is met.
Good reasons to call this shift ‘inevitable’
The future of telepsychiatry includes expansion into new areas of practice. The move to providing services to patients where they happen to be—at work or home— seems inevitable:
• In rural areas, practitioners can communicate with patients so that they are cared for in their homes, without the expense of transportation.
• Employers can invest in workplace health clinics that use telemedicine services to reduce absenteeism.
• For psychiatrists, the ability to provide services to patients across a wide region, from a single convenient location, and at lower cost is an attractive prospect.
To conclude: telepsychiatry holds potential to provide greater reimbursement and improved quality of life for psychiatrists and patients: It allows physicians to choose where they live and work, and limits the number of unreimbursed commutes, and gives patients access to psychiatric care locally, without disruptive travel and delays.
Bottom Line
The exchange of medical information from 1 site to another by means of electronic communication has great potential to improve the health of patients and to alleviate the shortage of psychiatric practitioners across regions and settings. Pediatric, geriatric, and correctional psychiatry stand to benefit because of the nature of the patients and locations.
Related Resources
• American Telemedicine Association. Practice guidelines for video-based online mental health services. http://www. americantelemed.org/docs/default-source/standards/practice-guidelines-for-video-based-online-mental-health-services. pdf?sfvrsn=6. Published May 2013. Accessed February 10, 2015.
• Freudenberg N, Yellowlees PM. Telepsychiatry as part of a comprehensive care plan. Virtual Mentor. 2014;16(12):964-968.
• Kornbluh R. Telepsychiatry is a tool that we must exploit. Clinical Psychiatry News. August 7, 2014. http://www. clinicalpsychiatrynews.com/home/article/telepsychiatry-is-a-tool-that-we-must-exploit/28c87bec298e0aa208309fa 9bc48dedc.html.
• University of Colorado Denver. Telemental Health Guide. http:// www.tmhguide.org.
Disclosure
Dr. Kornbluh reports no financial relationships with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
Too few psychiatrists. A growing number of patients. A new federal law, technological advances, and a generational shift in the way people communicate. Add them together and you have the perfect environment for telepsychiatry—the remote practice of psychiatry by means of telemedicine—to take root (Box 1). Although telepsychiatry has, in various forms, been around since the 1950s,1 only recently has it expanded into almost all areas of psychiatric practice.
Here are some observations from my daily work on why I see this method of delivering mental health care is poised to expand in 2015 and beyond. Does telepsychiatry make sense for you?
Lack of supply is a big driver
There are simply not enough psychiatrists where they are needed, which is the primary driver of the expansion of telepsychiatry. With 77% of counties in the United States reporting a shortage of psychiatrists2 and the “graying” of the psychiatric workforce,3 a more efficient way to make use of a psychiatrist’s time is needed. Telepsychiatry eliminates travel time and allows psychiatrists to visit distant sites virtually.
The shortage of psychiatric practitioners that we see today is only going to become worse. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 includes mental health care and substance abuse treatment among its 10 essential benefits; just as important, new rules arising from the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 limit restrictions on access to mental health care when insurance provides such coverage.4 These legislative initiatives likely will lead to increased demand for psychiatrists in all care settings—from outpatient consults to acute inpatient admissions.
Why so attractive an option?
The shortage of psychiatrists creates limitations on access to care. Fortunately, telemedicine has entered a new age, ushered in by widely available teleconferencing technology. Specialists from dermatology to surgery currently are using telemedicine; psychiatry is a good fit for telemedicine because of (1) the limited amount of “touch” required to make a psychiatric assessment, (2) significant improvements in video quality in recent years, and (3) a decrease in the stigma associated with visiting a psychiatrist.
A generation raised on the Internet is entering the health care marketplace. These consumers and clinicians are accustomed to using video for many daily activities, and they seek health information from the Web. Visiting a psychiatrist through teleconferencing isn’t strange or alienating to this generation; their comfort with technology allows them to have intimate exchanges on video.
Subspecialty particulars
The earliest adopters, not surprisingly, are in areas where the strain of shortage has been felt most, with pediatric, geriatric, and correctional psychiatrists leading the way. In these fields, a substantial literature supports the use of telepsychiatry from a number of practice perspectives.
Pediatric psychiatry. The literature shows that children, families, and clinicians are, on the whole, satisfied with telepsychiatry.5 Children and adolescents who have been shown to benefit from telepsychiatry include those with depression,6 posttraumatic stress disorder, and eating disorders.7 Based on a case series, some authors have asserted that telepsychiatry might be preferable to in-person treatment (Box 2).8
Geriatric psychiatry. Research shows that geriatric patients, who are most likely to feel threatened by new technology, accept telepsychiatry visits.9 For psychiatrists treating geriatric patients, telepsychiatry can significantly lower costs by cutting commuting10 and make more accessible for patients whose age makes them unable to drive.
Correctional psychiatry. Clinicians working in correctional psychiatry have been at the forefront of experimentation with telepsychiatry. The technology is a natural fit for this setting:
• Prisons often are located in remote locations.
• Psychiatrists can be reluctant to provide on-site services because of safety concerns.
With correctional telepsychiatry, not only are patient outcomes comparable with in-person psychiatry, but the cost of delivering care can be significantly lower.11 With the U.S. Department of Justice reporting that 50% of inmates have a diagnosable mental disorder, including substance abuse,12 the need for access to a psychiatrist in the correctional system is acute.
Telepsychiatry can confidently be provided in a number of settings:
• emergency rooms
• nursing homes
• offices of primary care physicians
• in-home care.
Clinical services in these settings have been offered, studied, and reviewed.13
Can confidentiality and security be assured?
As with any new medical tool, the risk and benefits must be weighed care fully. The most obvious risk is to privacy. Telepsychiatry visits, like all patient encounters, must be secure and confidential. Given the growing suspicion among the public and professionals who use computers that all data are at risk, clinicians must take appropriate cautions and, at the same time, warn patients of the risks. Readily available videoconferencing software, such as Skype, does not provide the level of security that patients expect from health care providers.14
Other common concerns about telepsychiatry are stable access to videoconferencing and the safety from hackers of necessary hardware. Medical device companies have created hardware and software for use in telepsychiatry that provide a Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act-compliant high-quality, stable, videoconferencing visit.
Do patients benefit?
Clinically, patients have fared well when they receive care through telepsychiatry. In some studies, however, clinicians have expressed some dissatisfaction with the technology13— understandable, given the value that psychiatry traditionally has put on sitting with the patient. As Knoedler15 described it, making the switch to telepsychiatry from in-person contact can engender loneliness in some physicians; not only is patient contact shifted to videoconferencing, but the psychiatrist loses the supportive environment of a busy clinical practice. Knoedler also pointed out that, on the other hand, telepsychiatry offers practitioners the opportunity to evaluate and treat people who otherwise would not have mental health care.
Obstacles—practical, knotty ones
Reimbursement and licensing. These are 2 pressing problems of telepsychiatry, although recent policy developments will help expand telepsychiatry and make it more appealing to physicians:
• Medicare reimburses for telepsychiatry in non-metropolitan areas.
• In 41 states, Medicaid has included telepsychiatry as a benefit.16
• Nine states offer a specific medical license for practicing telepsychiatry17 (in the remaining states, a full medical license must be obtained before one can provide telemedicine services).
• The Joint Commission has included language in its regulations that could expedite privileging of telepsychiatrists.18
Even with such advancements, problems with licensure, credentialing, privacy, security, confidentiality, informed consent, and professional liability remain.19 I urge you to do your research on these key areas before plunging in.
Changes to models of care. The risk that telepsychiatry poses to various models of care has to be considered. Telepsychiatry is a dramatic innovation, but it should be used to support only high-quality, evidence-based care to which patients are entitled.20 With new technology—as with new medications—use must be carefully monitored and scrutinized.
Although evidence of the value of telepsychiatry is growing, many methods of long-distance practice are still in their infancy. Data must be collected and poor outcomes assessed honestly to ensure that the “more-good-than-harm” mandate is met.
Good reasons to call this shift ‘inevitable’
The future of telepsychiatry includes expansion into new areas of practice. The move to providing services to patients where they happen to be—at work or home— seems inevitable:
• In rural areas, practitioners can communicate with patients so that they are cared for in their homes, without the expense of transportation.
• Employers can invest in workplace health clinics that use telemedicine services to reduce absenteeism.
• For psychiatrists, the ability to provide services to patients across a wide region, from a single convenient location, and at lower cost is an attractive prospect.
To conclude: telepsychiatry holds potential to provide greater reimbursement and improved quality of life for psychiatrists and patients: It allows physicians to choose where they live and work, and limits the number of unreimbursed commutes, and gives patients access to psychiatric care locally, without disruptive travel and delays.
Bottom Line
The exchange of medical information from 1 site to another by means of electronic communication has great potential to improve the health of patients and to alleviate the shortage of psychiatric practitioners across regions and settings. Pediatric, geriatric, and correctional psychiatry stand to benefit because of the nature of the patients and locations.
Related Resources
• American Telemedicine Association. Practice guidelines for video-based online mental health services. http://www. americantelemed.org/docs/default-source/standards/practice-guidelines-for-video-based-online-mental-health-services. pdf?sfvrsn=6. Published May 2013. Accessed February 10, 2015.
• Freudenberg N, Yellowlees PM. Telepsychiatry as part of a comprehensive care plan. Virtual Mentor. 2014;16(12):964-968.
• Kornbluh R. Telepsychiatry is a tool that we must exploit. Clinical Psychiatry News. August 7, 2014. http://www. clinicalpsychiatrynews.com/home/article/telepsychiatry-is-a-tool-that-we-must-exploit/28c87bec298e0aa208309fa 9bc48dedc.html.
• University of Colorado Denver. Telemental Health Guide. http:// www.tmhguide.org.
Disclosure
Dr. Kornbluh reports no financial relationships with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.
1. Shore JH. Telepsychiatry: videoconferencing in the delivery of psychiatric care. Am J Psychiatry. 2013;170(3):256-262.
2. Konrad TR, Ellis AR, Thomas KC, et al. County-level estimates of need for mental health professionals in the United States. Psychiatr Serv. 2009;60(10):1307-1314.
3. Vernon DJ, Salsberg E, Erikson C, et al. Planning the future mental health workforce: with progress on coverage, what role will psychiatrists play? Acad Psychiatry. 2009;33(3):187-192.
4. Carrns A. Understanding new rules that widen mental health coverage. The New York Times. http://www. nytimes.com/2014/01/10/your-money/understanding-new-rules-that-widen-mental-health-coverage.html. Published January 9, 2014. Accessed February 10, 2015.
5. Myers KM, Valentine JM, Melzer SM. Feasibility, acceptability, and sustainability of telepsychiatry for children and adolescents. Psychiatr Serv. 2007;58(11):1493-1496.
6. Nelson EL, Barnard M, Cain S. Treating childhood depression over videoconferencing. Telemed J E Health. 2003;9(1):49-55.
7. Boydell KM, Hodgins M, Pignatiello A, et al. Using technology to deliver mental health services to children and youth: a scoping review. J Can Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry. 2014;23(2):87-99.
8. Pakyurek M, Yellowlees P, Hilty D. The child and adolescent telepsychiatry consultation: can it be a more effective clinical process for certain patients than conventional practice? Telemed J E Health. 2010;16(3):289-292.
9. Poon P, Hui E, Dai D, et al. Cognitive intervention for community-dwelling older persons with memory problems: telemedicine versus face-to-face treatment. Int J Geriatr Psychiatry. 2005;20(3):285-286.
10. Rabinowitz T, Murphy KM, Amour JL, et al. Benefits of a telepsychiatry consultation service for rural nursing home residents. Telemed J E Health. 2010;16(1):34-40.
11. Deslich SA, Thistlethwaite T, Coustasse A. Telepsychiatry in correctional facilities: using technology to improve access and decrease costs of mental health care in underserved populations. Perm J. 2013;17(3):80-86.
12. James DJ, Glaze LE. Mental health problems of prison and jail inmates. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji. pdf. Updated December 14, 2006. Accessed February 10, 2015.
13. Hilty DN, Ferrer DC, Parish MB, et al. The effectiveness of telemental health: a 2013 review. Telemed J E Health. 2013;19(6):444-454.
14. Maheu MM, Mcmenamin J. Telepsychiatry: the perils of using skype. Psychiatric Times. http://www. psychiatrictimes.com/blog/telepsychiatry-perils-using-skype. Published March 28, 2013. Accessed February 10, 2015.
15. Knoedler DW. Telepsychiatry: first week in the trenches. Psychiatric Times. http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/ blogs/couch-crisis/telepsychiatry-first-week-trenches. Published January 22, 2014. Accessed February 15, 2015.
16. Secure Telehealth. Medicaid reimburses for telehealth in 41 states. http://www.securetelehealth.com/medicaid-reimbursement.html. Updated January 15, 2015. Accessed February 10, 2015.
17. Federation of State Medical Boards. Telemedicine overview: Board-by-Board approach. http://library.fsmb.org/pdf/ grpol_telemedicine_licensure.pdf. Updated June 2013. Accessed February 10, 2015.
18. Joint Commission Perspectives. Accepted: final revisions to telemedicine standards. http://www.jointcommission. org/assets/1/6/Revisions_telemedicine_standards.pdf. Published January 2012. Accessed February 10, 2015.
19. Hyler SE, Gangure DP. Legal and ethical challenges in telepsychiatry. J Psychiatr Pract. 2004;10(4):272-276.
20. Kornbluh RA. Staying true to the mission: adapting telepsychiatry to a new environment. CNS Spectr. 2014;19(6):482-483.
1. Shore JH. Telepsychiatry: videoconferencing in the delivery of psychiatric care. Am J Psychiatry. 2013;170(3):256-262.
2. Konrad TR, Ellis AR, Thomas KC, et al. County-level estimates of need for mental health professionals in the United States. Psychiatr Serv. 2009;60(10):1307-1314.
3. Vernon DJ, Salsberg E, Erikson C, et al. Planning the future mental health workforce: with progress on coverage, what role will psychiatrists play? Acad Psychiatry. 2009;33(3):187-192.
4. Carrns A. Understanding new rules that widen mental health coverage. The New York Times. http://www. nytimes.com/2014/01/10/your-money/understanding-new-rules-that-widen-mental-health-coverage.html. Published January 9, 2014. Accessed February 10, 2015.
5. Myers KM, Valentine JM, Melzer SM. Feasibility, acceptability, and sustainability of telepsychiatry for children and adolescents. Psychiatr Serv. 2007;58(11):1493-1496.
6. Nelson EL, Barnard M, Cain S. Treating childhood depression over videoconferencing. Telemed J E Health. 2003;9(1):49-55.
7. Boydell KM, Hodgins M, Pignatiello A, et al. Using technology to deliver mental health services to children and youth: a scoping review. J Can Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry. 2014;23(2):87-99.
8. Pakyurek M, Yellowlees P, Hilty D. The child and adolescent telepsychiatry consultation: can it be a more effective clinical process for certain patients than conventional practice? Telemed J E Health. 2010;16(3):289-292.
9. Poon P, Hui E, Dai D, et al. Cognitive intervention for community-dwelling older persons with memory problems: telemedicine versus face-to-face treatment. Int J Geriatr Psychiatry. 2005;20(3):285-286.
10. Rabinowitz T, Murphy KM, Amour JL, et al. Benefits of a telepsychiatry consultation service for rural nursing home residents. Telemed J E Health. 2010;16(1):34-40.
11. Deslich SA, Thistlethwaite T, Coustasse A. Telepsychiatry in correctional facilities: using technology to improve access and decrease costs of mental health care in underserved populations. Perm J. 2013;17(3):80-86.
12. James DJ, Glaze LE. Mental health problems of prison and jail inmates. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji. pdf. Updated December 14, 2006. Accessed February 10, 2015.
13. Hilty DN, Ferrer DC, Parish MB, et al. The effectiveness of telemental health: a 2013 review. Telemed J E Health. 2013;19(6):444-454.
14. Maheu MM, Mcmenamin J. Telepsychiatry: the perils of using skype. Psychiatric Times. http://www. psychiatrictimes.com/blog/telepsychiatry-perils-using-skype. Published March 28, 2013. Accessed February 10, 2015.
15. Knoedler DW. Telepsychiatry: first week in the trenches. Psychiatric Times. http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/ blogs/couch-crisis/telepsychiatry-first-week-trenches. Published January 22, 2014. Accessed February 15, 2015.
16. Secure Telehealth. Medicaid reimburses for telehealth in 41 states. http://www.securetelehealth.com/medicaid-reimbursement.html. Updated January 15, 2015. Accessed February 10, 2015.
17. Federation of State Medical Boards. Telemedicine overview: Board-by-Board approach. http://library.fsmb.org/pdf/ grpol_telemedicine_licensure.pdf. Updated June 2013. Accessed February 10, 2015.
18. Joint Commission Perspectives. Accepted: final revisions to telemedicine standards. http://www.jointcommission. org/assets/1/6/Revisions_telemedicine_standards.pdf. Published January 2012. Accessed February 10, 2015.
19. Hyler SE, Gangure DP. Legal and ethical challenges in telepsychiatry. J Psychiatr Pract. 2004;10(4):272-276.
20. Kornbluh RA. Staying true to the mission: adapting telepsychiatry to a new environment. CNS Spectr. 2014;19(6):482-483.