Health Policy

If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.

Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) ¹

Early in residency, I decided I only wanted to work at the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). It was a way to follow the example of service that my parents, an Army doctor and nurse, had set. I spent much of my residency, including all of my last year of training, at a VA medical center, hoping a vacancy would open in the psychiatry service. In those days, VA jobs were hard to come by; doctors spent their entire careers in the system, only retiring after decades of commitment to its unique mission. Finally, close to graduation, one of my favorite attending physicians left his post. After mountains of paperwork and running the human resources obstacle course with the usual stumbles, I arrived at my dream job as a VA psychiatrist.

So, it is with immense sadness and even shock that I read a recent ProPublica article reporting that from January to March 2025 almost 40% of the physicians who received employment offers from the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) declined the positions.² Medical media rapidly picked up the story, likely further discouraging potential applicants.³

There have always been health care professionals (HCPs) who had zero interest in working for the VA. Medical students and residents often have a love/hate relationship with the VA, with some trainees not having the patience for the behemoth pace of the bureaucracy or finding the old-style physical environment and more relaxed pace antiquated and inefficient.

The reasons doctors are saying no to VA employment at 4 times the previous rate are different and more disturbing. According to ProPublica, VA officials in Texas reported in a June internal presentation that about 90 people had turned down job offers due to the “uncertainty of reorganization.”² They reported that low morale was causing existing employees to recommend against working at the VA. My own anecdotal experience is similar: contrary to prior years, few residents, if any, are interested in working at the VA because of concerns about the stability of employment and the direction of its organizational culture.

It is fair to question the objectivity of the ProPublica report. However, the latest VA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) analysis of staffing had similar findings. “Despite the ability to make noncompetitive appointments for such occupations, VHA continues to experience severe occupational staffing shortages for these occupations that are fundamental to the delivery of health care.” The 4434 severe occupational shortage figures in fiscal year (FY) 2025 were 50% higher than in FY 2024.⁴ OIG reported that 57% of facilities noted severe occupational staffing shortages for psychology, making it the most frequently reported clinical shortage.

At this critical juncture, when new health care professional energy is not flowing into the VHA, there is an unprecedented drain of the lifeblood of any system—the departure of the bearers of institutional memory. Early and scheduled retirements, the deferred resignation program, and severance have decimated the ranks of senior HCPs, experienced leaders, and career clinicians. ProPublica noted the loss of 600 doctors and 1900 nurses at the VHA so far in 2025.² Internal VA data from exit interviews suggest similar motivations. Many cited lack of trust and confidence in senior leaders and job stress/pressure.⁵

It should be noted the VA has an alternative and plausible explanation for the expected departure of 30,000 employees. They argue that the VHA was overstaffed and the increased workforce decreased the efficiency of service. Voluntary separation from employment, VA contends, has avoided the need for a far more disruptive reduction in force. VA leaders avow that downsizing has not adversely impacted its ability to deliver high-quality health care and benefits and they assert that a reduction in red tape will enable VA to provide easier access to care. VA Secretary Doug Collins has concluded that because of these difficult but necessary changes, “VA is headed in the right direction.”⁶

What is institutional memory, and why is it important? “The core of institutional memory is collective awareness and understanding of a collective set of facts, concepts, experiences, and know-how,” Bhugra and Ventriglio explain. “These are all held collectively at various levels in any given institution. Thus, collective memory or history can be utilized to build on what has gone before and how we take things forward.”⁷

The authors of this quote offer a modern twist on what Sir Isaac Newton described in more metaphorical language in the epigraph: to survive, and even more to thrive, an enterprise must have those who have accumulated technical knowledge and professional wisdom as well as those who assume responsibility for appropriating and adding to this storehouse of operational skill, expertise, unique cultural values, and ethical commitments. The VHA is losing its instructors and students of institutional memory which deals a serious blow to the stability and vitality of any learning health system.⁶ As Bhugra and Ventriglio put it, institutional memory identifies “what has worked in delivering the aims in the past and what has not, thereby ensuring the lessons learnt are remembered and passed on to the next generation.”⁷

Nearly every week, at all levels of the agency, I have encountered this exodus of builders and bearers of institutional memory. Those who have left did so for many of the same reasons cited by those who declined to come, leaving incalculable gaps at both ends of the career spectrum. Both the old and new are essential for organizational resilience: fresh ideas enable an institution to be agile in responding to challenges, while operational savvy ensures responses are ecologically aligned with the organizational mission.⁸

The dire shortage of HCPs—especially in mental health and primary care—has opened up unprecedented opportunities.⁹ Colleagues have noted that with only a little searching they found multiple lucrative positions. Once, HCPs picked the VA because they valued the commitment to public service and being part of a community of education and research more than fame or fortune. Having the best benefits packages in the industry only reinforced its value. 

Even so, surpassing a genius such as Sir Isaac Newton, writing to a scientific competitor, Robert Hooke, recognized that progress and discovery in science and medicine are nigh well impossible without the collective achievements housed in institutional memory.¹ It was inspiring teachers and attending physicians—Newton’s giants—who attracted the best and brightest in medicine and nursing, other HCPs, and research, to the VA, where they could participate in a transactive organizational learning process from their seniors, and then grow that fund of knowledge to improve patient care, educate their learners, and innovate. What will happen when there are no longer shoulders of giants or anyone to stand on them?

If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.

Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) ¹

Early in residency, I decided I only wanted to work at the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). It was a way to follow the example of service that my parents, an Army doctor and nurse, had set. I spent much of my residency, including all of my last year of training, at a VA medical center, hoping a vacancy would open in the psychiatry service. In those days, VA jobs were hard to come by; doctors spent their entire careers in the system, only retiring after decades of commitment to its unique mission. Finally, close to graduation, one of my favorite attending physicians left his post. After mountains of paperwork and running the human resources obstacle course with the usual stumbles, I arrived at my dream job as a VA psychiatrist.

So, it is with immense sadness and even shock that I read a recent ProPublica article reporting that from January to March 2025 almost 40% of the physicians who received employment offers from the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) declined the positions.² Medical media rapidly picked up the story, likely further discouraging potential applicants.³

There have always been health care professionals (HCPs) who had zero interest in working for the VA. Medical students and residents often have a love/hate relationship with the VA, with some trainees not having the patience for the behemoth pace of the bureaucracy or finding the old-style physical environment and more relaxed pace antiquated and inefficient.

The reasons doctors are saying no to VA employment at 4 times the previous rate are different and more disturbing. According to ProPublica, VA officials in Texas reported in a June internal presentation that about 90 people had turned down job offers due to the “uncertainty of reorganization.”² They reported that low morale was causing existing employees to recommend against working at the VA. My own anecdotal experience is similar: contrary to prior years, few residents, if any, are interested in working at the VA because of concerns about the stability of employment and the direction of its organizational culture.

It is fair to question the objectivity of the ProPublica report. However, the latest VA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) analysis of staffing had similar findings. “Despite the ability to make noncompetitive appointments for such occupations, VHA continues to experience severe occupational staffing shortages for these occupations that are fundamental to the delivery of health care.” The 4434 severe occupational shortage figures in fiscal year (FY) 2025 were 50% higher than in FY 2024.⁴ OIG reported that 57% of facilities noted severe occupational staffing shortages for psychology, making it the most frequently reported clinical shortage.

At this critical juncture, when new health care professional energy is not flowing into the VHA, there is an unprecedented drain of the lifeblood of any system—the departure of the bearers of institutional memory. Early and scheduled retirements, the deferred resignation program, and severance have decimated the ranks of senior HCPs, experienced leaders, and career clinicians. ProPublica noted the loss of 600 doctors and 1900 nurses at the VHA so far in 2025.² Internal VA data from exit interviews suggest similar motivations. Many cited lack of trust and confidence in senior leaders and job stress/pressure.⁵

It should be noted the VA has an alternative and plausible explanation for the expected departure of 30,000 employees. They argue that the VHA was overstaffed and the increased workforce decreased the efficiency of service. Voluntary separation from employment, VA contends, has avoided the need for a far more disruptive reduction in force. VA leaders avow that downsizing has not adversely impacted its ability to deliver high-quality health care and benefits and they assert that a reduction in red tape will enable VA to provide easier access to care. VA Secretary Doug Collins has concluded that because of these difficult but necessary changes, “VA is headed in the right direction.”⁶

What is institutional memory, and why is it important? “The core of institutional memory is collective awareness and understanding of a collective set of facts, concepts, experiences, and know-how,” Bhugra and Ventriglio explain. “These are all held collectively at various levels in any given institution. Thus, collective memory or history can be utilized to build on what has gone before and how we take things forward.”⁷

The authors of this quote offer a modern twist on what Sir Isaac Newton described in more metaphorical language in the epigraph: to survive, and even more to thrive, an enterprise must have those who have accumulated technical knowledge and professional wisdom as well as those who assume responsibility for appropriating and adding to this storehouse of operational skill, expertise, unique cultural values, and ethical commitments. The VHA is losing its instructors and students of institutional memory which deals a serious blow to the stability and vitality of any learning health system.⁶ As Bhugra and Ventriglio put it, institutional memory identifies “what has worked in delivering the aims in the past and what has not, thereby ensuring the lessons learnt are remembered and passed on to the next generation.”⁷

Nearly every week, at all levels of the agency, I have encountered this exodus of builders and bearers of institutional memory. Those who have left did so for many of the same reasons cited by those who declined to come, leaving incalculable gaps at both ends of the career spectrum. Both the old and new are essential for organizational resilience: fresh ideas enable an institution to be agile in responding to challenges, while operational savvy ensures responses are ecologically aligned with the organizational mission.⁸

The dire shortage of HCPs—especially in mental health and primary care—has opened up unprecedented opportunities.⁹ Colleagues have noted that with only a little searching they found multiple lucrative positions. Once, HCPs picked the VA because they valued the commitment to public service and being part of a community of education and research more than fame or fortune. Having the best benefits packages in the industry only reinforced its value. 

Even so, surpassing a genius such as Sir Isaac Newton, writing to a scientific competitor, Robert Hooke, recognized that progress and discovery in science and medicine are nigh well impossible without the collective achievements housed in institutional memory.¹ It was inspiring teachers and attending physicians—Newton’s giants—who attracted the best and brightest in medicine and nursing, other HCPs, and research, to the VA, where they could participate in a transactive organizational learning process from their seniors, and then grow that fund of knowledge to improve patient care, educate their learners, and innovate. What will happen when there are no longer shoulders of giants or anyone to stand on them?

If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.

Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) ¹

Early in residency, I decided I only wanted to work at the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). It was a way to follow the example of service that my parents, an Army doctor and nurse, had set. I spent much of my residency, including all of my last year of training, at a VA medical center, hoping a vacancy would open in the psychiatry service. In those days, VA jobs were hard to come by; doctors spent their entire careers in the system, only retiring after decades of commitment to its unique mission. Finally, close to graduation, one of my favorite attending physicians left his post. After mountains of paperwork and running the human resources obstacle course with the usual stumbles, I arrived at my dream job as a VA psychiatrist.

So, it is with immense sadness and even shock that I read a recent ProPublica article reporting that from January to March 2025 almost 40% of the physicians who received employment offers from the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) declined the positions.² Medical media rapidly picked up the story, likely further discouraging potential applicants.³

There have always been health care professionals (HCPs) who had zero interest in working for the VA. Medical students and residents often have a love/hate relationship with the VA, with some trainees not having the patience for the behemoth pace of the bureaucracy or finding the old-style physical environment and more relaxed pace antiquated and inefficient.

The reasons doctors are saying no to VA employment at 4 times the previous rate are different and more disturbing. According to ProPublica, VA officials in Texas reported in a June internal presentation that about 90 people had turned down job offers due to the “uncertainty of reorganization.”² They reported that low morale was causing existing employees to recommend against working at the VA. My own anecdotal experience is similar: contrary to prior years, few residents, if any, are interested in working at the VA because of concerns about the stability of employment and the direction of its organizational culture.

It is fair to question the objectivity of the ProPublica report. However, the latest VA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) analysis of staffing had similar findings. “Despite the ability to make noncompetitive appointments for such occupations, VHA continues to experience severe occupational staffing shortages for these occupations that are fundamental to the delivery of health care.” The 4434 severe occupational shortage figures in fiscal year (FY) 2025 were 50% higher than in FY 2024.⁴ OIG reported that 57% of facilities noted severe occupational staffing shortages for psychology, making it the most frequently reported clinical shortage.

At this critical juncture, when new health care professional energy is not flowing into the VHA, there is an unprecedented drain of the lifeblood of any system—the departure of the bearers of institutional memory. Early and scheduled retirements, the deferred resignation program, and severance have decimated the ranks of senior HCPs, experienced leaders, and career clinicians. ProPublica noted the loss of 600 doctors and 1900 nurses at the VHA so far in 2025.² Internal VA data from exit interviews suggest similar motivations. Many cited lack of trust and confidence in senior leaders and job stress/pressure.⁵

It should be noted the VA has an alternative and plausible explanation for the expected departure of 30,000 employees. They argue that the VHA was overstaffed and the increased workforce decreased the efficiency of service. Voluntary separation from employment, VA contends, has avoided the need for a far more disruptive reduction in force. VA leaders avow that downsizing has not adversely impacted its ability to deliver high-quality health care and benefits and they assert that a reduction in red tape will enable VA to provide easier access to care. VA Secretary Doug Collins has concluded that because of these difficult but necessary changes, “VA is headed in the right direction.”⁶

What is institutional memory, and why is it important? “The core of institutional memory is collective awareness and understanding of a collective set of facts, concepts, experiences, and know-how,” Bhugra and Ventriglio explain. “These are all held collectively at various levels in any given institution. Thus, collective memory or history can be utilized to build on what has gone before and how we take things forward.”⁷

The authors of this quote offer a modern twist on what Sir Isaac Newton described in more metaphorical language in the epigraph: to survive, and even more to thrive, an enterprise must have those who have accumulated technical knowledge and professional wisdom as well as those who assume responsibility for appropriating and adding to this storehouse of operational skill, expertise, unique cultural values, and ethical commitments. The VHA is losing its instructors and students of institutional memory which deals a serious blow to the stability and vitality of any learning health system.⁶ As Bhugra and Ventriglio put it, institutional memory identifies “what has worked in delivering the aims in the past and what has not, thereby ensuring the lessons learnt are remembered and passed on to the next generation.”⁷

Nearly every week, at all levels of the agency, I have encountered this exodus of builders and bearers of institutional memory. Those who have left did so for many of the same reasons cited by those who declined to come, leaving incalculable gaps at both ends of the career spectrum. Both the old and new are essential for organizational resilience: fresh ideas enable an institution to be agile in responding to challenges, while operational savvy ensures responses are ecologically aligned with the organizational mission.⁸

The dire shortage of HCPs—especially in mental health and primary care—has opened up unprecedented opportunities.⁹ Colleagues have noted that with only a little searching they found multiple lucrative positions. Once, HCPs picked the VA because they valued the commitment to public service and being part of a community of education and research more than fame or fortune. Having the best benefits packages in the industry only reinforced its value. 

Even so, surpassing a genius such as Sir Isaac Newton, writing to a scientific competitor, Robert Hooke, recognized that progress and discovery in science and medicine are nigh well impossible without the collective achievements housed in institutional memory.¹ It was inspiring teachers and attending physicians—Newton’s giants—who attracted the best and brightest in medicine and nursing, other HCPs, and research, to the VA, where they could participate in a transactive organizational learning process from their seniors, and then grow that fund of knowledge to improve patient care, educate their learners, and innovate. What will happen when there are no longer shoulders of giants or anyone to stand on them?

Background

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) faces a landscape of increasingly complex practice, especially in Hematology/Oncology (H/O), and a nationwide shortage of healthcare providers, while serving more Veterans than ever before. To understand current and future staffing needs, the VA National Oncology Program performed an assessment of H/O staffing, including attending physicians, residents/ fellows, licensed independent practitioners (LIPs) (nurse practitioners/physician assistants), and nurses for fiscal years (FY) 19–24.

Methods

Using VA Corporate Data Warehouse, we identified H/O visits in VA from 10/01/2018 through 09/30/2024 using stop codes. No-show (< 0.00001%) and National TeleOncology appointments (1%) were removed. We retrieved all notes associated with resulting visits and used area-ofspecialization and provider-type data to identify all attending physicians, trainees, LIPs, and nurses who authored or cosigned these notes. We identified H/O staff as 1. those associated with H/O clinic locations, 2. physicians who consistently cosigned H/O notes authored by fellows and LIPs associated with H/O locations, 3. fellows and LIPs authoring notes that were then cosigned by H/O physicians, and 4. nurses authoring notes associated with H/O visits.

Analysis

For each FY, we obtained total numbers of visits, unique patients, and care-providing staff by type. For validation, collaborating providers at several sites reviewed visit information, and a colleague also performed an independent, parallel data extraction. We adjusted FY totals to account for the growing patient population by dividing unique staff count by number of unique patients and multiplying by 200,000 (the approximate number of unique patients in FY19).

Results

From FY19 through FY24, VA Hematology/ Oncology saw a 14.6% rise in unique patients (from 232,084 to 265,926) and a 15.4% rise in visits (from 923,175 to 1,065,186). The absolute number of attendings rose by 4 (0.6%); of LIPs, by 138 (14.4%); and of nurses, by 142 (4.9%); trainees fell by 102 (4.3%). Adjusted to 200,000 patients, the number of attendings fell by 76 (12.3%); LIPs, by 1 (0.1%); trainees, by 335 (16.5%); and nurses, by 211 (8.4%).

Conclusions

Adjusted to number of Veterans, there are 10.4% fewer staff in Hematology/Oncology in FY24 compared to FY19.

Background

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) faces a landscape of increasingly complex practice, especially in Hematology/Oncology (H/O), and a nationwide shortage of healthcare providers, while serving more Veterans than ever before. To understand current and future staffing needs, the VA National Oncology Program performed an assessment of H/O staffing, including attending physicians, residents/ fellows, licensed independent practitioners (LIPs) (nurse practitioners/physician assistants), and nurses for fiscal years (FY) 19–24.

Methods

Using VA Corporate Data Warehouse, we identified H/O visits in VA from 10/01/2018 through 09/30/2024 using stop codes. No-show (< 0.00001%) and National TeleOncology appointments (1%) were removed. We retrieved all notes associated with resulting visits and used area-ofspecialization and provider-type data to identify all attending physicians, trainees, LIPs, and nurses who authored or cosigned these notes. We identified H/O staff as 1. those associated with H/O clinic locations, 2. physicians who consistently cosigned H/O notes authored by fellows and LIPs associated with H/O locations, 3. fellows and LIPs authoring notes that were then cosigned by H/O physicians, and 4. nurses authoring notes associated with H/O visits.

Analysis

For each FY, we obtained total numbers of visits, unique patients, and care-providing staff by type. For validation, collaborating providers at several sites reviewed visit information, and a colleague also performed an independent, parallel data extraction. We adjusted FY totals to account for the growing patient population by dividing unique staff count by number of unique patients and multiplying by 200,000 (the approximate number of unique patients in FY19).

Results

From FY19 through FY24, VA Hematology/ Oncology saw a 14.6% rise in unique patients (from 232,084 to 265,926) and a 15.4% rise in visits (from 923,175 to 1,065,186). The absolute number of attendings rose by 4 (0.6%); of LIPs, by 138 (14.4%); and of nurses, by 142 (4.9%); trainees fell by 102 (4.3%). Adjusted to 200,000 patients, the number of attendings fell by 76 (12.3%); LIPs, by 1 (0.1%); trainees, by 335 (16.5%); and nurses, by 211 (8.4%).

Conclusions

Adjusted to number of Veterans, there are 10.4% fewer staff in Hematology/Oncology in FY24 compared to FY19.

Background

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) faces a landscape of increasingly complex practice, especially in Hematology/Oncology (H/O), and a nationwide shortage of healthcare providers, while serving more Veterans than ever before. To understand current and future staffing needs, the VA National Oncology Program performed an assessment of H/O staffing, including attending physicians, residents/ fellows, licensed independent practitioners (LIPs) (nurse practitioners/physician assistants), and nurses for fiscal years (FY) 19–24.

Methods

Using VA Corporate Data Warehouse, we identified H/O visits in VA from 10/01/2018 through 09/30/2024 using stop codes. No-show (< 0.00001%) and National TeleOncology appointments (1%) were removed. We retrieved all notes associated with resulting visits and used area-ofspecialization and provider-type data to identify all attending physicians, trainees, LIPs, and nurses who authored or cosigned these notes. We identified H/O staff as 1. those associated with H/O clinic locations, 2. physicians who consistently cosigned H/O notes authored by fellows and LIPs associated with H/O locations, 3. fellows and LIPs authoring notes that were then cosigned by H/O physicians, and 4. nurses authoring notes associated with H/O visits.

Analysis

For each FY, we obtained total numbers of visits, unique patients, and care-providing staff by type. For validation, collaborating providers at several sites reviewed visit information, and a colleague also performed an independent, parallel data extraction. We adjusted FY totals to account for the growing patient population by dividing unique staff count by number of unique patients and multiplying by 200,000 (the approximate number of unique patients in FY19).

Results

From FY19 through FY24, VA Hematology/ Oncology saw a 14.6% rise in unique patients (from 232,084 to 265,926) and a 15.4% rise in visits (from 923,175 to 1,065,186). The absolute number of attendings rose by 4 (0.6%); of LIPs, by 138 (14.4%); and of nurses, by 142 (4.9%); trainees fell by 102 (4.3%). Adjusted to 200,000 patients, the number of attendings fell by 76 (12.3%); LIPs, by 1 (0.1%); trainees, by 335 (16.5%); and nurses, by 211 (8.4%).

Conclusions

Adjusted to number of Veterans, there are 10.4% fewer staff in Hematology/Oncology in FY24 compared to FY19.

Background

Germline genetic testing (GGT) is essential in prostate cancer care, informing clinical decisions. The Veterans Affairs National Oncology Program (VA NOP) recommends GGT for patients with specific risk factors in non-metastatic prostate cancer and all patients with metastatic disease. Understanding GGT access helps evaluate care quality and guide improvements. Since 2021, VA NOP has implemented pathway health factor (HF) templates to standardize cancer care documentation, including GGT status, enabling data extraction from the Corporate Data Warehouse (CDW) rather than requiring manual review of clinical notes. This work aims to evaluate Veterans’ access to GGT in prostate cancer care by leveraging pathway HF templates, and to assess the feasibility of using structured electronic health record (EHR) data to monitor adherence to GGT recommendations.

Methods

Process delivery diagrams (PDDs) were used to map data flow from prostate cancer clinical pathways to the VA CDW. We identified and categorized HFs related to prostate cancer GGT through the computerized patient record system (CPRS). Descriptive statistics were used to summarize access, ordering, and consent rates.

Results

We identified 5,744 Veterans with at least one prostate cancer GGT-relevant HF entered between 02/01/2021 and 12/31/2024. Of these, 5,125 (89.2%) had access to GGT, with 4,569 (89.2%) consenting to or having GGT ordered, while 556 (10.8%) declined testing. Among the 619 (10.8%) Veterans without GGT access, providers reported plans to discuss GGT in the future for 528 (85.3%) patients, while 91 (14.7%) were off pathway.

Conclusions

NOP-developed HF templates enabled extraction of GGT information from structured EHR data, eliminating manual extraction from clinical notes. We observed high GGT utilization among Veterans with pathway-entered HFs. However, low overall HF utilization may introduce selection bias. Future work includes developing a Natural Language Processing pipeline using large language models to automatically extract GGT information from clinical notes, with HF data serving as ground truth.

Background

Germline genetic testing (GGT) is essential in prostate cancer care, informing clinical decisions. The Veterans Affairs National Oncology Program (VA NOP) recommends GGT for patients with specific risk factors in non-metastatic prostate cancer and all patients with metastatic disease. Understanding GGT access helps evaluate care quality and guide improvements. Since 2021, VA NOP has implemented pathway health factor (HF) templates to standardize cancer care documentation, including GGT status, enabling data extraction from the Corporate Data Warehouse (CDW) rather than requiring manual review of clinical notes. This work aims to evaluate Veterans’ access to GGT in prostate cancer care by leveraging pathway HF templates, and to assess the feasibility of using structured electronic health record (EHR) data to monitor adherence to GGT recommendations.

Methods

Process delivery diagrams (PDDs) were used to map data flow from prostate cancer clinical pathways to the VA CDW. We identified and categorized HFs related to prostate cancer GGT through the computerized patient record system (CPRS). Descriptive statistics were used to summarize access, ordering, and consent rates.

Results

We identified 5,744 Veterans with at least one prostate cancer GGT-relevant HF entered between 02/01/2021 and 12/31/2024. Of these, 5,125 (89.2%) had access to GGT, with 4,569 (89.2%) consenting to or having GGT ordered, while 556 (10.8%) declined testing. Among the 619 (10.8%) Veterans without GGT access, providers reported plans to discuss GGT in the future for 528 (85.3%) patients, while 91 (14.7%) were off pathway.

Conclusions

NOP-developed HF templates enabled extraction of GGT information from structured EHR data, eliminating manual extraction from clinical notes. We observed high GGT utilization among Veterans with pathway-entered HFs. However, low overall HF utilization may introduce selection bias. Future work includes developing a Natural Language Processing pipeline using large language models to automatically extract GGT information from clinical notes, with HF data serving as ground truth.

Background

Germline genetic testing (GGT) is essential in prostate cancer care, informing clinical decisions. The Veterans Affairs National Oncology Program (VA NOP) recommends GGT for patients with specific risk factors in non-metastatic prostate cancer and all patients with metastatic disease. Understanding GGT access helps evaluate care quality and guide improvements. Since 2021, VA NOP has implemented pathway health factor (HF) templates to standardize cancer care documentation, including GGT status, enabling data extraction from the Corporate Data Warehouse (CDW) rather than requiring manual review of clinical notes. This work aims to evaluate Veterans’ access to GGT in prostate cancer care by leveraging pathway HF templates, and to assess the feasibility of using structured electronic health record (EHR) data to monitor adherence to GGT recommendations.

Methods

Process delivery diagrams (PDDs) were used to map data flow from prostate cancer clinical pathways to the VA CDW. We identified and categorized HFs related to prostate cancer GGT through the computerized patient record system (CPRS). Descriptive statistics were used to summarize access, ordering, and consent rates.

Results

We identified 5,744 Veterans with at least one prostate cancer GGT-relevant HF entered between 02/01/2021 and 12/31/2024. Of these, 5,125 (89.2%) had access to GGT, with 4,569 (89.2%) consenting to or having GGT ordered, while 556 (10.8%) declined testing. Among the 619 (10.8%) Veterans without GGT access, providers reported plans to discuss GGT in the future for 528 (85.3%) patients, while 91 (14.7%) were off pathway.

Conclusions

NOP-developed HF templates enabled extraction of GGT information from structured EHR data, eliminating manual extraction from clinical notes. We observed high GGT utilization among Veterans with pathway-entered HFs. However, low overall HF utilization may introduce selection bias. Future work includes developing a Natural Language Processing pipeline using large language models to automatically extract GGT information from clinical notes, with HF data serving as ground truth.

A mid-season analysis of the influenza vaccine by the US Department of Defensive (DoD) Global Respiratory Pathogen Surveillance Program (DoDGRPSP) has reported low to moderate vaccine effectiveness (VE). 

The study included 295 Military Health System (MHS) beneficiaries (adults and children) who tested positive for influenza and 965 controls who tested negative. Vaccinated patients had received the 2024-2025 influenza vaccine at least 14 days prior to symptom onset. The study conducted VE analyses for influenza A (any subtype), influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, and influenza A(H3N2). 

Overall, moderate effectiveness against influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 was reported in all beneficiaries and children aged 6 months to 17 years. In adults aged 18 to 64 years—and all beneficiaries—there was moderate effectiveness against influenza A(H3N2). VE estimates against influenza A (any subtype) for all beneficiaries, children, and adults were not significant; VE estimates were also not effective among children for influenza A(H3N2) and in adults for influenza A(H1N1)pdm09.

Adjusted VE estimates among all participants for influenza A (any subtypes), influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, and influenza A(H3N2) were 25%, 58%, and 42%, respectively. VE for influenza B was not calculated due to a low number of cases.

Flu vaccination rates for adults are usually in the 30% to 60% range despite the recommended target of 70%. Flu vaccination rates were rising by around 1% to 2% annually before 2020, but began dropping after the COVID-19 pandemic, especially in higher-risk groups. In adults aged ≥ 65 years, flu vaccination rates dropped from 52% in 2019-2020 to 43% in 2024-2025.

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), at the end of the 2023-2024 flu season, 9.2 million fewer doses were administered in pharmacies and doctors offices compared with the baseline before the COVID-19 pandemic. Since 2022, private manufacturers have distributed significantly fewer influenza vaccine doses. 

Each March, the US Food and Drug Association (FDA) Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee (VRBPAC) meets to analyze the current influenza season and forecast the next. The committee reviews and discusses data on influenza strain circulation and VE, which come from DoDGRPSP analyses. In February, US Department of Health and Human Services officials indefinitely postponed a public meeting of the CDC Advisory Committee on Immunization Practice (ACIP), at which members were also expected to discuss, among other things, VE and vaccine recommendations. The FDA canceled a March 13 VRBPAC meeting and provided no reason for the cancelation to members. That day, however, the FDA issued new recommendations for the influenza vaccine for the 2025-2026 season without the input of VRBPAC. Instead, experts from the FDA, CDC, and DoD made recommendations after reviewing surveillance data from the US and globally.

For the 2025-2026 influenza season, the FDA recommends the vaccines be trivalent and target 2 strains of influenza A and 1 strain of influenza B. The FDA anticipates there will be an “adequate and diverse supply” of approved trivalent seasonal influenza vaccines. Trivalent flu vaccines are formulated to protect against 3 influenza viruses: an A(H1N1) virus, an A(H3N2) virus, and a B/Victoria virus. All influenza vaccines for the 2025-2026 season are anticipated to be trivalent in the US.

A mid-season analysis of the influenza vaccine by the US Department of Defensive (DoD) Global Respiratory Pathogen Surveillance Program (DoDGRPSP) has reported low to moderate vaccine effectiveness (VE). 

The study included 295 Military Health System (MHS) beneficiaries (adults and children) who tested positive for influenza and 965 controls who tested negative. Vaccinated patients had received the 2024-2025 influenza vaccine at least 14 days prior to symptom onset. The study conducted VE analyses for influenza A (any subtype), influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, and influenza A(H3N2). 

Overall, moderate effectiveness against influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 was reported in all beneficiaries and children aged 6 months to 17 years. In adults aged 18 to 64 years—and all beneficiaries—there was moderate effectiveness against influenza A(H3N2). VE estimates against influenza A (any subtype) for all beneficiaries, children, and adults were not significant; VE estimates were also not effective among children for influenza A(H3N2) and in adults for influenza A(H1N1)pdm09.

Adjusted VE estimates among all participants for influenza A (any subtypes), influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, and influenza A(H3N2) were 25%, 58%, and 42%, respectively. VE for influenza B was not calculated due to a low number of cases.

Flu vaccination rates for adults are usually in the 30% to 60% range despite the recommended target of 70%. Flu vaccination rates were rising by around 1% to 2% annually before 2020, but began dropping after the COVID-19 pandemic, especially in higher-risk groups. In adults aged ≥ 65 years, flu vaccination rates dropped from 52% in 2019-2020 to 43% in 2024-2025.

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), at the end of the 2023-2024 flu season, 9.2 million fewer doses were administered in pharmacies and doctors offices compared with the baseline before the COVID-19 pandemic. Since 2022, private manufacturers have distributed significantly fewer influenza vaccine doses. 

Each March, the US Food and Drug Association (FDA) Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee (VRBPAC) meets to analyze the current influenza season and forecast the next. The committee reviews and discusses data on influenza strain circulation and VE, which come from DoDGRPSP analyses. In February, US Department of Health and Human Services officials indefinitely postponed a public meeting of the CDC Advisory Committee on Immunization Practice (ACIP), at which members were also expected to discuss, among other things, VE and vaccine recommendations. The FDA canceled a March 13 VRBPAC meeting and provided no reason for the cancelation to members. That day, however, the FDA issued new recommendations for the influenza vaccine for the 2025-2026 season without the input of VRBPAC. Instead, experts from the FDA, CDC, and DoD made recommendations after reviewing surveillance data from the US and globally.

For the 2025-2026 influenza season, the FDA recommends the vaccines be trivalent and target 2 strains of influenza A and 1 strain of influenza B. The FDA anticipates there will be an “adequate and diverse supply” of approved trivalent seasonal influenza vaccines. Trivalent flu vaccines are formulated to protect against 3 influenza viruses: an A(H1N1) virus, an A(H3N2) virus, and a B/Victoria virus. All influenza vaccines for the 2025-2026 season are anticipated to be trivalent in the US.

A mid-season analysis of the influenza vaccine by the US Department of Defensive (DoD) Global Respiratory Pathogen Surveillance Program (DoDGRPSP) has reported low to moderate vaccine effectiveness (VE). 

The study included 295 Military Health System (MHS) beneficiaries (adults and children) who tested positive for influenza and 965 controls who tested negative. Vaccinated patients had received the 2024-2025 influenza vaccine at least 14 days prior to symptom onset. The study conducted VE analyses for influenza A (any subtype), influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, and influenza A(H3N2). 

Overall, moderate effectiveness against influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 was reported in all beneficiaries and children aged 6 months to 17 years. In adults aged 18 to 64 years—and all beneficiaries—there was moderate effectiveness against influenza A(H3N2). VE estimates against influenza A (any subtype) for all beneficiaries, children, and adults were not significant; VE estimates were also not effective among children for influenza A(H3N2) and in adults for influenza A(H1N1)pdm09.

Adjusted VE estimates among all participants for influenza A (any subtypes), influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, and influenza A(H3N2) were 25%, 58%, and 42%, respectively. VE for influenza B was not calculated due to a low number of cases.

Flu vaccination rates for adults are usually in the 30% to 60% range despite the recommended target of 70%. Flu vaccination rates were rising by around 1% to 2% annually before 2020, but began dropping after the COVID-19 pandemic, especially in higher-risk groups. In adults aged ≥ 65 years, flu vaccination rates dropped from 52% in 2019-2020 to 43% in 2024-2025.

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), at the end of the 2023-2024 flu season, 9.2 million fewer doses were administered in pharmacies and doctors offices compared with the baseline before the COVID-19 pandemic. Since 2022, private manufacturers have distributed significantly fewer influenza vaccine doses. 

Each March, the US Food and Drug Association (FDA) Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee (VRBPAC) meets to analyze the current influenza season and forecast the next. The committee reviews and discusses data on influenza strain circulation and VE, which come from DoDGRPSP analyses. In February, US Department of Health and Human Services officials indefinitely postponed a public meeting of the CDC Advisory Committee on Immunization Practice (ACIP), at which members were also expected to discuss, among other things, VE and vaccine recommendations. The FDA canceled a March 13 VRBPAC meeting and provided no reason for the cancelation to members. That day, however, the FDA issued new recommendations for the influenza vaccine for the 2025-2026 season without the input of VRBPAC. Instead, experts from the FDA, CDC, and DoD made recommendations after reviewing surveillance data from the US and globally.

For the 2025-2026 influenza season, the FDA recommends the vaccines be trivalent and target 2 strains of influenza A and 1 strain of influenza B. The FDA anticipates there will be an “adequate and diverse supply” of approved trivalent seasonal influenza vaccines. Trivalent flu vaccines are formulated to protect against 3 influenza viruses: an A(H1N1) virus, an A(H3N2) virus, and a B/Victoria virus. All influenza vaccines for the 2025-2026 season are anticipated to be trivalent in the US.

A bipartisan bill establishing research directives aimed at revealing cancer risks among military aviators and aircrews recently became law.

Spearheaded by Sen. Mark Kelly (D-AZ) and Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AR), as well as Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX-11) and Rep. Jimmy Panetta (D-CA-19), all of whom are veterans, the Aviator Cancer Examination Study (ACES) Act was signed into law on August 14. The ACES Act will address cancer rates among Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps aircrew members by directing the Secretary of the US Department of Veterans Affairs to study cancer incidence and mortality rates among these populations.

Military aviators and aircrews face a 15% to 24% higher rate of cancer compared with the general US population, including a 75% higher rate of melanoma, 31% higher rate of thyroid cancer, 20% higher rate of prostate cancer, and 11% higher rate of female breast cancer, with potential links to non-Hodgkin lymphoma and testicular cancer. These individuals are also diagnosed earlier in life, at the median age of 55 years compared with 67 years. However, further investigation is still needed to understand why. 

“By better understanding the correlation between aviator service and cancer, we can better assist our military and provide more adequate care for our veterans,” Kelly said.

Some reasons for the higher rates of cancer in aviators seem clear, such as the association between dioxin exposure and cancer. In a study of cancer incidence and mortality in Air Force veterans of the Vietnam War, incidence of melanoma and prostate cancer was increased among White veterans who sprayed herbicides during Operation Ranch Hand. The risk of cancer at any site, prostate cancer, and melanoma was increased in the highest dioxin exposure category among veterans who spent ≤ 2 years in Southeast Asia.

However, some links between these veterans and increased cancer rates are less clear. In a review of 28 studies (including 18 studies in military settings), slight evidence was found for associations between jet fuel exposure and various outcomes including cancer. Cosmic ionizing radiation (CIR) exposure is another possible cause. Several epidemiological studies have documented elevated incidence and mortality for several cancers in flight crews, but a link between them and CIR exposure has not been established.

Certain occupations have been associated with increased risk of testicular germ cell tumors, including aircraft maintenance, military pilots, fighter pilots, and aircrews. Those associations led to hypotheses that job-related chemical exposures (eg, per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances, solvents, paints, hydrocarbons in degreasing/lubricating agents, lubricating oils) may increase risk. A study of young active-duty Air Force servicemen found that pilots and men with aircraft maintenance jobs had elevated tenosynovial giant cell tumor risk, but indicates that further research is needed to “elucidate specific occupational exposures underlying these associations.”

“As a former Navy pilot, there are certain risks that we know and accept come with our service, but we know far less about the health risks that are affecting many aviators and aircrews years later,” Kelly said in a statement. “Veteran aviators and aircrews deserve answers about the correlation between their job and cancer risks so we can reduce those risks for future pilots. Getting this across the finish line has been a bipartisan effort from the start, and I’m proud to see this bill become law so we can deliver real answers and accountability for those who served.”   

“The ACES Act is now the law of the land,” Cotton added. “We owe it to past, present, and future aviators in the armed forces to study the prevalence of cancer among this group of veterans.”

The ACES Act complements Kelly’s bipartisan Counting Veterans’ Cancer Act, which requires Veterans Health Administration facilities to share cancer data with state cancer registries, thereby guaranteeing their inclusion in the national registries. Key provisions of the Counting Veterans’ Cancer Act were included in the first government funding package of fiscal year 2024. 

A bipartisan bill establishing research directives aimed at revealing cancer risks among military aviators and aircrews recently became law.

Spearheaded by Sen. Mark Kelly (D-AZ) and Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AR), as well as Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX-11) and Rep. Jimmy Panetta (D-CA-19), all of whom are veterans, the Aviator Cancer Examination Study (ACES) Act was signed into law on August 14. The ACES Act will address cancer rates among Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps aircrew members by directing the Secretary of the US Department of Veterans Affairs to study cancer incidence and mortality rates among these populations.

Military aviators and aircrews face a 15% to 24% higher rate of cancer compared with the general US population, including a 75% higher rate of melanoma, 31% higher rate of thyroid cancer, 20% higher rate of prostate cancer, and 11% higher rate of female breast cancer, with potential links to non-Hodgkin lymphoma and testicular cancer. These individuals are also diagnosed earlier in life, at the median age of 55 years compared with 67 years. However, further investigation is still needed to understand why. 

“By better understanding the correlation between aviator service and cancer, we can better assist our military and provide more adequate care for our veterans,” Kelly said.

Some reasons for the higher rates of cancer in aviators seem clear, such as the association between dioxin exposure and cancer. In a study of cancer incidence and mortality in Air Force veterans of the Vietnam War, incidence of melanoma and prostate cancer was increased among White veterans who sprayed herbicides during Operation Ranch Hand. The risk of cancer at any site, prostate cancer, and melanoma was increased in the highest dioxin exposure category among veterans who spent ≤ 2 years in Southeast Asia.

However, some links between these veterans and increased cancer rates are less clear. In a review of 28 studies (including 18 studies in military settings), slight evidence was found for associations between jet fuel exposure and various outcomes including cancer. Cosmic ionizing radiation (CIR) exposure is another possible cause. Several epidemiological studies have documented elevated incidence and mortality for several cancers in flight crews, but a link between them and CIR exposure has not been established.

Certain occupations have been associated with increased risk of testicular germ cell tumors, including aircraft maintenance, military pilots, fighter pilots, and aircrews. Those associations led to hypotheses that job-related chemical exposures (eg, per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances, solvents, paints, hydrocarbons in degreasing/lubricating agents, lubricating oils) may increase risk. A study of young active-duty Air Force servicemen found that pilots and men with aircraft maintenance jobs had elevated tenosynovial giant cell tumor risk, but indicates that further research is needed to “elucidate specific occupational exposures underlying these associations.”

“As a former Navy pilot, there are certain risks that we know and accept come with our service, but we know far less about the health risks that are affecting many aviators and aircrews years later,” Kelly said in a statement. “Veteran aviators and aircrews deserve answers about the correlation between their job and cancer risks so we can reduce those risks for future pilots. Getting this across the finish line has been a bipartisan effort from the start, and I’m proud to see this bill become law so we can deliver real answers and accountability for those who served.”   

“The ACES Act is now the law of the land,” Cotton added. “We owe it to past, present, and future aviators in the armed forces to study the prevalence of cancer among this group of veterans.”

The ACES Act complements Kelly’s bipartisan Counting Veterans’ Cancer Act, which requires Veterans Health Administration facilities to share cancer data with state cancer registries, thereby guaranteeing their inclusion in the national registries. Key provisions of the Counting Veterans’ Cancer Act were included in the first government funding package of fiscal year 2024. 

A bipartisan bill establishing research directives aimed at revealing cancer risks among military aviators and aircrews recently became law.

Spearheaded by Sen. Mark Kelly (D-AZ) and Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AR), as well as Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX-11) and Rep. Jimmy Panetta (D-CA-19), all of whom are veterans, the Aviator Cancer Examination Study (ACES) Act was signed into law on August 14. The ACES Act will address cancer rates among Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps aircrew members by directing the Secretary of the US Department of Veterans Affairs to study cancer incidence and mortality rates among these populations.

Military aviators and aircrews face a 15% to 24% higher rate of cancer compared with the general US population, including a 75% higher rate of melanoma, 31% higher rate of thyroid cancer, 20% higher rate of prostate cancer, and 11% higher rate of female breast cancer, with potential links to non-Hodgkin lymphoma and testicular cancer. These individuals are also diagnosed earlier in life, at the median age of 55 years compared with 67 years. However, further investigation is still needed to understand why. 

“By better understanding the correlation between aviator service and cancer, we can better assist our military and provide more adequate care for our veterans,” Kelly said.

Some reasons for the higher rates of cancer in aviators seem clear, such as the association between dioxin exposure and cancer. In a study of cancer incidence and mortality in Air Force veterans of the Vietnam War, incidence of melanoma and prostate cancer was increased among White veterans who sprayed herbicides during Operation Ranch Hand. The risk of cancer at any site, prostate cancer, and melanoma was increased in the highest dioxin exposure category among veterans who spent ≤ 2 years in Southeast Asia.

However, some links between these veterans and increased cancer rates are less clear. In a review of 28 studies (including 18 studies in military settings), slight evidence was found for associations between jet fuel exposure and various outcomes including cancer. Cosmic ionizing radiation (CIR) exposure is another possible cause. Several epidemiological studies have documented elevated incidence and mortality for several cancers in flight crews, but a link between them and CIR exposure has not been established.

Certain occupations have been associated with increased risk of testicular germ cell tumors, including aircraft maintenance, military pilots, fighter pilots, and aircrews. Those associations led to hypotheses that job-related chemical exposures (eg, per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances, solvents, paints, hydrocarbons in degreasing/lubricating agents, lubricating oils) may increase risk. A study of young active-duty Air Force servicemen found that pilots and men with aircraft maintenance jobs had elevated tenosynovial giant cell tumor risk, but indicates that further research is needed to “elucidate specific occupational exposures underlying these associations.”

“As a former Navy pilot, there are certain risks that we know and accept come with our service, but we know far less about the health risks that are affecting many aviators and aircrews years later,” Kelly said in a statement. “Veteran aviators and aircrews deserve answers about the correlation between their job and cancer risks so we can reduce those risks for future pilots. Getting this across the finish line has been a bipartisan effort from the start, and I’m proud to see this bill become law so we can deliver real answers and accountability for those who served.”   

“The ACES Act is now the law of the land,” Cotton added. “We owe it to past, present, and future aviators in the armed forces to study the prevalence of cancer among this group of veterans.”

The ACES Act complements Kelly’s bipartisan Counting Veterans’ Cancer Act, which requires Veterans Health Administration facilities to share cancer data with state cancer registries, thereby guaranteeing their inclusion in the national registries. Key provisions of the Counting Veterans’ Cancer Act were included in the first government funding package of fiscal year 2024. 

TOPLINE:Expanding United States Department of Housing and Urban Development-Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing (HUD-VASH) eligibility to veterans with other-than-honorable (OTH) discharge significantly increased their program enrollments without impacting services for those with honorable discharge. Emergency department visits increased for honorable discharge veterans while hospitalizations rose for both groups.

METHODOLOGY:

• A quality improvement study following SQUIRE 2.0 reporting guidelines analyzed data from 129,873 veterans enrolled in HUD-VASH between June 1, 2019, and September 30, 2021.
• Analysis included 127,876 veterans (98.5%) with honorable/general discharge and 1997 veterans (1.5%) with OTH discharge, with a mean age of 53.7 years.
• Researchers utilized an interrupted time series design to compare program enrollments and healthcare utilization before (June 2019-December 2020) and after (January 2021-September 2021) policy implementation.
• Data linkage between the Homeless Operations and Management Evaluation System database and VA Corporate Data Warehouse enabled tracking of emergency department visits, hospitalizations, and primary care visits.
   

TAKEAWAY:

• Monthly HUD-VASH enrollments showed a significant increase for OTH veterans after the policy change (difference in slopes, 1.90; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.28-2.52), while honorable/general veterans experienced a non-significant increase (difference in slopes, 9.23; 95% CI, −20.35-38.79).
• Emergency department visits demonstrated a significant increase for honorable/general veterans (change in slope, 0.24; 95% CI, 0.12-0.35) but not for OTH veterans (change in slope, 0.08; 
  95% CI, −0.12-0.28).
• Hospitalizations significantly increased for both OTH veterans (change in slope, 0.098; 95% CI, 0.009-0.170) and honorable/general veterans (change in slope, 0.078; 95% CI, 0.004-0.060).
• Primary care visits showed no significant changes for either group after the policy implementation (OTH: change in slope, −0.12; 95% CI, −0.65-0.42; honorable/general: change in slope, 0.20; 
  95% CI, −0.13-0.53).

IN PRACTICE:“Expanding HUD-VASH eligibility increased access to housing and social support for OTH veterans without disrupting services for those with honorable discharges,” the authors reported. “Efforts should focus on improving access to connecting OTH veterans with clinical services outside of HUD-VASH.”

SOURCE:The study was led by Thomas F. Nubong, MD, Center of Innovation for Long-Term Services and Supports, Providence Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Providence. It was published online on August 5 in JAMA Network Open.

LIMITATIONS: According to the authors, the study period overlapped with the COVID-19 pandemic, potentially affecting results. Additionally, staff training on the policy change varied across US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) sites, introducing implementation inconsistencies. The single-group interrupted time series design, while effective for tracking temporal trends, limited formal comparisons between discharge groups.

DISCLOSURES: The analyses were conducted under the VA Homeless Programs Office with operational funding support. Jack Tsai, PhD, and Eric Jutkowitz, PhD, reported being principal investigators of a VA Merit study on the Impact of COVID-19 for the HUD-VASH program. James L. Rudolph, MD, reported receiving grants from Icosavax outside the submitted work and being a United States government employee.

This article was created using several editorial tools, including AI, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication.

TOPLINE:Expanding United States Department of Housing and Urban Development-Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing (HUD-VASH) eligibility to veterans with other-than-honorable (OTH) discharge significantly increased their program enrollments without impacting services for those with honorable discharge. Emergency department visits increased for honorable discharge veterans while hospitalizations rose for both groups.

METHODOLOGY:

• A quality improvement study following SQUIRE 2.0 reporting guidelines analyzed data from 129,873 veterans enrolled in HUD-VASH between June 1, 2019, and September 30, 2021.
• Analysis included 127,876 veterans (98.5%) with honorable/general discharge and 1997 veterans (1.5%) with OTH discharge, with a mean age of 53.7 years.
• Researchers utilized an interrupted time series design to compare program enrollments and healthcare utilization before (June 2019-December 2020) and after (January 2021-September 2021) policy implementation.
• Data linkage between the Homeless Operations and Management Evaluation System database and VA Corporate Data Warehouse enabled tracking of emergency department visits, hospitalizations, and primary care visits.
   

TAKEAWAY:

• Monthly HUD-VASH enrollments showed a significant increase for OTH veterans after the policy change (difference in slopes, 1.90; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.28-2.52), while honorable/general veterans experienced a non-significant increase (difference in slopes, 9.23; 95% CI, −20.35-38.79).
• Emergency department visits demonstrated a significant increase for honorable/general veterans (change in slope, 0.24; 95% CI, 0.12-0.35) but not for OTH veterans (change in slope, 0.08; 
  95% CI, −0.12-0.28).
• Hospitalizations significantly increased for both OTH veterans (change in slope, 0.098; 95% CI, 0.009-0.170) and honorable/general veterans (change in slope, 0.078; 95% CI, 0.004-0.060).
• Primary care visits showed no significant changes for either group after the policy implementation (OTH: change in slope, −0.12; 95% CI, −0.65-0.42; honorable/general: change in slope, 0.20; 
  95% CI, −0.13-0.53).

IN PRACTICE:“Expanding HUD-VASH eligibility increased access to housing and social support for OTH veterans without disrupting services for those with honorable discharges,” the authors reported. “Efforts should focus on improving access to connecting OTH veterans with clinical services outside of HUD-VASH.”

SOURCE:The study was led by Thomas F. Nubong, MD, Center of Innovation for Long-Term Services and Supports, Providence Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Providence. It was published online on August 5 in JAMA Network Open.

LIMITATIONS: According to the authors, the study period overlapped with the COVID-19 pandemic, potentially affecting results. Additionally, staff training on the policy change varied across US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) sites, introducing implementation inconsistencies. The single-group interrupted time series design, while effective for tracking temporal trends, limited formal comparisons between discharge groups.

DISCLOSURES: The analyses were conducted under the VA Homeless Programs Office with operational funding support. Jack Tsai, PhD, and Eric Jutkowitz, PhD, reported being principal investigators of a VA Merit study on the Impact of COVID-19 for the HUD-VASH program. James L. Rudolph, MD, reported receiving grants from Icosavax outside the submitted work and being a United States government employee.

This article was created using several editorial tools, including AI, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication.

TOPLINE:Expanding United States Department of Housing and Urban Development-Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing (HUD-VASH) eligibility to veterans with other-than-honorable (OTH) discharge significantly increased their program enrollments without impacting services for those with honorable discharge. Emergency department visits increased for honorable discharge veterans while hospitalizations rose for both groups.

METHODOLOGY:

• A quality improvement study following SQUIRE 2.0 reporting guidelines analyzed data from 129,873 veterans enrolled in HUD-VASH between June 1, 2019, and September 30, 2021.
• Analysis included 127,876 veterans (98.5%) with honorable/general discharge and 1997 veterans (1.5%) with OTH discharge, with a mean age of 53.7 years.
• Researchers utilized an interrupted time series design to compare program enrollments and healthcare utilization before (June 2019-December 2020) and after (January 2021-September 2021) policy implementation.
• Data linkage between the Homeless Operations and Management Evaluation System database and VA Corporate Data Warehouse enabled tracking of emergency department visits, hospitalizations, and primary care visits.
   

TAKEAWAY:

• Monthly HUD-VASH enrollments showed a significant increase for OTH veterans after the policy change (difference in slopes, 1.90; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.28-2.52), while honorable/general veterans experienced a non-significant increase (difference in slopes, 9.23; 95% CI, −20.35-38.79).
• Emergency department visits demonstrated a significant increase for honorable/general veterans (change in slope, 0.24; 95% CI, 0.12-0.35) but not for OTH veterans (change in slope, 0.08; 
  95% CI, −0.12-0.28).
• Hospitalizations significantly increased for both OTH veterans (change in slope, 0.098; 95% CI, 0.009-0.170) and honorable/general veterans (change in slope, 0.078; 95% CI, 0.004-0.060).
• Primary care visits showed no significant changes for either group after the policy implementation (OTH: change in slope, −0.12; 95% CI, −0.65-0.42; honorable/general: change in slope, 0.20; 
  95% CI, −0.13-0.53).

IN PRACTICE:“Expanding HUD-VASH eligibility increased access to housing and social support for OTH veterans without disrupting services for those with honorable discharges,” the authors reported. “Efforts should focus on improving access to connecting OTH veterans with clinical services outside of HUD-VASH.”

SOURCE:The study was led by Thomas F. Nubong, MD, Center of Innovation for Long-Term Services and Supports, Providence Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Providence. It was published online on August 5 in JAMA Network Open.

LIMITATIONS: According to the authors, the study period overlapped with the COVID-19 pandemic, potentially affecting results. Additionally, staff training on the policy change varied across US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) sites, introducing implementation inconsistencies. The single-group interrupted time series design, while effective for tracking temporal trends, limited formal comparisons between discharge groups.

DISCLOSURES: The analyses were conducted under the VA Homeless Programs Office with operational funding support. Jack Tsai, PhD, and Eric Jutkowitz, PhD, reported being principal investigators of a VA Merit study on the Impact of COVID-19 for the HUD-VASH program. James L. Rudolph, MD, reported receiving grants from Icosavax outside the submitted work and being a United States government employee.

This article was created using several editorial tools, including AI, as part of the process. Human editors reviewed this content before publication.

The Critical Access for Veterans Care Act, S.1868, introduced in May by Senators Kevin Cramer (R-ND) and Tim Sheehy (R-MT), would fundamentally reshape how veterans living in rural communities access private health care. The legislation establishes a new paradigm impacting veterans enrolled in US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care who reside within 35 miles of any Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services-designated Critical Access Hospital (CAH) or affiliated clinic. The bill would allow veterans unprecedented autonomy to self-refer directly to these facilities.

However, despite its seemingly straightforward title, the bill will not expedite care delivery, reduce travel burdens, or enhance network critical care capacity for veterans living in rural areas. Instead, the bill would further privatize veteran health care delivery by permitting veterans within this geographic radius to independently pursue care at CAHs and clinics without prior authorization. The legislation would establish a parallel referral system that erodes the Veterans Community Care Program (VCCP) eligibility determinations that were meticulously developed under the VA MISSION Act of 2018.

Some lawmakers have repeatedly pushed to eliminate VA's authorization role in the past 6 years, seeking to grant unrestricted private sector access to various veteran populations, particularly those requiring mental health services. Sponsors of the current bill are explicitly pursuing this same objective, characterizing VA authorization as an “unnecessary roadblock” that should be removed. However, this characterization misrepresents the actual function and value of the authorization process.

Over the past 6 years, provisions in the VA MISSION Act and other laws for predetermining veteran eligibility for private care have provided veterans with broad access while maintaining oversight and accountability. Enrolled veterans may receive comprehensive emergency medical and psychiatric care at any health care facility, including CAHs. They are guaranteed unrestricted walk-in urgent care access anywhere in the country. Veterans can also obtain outpatient and inpatient services through VCCP clinicians when they meet the following established access criteria: VA facilities exceed 30-minute travel times for primary and mental health services or 60 minutes for specialty care, or when appointment wait times surpass 20 days for primary/mental health care or 28 days for specialty services. Nearly half of covered veterans used this option in FY2023. 

This bill does more than upend the established paradigm of VCCP eligibility requirements: it also eliminates the critical function of utilization review and accountability. Its passage would establish a dangerous precedent. By eliminating drive time and wait time eligibility standards and simultaneously removing VA’s ability to manage use, the bill generates powerful political momentum to extend identical provisions to all enrolled veterans. Furthermore, this legislation could specifically precipitate the downsizing or closure of VA community-based outpatient clinics (CBOCs) in areas served by CAHs. North Dakota, for example, operates 5 CBOCs that could be affected. Veterans who live in rural areas within the standard 30- to 60-minute drive time of a CBOC and can secure appointments within the established 20- to 28-day timeframes would no longer be subject to the same eligibility criteria that govern all covered veterans.

The Veterans Healthcare Policy Institute (VHPI) has serious reservations about legislation that eliminates VA's indispensable authorization and referral functions for supplemental private care. Founded in 2016, the VHPI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization dedicated to analyzing health care, disability compensation, and benefits for US veterans and their families. It provides fact-based research to educate the public and improve care quality both within and outside the VA.

New initiatives threaten to drastically reduce veterans' health and disability benefits through staff cuts and service reductions that will limit access to earned benefits and life-sustaining health care. Attacks against the VA also threaten to erode the training that produces new cohorts of health professionals, dramatically exacerbating the nation’s already dire shortages of physicians, nurses, psychologists and social workers. 

VHPI’s coverage of Veterans Health Administration downsizing within rural health care provides important context. Starting with a comprehensive 15-page white paper published in 2024, VHPI has consistently highlighted how veterans living in rural communities face the same health care access challenges as all rural Americans—living in regions with severe shortages of health care facilities, professionals, and support staff. Lawmakers who assume veterans living in rural areas will experience shorter wait times and drive distances through private sector care fundamentally misunderstand these systemic issues 

VHPI is committed to rigorously scrutinize policies that may compromise high quality care for veterans, especially those living in rural areas.  The organization recently examined the flawed assumptions underlying these misguided policies. On August 12, VHPI released an in-depth analysis of private sector  clinicians’ capacity to care for veterans in across all 50 states titled “Veterans’ Health Care Choice—Myth or Reality? A State- by- State Reality Check of the False Promise of VA Privatization.” This analysis revealed that, in most states, and in all rural states, the private sector system was struggling to meet even the basic needs of non-veterans. As one long time VA expert stated, to imagine that the system could absorb an influx of millions of veterans – particularly when new cuts to Medicaid and other healthcare funding are implemented, is “delusional.”

Russell Lemle and Suzanne Gordon are senior policy analysts at the Veterans Healthcare Policy Institute. Suzanne Gordon is author of Wounds of War.

The Critical Access for Veterans Care Act, S.1868, introduced in May by Senators Kevin Cramer (R-ND) and Tim Sheehy (R-MT), would fundamentally reshape how veterans living in rural communities access private health care. The legislation establishes a new paradigm impacting veterans enrolled in US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care who reside within 35 miles of any Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services-designated Critical Access Hospital (CAH) or affiliated clinic. The bill would allow veterans unprecedented autonomy to self-refer directly to these facilities.

However, despite its seemingly straightforward title, the bill will not expedite care delivery, reduce travel burdens, or enhance network critical care capacity for veterans living in rural areas. Instead, the bill would further privatize veteran health care delivery by permitting veterans within this geographic radius to independently pursue care at CAHs and clinics without prior authorization. The legislation would establish a parallel referral system that erodes the Veterans Community Care Program (VCCP) eligibility determinations that were meticulously developed under the VA MISSION Act of 2018.

Some lawmakers have repeatedly pushed to eliminate VA's authorization role in the past 6 years, seeking to grant unrestricted private sector access to various veteran populations, particularly those requiring mental health services. Sponsors of the current bill are explicitly pursuing this same objective, characterizing VA authorization as an “unnecessary roadblock” that should be removed. However, this characterization misrepresents the actual function and value of the authorization process.

Over the past 6 years, provisions in the VA MISSION Act and other laws for predetermining veteran eligibility for private care have provided veterans with broad access while maintaining oversight and accountability. Enrolled veterans may receive comprehensive emergency medical and psychiatric care at any health care facility, including CAHs. They are guaranteed unrestricted walk-in urgent care access anywhere in the country. Veterans can also obtain outpatient and inpatient services through VCCP clinicians when they meet the following established access criteria: VA facilities exceed 30-minute travel times for primary and mental health services or 60 minutes for specialty care, or when appointment wait times surpass 20 days for primary/mental health care or 28 days for specialty services. Nearly half of covered veterans used this option in FY2023. 

This bill does more than upend the established paradigm of VCCP eligibility requirements: it also eliminates the critical function of utilization review and accountability. Its passage would establish a dangerous precedent. By eliminating drive time and wait time eligibility standards and simultaneously removing VA’s ability to manage use, the bill generates powerful political momentum to extend identical provisions to all enrolled veterans. Furthermore, this legislation could specifically precipitate the downsizing or closure of VA community-based outpatient clinics (CBOCs) in areas served by CAHs. North Dakota, for example, operates 5 CBOCs that could be affected. Veterans who live in rural areas within the standard 30- to 60-minute drive time of a CBOC and can secure appointments within the established 20- to 28-day timeframes would no longer be subject to the same eligibility criteria that govern all covered veterans.

The Veterans Healthcare Policy Institute (VHPI) has serious reservations about legislation that eliminates VA's indispensable authorization and referral functions for supplemental private care. Founded in 2016, the VHPI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization dedicated to analyzing health care, disability compensation, and benefits for US veterans and their families. It provides fact-based research to educate the public and improve care quality both within and outside the VA.

New initiatives threaten to drastically reduce veterans' health and disability benefits through staff cuts and service reductions that will limit access to earned benefits and life-sustaining health care. Attacks against the VA also threaten to erode the training that produces new cohorts of health professionals, dramatically exacerbating the nation’s already dire shortages of physicians, nurses, psychologists and social workers. 

VHPI’s coverage of Veterans Health Administration downsizing within rural health care provides important context. Starting with a comprehensive 15-page white paper published in 2024, VHPI has consistently highlighted how veterans living in rural communities face the same health care access challenges as all rural Americans—living in regions with severe shortages of health care facilities, professionals, and support staff. Lawmakers who assume veterans living in rural areas will experience shorter wait times and drive distances through private sector care fundamentally misunderstand these systemic issues 

VHPI is committed to rigorously scrutinize policies that may compromise high quality care for veterans, especially those living in rural areas.  The organization recently examined the flawed assumptions underlying these misguided policies. On August 12, VHPI released an in-depth analysis of private sector  clinicians’ capacity to care for veterans in across all 50 states titled “Veterans’ Health Care Choice—Myth or Reality? A State- by- State Reality Check of the False Promise of VA Privatization.” This analysis revealed that, in most states, and in all rural states, the private sector system was struggling to meet even the basic needs of non-veterans. As one long time VA expert stated, to imagine that the system could absorb an influx of millions of veterans – particularly when new cuts to Medicaid and other healthcare funding are implemented, is “delusional.”

Russell Lemle and Suzanne Gordon are senior policy analysts at the Veterans Healthcare Policy Institute. Suzanne Gordon is author of Wounds of War.

The Critical Access for Veterans Care Act, S.1868, introduced in May by Senators Kevin Cramer (R-ND) and Tim Sheehy (R-MT), would fundamentally reshape how veterans living in rural communities access private health care. The legislation establishes a new paradigm impacting veterans enrolled in US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care who reside within 35 miles of any Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services-designated Critical Access Hospital (CAH) or affiliated clinic. The bill would allow veterans unprecedented autonomy to self-refer directly to these facilities.

However, despite its seemingly straightforward title, the bill will not expedite care delivery, reduce travel burdens, or enhance network critical care capacity for veterans living in rural areas. Instead, the bill would further privatize veteran health care delivery by permitting veterans within this geographic radius to independently pursue care at CAHs and clinics without prior authorization. The legislation would establish a parallel referral system that erodes the Veterans Community Care Program (VCCP) eligibility determinations that were meticulously developed under the VA MISSION Act of 2018.

Some lawmakers have repeatedly pushed to eliminate VA's authorization role in the past 6 years, seeking to grant unrestricted private sector access to various veteran populations, particularly those requiring mental health services. Sponsors of the current bill are explicitly pursuing this same objective, characterizing VA authorization as an “unnecessary roadblock” that should be removed. However, this characterization misrepresents the actual function and value of the authorization process.

Over the past 6 years, provisions in the VA MISSION Act and other laws for predetermining veteran eligibility for private care have provided veterans with broad access while maintaining oversight and accountability. Enrolled veterans may receive comprehensive emergency medical and psychiatric care at any health care facility, including CAHs. They are guaranteed unrestricted walk-in urgent care access anywhere in the country. Veterans can also obtain outpatient and inpatient services through VCCP clinicians when they meet the following established access criteria: VA facilities exceed 30-minute travel times for primary and mental health services or 60 minutes for specialty care, or when appointment wait times surpass 20 days for primary/mental health care or 28 days for specialty services. Nearly half of covered veterans used this option in FY2023. 

This bill does more than upend the established paradigm of VCCP eligibility requirements: it also eliminates the critical function of utilization review and accountability. Its passage would establish a dangerous precedent. By eliminating drive time and wait time eligibility standards and simultaneously removing VA’s ability to manage use, the bill generates powerful political momentum to extend identical provisions to all enrolled veterans. Furthermore, this legislation could specifically precipitate the downsizing or closure of VA community-based outpatient clinics (CBOCs) in areas served by CAHs. North Dakota, for example, operates 5 CBOCs that could be affected. Veterans who live in rural areas within the standard 30- to 60-minute drive time of a CBOC and can secure appointments within the established 20- to 28-day timeframes would no longer be subject to the same eligibility criteria that govern all covered veterans.

The Veterans Healthcare Policy Institute (VHPI) has serious reservations about legislation that eliminates VA's indispensable authorization and referral functions for supplemental private care. Founded in 2016, the VHPI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization dedicated to analyzing health care, disability compensation, and benefits for US veterans and their families. It provides fact-based research to educate the public and improve care quality both within and outside the VA.

New initiatives threaten to drastically reduce veterans' health and disability benefits through staff cuts and service reductions that will limit access to earned benefits and life-sustaining health care. Attacks against the VA also threaten to erode the training that produces new cohorts of health professionals, dramatically exacerbating the nation’s already dire shortages of physicians, nurses, psychologists and social workers. 

VHPI’s coverage of Veterans Health Administration downsizing within rural health care provides important context. Starting with a comprehensive 15-page white paper published in 2024, VHPI has consistently highlighted how veterans living in rural communities face the same health care access challenges as all rural Americans—living in regions with severe shortages of health care facilities, professionals, and support staff. Lawmakers who assume veterans living in rural areas will experience shorter wait times and drive distances through private sector care fundamentally misunderstand these systemic issues 

VHPI is committed to rigorously scrutinize policies that may compromise high quality care for veterans, especially those living in rural areas.  The organization recently examined the flawed assumptions underlying these misguided policies. On August 12, VHPI released an in-depth analysis of private sector  clinicians’ capacity to care for veterans in across all 50 states titled “Veterans’ Health Care Choice—Myth or Reality? A State- by- State Reality Check of the False Promise of VA Privatization.” This analysis revealed that, in most states, and in all rural states, the private sector system was struggling to meet even the basic needs of non-veterans. As one long time VA expert stated, to imagine that the system could absorb an influx of millions of veterans – particularly when new cuts to Medicaid and other healthcare funding are implemented, is “delusional.”

Russell Lemle and Suzanne Gordon are senior policy analysts at the Veterans Healthcare Policy Institute. Suzanne Gordon is author of Wounds of War.

The initial plan to reduce the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) workforce by 15%—roughly 83,000 employees—has been revised. The VA announced that it expected to reduce its workforce by 30,000 positions through normal attrition, early retirements, and resignations by the end of fiscal year 2025, “eliminating the need for a large-scale reduction-in-force.” Most of the positions will not be replaced due to the federal hiring freeze, which has been extended for 3 months.

“Since March, we’ve been conducting a holistic review of the department centered on reducing bureaucracy and improving services to Veterans,” VA Secretary Doug Collins said in a press release. “A department-wide RIF is off the table, but that doesn’t mean we’re done improving VA.”

About 17,000 VA employees have left their jobs as of June 1. From now and Sept. 30, the department expects another reduction of nearly 12,000. Pete Kasperowicz, a VA spokesperson, said there would not be any reductions beyond the 30,000 planned.

The VA says it has multiple safeguards in place to ensure the reductions do not impact veteran care or benefits. All VA mission-critical positions are exempt from the voluntary early retirement authority and deferred resignation program, and > 350,000 positions are exempt from the federal hiring freeze. 

The release noted several other improvements regarding VA performance in 2025, among them that the disability claims backlog has been reduced by 30% and a record 2 million disability claims have been processed by June. More than 60,000 VA employees have also returned to the office, according to the release.

“As a result of our efforts, VA is headed in the right direction – both in terms of staff levels and customer service,” Collins said. “Our review has resulted in a host of new ideas for better serving Veterans that we will continue to pursue.” 

The initial plan to reduce the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) workforce by 15%—roughly 83,000 employees—has been revised. The VA announced that it expected to reduce its workforce by 30,000 positions through normal attrition, early retirements, and resignations by the end of fiscal year 2025, “eliminating the need for a large-scale reduction-in-force.” Most of the positions will not be replaced due to the federal hiring freeze, which has been extended for 3 months.

“Since March, we’ve been conducting a holistic review of the department centered on reducing bureaucracy and improving services to Veterans,” VA Secretary Doug Collins said in a press release. “A department-wide RIF is off the table, but that doesn’t mean we’re done improving VA.”

About 17,000 VA employees have left their jobs as of June 1. From now and Sept. 30, the department expects another reduction of nearly 12,000. Pete Kasperowicz, a VA spokesperson, said there would not be any reductions beyond the 30,000 planned.

The VA says it has multiple safeguards in place to ensure the reductions do not impact veteran care or benefits. All VA mission-critical positions are exempt from the voluntary early retirement authority and deferred resignation program, and > 350,000 positions are exempt from the federal hiring freeze. 

The release noted several other improvements regarding VA performance in 2025, among them that the disability claims backlog has been reduced by 30% and a record 2 million disability claims have been processed by June. More than 60,000 VA employees have also returned to the office, according to the release.

“As a result of our efforts, VA is headed in the right direction – both in terms of staff levels and customer service,” Collins said. “Our review has resulted in a host of new ideas for better serving Veterans that we will continue to pursue.” 

The initial plan to reduce the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) workforce by 15%—roughly 83,000 employees—has been revised. The VA announced that it expected to reduce its workforce by 30,000 positions through normal attrition, early retirements, and resignations by the end of fiscal year 2025, “eliminating the need for a large-scale reduction-in-force.” Most of the positions will not be replaced due to the federal hiring freeze, which has been extended for 3 months.

“Since March, we’ve been conducting a holistic review of the department centered on reducing bureaucracy and improving services to Veterans,” VA Secretary Doug Collins said in a press release. “A department-wide RIF is off the table, but that doesn’t mean we’re done improving VA.”

About 17,000 VA employees have left their jobs as of June 1. From now and Sept. 30, the department expects another reduction of nearly 12,000. Pete Kasperowicz, a VA spokesperson, said there would not be any reductions beyond the 30,000 planned.

The VA says it has multiple safeguards in place to ensure the reductions do not impact veteran care or benefits. All VA mission-critical positions are exempt from the voluntary early retirement authority and deferred resignation program, and > 350,000 positions are exempt from the federal hiring freeze. 

The release noted several other improvements regarding VA performance in 2025, among them that the disability claims backlog has been reduced by 30% and a record 2 million disability claims have been processed by June. More than 60,000 VA employees have also returned to the office, according to the release.

“As a result of our efforts, VA is headed in the right direction – both in terms of staff levels and customer service,” Collins said. “Our review has resulted in a host of new ideas for better serving Veterans that we will continue to pursue.” 

The US House Appropriations Committee approved a $453 billion budget to fund the US Department of Veterans (VA), military construction, and other programs in 2026 by a 36-27 vote. The bill includes $34 billion proposed for community care programs, an increase of > 50% from 2025 community care funding levels.

The discretionary funding would also send $2.5 billion to the VA electronic health records modernization program. Mandatory spending includes $53 billion for the Toxic Exposures Fund, which supports benefits and health care costs associated with the PACT Act.

Although VA budget bills are typically bipartisan in nature, this bill passed by a much narrower margin than is typical. Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz (D-FL), ranking member of the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Subcommittee, said the bill “diverts far too many resources away from the vital, VA-based care that veterans consistently tell us they want, and it pushes them into pricier, subpar corporate hospitals.” 

Committee Democrats offered dozens of amendments. All amendments were rejected except for a modification that would block staff reductions at the Veterans Crisis Line and other VA suicide prevention programs.

The bill now moves to the full House of Representatives for consideration. House leaders have not yet announced when that vote will take place; the House is in recess the week of June 16, 2025. 

The committee also released the Fiscal Year 2026 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Bill, which would spend > $83 million, a 22% increase over the 2025.

The US House Appropriations Committee approved a $453 billion budget to fund the US Department of Veterans (VA), military construction, and other programs in 2026 by a 36-27 vote. The bill includes $34 billion proposed for community care programs, an increase of > 50% from 2025 community care funding levels.

The discretionary funding would also send $2.5 billion to the VA electronic health records modernization program. Mandatory spending includes $53 billion for the Toxic Exposures Fund, which supports benefits and health care costs associated with the PACT Act.

Although VA budget bills are typically bipartisan in nature, this bill passed by a much narrower margin than is typical. Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz (D-FL), ranking member of the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Subcommittee, said the bill “diverts far too many resources away from the vital, VA-based care that veterans consistently tell us they want, and it pushes them into pricier, subpar corporate hospitals.” 

Committee Democrats offered dozens of amendments. All amendments were rejected except for a modification that would block staff reductions at the Veterans Crisis Line and other VA suicide prevention programs.

The bill now moves to the full House of Representatives for consideration. House leaders have not yet announced when that vote will take place; the House is in recess the week of June 16, 2025. 

The committee also released the Fiscal Year 2026 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Bill, which would spend > $83 million, a 22% increase over the 2025.

The US House Appropriations Committee approved a $453 billion budget to fund the US Department of Veterans (VA), military construction, and other programs in 2026 by a 36-27 vote. The bill includes $34 billion proposed for community care programs, an increase of > 50% from 2025 community care funding levels.

The discretionary funding would also send $2.5 billion to the VA electronic health records modernization program. Mandatory spending includes $53 billion for the Toxic Exposures Fund, which supports benefits and health care costs associated with the PACT Act.

Although VA budget bills are typically bipartisan in nature, this bill passed by a much narrower margin than is typical. Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz (D-FL), ranking member of the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Subcommittee, said the bill “diverts far too many resources away from the vital, VA-based care that veterans consistently tell us they want, and it pushes them into pricier, subpar corporate hospitals.” 

Committee Democrats offered dozens of amendments. All amendments were rejected except for a modification that would block staff reductions at the Veterans Crisis Line and other VA suicide prevention programs.

The bill now moves to the full House of Representatives for consideration. House leaders have not yet announced when that vote will take place; the House is in recess the week of June 16, 2025. 

The committee also released the Fiscal Year 2026 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Bill, which would spend > $83 million, a 22% increase over the 2025.